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A B S T R A C T
Nokyo, Japan’s mammoth farm organisation is the subject of this 
thesis. The focal point of interest is Nokyo’s role as a pressure group 
and the relationship between this and other aspects of its diverse 
activities. The approach is primarily empirical: the thesis seeks to
elucidate Nokyo as an organisation functioning according to its own logic. 
This emerges as a compound of historical, legal, administrative, economic 
and political factors. At the same time, broader theoretical issues are 
taken up including comparative references to patterns of Japanese inter­
est group behaviour. Special attention is given to the extent of Nokyo's 
conservative bias and connections between Nokyo and political parties.
Chapter 1 considers Nokyo's organisational structure and functions, 
while Chapter 2 explores Nokyo's policy-related activities in more detail. 
Chapter 3 examines historical aspects of Nokyo's official representation 
in the Diet; types of agricultural cooperative electoral participation 
are surveyed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 takes up the issue of rice as the 
traditional focus of pressure from the agricultural cooperatives, with 
other commodities such as fruit and livestock products discussed in 
Chapter 6 in the context of the agricultural trade liberalisation debate.
Throughout, Nokyo is seen as a group heavily committed to its own 
economic priorities, but exercising massive political clout as a result 
of the interaction between certain organisational attributes and external 
environmental factors. In policy terms, Nokyo's primary interest is in 
agricultural support prices. Related to this are the twin issues of rice 
as regulated by the Food Control system - Nokyo's chief source of official 
patronage - and protection of domestic farm producers from foreign
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competition. Japanese agriculture is seen as a highly managed and con­
trolled industry with a substantial political content - both cause and 
effect of Nokyo's involvement in the policy-making process.
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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS
An extensive list of Japanese terms relating to Nokyo is set out 
below.
beika undo - rice price campaign
buraku - village hamlet
chikusan giin - livestock Diet member
Chikusan Shinko Jigyodan - Livestock Industry Promotion 
Corporation
Chikusan Shinko Shingikai - Livestock Industry Promotion Council
Chukin, or Norin Chukin; Norin Chuo Kinko - Central (Cooperative) 
Bank for Agriculture and Forestry
chuo honbu - central (policy) headquarters of Zenchu
chuokai - central union
Churaku, or Chuo Rakund Kaigi - Central Dairy Council
eino danchi - regionally integrated farm management units, or 
cooperative farm complexes
gaikaku dantai - extra-departmental group
giin renmei - Diet members’ league
hogin -  juridical person, legal person
Hokkaido Homin Domei -  Hokkaido Farmers' League
Ie no Hikavi Kyokai -  ’Light in the Home’Association (Nokyo’s 
publishing group)
jiban -  voting base
Kaishinto -  Reformist Party (1952-1954)
Kaguren, or Nihon Kag'u Nokyo Rengokai - Japan Fruit Juice 
Agricultural Cooperative Federation
Kaitakuren, or Zenkoku Kaitaku Nokyo Rengokai - National Settlers’ 
Nokyo Federation
kankei - political 'connections' (see Chapter 4) 
kanven gaisha -  (Nokyo's) related companies 
Keidanren -  Federation of Economic Organisations 
keivetsu -  big business enterprise network
keito Nokyo soshiki -  federated Nokyo organisation, or network 
of Nokyo federations
keizai dantai - economic group
Keizai Doyukai - Japan Committee for Economic Development 
keizaiven -  economic federation
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keizai vonri - economic principles
kenchu, or ken chuokai - prefectural central union (of 
agricultural cooperatives)
kenven, or ken rengokai - prefectural federation (of 
agricultural cooperatives)
koenkai - political supporters' association
koku - 150 kilos (of rice)
Kokumin Kyokai - the People's Association (LDP) 
kome giin - rice Diet members 
Komeito - Clean Government Party
Kono Seiji Renmei - Political League for Promoting Agriculture 
(in Ibaragi Prefecture)
kudamono giin - fruit Diet members
Kumiai Boeki - Unicoop Japan (Nokyo's trading company) 
kumiaicho - agricultural cooperative chairman 
kumiaiin - member of an agricultural cooperative 
kyodo kaisha - cooperative company 
kyodo kumiai shugi - cooperative unionism
kyosairen, or kyosai rengokai - mutual aid (Nokyo) federation 
mikan - Japanese mandarin orange
Nichienren, or Nihon Engei Nokyo Rengokai - Japan Horticultural 
Nokyo Federation
Nichino, or Nihon Nomin Rumiai - the Japan Farmers' Union
nogyo iinkai - agricultural committee (local-level organisation of 
the National Chamber of Agriculture)
nogyokai - agricultural association (wartime)
nogyo kaigi - agricultural council (prefectural organisation of 
the National Chamber of Agriculture)
Nogyo Kihonho - Agricultural Basic Law
Nogyo Mondai Kenkyukai - Agricultural Problems Research Association
noji kumiai hojin - farmers' group corporation
nokai - agricultural association
Nokyo Fujinbu - Nokyo Women's Division
Nokyo gappei - agricultural cooperative amalgamation
Nokyo giin - Nokyo Diet member
Nokyoho, or Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaiho - Agricultural Cooperative Union 
Law, or Nokyo Law
Nokyo Seinenbu - Nokyo Youth Division 
nomin kumiai - farmers' union
xiv
Nomin Kyodoto - Farmers' Cooperative Party (1949-1952)
nomin no seijivyoku kesshu - mobilization of the farmers' 
political power
nomin venmei - farmers' federation 
nomin soshiki - farmers' organisation 
nomin undo - farmers' campaigns
Norin Bukai - Agriculture and Forestry Division (LDP - PARC)
norin giin - agricultural and forestry Diet member
Noseibu - Agricultural Policy Department (of Zenchu and kenchu)
nosei giin - agricultural policy Diet member
nosei katsudo - agricultural policy activities
Nosei Kenkyukai -  Agricultural Policy Research Association
Noseikyu, or Nogyo Seisaku Kenkyukai - Agricultural Policy Research 
Association (not to be confused with the Nosei Kenkyukai, or 
APRA)
noseiren, or nomi?i seiji venmei - farmers' political league
Nosei Suishin Giindan - Agricultural Policy Promotion Diet
Members ' League, or Agricultural Policy Promotion League
nosei undo - agricultural policy campaigns
noson giin - rural Diet member
vakuno giin - dairy politician
Ronoto, or Rodosha Nominto - Worker Farmer Party (1948-1957) 
Ryokufukai - Green Breeze Society
sangyo kumiai - industrial (producer) cooperatives 
seiji dantai - political group
Seiji Shikin Kiseiho -  Political Funds Regulation Law
Seikaven, or Ehime-ken Seika Nokyo Rengokai -  Ehime Prefecture 
Vegetable and Fruit Nokyo Federation
senkyo katsudo - electoral activities
senmon nokyo - special- (or single-) purpose, or specialist 
agricultural cooperative
senmonven, or senmon rengokai - specialist agricultural cooperative 
federation
Shakai Kakushinto -  Social Reform Party (led by Hirano Rikizo)
shiohoson nokyo - city, town and village agricultural cooperatives
Shinbunren, or Zenkoku Shinbun Nokyo Rengokai -  National Newspaper 
Nokyo Federation
shinren - trust (Nokyo) federations 
Shufuren -  Housewives' Federation
sogo nokyo -  general- (or multi-) purpose, or generalist 
agricultural cooperative
XV
Sogo Nosei Chosakai - Comprehensive Agricultural Policy 
Investigation Committee (LDP - PARC)
Sohyo - General Council of Japanese Trade Unions
taikai - national (Nokyo) convention
taisaku honbu -  policy headquarters (of the Nokyo central unions)
tankyo, or tani nokyo - unit agricultural cooperative, or unit 
co-op
undo genri - principles of action
Zenchu, or Zenkoku Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Chuokai -  National Central 
Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (or, the National Central 
Union, or the Central Union)
Zenchikuren, or Zenkoku Chikusan Nokyo Rengokai -  National 
Livestock Nokyo Federation
Zenhanren, or Zenkoku Hanbai Nokyo Rengokai - National Marketing 
Nokyo Federation (dissolved in 1972)
Zenkoku Nogyo Kaigisho - National Chamber of Agriculture
zenkokuren, or zenkoku rengokai -  national federation (of 
agricultural cooperatives)
Zenkoren, or Zenkoku Kobai Nokyo Rengokai - National Purchasing 
Nokyo Federation (dissolved in 1972)
Zenkoren, or Zenkoku Kosei Nokyo Rengokai -  National Welfare Nokyo 
Federation
Zenkyoren, or Zenkoku Kyosai Nokyo Rengokai - National Mutual Aid 
Nokyo Federation
Zennichinö, or Zennihon Nomin Kumiai Rengokai -  All-Japan Federation 
of Farmers' Unions (JSP)
Zennö, or Zenkoku Nomin Domei - National Farmers' League (DSP)
Zenno, or Zenkoku Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Rengokai - the National 
Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives
Zennöfukyöy or Zenkoku Nokyo Fug in Soshiki Kyogikai - National 
Nokyo Women's Organisation Council
Zennokyo, or Zenkoku Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Kyogikai -  the National 
Nokyo Council
Zeymoren, or Zenkoku Nomin Renmei -  National Farmers' Federation
Zennoseiren, or Zenkoku Nomin Seiji Renmei -  National Farmers' 
Political League
Zennoseiren, or Zenkoku Noson Seinen Renmei -  National Rural Youth 
League (prefectural bodies were the rural youth leagues -
noseiren)
Zennosoren, or Zenkoku Nomin Sorenmei -  National Farmers' General 
Federation
Zenrakuren, or Zenkoku Rakuno Nokyo Rengokai -  National Dairy 
Nokyo Federation
Zenseikyo, or Zenkoku Nokyo Seinen Soshiki Kyogikai - National 
Nokyo Youth Organisation Council
Zenshiren, or Zenkoku Shido Nokyo Rengokaz_- National Guidance 
Nokyo Federation (forerunner of Zenchu)
Zenyoren, or Zenkoku Yoten Nokyo Rengokai - National Silk Nokyo 
Federation
xvii
The following abbreviations appear in the text:
APPL
APRA
CAP
CBP
CLA
DSP
EPA
FC
FCSA
FPL
JCP
JSP
JTU
LDP
LIPC, or LIP Corp. 
LIPC, or LIP Council 
MAF
MIT I
MOF
NBA
PARC
RPAC
Agricultural Policy Promotion Diet Members' 
League, or Agricultural Policy Promotion 
League
Agricultural Policy Research Association 
Comprehensive Agricultural Policy 
Comprehensive Budget Principle 
Central Livestock Association 
Democratic Socialist Party 
Economic Planning Agency 
Food Control
Food Control Special Account
Fruit Farming Promotion Diet Members'
League, or Fruit Promotion League
Japan Communist Party
Japan Socialist Party
Japan Teachers' Union
Liberal Democratic Party
Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation
Livestock Industry Promotion Council
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
(in July 1978, it became MAFF - Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries)
Ministry of International Trade and Industry
Ministry of Finance
National Beef Association
Policy Affairs Research Council (LDP)
Rice Price Advisory Council
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PREFACE
At the time this thesis was being written lively and increasing 
interest was evident among Australian government officials, agricultural 
economists and leaders of farm groups in how agricultural organisation 
in Japan influences the formation of farm policy and trade in food and 
livestock producers between Japan and Australia. This interest stemmed 
from a growing appreciation of the importance of the 'political factor' 
shaping government decisions on access to the Japanese market. Despite 
awareness of the role of politics in Japanese agriculture policy-making, 
however, there was little detailed information on the composition of the 
farm lobby and its machinery for exercising power. One of the main 
objectives of this thesis therefore, has been to identify the linkages 
between the major farm pressure group in Japan, Nokyo, and the Japanese 
government.
Nokyo is an acronym for nogyo kyodo kwniai, which translates 
literally into English as 'agricultural cooperative union', or 'agricultur­
al cooperative'. It has been variously translated in other English 
language materials as 'agricultural cooperative association' (the 
dictionary translation for 'kumiai' is either 'union' or 'association') 
or 'agricultural cooperative society'. The terminology preferred in this 
study is the fuller and more literal one of 'agricultural cooperative 
union' (particularly where it occurs in titles of publications translated 
from the Japanese), or its shortened equivalent, 'agricultural 
cooperative'. Used in this sense,'nogyo kyodo kumiai', or 'nokyo' is a 
generic term which refers to a class of organisation, the 'agricultural
xix
cooperative'. On the other hand, 'Nokyo' with a capital 'N' is the 
name or label given to one specific grouping, the Agricultural 
Cooperative organisation. In this form, Nokyo is a comprehensive term 
standing for a collection of interrelated groups, all of which are 
agricultural cooperatives (nokyo) in the generic sense, but also 
components of Nokyo as a whole. Various translations of Nokyo have 
been used in English: the Agricultural Cooperative Association, the
National Association of Agricultural Cooperatives, the Agricultural 
Cooperative Society, or the Union of Agricultural Cooperatives.
With these distinctions in mind, nokyo is used in the thesis in 
its Japanese form to denote an agricultural cooperative unit within 
Nokyo, the overall organisation. The title 'Nokyo' in contrast, is 
employed as an English word, except where it appears in titles of Japanese 
publications and Japanese phrases. The term Nokyo has acquired 
common usage in Japan since the formation of the organisation in 1947.
Its meaning is well understood. 'Socialist' on the other hand needs 
some clarification in the Japanese context. As a descriptive term, 
'Socialist' is applied in this thesis only to the Japan Socialist Party 
(including the Right Socialist Party and Left Socialist Party of the 
period 1951-1955). On the other hand, 'socialist' is used in a specific 
sense to embrace the Japan Socialist Party and the Democratic Socialist 
Party where these are referred to jointly.
My interest in Nokyo began in mid-1973 after six months initial 
study of pressure group participation in the Rice Price Advisory Council. 
At the time I was Mombusho Scholar and Foreign Research Fellow at the 
Institute of Social Sciences, University of Tokyo. I met Dr Michael 
Donnelly also at the Institute who had just completed a lengthy period 
of research on Japan's politics of rice. He suggested that in order to
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avoid duplication of his work, I should attack the problem of interest 
representation in the farm sector from the point of view of Nokyo, which 
would provide a rewarding and varied alternative area of investigation.
A preliminary survey of the field revealed that agricultural organisation 
had not yet been covered by Western political scientists in any of the 
major pressure group studies on Japan. Clearly, the continuing nexus 
between politics and agriculture was little understood outside Japan.
There followed an intense period of research extending over the 
next 18 months in which I concentrated my investigations on Nokyo's 
activities at the central government level and its relationship with 
political parties, particularly the Liberal Democratic Party. I also 
conducted field work at the local levels in Iwate, Saitama and Kanagawa 
Prefectures.
This period of research in Japan ended in November 1974. In early 
1975 I took up a Ph.D. Scholarship at the Australian National University. 
After two years in Australia I was able to return to Japan for two months 
to conduct a questionnaire survey of Nokyo's Diet supporters in the 
Agricultural Policy Research Association (Nosei Kerikyukai). The visit 
was timed to coincide with the December 1976 House of Representatives' 
elections, in which I closely followed the campaigns and electoral 
fortunes of a number of key farm politicians.
In the seven years since I began working on Nokyo, I have benefited 
from the advice, support and personal kindness of friends and colleagues 
in Australia, New Zealand and Japan. In the first instance I am indebted 
to the Japanese Ministry of Education who provided the initial opportunity 
for me to study in Japan as a foreign scholar from New Zealand. My 
subsequent period of study and field work have been financed by the 
Australian National University.
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At the personal level I am conscious of the tremendous debt I owe 
to my Australian supervisor Arthur Stockwin, who combined penetrating 
academic analysis with patience (while I produced two sons) and consistent 
understanding. Many others have contributed to the completion of this 
work at different times and in different places. Professor Hayashi 
Shigeru my first supervisor at the Institute of Social Sciences,
University of Tokyo, first suggested that agricultural politics might 
provide a rewarding subject for investigation. Professor Takeshi Ishida 
took over from Professor Hayashi on his retirement as my supervising 
professor. I was very fortunate in having the opportunity of working with 
him on a joint chapter on Nokyo'*’ from which I gained my first insights into 
the character of the agricultural cooperative organisation. Professor 
Ishida's professional support has continued far beyond my period of 
attachment to the Institute of Social Sciences. Professor Iwao Kobori 
also of the University of Tokyo (Department of Geography) gave me the 
benefit of extensive local contacts in the Japanese countryside for 
work in village cooperatives. To my hosts in Maesawa, Iwate Prefecture, 
and to the farmers and many cooperative officials in surrounding districts, 
I express my gratitude for the chance to observe farmers and Nokyo at 
first hand. My Tokyo friends, Ilosoe-san of the Nosei Kenkyukai who spent 
long hours explaining the intricacies of Nokyo's political connections 
with Diet members, and Mitsuko Oguma who accompanied me on my preliminary 
ventures into the world of Nokyo also provided invaluable assistance.
For Peter Drysdale and Hironobu Kitaoji (eds.), Australia and 
Japan: Two Societies and Their Interaction, Canberra, ANU Press,
forthcoming.
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In Canberra I would especially like to mention Eric Saxon and 
Ivan Roberts of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of 
Primary Industry, who offered many insights into the economic 
determinants of Japanese farm policy and who willingly gave their time 
to read and comment on thesis drafts.
To all those individuals whom I interviewed in Japan amongst 
Diet politicians, party officials, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
bureaucrats, agricultural journalists, academic researchers, executive 
and staff members of Nokyo and other agricultural organisations, and 
to many Japanese farmers, I am indebted for revealing the rich detail 
of the subject matter of this thesis. It has continued to fascinate 
the writer throughout seven years of research and writing.
Finally, to the members of the Australia-Japan Economic Relations 
Research Project who dedicated long and tedious hours to proof-reading 
and typing, and to the Research Director of the Project, Dr Peter Drysdale, 
I express my thanks.
Aurelia George 
May, 1980
1I N T R O D U C T I O N
Japan's farmers are a well mobilised and vocal political force.
This is in no small part due to the activities of Nokyo, the agricultural 
cooperative organisation which dominates the political and economic life 
of the countryside.
By the standards of farm organisations in other democratic systems, 
Nokyo is an extraordinary grouping. A coincidence of historical, socio­
logical and economic factors has resulted in almost universal membership. 
Nokyo incorporates practically the entire agricultural population within 
its organisational system. In a nation of industries and cities, it is 
the largest single voluntary association. In spite of immense changes in 
the rural environment and farm society, the level of agricultural coopera­
tive membership has remained remarkably stable, and Nokyo's activities 
have continued to prosper and expand in scope. In range this is all- 
encompassing, extending from basic farm-related functions such as the 
marketing of agricultural produce and supply of farm inputs and credit, to 
every conceivable type of social, cultural, medical and consumer service. 
The dimensions of its economic operations rank Nokyo on a par with some 
of the best known Japanese business conglomerates. Although this fact 
has received increasing publicity during the 1970s when Nokyo achieved 
giant enterprise status, direct comparison with business groups is made 
difficult by Nokyo's cooperative and statutory origins. Nokyo is not a 
profit-making institution, nor is it structured like a large corporation 
with uni-directional command flows from the centre. Nokyo is a collection 
of predominantly independent units, each an agricultural cooperative in 
itself, with well defined geographic and functional areas of responsi­
bility .
2Nokyo can best be understood as incorporating a range of organis­
ational types. It is most fundamentally a farmers’ cooperative, but 
comparative references to other Japanese cooperative-type bodies such as 
those in the forestry, fishing and consumer sectors (or even to farm 
cooperatives operating in other Western capitalist democracies), provide 
an indication only of core Nokyo ideology and functions. In diversity 
of operations and scale of enterprise, Nokyo overshadows these other 
groups in sheer size and scope of activity. In this sense it is more 
like a keivetsu, an enterprise network of interlocking financial and 
economic interests which also monopolises one sector of the nation’s 
economy. At the same time, it seeks to represent the interests of this 
sector to government. As spokesman for the farmers, Nokyo is more like 
Keidanven, a peak organisation of agriculturalists (as opposed to 
industrialists). The thesis focusses on this role: Nokyo as a pressure
group, and the strategies it employs to influence policy-makers on 
matters relating to the farmers and the cooperatives.
A number of pressure group studies of Japanese organisations have 
been written by Western political scientists over the past two decades. 
Groups representing Japan’s doctors, teachers, big business interests, 
housewives, repatriates and landlords, in addition to labour unions and 
the peace and citizens' movements, have all been examined in greater or 
lesser detail. As yet, however, no major study in English has appeared 
on the politics of Japan’s mammoth farm organisation."*" References to 
Nokyo in those works in which they appear tend to be secondary rather
A masters' thesis was written on Nokyo by Gilbert C. George (no 
relation to the present writer) entitled 'Japan's Post-War Agricultural 
Cooperative Movement', Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, 1976. The empha­
sis of his work is on economic aspects of Nokyo's activities.
3than central to the subject matter. Perhaps one of the main reasons for 
this is the work already completed on Nokyo in the 1950s and early 
'sixties by a Japanese specialist in comparative politics, Ishida Takeshi. 
Ishida was one of the chief academic proponents of the tripartite power 
elite model. According to this notion, Japan's government and politics 
were dominated by a ruling alliance of Liberal Democratic Party poli­
ticians, the national bureaucracy and influential interest groups (chiefly 
big business organisations). The model dichotomised Japanese interest 
groups into economically and politically strong organisations as repre­
sented by big business, and economically and politically weak organis­
ations (in practice all the rest). Nokyo fitted into the model as one of
Ronald P. Dore included a detailed discussion on the organisation 
and activities of the Japanese agricultural cooperatives in his Land 
Reform in Japan, London, Oxford University Press, 1966, especially 
pp.277-279. Although his analysis was restricted to the period of the 
early 1950s, it is an indication of the value of his work and of the 
unchanging nature of core Nokyo activities, that many of his conclusions 
relating to the agricultural cooperatives still apply more than two 
decades later.
The writings of an American political scientist, Michael W. Donnelly 
on Japan's politics of rice have encompassed Nokyo's political and 
economic roles, both in general, and in relation to this key agricultural 
commodity. References to Nokyo can be found in three works: Donnelly's
Ph.D. dissertation, Scarcity and Abundance: A Political Study of Japan's
Rice Economy, Columbia University, 1978; 'Politics and Economic 
Constraints in Japan's Rice Price Policies', Monograph, n.d.; and 'Setting 
the Price of Rice: A Study in Political Decisionmaking', in T.J. Pempel
(ed.), Policymaking in Contemporary Japan, Ithaca and London, Cornell 
University Press, 1977.
A chapter contributed by Haruhiro Fukui on 'The Japanese Farmer and 
Politics', to Isaiah Frank (ed.), The Japanese Economy in International 
Perspective, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975,
also considers political factors operating in the formation of Japanese 
agricultural policy including the role of Nokyo.
More recent analysis on Nokyo itself has been done by Hideo Sato on 
'The Structure of Nokyo and Its Implications as a Non-Rice Lobby: Case
of Anti-Import Campaigns', Department of Political Science, Yale 
University, August, 1979. According to the author himself, however, this 
work is as yet in the preparatory stage.
4the less influential interest groups because of its 'economic and
financial weakness’.'*' In Ishida's argument, the strategies of voluntary
organisations were dictated by their ranking in the hierarchy of the
power elite. Big business exercise of power was essentially covert, but
at the same time, extremely effective. For other groups including Nokyo,
mass lobbying and noisy rhetoric was necessary in order to make their
claims heard and to demonstrate potential voting capacities. Furthermore,
'while relatively small and weak pressure groups were dependent on
bureaucrats for their access to government funds and various other favors,
the larger and more powerful employer groups manipulated and used almost
at will, and could if necessary negotiate directly with, the leadership
2of the ruling class'. Because it was economically weak, Nokyo's need 
for subsidies from government was greater; consequently its relationship 
with official policy-makers (particularly those in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry and the government party) was as a subordinate 
and dependent grouping in constant defence of its own interests and con­
tinually petitioning for increased subsidies. This need compromised its 
organisational independence and limited its strategic alternatives as 
an interest group. Continuing financial support from government was an
on-going incentive for compliance with government measures.
Although Ishida is not systematically taken to task in the thesis, 
exposition of Nokyo's organisational resources and its economic and 
political activity levels contains an implicit rejection of Ishida's 
viewpoint. His argument is challenged on two basic grounds: Nokyo's
Takeshi Ishida, Interest Groups in Japan3 Monograph, n.d., p.67.
2 Haruhiro Fukui, 'Studies in Policymaking: A Review of the Literature',
in T.J. Pempel, (ed.), op, cit. , 9.23.
5e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  an  i n d e p e n d e n t  e c o n o m ic  power  b a s e  s u b s e q u e n t  to  I s h i d a ' s  
t i m e  o f  w r i t i n g  b r i n g s  i n t o  q u e s t i o n  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  p r e m i s e  o f  No.kyo’s 
e c o n o m ic  an d  f i n a n c i a l  w e a k n e s s ,  i t s  r e l a t i v e  d e p e n d e n c e  on s u b s i d i e s  
f o r  e c o n o m ic  s u r v i v a l ,  an d  i t s  c o n s e q u e n t  c a t e g o r i s a t i o n  a s  one  o f  t h e  
’w e a k e r ’ i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s .  H i s t o r i c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t s  h a v e  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  
i n v a l i d a t e d  t h i s  t h e s i s .  Even more  s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  
o f  e c o n o m i c  pow er  r a n k i n g  a s  a means  o f  c l a s s i f y i n g  i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s  n e e d s  
r e - e x a m i n a t i o n .  I t  a s s u m e s  ec onom ic  power  t o  b e  t h e  s o l e  m e a s u r e  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  i n f l u e n c e .  I t  i s  p r e d i c a t e d  on t h e  n a r r o w  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  
g o v e r n m e n t  p o l i c y  a s  t h e  p r e d o m i n a n t  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  J a p a n e s e  b i g  b u s i n e s s  
i n t e r e s t s .  Where s e c t o r a l  i n t e r e s t s  c o n f l i c t ,  b i g  b u s i n e s s  i n t e r e s t s  
h o l d  sway .  Not  o n l y  d o e s  t h i s  n o t i o n  r e q u i r e  e m p i r i c a l  v a l i d a t i o n ,  p a r ­
t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h o s e  p o l i c y  s p h e r e s  w h e r e  i t  i s  n o t  i m m e d i a t e l y  an d  
o b v i o u s l y  r e l e v a n t  s u c h  a s  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  b u t  i t  d o e s  n o t  g i v e  s u f f i c i ­
e n t  e m p h a s i s  t o  p u r e l y  p o l i t i c a l  i n g r e d i e n t s  i n  a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  power 
b a s e .  I t  i s  a m a j o r  c o n t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  p r i m a r y  s o u r c e  o f  
N o k y o ’s i n f l u e n c e  i s  p o l i t i c a l  an d  n o t  e c o n o m i c ,  an d  t h a t  t h i s  f a c t o r  
h o l d s  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  i t s  e c o n o m ic  p o w e r .  T h i s  a r g u m e n t  r e s t s  on  s e v e r a l  
b a s i c  e l e m e n t s .  N o k y o ’s m e m b e r sh ip  a t t r i b u t e s  a r e  s u c h  t h a t  i t  i n c o r p o r ­
a t e s  t h e  e n t i r e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e l e c t o r a t e  w i t h i n  i t s  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
b o u n d a r i e s .  At t h e  same t i m e ,  c e r t a i n  e n t r e n c h e d  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  
J a p a n e s e  e l e c t o r a l  s y s t e m  a c c o r d  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  w e i g h t  t o  v o t e r s  i n  
r u r a l  a n d  s e m i - r u r a l  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .  T h e s e  f a c t o r s  com bine  w i t h  
p a r t i c u l a r  v o t i n g  p a t t e r n s  i n  t h e s e  a r e a s  t o  make t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s u p p o r t  
o f  J a p a n ' s  f a r m e r s  o f  c r i t i c a l  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  t h e  r u l i n g  L i b e r a l  D e m o c r a t i c  
P a r t y .  N o k y o ’s r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  p a r t y  an d  i t s  r u r a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h u s  a s s u m e s  v i t a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  
t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c o o p e r a t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  s t r e n g t h .  The 
m u c h - v a u n t e d  ’p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r ’ i n  J a p a n e s e  a g r i c u l t u r e  i n c o r p o r a t e s
6this combination of elements. Although recognised by Ishida, it did not 
alter his basic conclusions. The following thesis is an extended explan­
ation of the political determinants of Japanese agricuitural policy with 
special reference to the role of the agricultural cooperatives, the 
nature of their political connections to policy-makers, the character 
of Nokyo's electoral and policy involvement, and the various strategies 
by which it seeks to exercise influence.
The approach to the subject matter is primarily analytical and
explanatory. The application of excessively broad theoretical frameworks
in the form of 'organisation models' or 'organisation sets' is rejected
not on grounds of cultural particularism but for more fundamental reasons.
Western organisational theory - Mancur Olson's 'The Logic of Collective
Action: Public Groups and the Theory of Groups'"*" and an adaptation by
2W.M. Evan of R.K. Merton's intra-organisational model - have both been 
applied to Nokyo with the object of illuminating different aspects of its 
internal organisational connections and its input-output relationships 
with the external environment. Both these frameworks highlighted certain 
facets of Nokyo as a functioning organisation. This thesis aims above 
all, however, to treat Nokyo as a situation sui generis, to evaluate it 
according to its own logic. Furthermore, selection of an approach which 
is strongly empirical and descriptive rather than abstract and theoretical 
appears to be indicated by the extreme complexity of the structure and 
activities of the agricultural cooperatives and the inherent difficulties 
of sorting out the facts of the interrelationships linking the multitude 
of groupings which operate under the Nokyo umbrella. Nokyo is an amalgam
1
2
See Sato, op. cit. , pp.5-7 et passim.
See George, op. cit. , especially pp.34-58.
7of diverse organisational features: it functions at one and the same
time as a self-help cooperative, business enterprise, voluntary associ­
ation of farmers, political support group, electoral and campaign organ­
isation, administrative agency, technical advisory group and agricultural 
manager. In more concrete terms, it is a collection of over 10,000 
individual groupings which are independent in organisational set-up and 
internal decision-making structures, but interdependent in flow of goods 
and services.
A further analytical difficulty facing the researcher on Nokyo is 
the need to distinguish between agricultural cooperative activity which 
is formalised, legally-sanctioned and explicit, and that which is of 
more questionable legitimacy, sometimes covert, and certainly functionally 
derivative in the sense of being an extension of mainstream Nokyo 
functions. This problem is of particular relevance to the subject 
matter of the thesis: Nokyo*s political activities, which are more
oriented towards the latter category.
Part I of the thesis (Chapters 1 and 2) is concerned with Nokyo and 
its organisation. Chapter 1 seeks to elucidate the formal structure, 
functional characteristics and membership composition of the agricultural 
cooperatives. It surveys the scope of agricultural cooperative activity 
in its entirety with a view to establishing its fundamental organis­
ational identity. Chapter 2 examines Nokyo's central policy functions, 
its role as spokesman for the farmer and agricultural cooperatives, and 
the ways in which it conducts policy advisory activities. It also 
measures the quality of democracy within the organisation, particularly 
in relation to agricultural cooperative decision-making procedures and 
intra-organisational linkages. It points to the development of a number 
of internal cleavages within Nokyo which have raised the spectre of
inter-group competition and posed a challenge to the national leadership 
in terms of maintaining overall unity and a common definition of agri­
cultural 'interests’.
Part II (Chapters 3 and 4) deals with Nokyo and elections. Chapter 
3 is a historical analysis of Nokyo's official Diet representation 
between 1949 and 1977 focussing in particular on the extent of conserva­
tive party affiliation. It includes a discussion of the origins and 
experience of postwar Japanese farmers' parties and Nokyo-sponsored 
political groups. Chapter 4 examines types of agricultural cooperative 
vote mobilisation and electoral participation, and the range of political 
connections between Nokyo and Diet members. The criteria on which Nokyo 
bases its political support are derived from this study, as well as an 
indication of the areas where it operates most effectively as an 
electoral support organisation.
Chapters 5 and 6 form Part III of the thesis. The subject is Nokyo 
and policy issues. No assessment of Nokyo would be complete without a 
discussion of its involvement in the administrative operations of the 
Food Control system governing the rice trade in Japan. Of all agricultural 
items produced by the Japanese farmer, rice is the political commodity par 
excellence. It is also an integral part of Nokyo's economic and policy 
representation activities. The extent of agricultural cooperative depend­
ence on direct and indirect financial benefits gained from rice collection 
and handling has traditionally provided the strongest evidence for the 
Ishida thesis. Chapter 6 takes up the issue of agricultural trade liberal­
isation centring around livestock and fruit products. The structure of the 
agricultural cooperative anti-liberalisation lobby is analysed in detail, 
together with a historical overview of developments and policy shifts in 
the liberalisation dispute. One of the recurring themes in this discussion
9is the rising strength of specialist, non-rice farming interests in Japan, 
and the extent to which specialist Nokyo organisations have moved into 
the political arena in defence of their own cause. A final section con­
siders political factors in the resurgence of self-sufficiency policies 
in the agricultural sector.
NOKYO AND ITS ORGANISATION
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CHAPTER 1
NOKYO: THE PRESSURE GROUP
This chapter seeks to establish Nokyo’s organisational identity: 
to determine the legal basis for its activities as an interest group, 
and to categorise its multitudinous functions into a series of organis­
ational aspects - economic, cooperative, administrative, and political. 
These are interpreted in the light of Nokyo’s special relationship with 
government, particularly its functioning within the agricultural and 
forestry administrative system, and also its own economic and political 
power base. This raises the question of Nokyo’s organisational 
independence: the manner in which it combines the task of representing
farm interests with its duties as agent of government in policy admini­
stration. Organisational alternatives to Nokyo as farm spokesman are 
briefly canvassed, and structural comparisons made with other Japanese 
interest groups.
Although Nokyo in its democratic composition and complexity of 
business involvement is very much a postwar phenomenon, the contribution 
of history to its current organisational form cannot be dismissed. A 
survey of the origins and subsequent development of Japanese agricultural 
producer groups in the prewar and wartime period provides useful insights 
into the linkages between Nokyo and its organisational antecedents.
This serves as background to the discussion of Nokyo's present membership 
structure and functional divisions.
Perhaps the most striking contrast between Nokyo of the 1970s and 
Nokyo as it was re-created after the war, is its emergence as a giant
11
enterprise and its extension into economic categories outside its 
statutory guidelines. The outstanding growth areas in Nokyo's business 
activities have been in finance, insurance, and industry. This high­
lights yet another fundamental contradiction in agricultural cooperative 
organisation: the conflict between Nokyo's role as a cooperative body
operating for the benefit of farmers, and as a commercial, profit-making 
enterprise, working in its own interests.
The Popular Image of Nokyo
The consensus of opinion on Japan’s agricultural cooperatives is 
that collectively, they constitute one of the nation's most powerful 
organisations, and incorporate some of the most distinctive features of 
Japanese interest groups (rieki dantai). Nokyo has been selected by 
one theorist as the 'archetype' or 'model' for an explanation of 
Japanese interest group behaviour."^ The popular verdict of Nokyo is not 
fundamentally, very different. It shares the label of 'pressure group'
(atsuryoku dantai) with other prominent national organisations such as 
the Japan Medical Association (Nihon Ishikai), the General Council of 
Japanese Trade Unions (Sdhyd), and the Housewives' Federation (Shufuren). 
Other references to Nokyo such as the 'farmers' political group' (ndnrln 
no seiji dantai) or 'the farmers' Sohyo' are also in wide currency.
Takeshi Ishida, 'The Development of Interest Groups and the Pattern 
of Political Modernization in Japan', in Robert E. Ward, (ed.),
Political Development in Modem Japan, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1968, pp. 293-336, and his 'Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai no Soshiki 
Ronteki Kosatsu: Waga Kuni Atsuryoku Dantai no Tokushitsu Kyumei no tame
ni' (The Distinctive Character of the Internal Organisation of the 
Agricultural Cooperative Unions as a Pressure Group), Shdkai Kagaku 
KenkyTi, Vol. X, No.4, 1958, pp.1-66.
2 Aono Bunsaku, Nokyo: Soshiki to Hito to Senryaku (Nokyo:
Organisation, People and Strategies), Tokyo, Daiyamondosha, 1976, p.3.
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One factor contributes above all others to this public image of 
Nokyo: its highly publicised leadership of the annual farmers' cam­
paign to raise the producer rice price (heika undo). Popular estimates 
of Nokyo's influence as a pressure group are based largely on the size 
of the budgetary deficits which the Japanese government is prepared to
countenance in order to subsidise rice producers,^ and the inflated prices
2consumers have to pay for their rice. Subsidies and income supports have 
made Japanese farmers such efficient rice producers that one of the 
most consistent problems facing agricultural policy-makers has been the 
disposal of a rice surplus.
Nokyo's rice price campaign receives extensive coverage in
newspapers and has all the trappings of an elaborately 'staged'
3production for the benefit of public and politician alike, in addition
to its own rank and file. Its operations in mobilising 'legions' of the
nation's farmers to 'invade' and ’occupy’ government offices, to 'stand
guard' and 'launch skirmishes' outside Rice Price Advisory Council
hearings, and to 'surround' the Diet when farmers present petitions to
4Diet members, have been likened to those of the prewar Imperial Army.
This subject is examined in more detail in Chapter 5.
The domestic wholesale price for rice in Japan varies from three to 
five times the import parity price. See E.A. Saxon, I.M. Roberts, and 
R.A. Bain, 'Japanese Agricultural Policy', paper prepared for the 24th 
Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural Economics Society, 
Adelaide, February 12-14, 1980, p.21.
Tanaka Toyotoshi, Nihon no Nokyo (Japan's Nokyo), Tokyo, Nokyo 
Kyokai, 1971, p ,424 .
 ^ Koichi Nishimoto, 'Nokyo: Pressure from the Co-ops', The Japan
Interpreter, trans^ _ by V. Dixon Morris, Vol.7, 3-4, Sum-Aut 1972, p.321; 
and Ito_Toshio, 'Nokyo to Seiji Katsudo', (Nokyo and Political Activities), 
in Kondo Yasuo _(ed.), Nokyo Nijugonen (Twenty Five Years of Nokyo), Tokyo, 
Ochanomizu Shobo, 1973, p.146.
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The ’inside’ or official image of Nokyo is, however, vastly dif­
ferent from this outside or 'public’ view. Agricultural cooperative 
executives and employees go out of their way to disassociate themselves 
from the label ’pressure group’ and hasten to redress the image of their 
organisation as a political entity. The reluctance of the ’Nokyo man’ 
to accept the popular portrayal of his organisation as a pressure group 
stems not only from cultural antipathy to the concept of a group selfish­
ly exercising its political muscle, but also from the emphasis given in 
Nokyo’s covering legislation to economic activities.
Agricultural Cooperative Union Law
Nokyo was established by legislation brought into effect in 
December 1947. Article 10 of Agricultural Cooperative Union Law (Nogyo 
Kyödö Kunrlabhö, or Nökyöhö) itemises the ’business’ {.cbgyö) which agri­
cultural cooperatives or federations of agricultural cooperatives may 
undertake, all or in part:
(1) Supplying the necessary funds for members' business or 
livelihood (credit business - shinyö jigyd);
(2) Receiving members' savings or fixed deposits;
(3) Supplying the necessary goods for members' business or 
livelihood (purchasing business - kdbai jigyö);
(3)-2 Installation of the necessary joint-use facilities
for members' business or livelihood (excluding medical 
facilities);^
These joint-use facilities (kyödö r*iyo shisetsu) include rice mills, 
rice centres, country elevators, high speed sprayers, vegetable and 
fruit markets, breeding facilities, egg selecting facilities, joint 
pastures, milk collection facilities, cooler stations, cold storage 
facilities, unpacked feed collecting stations and agricultural machinery 
service stations.
(4) Facilities for increasing farm labour efficiency or 
for promoting cooperation in farming;
(5) Development improvement or management of agricultural 
lands, sale, lease or exchange of agricultural lands, 
and installation or management of agricultural irri­
gation facilities;
(6) Transportation, processing, storage, or marketing of 
goods produced by members;
(7) Facilities for rural industries;
(8) Facilities for mutual aid (insurance business - kydsai
cigyö) ;
(9) Facilities for medical use (hospitals, clinics, etc.);
(10) Facilities for improving rural life and culture, or 
education for achieving improvement in management and 
techniques of members’ farming (guidance and extension 
services - shidö C'igyo) ;
(11) Conclusion of collective agreements for improving the 
economic status of members;
(12) Any other business incidental to the foregoing items;
Paragraph 2 - Undertaking the business of agricultural
management on trust from members (agricultural production
business - eind danohi*) ;
1 These are examined in more detail in Chapter 6.
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Paragraph 3 - Sale or lease of agricultural lands or 
grasslands on trust from members;
Paragraph 5 - Sale of converted-use agricultural lands 
and the construction of residences or other facilities on 
these lands (real estate business);
Paragraph 7 - Supplying credit to local public organis­
ations, banks, or other banking institutions;
Paragraph 10 - Discounting of bills for the benefit of 
members and undertaking domestic exchange transactions 
(restricted to federations of agricultural cooperatives 
only)
The above items were not all contained in the original Nökyöhö 
passed in 1947. They represent the sum total of activities listed in 
the first law, plus a number of amendments made in subsequent years 
permitting the agricultural cooperatives to conduct additional 
business. In their entirety, they cover a wide range of financial, 
management, technical, business, social, educational and cultural 
activities relating to agriculture and the farmers’ lives. There is 
no explicit reference to political functions. The functions listed in 
Article 10 belong in a category which could be broadly described as
This listing covers the items of cooperative business set out in 
Article 10 of ’Nögyö Kyödö Kumiaihö’ (Agricultural Cooperative Union 
Law) , in Nörinshö Kanshü, NDgyZ) Roppö (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry Editorial Supervision, A Compendium of Agricultural Laws), 
Tokyo, Gakuyö Shobö, 1976, pp.113-114. Under other laws, Nokyo also 
conducts agricultural warehousing, post office and national health 
insurance business,and acquisition of prior rights and mortgages over 
agricultural movables. See Aono, op. cit. , p.8.
2 Article 10 has been amended six times since 1947: in 1950, 1951,
1954, 1962, 1970 and 1972. The principal changes incorporated in these 
amendments have been the addition of Paragraphs 2-12.
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’economic’. For this reason, Nokyo spokesmen who stress the ’economic’
character of their organisation are substantially and formally correct.
1At the same time, however, the inclusion of Item (1$) (see above), as a 
'miscellaneous' category, allows scope for an unspecified range of 
activities which can be made justifiable by the tenuous link of being 
'incidental' to those which precede it. Agricultural cooperatives and 
federations of agricultural cooperatives could justify 'political' 
activities under this heading.
A later Chapter of the Nokyöhö does, however, refer to a special 
type of non-economic agricultural cooperative: the central union
{chüökai). There is one in each prefecture: a prefectural central
union (ken chüökai, or kenchü); and one at the apex of the entire Nokyo 
organisation: the National Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives
(Zenkoku Nögyö Kyödö Kimiai Chüökai, or Zenchü^) .
Legislation establishing the central unions was not part of the 
1947 Nokyo Law. They were created by an important amendment to the law 
in June 1954, which aimed to correct organisational and financial 
defects in an existing system of national and prefectural guidance 
federations (shidören), and to strengthen the agricultural cooperative 
movement generally.
Article 73(9) of Nokyöhö lays down that 'A central union may make 
proposals to administrative authorities on matters concerning the
Ocooperatives'. This Article encapsulates the 'agricultural policy' or 
'agricultural administration activities' (nösei katsudo) of the central
This organisation is also referred to as 'The Central Union of 
Agricultural Cooperatives', without the insertion of 'National'.
2 _ _'Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaiho', op. cit. , p.126.
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unions. It is supplemented by an additional section of the Law which 
also indirectly subsumes activities which could be considered relevant 
to an interest group function. Item (6) of Article 73(9) states that 
each central union shall conduct 'any other matters required for 
attaining the object of a central union', which in Article 73(2) is 
defined as 'securing the sound development of the cooperatives'. The 
latter provision gives the central unions fairly wide scope for pro­
motional activities on behalf of agricultural cooperatives and their 
members.
In a sense, both the popular view of Nokyo and the official 
view of Nokyo are therefore correct. Patently, economic functions 
represent the substance of the business of agricultural cooperatives and 
federations of agricultural cooperatives, which are accurately labeled 
'economic groups' (keizai dantai). This is an equally good summary 
description of the total Nokyo organisation in formal-legal terms be­
cause of the overwhelming importance given to economic functions in the 
Nökyoho. Nevertheless, 'agricultural policy activities' do receive 
official sanction in the section of the law pertaining to the business 
of the central unions. Possibilities also exist for a fairly wide mar­
gin between the formal boundaries of agricultural cooperative activity 
and what Nokyo actually does in practice. It is customary for Japanese 
organisations to adopt a wide range of informal functions outside the
3specific objectives and original purposes for which they were founded.
 ^ Ibid.
Ibid.
3 This view is discussed in Ishida, 'The Development of Interest 
Groups and the Pattern of Political Modernization in Japan', op. ait., 
pp.331-332.
18
These activities are legitimised by their value in developing the 
total commitment, loyalty and in-group solidarity of the membership.
This leads to extremely broad spheres of activity encouraged by the 
sole rationale that they enhance the group itself and therefore advance 
its interests. Extra-organisational functions range over a wide 
variety of areas including political and electoral activities. In a 
curiously contradictory fashion, political functions undertaken in 
this light are tacitly legitimised by Japanese social and cultural 
norms, even though specific instances of pressure group activity are 
not. Many of the electoral activities of the cooperatives are sanctioned 
on these grounds: as part of a legitimate extension of cooperative 
functions. At the same time, blatant exercise of Nokyo's mass power 
during the annual rice price campaign is considered a self-interested 
demonstration of group power regardless of the public good.
A narrowly legalistic view of Nokyo’s functions is naturally 
promulgated by many of its internal management who devote much attention 
to interpreting and accounting to the Nokyöhö, and who are obliged to 
present an 'official’ view to the outside world. This does not make the 
name tag ’pressure group' any less appropriate. It merely reveals that 
an organisation, although not formally established as a pressure group, 
can nevertheless, behave like one. Moreover, the fact that different 
labels can be pinned on the same group is also an indication that one 
organisation can have multiple roles, some more legally sanctioned than
o thers.
19
Nokyo's Multiple Roles
The metaphor of the 'face' has been one very often applied by 
Japanese observers to Nokyo as a convenient analytical framework to 
assist them in categorising the agricultural cooperatives’ wide-ranging 
functions.^
There are variations in these analyses, but they all reach
essentially the same conclusion: that the multi-faceted aspects of
Nokyo's activities contain a number of fundamental contradictions.
One writer sees Nokyo above all as ’an organisation of farmers' (riomin 
2no soshiki) or, (with a slight variation in terminology), as ’an
. . .  3organised body of farmers' (nonrtn no soshikitai). Although this may 
appear too obvious and simplistic to deserve special comment, certain 
behavioural imperatives or principles of action (undo genni) flow from 
it which are intrinsic to Nokyo ideology. The first is the cooperative 
directive: Nokyo is an organisation ’of farmers and for farmers'.“*
It provides the means by which farmers can achieve improvement in their 
economic position and a rise in their status through mutual self-help.
This approach was originally developed by Ishikawa Hideo, in 
'Nokyo no Mitsu no Kao' (The Three Faces of Nokyo), in Usui Yoshimi (ed.), 
Kanvyd3 Seitö3 Atsuryoku Dantai (Bureaucracy, Political Parties,
Pressure Groups)., Gendai Kyöyö Zenshü, Vol.21, Tokyo, Chikuma Shobö, 1956, 
pp.247-255. It was found no less appropriate by a contemporary economic
analyst of the 1970s, Aono Bunsaku, op. cit. , pp.9-11. These works were 
supplemented by yet another comprehensive survey which sought to reveal 
'the unpainted face of Nokyo'. See Onodera Yoshiyuki, Janbo Nökyö no 
Sugao (The Unpainted Face of Jumbo Nokyo), Tokyo, Jütaku Shinpösha, 1970.
2 Aono, op. cit., p.10.
3 Ibid., p.ll. In Ishikawa's terminology it is a 'regional organis­
ation of farmers'. Op. cit., p.249.
4 Aono, op. cist., p.ll.
Ibid. , p .26.
20
This philosophy is embodied in the slogan: 'One man for 10,000 and
10,000 for one man.'  ^ Nokyo's first principle of action is thus the
2notion of serving the interests of cooperative union members first.
In theory, the economic benefits of cooperative action should flow 
back to the farmer whose interests are paramount and must not be sacri­
ficed to the dictates of any other principles.
And yet, as the argument goes, Nokyo performs this service for the 
farmers primarily through economic enterprise. This constitutes the 
second fundamental aspect of the agricultural cooperative organisation:
Nokyo as a body for economic enterprise {keizai jigydtai toshite no 
3
Nokyo). If one takes the principle of economic enterprise to its 
logical conclusion, however, there are possibilities for direct con­
flict with the first principle of cooperativism. If Nokyo bases its 
activities on economic principles (keizai ronri), cooperatives are 
required to conduct their activities as efficient and viable economic 
units. This means operating surpluses. Profit-making, however, is 
regarded as totally inimical to the concept of mutual self-help as written 
into Nokyo Law. Article 8 sets out the 'object of business' of an agricul­
tural cooperative as rendering 'maximum services to its cooperative members
and member cooperatives... and it shall not be allowed to do its business
4for profit-making purposes.' In agricultural cooperative ideology,
Ibid., p.5. See also the discussion in Arai Yoshio, 'Kyodo Kumiai 
Genten Rongi no Yukue' (Where the Debate Stands on the Fundamentals of 
Cooperative Unionism), Novin Keizai, June 28, 1973, pp.2-6. The slogan 
itself is one of the mottos of the F.W. Raiffeisen cooperatives, which 
together with the Rochdale cooperatives, provided the models for Nokyo's 
earliest predecessors, the producers' cooperatives (sangyö kumiai) 
established in Japan in 1900.
2 Aono, op. ct-t. , p.26.
3 Ibid. , p.ll.
4 'Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaiho', op. cvt., p.113.
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commercialism is thus regarded as being diametrically opposed to 
cooperative principles. And yet if the agricultural cooperatives 
consciously ignore the profit motive, they may hinder the development 
and success of their economic operations. In other words, Nokyo's 
first two organisational principles lead to inevitable conflict in 
management practice.
The third principle of action relates to Nokyo's interest group 
role: its political 'face'. This derives in the first instance from
its agricultural policy function incorporated in Article 73(9) of 
Nokyo Law. In one estimation, 'Nokyo becomes a pressure group through 
its agricultural policy activities’."^
Nokyo’s political role is qualified in several respects, however. 
It is not strictly speaking, a ’political group’ (seiji dantai) in the 
specific legal sense in which this term is used in the Japanese. This 
applies to groups registered as such under the Political Funds Regu­
lation Law (Seiji Shikin Kiseiho), which requires organisations of this 
type to submit reports on their officially recognised function 
(political funding) to the Electoral Management Commission of the Local 
Autonomy Ministry.
Secondly, the official doctrine of the Nokyo organisation as
asserted by successive leaders of Zenchü is that Nokyo espouses a
2position of ’political neutrality’ (seijiteki churitsu).
Ishikawa, op. cit. , p.249. This argument is supported by Aono who 
maintained that Nokyo’s function in relation to agricultural policy gave 
it a ’political group aspect’ (seijiteki dantai). Op. cit., p.10.
2 Aono, op. cit., p.10. The rejection of the label ’political’ by 
the Nokyo leadership also stems from its common equation with 'ideo­
logical’. Nokyo prides itself on being a 'non-ideological’ organisation 
with a strong economic slant, in contrast to the ’political’ and ’ideo­
logical’ basis of such groups as the farmers' unions and trade unions.
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An equivalent notion is the concept of ’equidistance' from all 
political parties.^
The most fundamental qualification of Nokyo the pressure group 
derives from the emphasis given to its cooperative and economic goals 
in Nokyo Law. Political functions are relegated to a subsidiary pos­
ition in the rank-ordering of agricultural cooperative objectives. This 
becomes relevant in the event of conflict amongst Nokyo's three 
principles of action, principally when the dictates of interest group 
strategy jeopardise Nokyo's economic operations. Possibilities for such con­
flict arise out of the existence of yet another 'face' identifiable in agri­
cultural cooperative activity: Nokyo as a subsidiary organ of govern-
2ment in agricultural and forestry administration.
Nokyo's policy-related function is a dual one: it acts as agent
for the farmers in the presentation of proposals to 'administrative 
authorities', and as agent for the administration in the implementation 
of agricultural policies. In this respect, it operates very much like 
a semi-administrative arm of government. Accompanying this function, 
the cooperatives have consistently benefited from a wide range of 
subsidies and financial assistance from government, both directly and 
indirectly.
This ancilliary role as administrative agent has been notably 
encouraged by the dominant element of planning in Japanese agriculture.
In order to achieve its stated objectives of income parity for the farm 
population and maximum possible self-sufficiency in food, the government
See the interview with Miyawaki Asao, Zenchu Chairman (1974) in 
the Sankei Shinbim, June 5, 1974.
2 This 'face' was originally identified by Ishikawa, op. cit. , 
pp.249-251.
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has created a complex system of agricultural incentives, State subsidies, 
and price supports for farm products.
A number of agricultural laws integrate Nokyo into the functioning 
of agricultural and forestry administration and provide sub­
stantial financial fringe benefits for doing so. These include the
_  -  . -  1 2Agricultural Basic Law of 1961 (Nogyo Kihonho), the Food Control Law,
3the Law Relating to Price Stabilisation for Livestock Products, the 
Feed Demand and Supply Stabilisation Law, and so on. Government- 
subsidised long-term low interest loans are provided to the farmers 
through the cooperatives, and funds are also made available to the 
cooperatives through the Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries Finance 
Corporation.
In many areas of agricultural administration, Nokyo is thus 
used as an institutionalised mechanism for dispensing subsidies and 
channelling financial assistance to the farmer. As such, the agricultural 
cooperatives have achieved the role of ’peripheral agencies’ of 
government economic policies'.^
The way in which Nokyo has been inextricably interwoven into the 
whole fabric of agricultural administration and policy execution in 
Japan has been described by Ishida in terms of the ’. . . ’governmental-
ization’ of interest groups, a particular type of institutionalization
This provides for direct assistance to the agricultural cooperatives 
for the development and improvement of cooperative marketing, purchasing, 
production and other facilities.
2 The provisions of this law relating to Nokyo are discussed in 
Chapter 5.
3 This law is examined in detail in Chapter 6.
4 Ishikawa, quoted in Takeshi Ishida, Interest Groups in Japan, 
Monograph, n.d., p.68.
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encountered in Japan. In this process the specific purposes of
interest groups become fused with governmental purposes . . . .  '^
For this reason, he challenges the whole notion that the agricultural
cooperative organisation is a genuine interest group. He points out
that organisations which are not completely independent of government
naturally make concessions to the government bureaucracy. On these
grounds it is difficult to decide whether they really belong in the
category of voluntary associations or semi-governmental organisations.
In Nokyo’s case, he sees a primary clash of objectives between the
interest group ’face’ of Nokyo and its other roles. 'The function of
interest representation on the part of agricultural cooperative
unions . . . cannot threaten that of the economic enterprises which
the farmers undertake through them . . . nor can they resort to any
methods which would contradict the intentions of the government and
2therefore might result in the reduction of government subsidies.’ 
According to this argument, the guiding principle of all Nokyo’s action 
is therefore, the need to maintain the flow of government funding into 
and through the organisation. This is the yardstick against which all 
agricultural cooperative strategies are measured. The natural conse­
quence of government financial support is some loss of organisational 
independence, which Ishida maintains, Nokyo abrogated very early on in 
its postwar history when financial and general economic difficulties of
many local cooperatives in the early 'fifties forced them to consider
3the question of reorganisation. In order to rehabilitate themselves
 ^ See 'The Development of Interest Groups and the Pattern of 
Political Modernization in Japan', op. cit., p.297.
2
3
Interest Groups in Japan, op.cit., p.68. 
Ibid. , p.67.
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financially, the cooperatives made a direct request for governmental 
assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) which 
responded with a ’Reconstruction and Consolidation' (Sanken Seibi) 
program. This represented the first major intra-organisational crisis 
which Nokyo had to face. It was resolved in a series of laws per­
taining to 'Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Cooperative Unions' 
Reconstruction and Consolidation' (Nöringyo Kyödö Kumiai Saiken Seibi) 
passed in 1951,^ 1953 and 1956 (with minor variations in title), which 
provided for direct government assistance in the form of financial
grants and technical advice to cooperatives designated as 'non- 
2flourishing'.
The second major set of structural alterations to the Nokyo 
system undertaken with governmental support was the program of amal­
gamation (gappei) of agricultural cooperatives. It began in 1961 with 
the passage of the Nokyo Amalgamation Assistance Law (Nokyo Gappei 
Jöseihö), and was advanced in a series of amendments to the law in 1966, 
1970 and 1972. It has resulted in great reductions in the number of 
local agricultural cooperatives and is still in progress.
Thus, in addition to the indirect financial support Nokyo has 
received as an adjunct to the agricultural and forestry administration, 
it has been a direct beneficiary of government subsidies made specifi­
cally to the cooperatives. The quantity of assistance rose from 13.4
In the first year of operation of this law, the government provided 
subsidies to the cooperatives of 800 million yen, and one billion yen in 
the second. 2,480 cooperatives and 142 federations benefited from this 
assistance. See Shirö Morita, The Development of Agricultural 
Cooperative Associations in Japan, Tokyo, Japan FAO Association, 1960,
p. 86.
2 See Ronald P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan, London, Oxford University 
Press, 1966, p.294.
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billion yen in 1968 to 38.1 billion yen in 1974.^
The negative effects of this dependence on government subsidies 
on Nokyo's strategies as an interest group, however, are somewhat 
counterbalanced by the lack of any other organisational alternative 
for the Japanese farmers.
Organisational Alternatives to Nokyo
There are two other main sets of agricultural organisation in 
Japan which could claim a general representational role on behalf of 
the farmers: local agricultural committees (riögyö iinkai) and pre-
fectural agricultural councils (ken nögyö kaigi) attached to the 
National Chamber of Agriculture (Zenkoku Nögyö Kaigisho); and the 
farmers ' unions (nonrin kumiai). Neither presents a serious challenge 
to Nokyo as farm spokesman.
Early rivalry for the leadership of the farm sector between Nokyo
and the agricultural committee system was resolved in Nokyo's favour 
2by 1957. Unlike the cooperatives, the National Chamber of Agriculture 
and its lower level organs have no independent financial and mass member­
ship base. They were created as semi-public organisations by the Agri­
cultural Committees Law (Nögyö Iinkaihö) of 1951, (which was amended in 
1954 and 1957 involving some measure of structural change). They are
Norinshö, Norin Keizai Kyoku, Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaika (ed.), S3go Nökyö 
Tökeihyö (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Agriculture and Forestry 
Economics Bureau , Agricultural Cooperative Union Section, A Statistical 
Table of General-Purpose Agricultural Cooperatives), 1971, p.163, and 1974, 
p.178. Although it is not specifically stated, these amounts were probably 
allocated for the amalgamation program. The figures from the above source 
are much lower than those listed in a breakdown of MAF budget appropriations 
in E.A. Saxon, Reoent Developments in Food Consumption and Farm Production 
in Japan, Occasional Paper No.43, Pjureau of Agricultural Economics, Canberra, 
1978, p.76. Here, the allocations to 'agricultural co-ops and other' re­
corded a growth from 17.9 billion yen in 1960 to 152.6 billion yen in 1976.
2 The content of the jurisdictional dispute between Nokyo and the agri­
cultural committee system is discussed in Dore, op. cit., pp.425-431.
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dependent to a large extent on subsidies donated by central and pre- 
fectural governments for their functioning.
Membership of local agricultural committees, prefectural agri­
cultural councils and the National Chamber of Agriculture is shared 
between 'institutional' and 'individual' members, including 
representatives from the agricultural cooperatives,^ with only an
f 2indirect representation system and 'limited elections by farm members'.
As a result of its organisational setup, the agricultural committee 
system has emerged as an instrumentality in the propagation and 
dissemination of government agricultural policies. Prefectural 
agricultural councils officially function as auxiliary administrative
The membership structure of the agricultural committee system is 
as follows: 3,367 (as of 1969) local agricultural committees with an
average of 70 members each, except for Hokkaido with 216 members. These 
members are made up of between 10 and 40 elected farmer members (with 
an average of 15 per agricultural committee), and an average of six 
appointed members - (a) one director each from local agricultural 
cooperatives, and (b) agricultural mutual aid associations, and (c) five 
or less persons of learning and experience (gakushiki keikensha):
47 prefectural agricultural councils (one per prefecture) with one 
nominated member from each local agricultural committee, and an average 
of 16 members - (a) one representative each from the Prefectural Central 
Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, and the (b) Prefectural Federation 
of Agricultural Mutual Aid Associations, and (c) a few representatives 
of prefectural agricultural cooperative federations, (d) organisations 
carrying out agricultural improvement and development, and (e) persons 
of learning and experience; and one National Chamber of Agriculture 
with (a) an affiliated organisational membership of 47 prefectural 
agricultural councils (b) nine members from ZenohTi and national agri­
cultural cooperative federations,(c) 11 members from organisations 
carrying out agricultural improvement and development, and (d) 10 per­
sons of learning and experience. The executive structure of the 
National Chamber of Agriculture is made up of 14 directors from pre­
fectural agricultural councils, national agricultural cooperative organ­
isations and persons of learning and experience, plus two auditors.
These details were obtained from The National Chamber of Agriculture, 
Organization and Activities of the National and Prefectural Chambers of 
Agriculture and Local Agricultural Committees in Japan, Tokyo, 1969, 
pp.7-9.
2 Michael Donnelly, 'Setting the Price of Rice: A Study in Political
Decisionmaking', in T.J. Pempel (ed.), Policymaking in Contemporary 
Japan, New York, Cornell University Press, 1977, p.155.
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organs and advisory bodies to prefectural governors. Local agri­
cultural committees in turn are 'held responsible for administrative
2work as prescribed by the relevant Laws' including the Agricultural 
Land Law, the Agricultural Land Improvement Law, and the Law 
Concerning the Infrastructural Reorganisation for Agricultural 
Development in Designated Areas. The table of functions for the 
local agricultural committees as set out in their governing legis­
lation heavily emphasises their policy assistance, administrative and 
research functions, with only one Article referring to the task of 
making 'known to the public, as well as to administrative agencies, 
through recommendations and submission of reports at their inquiries,
the views and opinions of the farmers on themselves and agriculture
3in general'. Needless to say, the agricultural committee system is 
generally held to be a conservative semi-official organisation, with 
powers limited to those of suggestion and advice.
The ideologically-based farmers' unions are at the opposite end of 
the organisational and political spectrum from the agricultural 
committee system. The largest farmers' union organisation, the All- 
Japan Federation of Farmers' Unions (Zennihon Nömin Kuniai Rengökai, or 
Zennichinö) is attached to the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and a smaller 
group, the National Farmers' League (Zenkoku Nömin Dömei, or Zennö) is 
affiliated to the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). As organisational
See 'Organization and Activities of the National and Prefectural 
Chambers of Agriculture and Local Agricultural Committees in Japan, 
op. oit., p.9, where these functions are set out in detail.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. , p.11.
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offshoots of Parliamentary socialist parties, their membership is 
based on political and ideological motivation.
The revival of the farmers' union movement in 1946 pre-dated the 
reorganisation of the agricultural cooperative system but its early 
demise after the completion of land reform (its principal policy 
objective), considerably reduced its chances of taking the leadership 
position amongst agricultural spokesmen groups. Membership numbers 
declined dramatically after 1947, and in many agricultural prefectures, 
farmers' union organisations became moribund. Their allegiance to 
opposition socialist parties not only effectively excluded them from a 
position of influence over government agricultural policy, but placed 
them in a minority position amongst farm voters.
The Political Source of Nokyo's Power
The principal ingredient in the political power of the agri­
cultural cooperatives is the endemic conservatism of the Japanese 
countryside in combination with the over-representation of rural and 
semi-rural districts in the electoral system,which magnifies the 
political significance of the farm vote. The need to retain this vital 
sector of the electorate under its wing has forced the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), in power since 1955, and also the conservative 
government parties which preceded it, to be responsive to the economic 
needs of farm voters. This has elevated political factors into the 
position of prime determinants of agricultural policy. These factors 
have worked to enhance the political influence of Nokyo in the light of 
its incorporation of a crucial section of conservative government supporters 
within its membership. The actions and motivations of rural Diet 
members are very much influenced by their belief that 'If one should lose
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the sympathy and support of the agricultural cooperative unions, one
would be sure to lose the elections'."^
In addition to the 'residual' electoral significance of the farm
vote, there is substantial evidence that Nokyo itself plays an active
role as electioneering agent, actually mobilising votes for and against
political candidates. One of the reasons for this lies in the nature
of Japanese party organisation, particularly in the case of the LDP,
JSP and DSP. As Ishida pointed out, interest groups are in a position
to influence Japanese political parties because parties lack mass
organisations. This enables organised groups to supply parties with
financial support missing as a result of a lack of membership fees and
contributions from party members, (he identified big business as a
primary source of this support), or if an organisation has many
members (theoretically it need not be either/or), it can supply votes.
2'Such groups can also serve as a source of active campaign workers'.
Ishida constructed the latter category of group-supplied voting support
on the basis of Nokyo's organisational attributes, and the kind of
political resources it could mobilise in its relationship with the 
3government party.
Ishikawa, op. cit., p.252.
2 Ishida, 'The Development of Interest Groups and the Pattern of 
Political Modernization in Japan', op. cit., p. 300.
3
Ibid.
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These political and electoral ingredients form the basis of 
Nokyo's power as an interest group. Although Nokyo plays the role of 
petitioner in its relationship with the MAF, displaying many of the 
characteristics of a semi-administrative organisation, it is in a much 
stronger position in relation to the government party because of its 
stronger political and electoral standing. In other words, Nokyo's 
subordination to the bureaucracy is counterbalanced by the LDP's 
dependence on the farm vote and Nokyo's role in mobilising this vote.
The analytical distinction between 'the relationships between interest 
groups and political parties and between interest groups and the 
bureaucracy'has been recognised elsewhere.^ Moreover, the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of Nokyo's respective positions vis-'a-vis the 
government party and the bureaucracy correspond to the general power 
balance between the ruling party and the bureaucracy within the 
structure of central government. This has been summarised in the 
following terms: 'the relationship between . . . the government party,
and the bureaucracy is characterized by the dominance of the former 
over the latter and it is a glaring fact that the conservative party 
began exercising control over the bureaucracy since the formation of 
the Liberal Democratic Party in 1955. Thus . . . the political party 
is on the offensive vis-a-vis the bureaucracy, but defensive vis-a-vis 
the pressure groups; . . . the pressure groups are on the offensive 
vis-a-vis the political party but defensive vis-a-vis the bureaucracy;
vand . . . the bureaucracy is on the offensive vis-a-vis the pressure
v ,2groups but defensive vis-a-vis the political party.
1 Ibid., p.299.
2 Fukuji Taguchi, 'Pressure Groups in Japanese Politics', The Develop­
ing Economies , Vol.VI, No.4, December 1968, p.477.
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Nokyo’s economic vulnerability and level of financial dependence 
on government has also undergone drastic alteration in the last two 
decades. In the 1950s local cooperatives sought to consolidate their 
economic and financial foundations with government assistance, but 
this government backing also laid the basis for Nokyo's spectacular 
expansion in later years, thus contributing to the formation of an 
independent agricultural cooperative economic power base. Nokyo 
received assistance and support from successive administrations not 
only to save local cooperatives from financial ruin, but under the same 
government protection and patronage, it was officially encouraged to 
move into every conceivable kind of activity in the farm sector and to 
extend and develop its operations in a multitude of spheres. Although 
it abrogated a certain measure of its organisational autonomy and 
consequently restricted its range of political manoeuvres as a result, 
these limitations were increasingly counterbalanced by the tremendous 
expansion in scale of its financial and economic power. This in turn 
made a valuable contribution to its overall political influence.^-
This calls into question the standard distinction made by 
Ishida between types of Japanese interest groups: between
economically powerful suppliers of financial support to the government 
party, and economically weak suppliers of votes. This latter categor­
isation no longer fits Nokyo. Ishida himself pointed out that con­
ditions relating to the 'weakness of autonomy' which characterised 
Japanese interest groups varied 'depending on the strength of their 
financial bases'. See 'The Development of Interest Groups and the 
Pattern of Political Modernization in Japan', op. cit., p.299. Further­
more, as Nokyo has become more economically powerful, its role as a 
supplier of financial support to the ruling party cannot be dismissed. 
This is examined in more detail in Chapter 4.
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Nokyo in the Pattern of Japanese Interest Groups
Nokyo's possession of an entirely separate and primary economic 
rationale for its existence endows it with a source of influence which 
is not open to purely 'associationalT interest groups. One of Nokyo’s 
particular strengths is that it is not first and foremost an interest 
group. This role has the status of a functional derivative: a
natural extension of its primary objective to service the farm sector 
through cooperative economic enterprise. This fundamental character­
istic is a source of organisational and functional limitations, but it 
also endows Nokyo with its very special character and powers as a 
Japanese interest group. In this respect it differs from the majority 
of other prominent Japanese pressure groups like the Federation of 
Economic Organisations (Keidanven), the Japan Medical Association, the 
Housewives' Federation etc. which are principally professional or 
’associational’ interest groups. Their specific vadson d'etve is 
'association' for the purpose of promotion and protection of common 
interests. In practice, their functions may be fairly wide, but they 
are not ’economic groups’ (keizai dantai) in the sense of conducting 
economic enterprise.
In terms of its legal grounding and organisational type, Nokyo is 
more akin to other ’cooperative union' organisations operating in 
Japan. Prime examples of these are the livelihood (consumer) coopera­
tive organisations and the forestry and fishery cooperatives. The 
latter service primary industry sectors through cooperative economic 
services in much the same manner as Nokyo with secondary status given 
to a representational function.
Unlike associational interest groups, Nokyo also has a specific 
legal identity and is governed closely by the statutory provisions of 
the law which set it up. As a governmental creation, it is not the
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product of the voluntary initiative of a group of founding members. 
Most other Japanese pressure groups in contrast, drew up their own 
organisational constitutions, charters or articles of association and 
bylaws. In Nokyo's case, the content of these are specified by law. 
Each individual cooperative has its own articles of incorporation 
(tezkan) and bylaws (kzyaku), but their provisions are specified by 
Section Four of the Nökyöhö pertaining to the administration of the 
agricultural cooperatives.
The Fundamentals of Nokyo's Organisational Structure
Mokyo in its totality constitutes a massive and highly complex 
grouping with a multitude of organisational offshoots. The core 
structure of Nokyo is referred to as the 'federated Nokyo organis­
ation’ (keztd Nokyo soshzkz), and this corresponds to the three-stage 
pattern of national political-administrative divisions. It forms a 
pyramid-shaped structure, or 'systematic three-stage system', with a 
base line made up of city, town and village agricultural cooperatives 
(shzchdson nokyo), which are local 'unit cooperatives' (tanz nokyo, or 
tankyö).
The members of unit cooperatives are:"^
(a) farmers;
(b) farmers' group corporations (nöjz kwnzaz hdjzn) 
undertaking farm management, and other types of 
corporations (höjzn) undertaking farm management;
(c) persons living in areas serviced by the 
cooperatives but not necessarily involved in 
agricultural activities;
1 See 'Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaiho', op. czt. , pp.113-116.
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(d) other agricultural cooperatives;
(e) other organisations composed chiefly of farmers 
which aim to promote the common interests of the 
farmers through the cooperative system; or 
organisations which have farmers as their main 
members or capital stock contributors.
Above the unit cooperatives sit prefectural federations (ken 
rengokai, or kenren) and central unions (kenchu). The members of 
prefectural Nokyo organisations are lower level unit cooperatives.
Above the prefectural agricultural cooperative federations and central 
unions are the national federations (zenkokuren) with the 'first 
among equals', the National Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives 
(Zenchü) at the apex of the whole Nokyo organisation. This three- 
stage system of tankyö - kenren - zenkokuren constitutes the organis­
ational framework of the federated Nokyo organisation.
Within this horizontal structure, a vertical division separates 
generalist from specialist agricultural cooperatives. At the city, 
town and village level, there are two types of unit agricultural 
cooperatives: general-purpose or multi-purpose agricultural
cooperatives (sögö nokyo); and specialist or single-purpose agri­
cultural cooperatives (senmon nokyo) . The multi-purpose cooperative is 
exactly what its name indicates. It is a unit agricultural cooperative 
which simultaneously conducts the whole range of businesses and 
services permitted to the cooperatives. The nature of these functions was 
covered earlier in the listing of agricultural cooperative activities 
under the section 'scope of business' as set down in the Nokyoho,
Article 10.
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What this means in practice is that only multi-purpose agri­
cultural cooperatives undertake general financial functions such as 
trust business in addition to their other commodity-related 
activities and services, effectively keeping the purse strings 
within the sogö nokyd or mainstream side of the agricultural 
cooperative organisation. The single-purpose agricultural coopera­
tives on the other hand, conduct only specific commodity-or activity- 
related functions. Specialist livestock cooperatives for example, 
engage in marketing, purchasing, technical guidance and production 
activities, but only in relation to livestock farming. They do not 
handle the whole range of farm products as do the multi-purpose 
co-ops, which may be involved in all aspects of business in connection 
with rice, vegetable, fruit and milk production in one area.
Nokyo's Organisational Antecedents
Of all the functions and services within Nokyo's ’scope of 
business', the credit function - providing loans to farmers - 
represents historically, the most significant activity of all, and the 
primary rationale for the initial formation of agricultural cooperative 
organisations in Japan.
Nokyo is in many respects a creature of its heritage. Its most 
distinctive organisational and functional characteristics were derived 
from its historical predecessors: the 'industrial' or producer
cooperatives {sangyd kurniai) 1900-1943; and the agricultural associ­
ations (jw kai) 1899-1943.
The sangyd kwrtiai were established by the Industrial Cooperatives 
Law (Sangyd Kumiaihd) of 1900. This Act was 'directly concerned with 
economic activity, especially interest rates and loans, for smaller
37
cultivators’. The aim of the bill was to support the extension of
credit to the petty or smaller landowners, the large group of hard-
pressed owner-cultivators (jisakunö), who were ’the backbone village
2leadership class’. The latter class came to dominate the producer 
cooperatives.
The history of the development of the sangyö kumiai reads like an
echo from the past: functionally, structurally, and terminologically,
the similarities to the present-day agricultural cooperatives are
striking. Although the focus of the original producer cooperatives’
bill was on creating credit cooperatives for the smaller producers, it
also provided for the establishment of separate cooperatives for
3marketing, purchasing, processing and production (joint-use). These 
were organised along the familiar three-stage pattern of local city, 
town and village cooperatives, prefectural and national federations, 
and a Greater-Japan Central Union of Producer Cooperatives at the top.
From these beginnings, the number of sangyö kumiai multiplied 
rapidly, until by 1912, 10,455 cooperatives were operating, and 57 per 
cent of farm households were members.^ According to one writer, the
T.R.H. Havens, Farm and Nation in Modern Japan, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1974, p.78.
2 Ibid. , p.79.
3 In 1903, there were 870 cooperatives, and 549 of them were credit 
cooperatives. The Institute for the Development of Agriculture 
Cooperation in Asia, Agricultural Cooperative Movement in Japan, n.d., 
p.15.
4 The latter was established by an amendment to the law in 1909.
The task of the Central Union was guidance and inspection of coopera­
tives, education, information, and publication activities - in 
other words, the core functions of Zenchu today.
Agricultural Cooperative Movement in Japan, op. cit. , p.16.
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most important 'factor contributing to the rapid growth of the Sangyo 
Kumiai was the role of government in revising laws, assisting with 
subsidies, and allowing diversification into many activities’.^  These 
areas where the producer cooperatives actively participated were in the 
rice, silk, and fertiliser trades. The antecedents of the specialist 
cooperatives were the special-purpose cooperatives for cocoon and orange 
producers.
Much of the growth in producer cooperative activities occurred 
in the 1920s (when national federations and a Central Cooperative Bank 
were established), and in the 1930s, when government policy aimed at 
strengthening producer federations and the marketing and purchasing 
divisions of the cooperatives. A major structural difference between 
the postwar agricultural cooperatives and the prewar producer 
cooperatives, however, was the conduct of these non credit-related 
functions within separate branches of the local sangyo kumiai. In 
Nokyo, these activities constitute separate but internal facets of the 
multi-purpose agricultural cooperatives.
From an initially much more broadly based Nökyöhö, the modern
agricultural cooperatives also experienced progressive liberalisation
of their activities by means of subsequent amendments to their founding 
2legislation. These have taken Nokyo well beyond the functional 
boundaries of the prewar sangyo kumiai. One of the most important new
Gilbert C. George, Japan's Post-War Agricultural Cooperative 
Movement, M. Econ. Thesis, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, 1976, p.6.
These additional activities were by and large, contained in the 
insertion of Paragraphs 2-12 in Article 10 of Nökyöhö.
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spheres of agricultural cooperative activity has been the mutual aid 
function, not permitted to the prewar producer cooperatives, which 
proved to be a vital ingredient in Nokyo's later economic expansion. 
Direct subsidies have also been a feature of Nokyo's development, 
financial survival, and structural reorganisation.
Nokyo's technical guidance and extension services had their 
organisational origins in the prewar agricultural associations 
(ndkai). The impetus behind the latter's establishment came from a 
government anxious to hasten the technological advancement of 
agriculture in order to improve farm production. The 1899 Agricultural 
Associations Law (Ndkaihd) required every local and prefectural 
political unit to have an agricultural society . . .  to serve as 
agricultural extension associations for the state.' In 1910, the 
Imperial Agricultural Association (Teikoku Ndkai) was set up to com­
plete the local, prefectural and national level structure. The ndkai 
were semi-official organisations supported by public funds and were 
therefore subject to a high level of government control. The State 
dictated the conditions of membership: it was made compulsory for
landlords and optional for other farmers giving 'large landholders
2de facto domination of the Nokai', and appointed its leadership.
The establishment of the nokai not only facilitated a State-desired 
dissemination of a new farm technology, but they functioned in the
This is because of the mechanism whereby insurance sold by local 
cooperatives is reinsured in the upper federations, and reserved funds 
are custodied and invested by the upper organisations.
2 Havens, op. c%t. , p.74.
3 Ibid.
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broader sense as organs for instituting government agricultural 
policy. They also acted as 'sounding boards for the interests of 
landlords'.^ These twin aspects of Nokyo's activity: as a channel 
for representing farm interests and as a mechanism for assisting the 
implementation of State-sponsored farm policy, have their organis­
ational antecedents in the nökai.
During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the sangyö kumiai came 
under greater State direction. By 1936, all towns and villages had 
cooperatives, and all farmers were affiliated with them.
The government control features of the cooperatives and the nökai 
were made absolute in the establishment of a new type of agricultural 
association (nögyökai) in 1943, under conditions of wartime mobilis­
ation. They were the medium for State control of the farmer, and were 
given administrative duties in the collection of agricultural 
commodities (particularly rice), and in the distribution of production 
materials and farming techniques.
Structurally speaking, the nogyokai amalgamated under a single 
organisational umbrella the two prewar streams of farmers' groups in 
Japan. Their broad functional base was incorporated into the design 
of Nokyo in 1947. Like the sangyö kumiai, the modern agricultural 
cooperatives were strongly economically-oriented, but were also charged 
with purely technical advisory and policy representation and assistance 
functions like the nökai. In addition, they inherited the function of 
the nögyökai in the collection of rice on behalf of the government, 
minus the 'control' aspects of enforced crop deliveries.
1 Ibid.
41
Although they were the instruments of governmental direction of 
farmers, the nögyökai thus represented a definite stage in the develop­
ment of agricultural cooperative organisation in Japan. The formation 
of Nokyo in 1947 was in many respects a complete break with the past, 
but in others, it was an extension of an organisational continuum 
which also included the wartime agricultural associations.
The overall historical process of the birth and development of the 
agricultural cooperative movement in Japan was in reverse order to the 
traditional pattern of the formation of agricultural organisations in 
democratic societies, including farmers' cooperatives. Like the 
sangyö kumiai and the nökai which were creatures of the Meiji State, 
the modern Japanese agricultural cooperatives were government-sponsored 
organisations. In the Japanese case, the primary organisational 
initiative^ came from the State which passed the necessary laws govern­
ing their constitution, cooperatives were then established, and only
2then were cooperative members organised. Nokyo's legal heritage
The word 'primary' rather than 'sole' is used here, because proto­
types of cooperative organisations amongst farmers did exist prior to 
1900 and the passage of government legislation. Dore pointed out that 
even before the close of the Tokugawa period, a number of embryonic 
agricultural cooperatives operated. Op. ait., pp.277-278. It was after 
the Meiji Restoration in 1868 which abolished the feudal landlord system 
and incorporated the farm sector into the money economy, however, that 
various farmers' groups began to flourish, such as seed exchange 
societies, agricultural improvement groups, silk and tea marketing 
cooperatives in Gumma and Shizuoka Prefectures, fertilizer purchasing 
associations in Gumma, and a credit cooperative association in Shizuoka. 
These developments took place particularly in the 1880s and 1890s. The 
1900 Sangyö Kumiaihö aimed at regularising the operations of farmers' 
cooperatives and at encouraging their further development, especially in 
the area of credit. Moreover, the role of government in the formation 
and continuing development of the agricultural cooperatives in Japan is 
such a vital one, that it is rightly considered the prime instigator of 
the cooperative movement. For discussion of early cooperative organis­
ations in Japan, see also George, op. cit. , pp.3-4.
2 In Europe for example, farmers on their own voluntary initiative 
founded cooperatives, and only after that was there legislation recog­
nising them. The contrast between this and the Japanese situation was 
pointed out by Aono, op. cit., p.16.
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endowed the agricultural cooperatives with some of their most 
distinctive characteristics: the simultaneous operation of a number
of farm-related economic functions and businesses drawn up according 
to legislative design; and an internal cooperative organisational 
framework which paralleled national political-administrative divisions 
and reflected the informed rationality of policy-makers anxious to 
ensure the complementarity of State-wide organisational structure.
The latter also facilitated subsidisation, communication, and super­
vision by government, and the rapid spread of a network of organis­
ations servicing agriculture throughout the entire State.
In incorporating these characteristics into its postwar design,
Nokyo has features in common with the prewar style of interest group rather 
than Japan's modern interest associations. As Ishida noted in his 
discussion of the emergence of interest groups in Japan: '(a)lmost
all of the important interest groups were approved . . .  or estab­
lished . . . by law.'^ As a result, the 'conduct of their activities
was very often governed by the need to help spread and develop the
policies of the government, while the original function of interest
2articulation was more or less suppressed'. To this extent, the 
structural and functional characteristics of Nokyo, the modern-day 
farm interest group, are uniquely Japanese and part of its organis­
ational heritage.
Several crucial differences exist, however, between Nokyo and its 
organisational antecedents. These are, by and large, the product of 
exogenous forces: the democratising reforms imposed by the Occupational
authorities .________
'The Development of Interest Groups and the Pattern of Political 
Modernization in Japan', op. cit. . p.302.
2 Ibid.
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The membership of the ndkai and sangyd kumiai generally paralleled 
certain class divisions in prewar agricultural society, at least in the 
first three decades of their existence. The nökai for instance, catered 
almost exclusively to the interests of large landholders, and the sangyö 
kumiai to those of the smaller landholders: the owner-cultivators
(jisakunö) . ^
The land reform process, by and large completed prior to the found­
ing of Nokyo in December 1947, drastically reduced the number of tenant 
farmers and created a system of small-holding owner-cultivators, thus 
providing a break with the prewar agricultural class structure. It 
undermined the socio-economic basis of class divisions within farm 
society and of organisational dominance of farmers' groups by landowners. 
The newly established agricultural cooperatives imposed no conditions or 
qualifications on membership, thereby spanning the breadth of a much 
less stratified farm society.
Quite apart from the radical effects of land reform on agricultural 
organisation, a number of other revolutionary changes undertaken during 
the Occupation pertained to the cooperatives directly. Most of the 
reforms can also be subsumed under the title of 'democratisation':
According to Havens, '(t)he agricultural associations chartered 
under the Nokaiho of 1899 and the producers' cooperatives authorized a 
year later were the two main ways the state supported larger and small 
landholders respectively at the beginning of the twentieth century.' 
They represented a government policy with a 'bias towards private- 
property owners in a system of small-scale farming'. Op. cit., pp.88- 
89. This was, however, less true of the period after 1930, when the 
hand of State-sponsored agricultural organisation did extend downwards 
to include the poorer class of farmers. It was a fixed aim of govern­
ment policy in these years to provide favourable conditions for the 
growth of the producer cooperatives and an expansion of their member­
ship. See Dore, op. cit., p.99. This was part of a conscious policy 
'to bring all classes of the village community' into the cooperatives 
in order to '"make even tighter the social-collectivity aspect of the 
bonds between members"'. Ibid., p.293.
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democratic elections of agricultural cooperative leaders; minimisation 
of government control; and provision for voluntary membership.
Agricultural Cooperative Membership
Nokyo's membership constitutes its primary organisational resource. 
It is outstanding in two respects: its absolute numerical size which
exceeds seven million individuals, and the extremely high proportion of 
potential members which it incorporates. The latter can be 
illustrated by comparing the total farm household (riöka) membership of 
Nokyo against the total number of farm households in Japan over a set 
period. ^
Table 1.1 shows that by 1971, practically every farm household had 
2membership in Nokyo. This must be a singular achievement for any 
voluntary farm organisation in a democratic system. The issue is con­
fused somewhat, however, by the fact that farmers (according to the 
Nökyöhö), join the agricultural cooperatives as individuals. Here the 
membership rate in Nokyo if compared with agricultural workforce figures 
is not as high as the farm household membership rate.
In practice, however, the membership of one agriculturally-employed 
member of a farm household is sufficient to bring all the rest of the 
household into the cooperative fold. In other words, those not shown 
as individual cooperative members would in fact be part of a farm house-
This is made easy by the fact that ’farm household’ is one of the 
basic statistical units of MAF Agricultural Census surveys as well as 
being one of the units which Nokyo uses to survey its own membership.
2 One statistical survey reported as early as 1957 that agricultural 
cooperatives organised 99.5 per cent of farming families. See Norin 
Chüo Kinko Chösabu, Nögyö Kyödö Kumiai JTmen no Ayumi (Research Division 
of the Central Bank for Agriculture and Forestry, Ten Years of the 
Agricultural Cooperatives), Tokyo, 1957, p.35.
NO
KY
O'
S 
FA
RM
 H
OU
SE
HO
LD
 M
EM
BE
RS
HI
P 
FI
GU
RE
S 
AN
D 
ME
MB
ER
SH
IP
 R
AT
E
45
O
O *H
rH pq
14-1O
4J
cdx
4-1
X
4-1•Hs
0)
CX
cdt—(P0)
>O
4->
•H
03
03
P
Cd
a
<d
X
X
ojx
P
r— Iuc•H
4-1Oc
0)•H
03
CD
>
•H
4J
cd
u
CD
CX
O
O
O
4-1 .
03 03
•H (D
rH •H
cd XJ
•H (D
O •H
CL) O
CX O
03 03
P CD
•H 03
O
CX CX
•H P
X P
03 CX
d 1
CD •H
X 4-1
e rH
03
s
P
6
*
}-jpo
C/3
Th
is
 p
ec
ul
ia
r 
di
sc
re
pa
nc
y 
is
 d
ue
 t
o 
th
e 
fa
ct
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
de
fi
ni
ti
on
 o
f 
a 
fa
rm
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 i
n 
MA
F 
su
rv
ey
s 
an
d 
th
e 
de
fi
ni
ti
on
 o
f 
fa
rm
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 m
em
be
rs
 i
n 
ag
ri
cu
lt
ur
al
 c
oo
pe
ra
ti
ve
s 
di
ff
er
s.
 
Th
e 
la
tt
er
 i
s 
la
id
 d
ow
n 
in
 t
he
 b
yl
aw
s 
of
 e
ac
h 
ag
ri
cu
lt
ur
al
 c
oo
pe
ra
ti
ve
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 t
o 
Ag
ri
cu
lt
ur
al
 C
oo
pe
ra
ti
ve
 U
ni
on
 L
aw
.
46
hold membership unit, making membership for each individual within the 
family unnecessary. Furthermore, the strength of kinship ties within 
farm families is such that the household can be rightly considered a 
cohesive membership unit.^ Table 1.2 shows that by and large, one 
farmer member per household joined Nokyo, regardless of the size of the 
agricultural workforce, which declined by just under 50 per cent during 
the period surveyed. It also shows that the proportion of Nokyo’s 
individual farm membership climbed to 96.6 per cent of the total, while 
actually declining in absolute terms. In fact, both Nokyo’s farm house­
hold and individual farmer membership fell marginally between 1960 and
1975, but at a slower rate than the total number of farm households and
2a much slower rate than the agricultural workforce. In view of the 
decline in the agricultural workforce of approximately 50 per cent between 
1960 and 1975, Nokyo’s farming membership was remarkably stable.
The extraordinarily high membership rate within the agricultural 
cooperatives is due to a constellation of factors: historical, legal,
geographic, sociological and economic. Even amongst Japanese interest
groups which are generally renowned for high membership rates, Nokyo
. , 3represents an extreme case .
According to Dore, op. cit., p.278, in the agricultural cooperative 
system, ’the effective members are households'.
2 In 1960 there were 11.96 million persons engaged in agriculture 
living in 5.99 million farm households: an average of 1.99 members in
each household in the farm workforce. By 1975, there were 5.96 persons 
engaged in agriculture living in 4.95 farm households: an average of
1.2 members in each household in the farm workforce. This pattern con­
forms to the increasing trend amongst farm household members to seek 
off-farm work, with the remainder constituting the core Nokyo membership. 
Even amongst those not engaged in farming, there are considerable 
economic incentives for the use of Nokyo facilities, and the relevance 
of these for non-farmers is enhanced by the number of non agriculture- 
related financial, business and consumer functions that the agricultural 
cooperatives perform.
Ishida, ’The Development of Interest Groups and the Pattern of 
Political Modernization in Japan', op. cit., p.332.
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One of the more immediately obvious reasons for this was the 
imposition of compulsory membership on the nögyökai by the wartime 
administration.^- This set a strong precedent for 100 per cent member­
ship. Although Nokyo was reconstituted as a voluntary organisation, 
it inherited the membership structure of the agricultural associations. 
Many nögyökai leaders were prohibited from holding positions of 
authority in the agricultural cooperatives because of the purge of 
public officials instituted by the Occupation authorities, but this did 
not affect that transference of membership from one group to the other. 
Nokyo replaced the nögyökai in each village, occupying the same set of 
buildings and facilities. The significance of this was not simply a 
matter of taking down one set of signs and putting up another. In 
spite of 'democratisation', Nokyo broadly took on the membership, 
structural and functional characteristics of the nögyökai. Although 
legal enforcement of high membership rates had been abolished, socio­
logical factors which had provided a favourable environment for the 
growth of formal cooperative organisation remained.
This wartime government policy was less of a radical new ’control' 
measure than has sometimes been supposed. Under government encourage­
ment, the producer cooperatives had gradually been absorbing greater 
numbers of the poorer tenant farmers into an expanded range of activities 
Moreover, as Dore also noted, in prewar farm society, there were limits 
to the development of strictly class-based agricultural organisations: 
from the landowner-dominated, government-sanctioned nökai and sangyö 
kumiai on the one hand, to the tenant-led farmers' unions on the other. 
'In most villages . . . there was . . .  a slow gradation - from the
tenant-cultivator of a small amount of land . . .  to the large landlord 
who derived most of his income from rents.' Op. oit. , p.79. Secondly, 
the geographic concentration of rural society into individual hamlets 
created closely-knit farm communities. These often tied landowner and 
tenant together in a shared community of interest which transcended class 
based divisions. True, this social structure was hierarchical, with rich 
landlords at the top and lowly tenants at the bottom, but the overwhelm­
ing force within rural communities was hamlet solidarity.
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These sociological factors reinforcing the extremely high member­
ship rate in Nokyo are largely associated with the regional focus of the 
cooperatives, the geographic solidarity of the hamlet system in Japan on 
which the nökai, sangyö kunriai, nögyökai and nökyö were based, and the 
traditions of cooperative activity operating within the hamlet system. 
According to Ishida, 'The postwar agricultural cooperatives . . .  *
inherited the prewar tendency of relying not on their consciousness of 
special interest but on geographic solidarity . . . .  The hamlet 
remained the natural basic unit of rural life regulating the entire 
existence of the farmer. The organisational structure of the new agri­
cultural cooperatives was therefore little different from that of the 
prewar rural associations, despite the fact that Occupation legislation 
aimed at making them strictly voluntary.'^" The members of each coopera­
tive thus shared in a strong tradition of localism and sense of community, 
based on strong personal relationships built up through frequent face-to- 
face encounters and kinship ties within restricted geographic areas.
The agricultural cooperatives were the formal organisational expression
of a natural and spontaneous group solidarity 'shared by those living and
2working in the same place'.
Although the boundaries of city, town and village cooperatives 
expanded after 1960 in the amalgamation program, the aim of the agri­
cultural cooperatives was still to service particular localities. In
'The Development of Interest Groups and the Pattern of Political 
Modernization in Japan', op. cit., p.321.
o Ishida, Interest Groups in Japan , op. cit., p.70. Dore also wrote: 
'Japan is traditionally a co-operating rather than an individualistic 
society - the multiplicity of forms of co-operation found in the Tokugawa 
village are proof of this . . . .  Traditional forms of co-operation were 
built into small face-to-face groups.' Op. cit., p.292.
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essence, they remained regional groupings, bringing together farmers 
and residents living within distinct areas. Those who may join an agri­
cultural cooperative are those who have an address in the area which it 
services. This gives each ndkyo fundamentally 'the character of a 
regional cooperative union'.^
Considerable legal pressure for joining the agricultural coopera­
tives was provided by the provisions of the Food Control Law which 
required that farmers sell their rice to the government through
officially designatedri.ee collection agents. Almost all of these were
2agricultural cooperatives. An extremely high proportion of Japanese 
farmers were also rice producers.
This legal influence on Nokyo's membership rate was supplemented by 
incentives more purely economic. It would grossly inconvenience any 
farmer to conduct his work activities and household economy outside the 
agricultural cooperative system. Local cooperatives and their branches 
are not only ubiquitous in the Japanese countryside, but provide all 
the services an agricultural producer might logically require. Moreover, 
the generous interpretation of Agricultural Cooperative Union Law by 
successive agricultural administrators and the scope for the development 
of Nokyo-funded business outside the Nökyöhö, have meant that the
Onodera, op. cit. , p.71.
2 The impact of social norms within the hamlet system was also felt in 
the area of rice marketing which was very much influenced by village and 
hamlet solidarity. Even in the late 'sixties it was reported that a 
farmer was condemned by his fellow villagers for wanting to go outside the 
agricultural cooperative system to sell his rice. Takeshi Ishida and 
Aurelia D. George, 'Nokyo: The Farmers' Representative', in Peter
Drysdale and Hironobu Kitaoji (eds), Japan and Australia: Tu)o Societies
and Their Interaction, Canberra, ANU Press, forthcoming.
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agricultural cooperatives have been able to move into economic and 
social functions relevant to the farmer (and other local residents) 
practically ’from the cradle to the grave’.^  Furthermore, in terms of 
agricultural cooperative philosophy, Nokyo is an agent of protection 
which, given the farmers’ keen awareness of their own economic vulner­
ability, has considerable emotional as well as economic appeal.
With its membership spanning practically the entire farm sector,
2Nokyo constitutes the largest voluntary organisation in Japan. It can
boast over five million individual farmer members (who are the ’regular'
3
members of the cooperatives); and over 5,000 'regular' group members 
(farmers' group corporations and any other type of corporation under­
taking farm management). In addition, it has nearly two million 
individual ’associate' members (individuals who live within the area
under the charge of an agricultural cooperative and who are entitled to
4 5use its facilities), and almost 50,000 ’associate’ group members.
It is in the area of associate membership that Nokyo has made its
most spectacular increases in recent years. These have more than offset
the decline in its farming membership, while simultaneously serving to
expand its financial and business functions not directly related to
farming.
Trends in associate membership are reviewed in the following table:
Nishimoto, op. c i t . , p.322.
2 Its nearest rival, Sohyo, has approximately four million members.
3 Only farmers (as defined by a cooperative's bylaws) may be 'regular' 
individual members (se iku n r la iin) of a cooperative.
 ^ 'Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaiho', op. c i t ., p.116.
'Associate' group members are other cooperatives, or groups composed 
chiefly of farmers.
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Table 1.3
INCREASES IN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP
1965-1975
Year
Associate
Membership
Numbers
Annual Increase
1965 871,000
1969 1,257,126 + 386,126
1970 1,347,951 + 90,825
1971 1,452,797 + 104,846
1972 1,566,179 + 113,382
1973 1,674,330 + 108,151
1974 1,766,351 + 92,021
1975 1,848,554 + 82,203
Total
Increase 977,554
Source: Nokyo Nenkan, relevant years.
Table 1.3 shows that in the ten years between 1965 and 1975, Nokyo 
increased its associate membership by almost one million, although there 
has been an overall slowdown in the rate of increase in recent years.
This has compensated for the decline in its individual farming membership 
(amounting to only seven thousand - 5.83 million in 1965 as against 5.76 
million in 1975), by almost 140 times.
Nokyo's total individual membership in 1975 therefore stood at 7.6 
million (5.7 ’regular’ members and 1.8 ’associate' members). In 1965, the 
same total of 'regular' and ’associate’ individual members was 6.7 million. 
Far from declining, Nokyo’s membership is actually increasing.
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Nokyo's 7.6 million members in 1975 were organised into 11,489 
agricultural cooperatives (4,942 sögö nökyö and 6,547 senmon nökyö) 
Whether or not a farmer joins a multi-purpose cooperative or a 
specialist cooperative, or has dual membership in both is of course a 
matter of his own free choice. According to Nokyo membership figures, 
all farmers are in fact either individual members or part of a farm 
household membership of a sögö nökyö». Membership of a senmon nökyö 
becomes relevant only if a farmer's level of crop specialisation warrants 
it. Specialist farmers commonly join both types of nökyö to take 
advantage of the services of each.
The Nokyo Federations
Nokyo federations exist at sub-prefectural (primarily county or gun 
level), prefectural, combined prefectural, and national level, with pre- 
fectural and national federations predominating. The most striking 
differences between the base level unit nökyös and the upper level Nokyo 
federations, is the functionally specialised character of the latter and 
the fact that they are essentially bureaucratic entities with an organis­
ational rather than an individual membership. The membership of Nokyo 
federations is made up of agricultural cooperatives themselves: each
level of cooperatives forms the membership of the set of cooperatives 
above it, although tankyö can also be direct members of national 
federations .
A breakdown of the types and numbers of specialist agricultural 
cooperatives operating in 1975 was as follows: General service - 256,
silk - 1,646, livestock - 584, dairy - 683, poultry - 272, pasture manage­
ment - 919, horticultural - 583, rural industry - 254, settlers' 
(reclamation) - 830, agricultural broadcasting - 134, and others - 386. 
Nökyö Nenkan, 1977, p.100.
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Whereas multi-purpose tankyö may conduct a number of services and 
businesses simultaneously, their upper level federations are specialised 
according to the four main economic functions which the sögd nokyo per­
form. This difference does not pertain to the specialist federations, 
which are, like their unit cooperatives, organised along single commodity 
or 'activity* lines.
The trust (shinyö) function of the multi-purpose cooperatives is 
represented at prefectural level by the prefectural credit Nokyo feder­
ations (ken shinyö Nokyo vengokai, shinven or shinnören); the mutual aid 
(insurance) function by the prefectural mutual aid Nokyo federations (ken 
kyösai Nökyö vengokai, or kyösaiven); the marketing and purchasing 
functions by the prefectural Nokyo economic federations (ken keizai Nokyo 
vengokai, or keizaiven); and the welfare function by the prefectural 
welfare Nokyo federations (ken koset Nokyo vengokai, or koseiven). The 
membership of these four types of prefectural Nokyo federations is pre­
dominantly made up of multi-purpose primary cooperatives. By law, they 
are not permitted to conduct activities relating to more than one type of 
business. Above the specialist tankyö sit prefectural silk Nokyo feder­
ations, livestock federations, dairy federations, poultry federations, 
horticultural federations, rural industry federations, settlers' feder­
ations, agricultural broadcasting federations and so on.
All multi-purpose cooperatives and their prefectural federations, and 
specialist cooperatives and their prefectural federations within each 
prefecture, are united into a prefectural central union of agricultural
These two functions were amalgamated in 1972. Prior to that_they 
were performed by prefectural purchasing Nokyo federations (ken kobai 
Ndkyö vengokai, or kdbaiven) and prefectural marketing Nokyo federations 
(ken hanbai Nokyo vengokai, or hanbaiven) .
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cooperatives (kenchü). These serve as the central guidance, liaison, 
adjustment and representative bodies for all the agricultural coopera­
tives within a prefecture.
Prefectural Nokyo federations are in turn, organised into the 'big 
four' national Nokyo organisations: the National Federation of Agri­
cultural Cooperatives (Zenkoku Nögyö Kyödö Kumiai Rengökai, or Zennö), 
which is the national body for the prefectural Nokyo economic feder­
ations; the National Mutual Aid Nokyo Federation (Zenkoku Kyösai Nokyo 
Rengökai_, or Zenkyören); the National Welfare Nokyo Federation (Zenkoku 
Kosei Nökyo Rengökai, or Zenkören); and the Central (Cooperative)^" Bank 
for Agriculture and Forestry (Nörin Chuö Kinkö, Chükin, or Nörin Chükin),
which is the national banking institution for the agricultural coopera- 
2tives. The latter is a special juridical person (tokushu hojin) set up 
according to a separate law, the Nörin Chuö Kinköhö. This allows for 
some degree of supervision from the Minister of Agriculture. The execu­
tive staff of Chükin is dominated by retired MAF and Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) bureaucrats, and one of its important tasks is to act as a channel 
for public funds into agriculture via the cooperatives.
The national specialist Nokyo federations outnumber the mainstream 
general-purpose federations by a considerable margin. A National Live­
stock Nokyo Federation (Zenkoku Chikusan Nökyö Rengökai, or Zenchikuren) 
and a National Dairying Nokyo Federation (Zenkoku Rakunö Nökyö Rengökai, 
or Zenrakuren) are the top-level cooperatives for the livestock and
Although 'Cooperative' is not incorporated in its title, it is 
frequently referred to as the Central Cooperative Bank because of the 
composition of its membership.
2 It is also the national banking institution for fishery and 
forestry cooperatives.
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dairying industries. The Japanese silk cooperatives are led by the 
National Silk Nokyo Federation (Zenkoku Yöten Nökyo Rengökai, or 
Zenyören), the National Dried Cocoon Marketing Nokyo Federation (Zenkoku 
Kanken Hanbai Nökyo Rengökai), the Japan Raw Silk Thread Marketing Nokyo 
Federation (Nihon Kiito Hanbai Nökyo Rengökai), and the Japan Associated 
Silk Manufacture Nokyo Federation (Nihon Kumiai Seishi Nökyö Rengökai)', 
the poultry and egg industries by the Japan Poultry Nokyo Federation 
{Nihon Yökei Nökyö Rengökai, or Niyören), and the National Egg Marketing 
Nokyo Federation (Zenkoku Keiran Hanbai Nökyö Rengökai, or Zenkeiren); 
the fruit and vegetable industries by the Japan Horticultural Nokyo 
Federation (Nihon Engei Nökyö Rengökai, or Nichienren), the Japan Fruit 
Juice Nokyo Federation {(Nihon Kajü Nokyo Rengökai, or Kajuren), the 
Japan Carrot Marketing Nokyo Federation {Nihon Ninjin Hanbai Nökyö 
Rengökai), and the Japan Mushroom Nokyo Federation {Nihon Shiitake Nokyo 
Rengökai); the hop industry by the National Hop Nokyo Federation {Zenkoku 
Hoppu Nökyö Rengökai), and the reclamation and colonisation industries 
by the National Settlers’Nokyo Federation {Zenkoku Kaitaku Nökyö Rengökai, 
or Kaitakuren), and the National Colonisation Nokyo Federation {Zenkoku 
Takushoku Nökyö Rengökai). Nokyo’s cultural and welfare activities are 
represented nationally by the Japan Culture and Welfare Nokyo Federation 
{Zenkoku Bunka Kösei Nökyö Rengökai) and its information industry by the 
National Newspaper and Information Nokyo Federation {Zenkoku Shinbun 
Nökyö Rengökai, or Shinbunren). A clarification of this complex organis­
ational structure is contained in Figure 1.1.
Altogether Nokyo had 846 federations both prefectural and national, 
in 1975.^ " The national Nokyo glamour organisations are Zennö , Zenkyören
1 Nokyo Nenkan, 1977, op. oit. , p.102.
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and Chükin, with financial and business operations running into
astronomical figures. Their expansion in the 1960s and 1970s was
spectacular, earning Nokyo fame and fortune as a ’giant enterprise'
organisation which has been likened to a 'mammoth agricultural
zaibatsu' On economic grounds alone Nokyo is one of Japan's most
powerful organisations, the equivalent in size of Mitsubishi, Mitsui
or Sumitomo companies. Its marketing and purchasing arm, Zenrio, has
been critically appraised for operating like a general trading company 
2(sogo shosha). Its combined marketing and purchasing business turn-
3over totalled 5,200 billion yen in 1976. Nokyo s big business trading
side is, however, outshone by the value of its insurance contracts. In
41976, these exceeded 99,800 billion yen. Nokyo ranks second to Japan 
Life Insurance (Nihon Seimei) in terms of life insurance contracts in 
addition to being a top-class general insurance company.“*
Nishimoto, op. cit., p.321. Strictly speaking, Nokyo is less like 
a zaibatsu (defined by Ishida as 'monopolistic cliques based upon 
extended family relations' in 'The Development of Interest Groups and the 
Pattern of Political Modernization in Japan', op. cit., p.296) than a 
modern keiretsu (enterprise grouping) which consists of a major trading 
bank surrounded by a number of large industrial firms. Nokyo has none 
of the family interlinkages of the zaibatsu system.
Yoshihara Shizuo, Zennö o Kivu (I Attack Zenno) , Tokyo, Nisshin Hodo, 
1973, p . 24 .
 ^ Nokyo Nenkan, 1978, pp. 162, 164.
4 Ibid. , p.209.
The growth of Nokyo's insurance business was particularly important 
for the development of the agricultural cooperatives, because of the 
boost it gave to Nokyo's internally generated funds, which greatly assisted 
one of the acute shortages of the co-ops in the 1950s: their lack of
working capital. In 1976, the Nokyo insurance business channelled 16 per 
cent of its financial assets (516 billion yen) into deposits of the 
federated Nokyo organisation. Ibid., p.215.
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On the banking side, Nokyo's achievement has been equally spectacu­
lar. Its trust business section recorded deposits of 17,300 billion yen 
in 1976. This sum equals the combined deposits of two top-ranking city 
banks.
Among its other businesses Nokyo can number 118 hospitals and 32 
clinics, and on the publicity and information side, it publishes news­
papers and weekly magazines, and runs its own publishing house, the 
'Light in the Home Association' (le no Hikari Kyökai). In its cultural 
and educational activities it produces TV and radio programs and manages 
schools for the research and training of Nokyo staff members.
Through these business operations, Nokyo has built an enormously 
powerful independent economic base. This has had substantial spin-off in 
terms of its general organisational influence, and goes some way towards 
counterbalancing its financial dependence on central government. In spite 
of the considerable financial difficulties suffered by many local coopera­
tives in the 'fifties, agricultural cooperative amalgamation contri­
buted greatly to increased management efficiency of the tankyö and also 
the strengthening of their business operations. (It reduced the number of 
multi-purpose societies to one third of their 1960 figure by 1976.) By 
the early 'seventies, over 98 per cent of all multi-purpose cooperatives 
were recording profits, and for the 1975/76 year, the average amount of 
profit per multi-purpose agricultural cooperative was 19.6 million yen.
The profits of prefectural and national Nokyo federations were naturally 
even more spectacular. Zennd alone recorded a profit of over two million 
yen in 1976.
1 Ibid., p.193.
The strength of the agricultural cooperatives in Japan, however, 
lies not only in the efficiency of their management, but in the degree 
of utilisation or support they receive from their membership. This can 
be measured in terms of the utilisation rates for cooperative services. 
These have been steadily increasing. Table 1.4 sets out the utilisation 
rates (by commodity) of Nokyo marketing and purchasing services.
The most outstanding growth rates in Nokyo business, however, have 
been recorded in the trust and mutual aid area, especially the latter.
In the business figures for multi-purpose cooperatives, the value of 
insurance contracts is equivalent to all the other primary economic 
activities (i.e. marketing, purchasing, loans and savings) put together.
What the spectacular success of Nokyo's purely financial categories 
of business (i.e. its trust and insurance branches) reveal, is the 
adaptability of the agricultural cooperative organisation as a whole to 
the immense social and economic changes that have taken place in the farm 
sector and rural environment since I960., particularly as a result of 
urbanisation and the diversification of farm household occupations with 
the growth in part-time farming. This adaptability has been enhanced by 
certain in-built structural aspects of Nokyo, especially the organisation's 
capacity for absorbing non-farming 'associate' members, which has enabled 
it to maintain its economic viability in areas which are rapidly urbanis­
ing. It has been able to profit directly from the contraction in the farm 
sector by receiving massive injections of capital in the form of savings 
deposits from farmers who have sold their lands. In other ways, Nokyo's
60
1 In 1974 for example, these were as follows: long-term insurance -
23,452 billion yen; balance of savings - 10,411 billion yen; balance of 
loans - 5,162 billion yen; marketing business - 3,017 billion yen, and 
purchasing business - 2,053 billion yen.
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capacity to change with its environment has resulted from functional 
adaptation or expansion: amendments to the Nokyo Law have allowed
Nokyo to move into such activities as the land sales and real estate 
business.
Perhaps the greatest developments, however, have taken place in 
terms of the growth of Nokyo’s mammoth 'extended' organisation.
Nokyo's 'Extended' Organisation
A sizeable proportion of the surplus funds generated by Nokyo's 
burgeoning insurance and trust business has been channelled into a 
massive 'extended organisation' (gaien soshiki). This is not part of the 
mainstream federated Nokyo organisation.
The creation of this huge Nokyo extended organisation arose largely 
from the legal restrictions on the nature of cooperative business. The 
problem was essentially one of strategy: how to exceed these limits, and
the answer that Nokyo leaders came up with was to create or 'sponsor' new 
business organisations which were not officially part of Nokyo but were 
largely funded and controlled by the agricultural cooperatives. Hence the 
formation of a large number of cooperative companies (kyödö kaisha). They 
are also termed 'tunnel companies' or 'related companies' (kanven gaisha). 
Nishimoto attributes the phraseology 'Nokyo Inc.'^ to the 'promiscuous way 
that Nokyo capital has spawned private companies. The reason', he says, 
'that Nokyo has invested in so many firms is partly that the Nokyo Law 
prevents it from going directly into business for itself in several fields.' 
Nishimoto points to another need as well: 'the co-ops have grown so
accustomed to government subsidies and protection under the food control
1
2
Op. cit. , p .329 . 
Ibid. , p.330.
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law that they cannot deal effectively in the free market or with food
processing firms. It is thus impossible to escape from controlled grain
into meat, dairy products, fruit, vegetables and other free trade items.
Instead, Nokyo relies on private firms, which enter these areas with
financial backing from the organisation.'"^
Nokyo is also formally hampered by its own cooperative ideology
which endorses the principle of non profit-making. This notion is
antipathetic to successful company-type operations. In order to be able
to chase profits and put powers of decision over business policy in the
hands of full-time business executives, the creation of joint stock
companies (kabushiki kaisha) was necessary. This, Nokyo accomplished so
rapidly and so successfully, that it was likened to a joint-stock company
itself: 'To launch business in the form of cooperative companies makes
2Nokyo a type of special joint-stock company'.
Nishimoto attempted to calculate the proportion of Nokyo's funds
that ended up as finance for 'related companies'. Firstly he plotted
the route of the massive amount of savings and deposits through the
Nokyo system. One fifth, he maintained, goes to local co-ops for 'inter- 
3nal financing' with the remaining four fifths 'deposits in prefectural- 
level Nokyo banks'.^ Half of that amount 'goes either to related 
industries for loans and the purchase of securities or to local co-ops 
for operating expenses. The other half finds its way to the central Nokyo 
bank. That institution . . . also buys securities and lends to related
1 Ibid.
2 Aono, op. cit., p.46.
 ^ Op. cit., p.328.
4 Ibid.
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enterprises . . . .' He went on to make the point that 'loans to
related industries outside the co-op system remain attractive . . . .
Not only the central bank but even the prefectural associations are
2expanding their external lending operations'. Nishimoto also uncovered
evidence of a similar situation in relation to the funds derived from
Nokyo's insurance business, 80 per cent of which were placed 'outside
farm areas in such investment as real estate, stock and loans to agri-
3cultural industries'. Clearly a not inconsiderable proportion of
Nokyo's financial investment has gone into its 'extended organisation':
the area of 'agriculturally-related industries' and other 'associated
industries'; convenient catch-all categories, which can be, and are,
interpreted to include almost any kind of business venture.
The number and range of these extended business organisations
attached to the Nokyo system remain for the present largely uncharted
territory. It is known that they number at least 1,000 (Zenriö alone had 
4138 in 1974); that their investment forms are various; and that they 
have been established on the initiative of all three levels of the Nokyo 
organisation: the tankyof the prefectural federations and the national
federations. One of the difficulties involved in tracing the actual
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3
Ibid. In 1976 for example, 26.4 per cent of funds derived from the 
mutual aid business went into shares, and 51.0 per cent into loans.
Nokyö Nßnkan , 1978, op. oit. , p.215.
 ^ Yoshihara, op.oit., p.50.
In 1974 for instance, 2,538 sdgd nokyo had shares in 5,574 companies 
worth 5.2 billion yen. 123 of these cooperatives owned 50 per cent or 
more of the shares in 136 companies worth 1.3 billion yen. See Sögö 
Nökyö Tökeihyö, 1974 , op. oit., pp.22-23.
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numbers of companies connected to Nokyo, is that these cooperative 
companies have in turn spawned their own company offshoots or subsidi­
aries . ^
Perhaps the best known of all Nokyo’s related companies is Unicoop 
Japan (Kumtai Boeki). This company was set up in 1961 by Nokyo in con­
cert with the fishery and forestry cooperative union organisations. It 
was established as a joint-stock company with initial capital of 8.6 
million yen subscribed by each of four cooperative organisations: the
National Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (Zenchu), the 
National Purchasing Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives (Zenkören), 
the National Federation of Fishery Cooperatives, and the National
Federation of Forest Owners' Cooperatives, along with the 'collaboration
2of relevant corporations ' which each advanced the same figure as the 
cooperative organisations themselves.
Aono has constructed a useful typology of the operations and type
of connection (financial and management) of Nokyo cooperative companies,
- 3using the 130 or so attached to Zenno. He comes up with five different 
categories of company. These are set out below.
To demonstrate the complexity of connection and construction of the 
cooperative companies, Aono cites the example of a 'top maker' of agri­
cultural chemicals, Associated Chemical Industries (Kumtai Kagaku Kögyd) . 
This had a capital of 1.8 billion yen, and 4,974 employees. Zenno's 
investment share was 38 per cent, Shizuoka Prefecture Economic Nokyo 
Federation 4.4 per cent, and Chukin 2.7 per cent. As Aono points out, 
this company had 11 subsidiaries, but the names of these companies were 
not recorded in his listing. He asks whether when one is looking into 
Nokyo's extended organisation companies, one should only take into account 
Kumtai Kagaku Kogyo, or its subsidiaries as well. Op. cit., p.45. How 
many cooperative companies there are obviously differ according to one's 
criteria of selection.
2 Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, 'Cooperative Trade and 
Unicoop Japan', Japan Agricultural Coop News, Vol.13, No.2, July 1972,
p.21.
Op. cit., pp.43-44. A similar typology can be found in Appendix II, 
Yoshihara, Op. cit., pp.252-262.
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Type I; 16 companies in which Zennd has more than 50 per cent of total 
shares, or alternatively, a 'reasonable' or 'appropriate' level of 
shares, and in which Zennd occupies a leadership position in management. 
This group includes such well known names as Unicoop Japan, A-Coop Line 
and Coop Meat.
Type II: 11 companies in which Zenrid has more than a 30 per cent share,
or companies to which Zenrid has supplied finance, which conduct more than 
50 per cent of their business with Zennd, and which necessarily reflect 
the 'will' of Zennd in their overall management. This group includes 
Japan Pharmacy, Zennd Chicken City.
Type III: 61 companies in which Zenno and the prefectural federations 
(kenven) have shares and in which a leadership position in management lies 
with the prefectural federations. This group includes a whole range of 
prefectural-based cooperative feed companies, Coop Juice, and Takasaki 
Ham.
Type IV: 24 companies with which Zennd has personal connections, and in
which it furnishes either leadership, or benefits from a moderate amount 
of preference, and which reflect Zennd supervision to some degree. This 
group includes Sungrain, Central Foods, and Echo Line.
Type V : Related companies other than those listed above. This group
includes Mitsubishi Chemical Industries, and Kanagawa Railways.
Although the functions of the 130 companies related to Zennd are
1 2 diverse, they can be categorised into three main areas:
Those engaged in business in the livestock sector are examined more 
fully in Chapter 6.
See Aono, op.  cit., pp.45-46.2
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1. Companies which produce and process commodities which
the federations supply to the unit cooperatives (pur­
chasing business);
2. Companies which sell to consumers items produced by 
the farmers (part of the cooperative marketing chain);
3. Companies which provide facilities which cooperative 
members utilise or from which cooperative members make 
direct purchases (the consumer-related cooperative 
business).
The most significant feature of these Nokyo 'related companies' is 
that in spite of certain financial, managerial and personnel links with 
agricultural cooperative organisations, they are not farmers' groups.
They operate outside the formal boundaries of the Nokyo Law and the 
jurisdiction of the guidance and control bodies of Nokyo: the central
unions. They could not be considered part of Nokyo the pressure group, 
but they do have resources such as finance that can be made available 
for political purposes.^"
Conclusion
The burgeoning of agricultural cooperative enterprise in the form of 
cooperative companies demonstrates very clearly that the statutory basis 
of Nokyo's activities has not in practice proven an effective obstacle to 
its economic expansion and diversification. Where proposed business 
projects have existed outside the scope of the Nokyo Law, the agri­
cultural cooperatives have invested in 'non-cooperative' organisations 
which have undertaken these enterprises on their behalf.
1 This subject is explored more fully in Chapter 4.
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The dimensions of Nokyo’s current economic and financial operations 
challenges the traditional view of agricultural cooperative dependence 
on central government subsidies, and the constraints on its strategic 
alternatives as a pressure group resulting from its need to maintain the 
flow of financial assistance, both direct and indirect, into the organis­
ation. To some extent, this explanation of agricultural cooperative 
behaviour is history-bound, based on the situation which Nokyo faced in 
the 1950s when many local cooperatives suffered from a chronic shortage 
of working capital. These problems were overtaken and largely resolved 
in the 1960s and 1970s, in large part owing to the Japanese economic 
miracle in which the agricultural cooperatives shared, and to the official 
encouragement and paternalistic attitude shown towards Nokyo's rapid 
expansion during this period by a government anxious for political, 
electoral, social welfare, and food security reasons, to support the 
development and maintenance of a prosperous farm sector.
Nokyo's incorporation into the functioning of a highly planned and 
administered sector of the Japanese economy may have resulted in some 
loss of organisational independence, but at the same time, it forced 
administrators to be responsive to cooperative demands on all aspects of 
agricultural policy, particularly in those areas in which the cooperatives 
are deeply involved: the operations of agricultural price support sys­
tems, government-sponsored alterations in the structure of production, 
the dissemination of advanced farming techniques, improvement in coopera­
tive marketing, processing and distribution systems, and the encouragement 
of long-term agricultural investment.
In addition, Nokyo's outstanding membership attributes and the 
electoral significance of the farm vote to successive conservative govern­
ments, provided it with an independent power base outside government, and
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considerably magnified its political influence. The initial search 
in this chapter for a legal basis for Nokyo's political activities 
proved to some extent a dead end. Apart from the formal provisions in 
Nokyo Law relating to the functions of the central unions, Nokyo's 
interest group role has the character of a functional derivative: the
logical and inevitable extension of its economic, administrative, welfare, 
and guidance activities, and also its incorporation of practically the 
entire farm sector within its organisational boundaries.
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CHAPTER 2
NOKYO'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY ACTIVITIES
Nokyo has dominated the conduct of agricultural policy activities 
(nosei katsudo) in postwar Japan. In the early postwar period, however, 
the agricultural cooperatives shared much more of their spokesmanship 
role with other farm groups than is the case now. Similarly, in the last 
ten years, Nokyo's formal leadership organisation, Zenchu, has been faced 
with certain formal leadership challenges from within its own organisation, 
and the dominant issue of the previous two decades (rice), has given way 
to a number of more varied but recurrent themes in agricultural policy.
This chapter focusses on the conduct of agricultural policy activi­
ties by Nokyo. Under the title 'nosei katsudo’ are included all internal 
organisational procedures leading up to the formulation of demands relat­
ing to agricultural policy and their subsequent presentation to govern­
ment. The first section provides a brief historical overview of the 
groups and major themes involved in nosei katsudo prior to the establish­
ment of stable government and stable organisation in 1955.
Nosei Katsudo Prior to 1955
1946 to 1955 spanned the period 'from land reform to the reform of 
agriculture’ (no chi kaikaku kara nogyo kaikaku e ) It began with a 
situation of extreme food shortage after the war and ended with a record 
rice harvest in 1955. The lead in agricultural policy activities
Okamoto Matsuzo, ’Noinin Dantai no Genjo to Undo no Tokucho’ (The 
Current State of Affairs of Farmers' Groups and the Special Features of 
their Campaigns), Nogyo Kyodo Kwniai, Vol. 19, No.2, February 1973, p.42
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immediately after the war was taken by the farmers' unions. Initial 
organisational development and consolidation of the left wing farmers' 
union movement took place with the establishment of the Japan Farmers' 
Union (Nihon Ndmin Kumiai, or Nichino), in February 1946. Its speedy 
foundation was assisted by a veteran agrarian Socialist leadership 
poised to resume the struggle for land reform immediately the war was 
over .
The farmers' unions received great organisational impetus from 
land reform itself. NichinB' s membership numbers underwent rapid 
expansion with the influx of local farmers into its ranks. By April 
1946, more than 2,000 branches had been organised with over 280,000 
members.'*' Official endorsement of the group's activities was granted in
the form of encouragement to participate in the administration of land
. 2reform via representation on the land committees (nochi iirikai) .
The organisational spin-off from land reform did not solely bene­
fit the farmers' unions, and with the publicised intention of the 
Occupation authorities to re-establish the agricultural cooperatives and 
the forcible democratisation of the existing agricultural associations 
(nögyökai), there developed a heightened interest in the issue of 
organisational reform in the agricultural sector. The question of what 
legal form the proposed agricultural cooperatives should take became the 
subject of continuous consultation between the government led by GHQ and
These figures were taken from Kyoto Daigaku Bungakubu Kokushi 
Kenkyü Shitsu (eds) , Nihon Kindaishi Jiten (Kyoto University, Faculty of 
Literature, National History Research Room, A Dictionary of Modern 
Japanese History), Tokyo, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1964, Furoku No.36.
2 See Mitsukawa Motochika, Nogyo Dantai Hattenshi (A History of the 
Development of Agricultural Groups), Tokyo, Meibun Shobö, 1972, p.68.
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the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and various representatives of
the farmers. Local agricultural leaders, many of whom had previous
histories in the more conservative prewar agricultural organisations
such as the nokai and the sangyo kutniai, and who rejected any connection
with the left wing farmers' union movement, helped to establish a
number of voluntary farmers ' groups which formed part of a pre-Nokyo
movement. The most important were the rural youth leagues {noseiren).
These combined to form a nationwide body, the National Rural Youth
League (Zenkoku Nöson Seinen Renmei, or Zennöseiren).
Established in 1946, the National Rural Youth League claimed a
founding membership of 360,000, which grew to 430,000 by 1949.^
Although it has been classed by some writers as a farmers' union
(nonrin kurmai) , the Zennoseiren had a separate and distinct organis-
2ational genealogy. It exhibited features of the more general category
_ 3of 'farmers' organisation' (ndmvn soshiki). It had in common with the
farmers' unions their goal of land reform, abolition of the landlord
system and the modernisation of agriculture, but it differed from the
Socialists on key points of political ideology. It acknowledged a
social class standpoint but it rejected the notion of farmers as workers
for wages, preferring to equate emancipated tenants with members of the 
4managerial class. It had strong links with the newly democratised but
These membership figures are given in Nihon Kindaishi Jiten, op. cit. , 
Furoku No.36. According to Mitsukawa, op. cit., p.69, the Zennoseiren 
increased its supporters from 700,000 to one million between 1946 and 
1947.
2
Nihon Kindaishi Jiten, op. cit., Furoku No.36.
3 Mitsukawa, op. cit., p.69.
4
Ibid.
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conservatively-oriented nögyökai and received considerable organisational
support from this source. Historical ties between the two groups were
also considerable. The rural youth leagues derived organisationally from
the youth groups attached to the prewar cooperative movements: the
Industrial Cooperatives' Youth League (Sangyd Kunriai Seinen Renmei3 or
Sanseiren), which later became incorporated into the wartime nögyökai.
Zennöseiren's organisational derivations also influenced its
objectives.^ The establishment of a postwar edition of a producer
2cooperative organisation was its primary aim, and it invested this with 
an ideology of political independence, democratisation, and freedom from 
bureaucratic control.
One of the earliest agricultural policy acts of the farmers' union
organisation (ßichinö') was the advocacy of an Agricultural Reconstruction
Council (Nögyö Fukkö Kaigi), established in June 1947. The farmers'
unions, National Agricultural Association (Zenkoku Nögyökai) and the
3National Rural Youth League all participated in this Council. Its 
function was to act as an official organ for the presentation of agri­
cultural policy demands to government. It not only exemplified the 
encouragement given by the Occupation authorities to the establishment of 
consultative and participatory groupings in which the opinions of 
reorganised democratic associations could be canvassed on matters vital 
to their membership, but also reflected the desire for mutual cooperation
Ibid. , p . 70.
2
Ibid. Its predecessor, the Industrial Cooperative Youth League, 
had been directly involved in the political struggle of the 1930s against 
the anti-cooperative movement.
3 Mitsukawa, op. cit. , p.126. These three groups did not form the 
entire membership of the Council. The full list of participants is given 
in ibid.
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and joint action which leaders of the entire spectrum of farmers' 
organisations shared at that time. The convergence of right and left 
wing farm groups on the Council was due to a number of factors: the 
main subject of debate involved questions relating to the re-establishment 
of the agricultural cooperative system in which it was duly recognised, 
all farmers had a stake and should therefore express their views.
Secondly, there existed a keen awareness amongst farm leaders of the 
historic nature of the decisions in which they were involved, and that 
unprecedented times called for unprecedented action.
The radical initiatives emanating from the Occupation authorities 
thus contributed to the rapid growth and distinctive shape of postwar 
Japanese farm groups. Land reform provided the impetus for the spectacu­
lar early development of the farmers' unions,"^ and the urgent priority of 
a policy to increase agricultural production and to supply food to the 
national population,raised the additional question of the formal powers 
of agricultural cooperatives and their assistance in this vital task.
This encouraged the formation of local farmers' groups linked to the 
notional idea of an agricultural cooperative system and their partici­
pation in the national debate on this issue. The postwar atmosphere of 
political freedom and democratisation was also conducive to demands for
See Exmald P. Dore, 'The Socialist Party and the Farmers', in Allan 
B. Cole, George 0. Totten, and Cecil H. Uyehara, Socialist Parties in 
Postwar Japan, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1966, pp.370- 
391, and Tadashi Fukutake, Japanese Rural Society, Ithaca and London, 
Cornell University Press, 1972, pp.189-201; and Itö Toshio, 'Nökyö to 
Seiji Katsudo ' (Nokyo and Political Activities), in Kondö Yasuo (ed.), 
Nökyö Nijügonen (Twenty Five Years of Nokyo), Tokyo, Ochanomizu Shobö,
1973 , p.149. Itö makes the point that Nokyo made little or no contri­
bution to this 'great reform of the century'. Ibid. This was due to 
Nokyo's fundamental composition as an organisation of all classes of farm­
ers. The whole conception of transferring land from landlords to farmer 
tenants, although integrating very well with a class-based view of agri­
cultural society (such as that of the farmers' unions), was fundamentally 
inimical to an organisation which encompassed all farmers' classes, 
farmer landlord and tenant alike.
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a voluntary agricultural cooperative organisation independent of govern­
ment supervision and control.
In November 1947, the Agricultural Cooperative Union Law 
was passed, and in November 1948, the National Guidance Nokyo Federation 
(Zenkoku Shido Nokyo Rengokai, or Zenshiren) was established. It not 
only quickly took the lead in agricultural policy activities but for the 
first time nosei katsudo came under the supervision of a full-time 
bureaucratic organisation. The strength which Nokyo increasingly 
mustered in this field was matched by the organisational disunity of the 
farmers’ unions^ and the decline of the National Rural Youth League.
By the early 1950s, the turn-about was almost complete. An agricultural 
policy movement dependent on the initiative of the farmers' unions, rural 
youth leagues and nogyokai (abolished in 1948) had been replaced by one 
centring on Nokyo. The integration of the agricultural cooperatives 
into the Food Control system and the pressing need to increase rice pro­
duction considerably assisted this process. Nokyo naturally acceded to 
the position of policy leader in the presentation of demands involving 
the acquisition of key production materials such as fertiliser, agric­
ultural chemicals and tools etc., and issues such as the producer rice 
price and rice delivery quotas.
The era of organisational cooperation was also at an end. There 
emerged a new period of policy wrangles between groups principally over 
matters relating to agricultural prices. One indicator of this was the 
appearance of major differences between Nokyo and Nichino over rice 
price demands. The most notable aspect of the demands put forward by
This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
1
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the farmers’ unions was their extreme nature compared to the more moder­
ate and realistic character of those emanating from Nokyo. (This differ­
ence is still very much in evidence today.) These policy differences 
stemmed from the constitutional differences between the two types of 
organisation. The membership of the farmers' unions derived from a 
select group of ideologically committed supporters of the Socialist and 
Communist parties. They sought to equalise 'wages’ in the agricultural 
sector with those of modern factory workers."^
Moreover, in contrast to Nichind which was patently 'outside the 
system' in both its functioning and party connections (unlike during the 
period of land reform when it operated very much within it), Nokyo's 
Food Control-related functions constrained its actions as farmers' 
representative. It could not challenge the legal-administrative sys­
tem of which it was a part.
Nokyo's position within the system became even more strongly 
entrenched after the union of the conservative parties in 1955. Until 
the formation of the Liberal Democratic Party, Nokyo had been in a pos­
ition to exploit the antagonisms between the two rural conservative 
parties in its agricultural policy activities. It had used this tactic 
to great effect in its producer rice price demands, demonstrating the
real meaning and advantages of a policy of 'political neutrality' and
2'equidistance from all political parties'. A change in these tactics
In this respect they were ahead of their time. After the passage 
of the 1961 Basic Agricultural Law, the Food Control system did in fact 
become the crux of a farm incomes policy which incorporated this basic 
goal. The methods used for deciding the rice price during this time 
were, however, parity formulae which took into account such factors as 
costs of production and of living, but not the standard of wage levels in 
factories.
2 See Ito, op. cit., p.150.
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was made inevitable, however, by the amalgamation of the Liberals and 
Democrats in 1955. The restructured political environment called for 
a different strategy of policy action.
The salient features of the agricultural policy system laid down 
in 1955 became enduring. Nokyo grew increasingly reliant on the govern­
ing Liberal Democratic Party as the latter's power to dispense patron­
age through the national budget became more and more pervasive. The 
agricultural policies that emerged after 1955 were a direct product of 
this dependency relationship. They have been typified as 'agricultural 
policies dependent on the government party' (yotö izon ndsei).^  The
reciprocal aspect of this relationship was Nokyo's emergence as a sub-
2ordinate agency of the LDP at the electoral level.
The mid-'fifties were also significant for the passage of the 
amendment to the Nökyöhö setting up the central union system in June 
1954. Nokyo's conduct of agricultural policy activities was thus 
consolidated and more efficiently organised.
By 1955 the stage had been set for the development of a distinctive 
system of Nokyo agricultural policy activities. The remainder of the 
chapter examines the operations of this system in detail. The functions 
of the central unions are listed, particularly as they relate to Nokyo's 
spokesmanship role on behalf of the farmers. Aspects of the internal 
policy-making structure of the agricultural cooperative system are also 
explored. Subjects selected for closer examination include the operations 
of Nokyo's internal democracy: the extent to which rank and file demands
Zenkoku Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Chuokai Noseibu, Noset Katsudo Tatset nt 
tsuite (National Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, Agricultural 
Policy Department, Concerning the System of Agricultural Policy Activities), 
October 1973, p.4.
This subject is examined more closely in Chapters 3 and 4.2
are relayed to government and the channels within the agricultural 
cooperative system which provide for this; the degree to which Nokyo’s 
pressure group function is the sole pregrogative of the central unions, 
and what if any, other agricultural cooperative organisations are 
involved; and finally, the factors which inhibit Nokyo's conduct of 
agricultural policy activities as an internally cohesive organisation. 
One of the major conclusions of the chapter is that Nokyo has become 
in some respects a 'house divided against itself'. A number of internal 
cleavages have become institutionalised within the agricultural coopera­
tive system which restrict the ability of Zenchü leaders to speak on 
behalf of their entire organisation. Nokyo, as we shall see, is a 
collection of interests, not all of which are entirely harmonious. The
outcome of internal policy debates within the agricultural cooperative 
fas
organisation is- not always been a diluted common measure of producer 
demands nationwide, but a policy which the Zenchü leadership calculates 
the governing LDP can be persuaded to accept. The use of this standard 
as the guiding principle of agricultural policy action has been the 
cause of an increasingly visible rift within Nokyo between its 
leaders and rank and file (described in more conceptual terms as 
centre versus periphery). A general criticism of Zenchü has been its 
failure to seek a balanced appreciation of what is satisfactory to 
specific branches of the farming industry, and its tendency to act as 
spokesman for certain selected and entrenched interests within the agri­
cultural cooperative movement. Part of the problem relates to the 
inevitable national orientation of Zenchü itself, and the fact that so 
much of its time and energy is taken up with policy issues that affect 
all farmers, rather than those which concern smaller specialist groups
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of producers. The National Central Union has, however, made some 
structural innovations in recent years to meet this problem and deal 
with the selective expansion of Japanese agriculture. The result has 
been a certain measure of policy sharing: other federations within the 
agricultural cooperative system have taken on the job of representing 
the more specific interests of their membership.'*'
The Central Unions
Nokyo's formal policy-making bodies are the chuokai, which under 
Nokyo Law bear the responsibility for conducting agricultural policy 
activities. These relate to the official function of giving 'adminis­
trative authorities helpful advice on matters relating to the agric-
2ultural cooperatives .
3 _ _The 'business' of the central unions is listed in Nokyoho as:
(1) Providing guidance on matters of organisation, business 
operations and management of agricultural cooperatives;
(2) Auditing of the accounts of member cooperatives;
(3) Furnishing information and providing education services 
for agricultural cooperatives;
(A) Liaison with and mediation of disputes amongst member 
cooperatives;
This theme is followed up more extensively in Chapter 6.
'Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaiho' (Agricultural Cooperative Union Law), in 
Norinsho Kanshu, Nogyo Roppö (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Edit­
orial Supervision, A Compendium of Agricultural Laws), Tokyo, Gakuyo 
Shobo, 1976, p.126.
See Article 73(9) of the 'Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaiho' in ibid.3
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(5) Research and investigation on matters relevant to 
the agricultural cooperatives;
(6) In addition to the business under each of the fore­
going items, any other activities required for 
attaining the object of the central union.
The prefectural central unions (kenchu) serve as leadership organs 
for the agricultural cooperatives within individual prefectures, and 
Zenchü's task is to act as the overall leader of Nokyo in the nation­
wide sphere. The difference between them, however, is more than geo­
graphic. Located in Tokyo, the seat of government, the 'administrative 
authorities' in Zenchu's case are those in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry (in practice this is extended to include all branches of 
government). The issues with which Zeyichu is concerned are the larger 
questions of State-wide farm policy. In addition, the articles of 
incorporation and bylaws of Zenchu greatly expand on its range of 
activities in this sphere. According to these, it is the 'sole and 
supreme national body which unifies the intentions, represents the 
interests and determines the directions of the whole movement'
Nevertheless, as can be seen from the items of 'business' which the 
central unions may undertake, a great deal of the activities of these 
organisations is taken up with internal matters involving the oper­
ations, management and finances of the cooperatives. Zenchu is the 
supreme 'staff' organisation of the cooperatives, and the chudkai 
altogether, comprise the administrative branch of the cooperatives.
Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, Central Union of 
Agricultural Cooperatives, 1972, p.6.
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Almost all the activities of the central unions according to Nokyo Law 
relate to internal management matters. Only one paragraph concerns the 
relationship between the central unions and outside (governmental) 
authorities. The same emphasis is evident in structural divisions within 
ZenchTi. By and large they correspond to the individual items in the 
Nökyöhö concerning central union activities and are represented in 
diagrammatic form in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1
Zenchu's INTERNAL STRUCTURAL DIVISIONS
-Directors' Office (Secretariat)
-General Affairs Department (Sdmubu)
-General Planning and Promotion Department (Sogo Keigakubu) 
-Agricultural Policy No.1 Department {Nösev Daiichibu)
------ No . 2 Department (Nosez Dabnbbu)
-Farming and Living Guidance Department (Ebno Seikatsubu) 
-Organisation Department (Soshikibu)
-Management and Auditing Department (Kebeb Kansabu) 
-Education Department (Kyöbkubu)
-International Department (Kokusabbu)
-Publicity Office (Kohd Kyoku)
-Central Cooperative College (Chuo Kyödö Kwi'ia.'i Gakuen)
Source: Nökyo Nenkan, 1978, p.133.
By and large the structural divisions within the prefectural central 
unions correspond to those of Zenchü. Of the 47 prefectural Nokyo central 
unions in 1977, 40 had Agricultural Policy Departments.^ As measured by
1 Nokyo Nenkan, 1978, p.130.
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executive allocation of priorities, that is, the distribution of staff 
numbers amongst different prefectural central union divisions, 'Farm 
Management and Agricultural Policy' rates second only to 'Management and 
Auditing'.^
The role of the Agricultural Policy Departments in the central unions 
is primarily a research and informational one. They are staffed by 
salaried employees: urban white collar workers who have only indirect
links to the farming world. The task of agricultural policy leadership 
within Nokyo is in the hands of its executive branch. This brings us to 
the fundamental question of the quality of democracy within the Nokyo 
organisation.
Agricultural Cooperative Democracy at Work
How democratic is Nokyo? To what extent does the 'helpful advice' 
which central unions may give 'administrative authorities' reflect the 
will of the farmers?
There are a number of formal structural provisions made in Nokyo 
Law for the translation of grass-roots demands into constructive proposals 
to government.
Organisational democratisation was one of the key reforms insti­
tuted by the Occupation authorities. On December 25 1945, an amendment
According to figures available for 1977, departmental staff distri­
butions amongst kenchü were as follows: General Affairs (464), General
Planning (159), Farm Management and Agricultural Policy (488), Manage­
ment and Auditing (592), Education and Public Relations (161) , Training 
Institutes (101), Others (294). Ibid., pp.130-131. Approximately the 
same relative importance amongst respective divisions is evident from 
staff allocations in ZenchTi: General Affairs (33), Organisation (14),
Education (7), Agricultural Management and Livelihood (19), Management 
and Auditing (20), Agricultural Policy (19), International Department (7), 
Publicity (14), Central Cooperative College (19). Ibid., p.133.
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to the Agricultural Groups Law instituted democratic elections of 
agricultural group executives. This principle was later enshrined in 
Articles of Nökyöhö relating to the voting rights (ketsugiken) and 
election rights (senkyokon) of agricultural cooperative members.
Article 16 of Nokyoho provides that 'each member shall have one 
voting right and one right to elect the executives or officers (yaku'in) 
of agricultural cooperatives and representatives (södai)'.1 In the 
tankyö, voting and election rights are limited to:
(a) farmer members;
(b) farmers’ group corporations (ndji kumiai höjin) under­
taking farm management;
(c) other types of juridical persons (hdjin) undertaking 
farm management (nögyö no keiei).
’Members’ with these same rights in upper level Nokyo federations and 
central unions are limited to cooperatives only.
Voting and election rights are exercised by members in the supreme 
decision-making organ of each cooperative: its ordinary general meeting
which, according to Article 34 of Nokyo Law, cooperative executives must 
convene once per business year.^
The general meeting is the principle procedural mechanism providing 
for the accountability of the cooperative leadership to its members.
At this meeting, the directors (riji) and auditors (kocnji) (five or more 
directors including the chairman and vice-chairman and two or more
 ^ ’Nögyö Kyödö Kumiaiho’, op. cit. , p.116.
2 General meetings may also be requested by members with the consent 
of more than one fifth of the entire membership. They are usually called 
twice a year.
84
auditors), who constitute the officials of the cooperatives are elected 
for a period of not more than three years.
Article 44 lists the items which must be put to the resolution of 
general meetings: they include all matters pertaining to the coopera­
tives’ internal organisational operations: their finances - business
plan, budget, profit and loss statements; their activities; and their 
federation, amalgamation or membership of other cooperatives. The 
function of the annual general meeting is to make resolutions in con­
nection with these matters. These are decided by a majority of votes of 
the members, and according to the Nökydhö, the duties of directors 
include observing 'resolutions adopted at general meetings'.^
The highest executive authority of the co-ops is the Board of 
Directors (chairman, vice-chairman and ordinary directors) which meets 
monthly.
These democratic procedures involving voting and election rights 
are replicated at the upper levels of the Nokyo organisation where the 
unit cooperatives are members of federations of agricultural coopera­
tives and central unions. The only difference here is that adjustment
2is made for variations in the membership size of member cooperatives.
The executives of the federations and prefectural central unions 
are elected by their agricultural cooperative membership, that is, by one
’Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaiho’, op. ci-t. , p.118.
2 Federations of agricultural cooperatives and central unions accord­
ing to the Nökyöhö may give two or more voting and election rights to 
their member cooperatives or member federations according to the latter's 
membership size. This helps to ensure equality of representation amongst 
member cooperatives in the upper level organisations relative to their 
membership size.
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or more executives representing each member cooperative. As at tankyo 
level, this usually takes place at annual general meetings, although it 
may take place outside it. Three quarters of the directors of a 
cooperative must come from its membership, and therefore, this proportion 
at least of upper level national and prefectural cooperative leaders must 
at the same time be directors of tankyo.
The system of annual general meetings also operates within upper 
level organisations. The business of these meetings is not only to 
elect directors and auditors, but to take votes on resolutions affect­
ing the operations of the cooperative concerned. The most fundamental 
organisational principle of Nokyo is that procedure, membership and 
structural aspects of the cooperatives are practically identical through­
out the entire system - both vertically and horizontally.
Where the membership of a cooperative exceeds 500, direct democracy 
becomes impracticable, and iiökyöhö makes provision for a system of 
indirect participation in general meetings and executive elections 
through the mechanism of representative members {sodat). The latter are 
elected by the membership of a cooperative and must number at least one 
fifth of the total membership of that cooperative. A meeting of 
representative members (södatkat) then replaces the general meeting of 
regular members. In other words, regular farmer members elect 
representatives to attend meetings of representatives in the tankyo or, 
in the case of upper level organisations, each cooperative elects a 
representative member (who must be a cooperative director) to attend 
the representatives' meeting of the upper level cooperative federation 
or central union. The National Central Union's general meeting is the 
only one which must by law be composed of representatives. Whether or 
not other cooperatives utilise this system is a matter for their own
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decision. Not all cooperatives choose to do so.
The above-mentioned Articles of the Nökyöhö encapsulate the demo­
cratic principles of the agricultural cooperative organisation. They 
provide for rank and file participation, either direct or indirect, in 
the decision-making of local cooperatives and in the election of their 
leaders. In practice, just as social and cultural norms in farm villages 
encourage extremely high rates of membership in the cooperatives, they 
also produce very high attendance rates at cooperative general meetings.
As a general principle, the system of representation becomes more 
indirect the greater the number of members of a cooperative, and the 
higher up the organisational ladder a cooperative operates. Thus, a 
farmer member of a local cooperative with a large membership may be 
four elections removed from the directorship of a prefectural federation 
or central union, and six elections removed from the executive level of 
a national federation or the National Central Union.
The organisational and representative principles by which Nokyo 
operates can be illustrated with regard to the central unions both 
prefectural and national. As they constitute the agricultural policy 
branch of the cooperatives, this should throw some light on rank and 
file input into the Nokyo policy-making system.
Those eligible for regular membership of the prefectural central
2unions (i.e. those with voting and election rights) are agricultural
Amongst 4,991 sögö nokyo surveyed in 1974 for instance, there were 
3,426 who had more than 500 members, but only 38 per cent of these pro­
vided for meetings of representatives in their articles of incorporation. 
Norinsho, Norin Keizai Kyoku, Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaika, Sogo Nökyö Tokeihyo 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Agriculture and Forestry Economics 
Bureau, Agricultural Cooperative Union Section, A Statistical Table of 
General-Purpose Agricultural Cooperatives), 1974, p.27.
2 Associate members do not have these rights and are not therefore 
relevant to the discussion on Nokyo’s internal representation system.
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cooperatives covering the whole (i.e. prefectural federations) or part 
of the area under the charge of the prefectural union. Membership of 
cooperatives in the kenchu is strictly voluntary. Cooperatives can 
choose to join or not depending on their desire to benefit from kenohü 
services such as auditing, agricultural cooperative management guidance, 
in-service training for executives and staff members, or to influence 
the policies of the cooperative movement at prefectural level. The 
membership composition of the prefectural unions is as follows:
Table 2.1
MEMBERSHIP COMPOSITION OF PREFECTURAL CENTRAL UNIONS (1977)
Type of Member Number
Unit Cooperatives 4,883
Federations 394
Total 5,277
Source: Uokyo Nenkan, 1978, p.128.
According to these figures, the membership rate of tankyd in the 
prefectural central unions is 46 per cent. This surprisingly low figure 
is due to one factor: only 120 out of 5,924 specialist agricultural
cooperatives were members of Kenohü. In a sense they are already 
represented in the ohüökai insofar as each sermon nokyo farmer member is 
also a sdgd nökyö member, and therefore connected to the central union
system.
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The composition of the regular membership of Zenchu is made up from 
all levels of the agricultural cooperative organisation:
Table 2.2
ZENCHÜ MEMBERSHIP COMPOSITION (1976)
Type of Member Number
Prefectural Central Unions 47
Prefectural and less than 
size federations
prefectural
394
Unit cooperatives 4,883
Greater than prefectural size federations 15
Total 5,339
Source: Nokyo Nenkan, 1978, p.132.
The 4,883 tankyö that are members of the prefectural central unions 
are also members of Zenchü. By allowing regular member cooperatives of 
prefectural unions to become members of the National Central Union, 
Agricultural Cooperative Union Law has provided a mechanism for the 
participation of grass-roots Nokyo organisations in the national leader­
ship and policy-making body for the entire cooperative system. This
they do through the elections of representative members to the general
2meeting of Zenchu which is its 'supreme decision-making body'.
In addition to these regular members, Zenchu has eight associate 
members: Chukin, Ie no Hikari' Kyokai3 the National Association of
Prefectural Credit Federations, the National Travel Association of 
Agricultural Cooperatives, Unicoop-Japan, and the Agricultural 
Cooperative Architecture Design Centre.
Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, 1972, op. cit., p.7.2
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Given the very large total of regular members of Zenchü (5,339 in 1976), 
Nokyo Law specifies that its general meeting 'shall be composed entirely 
of representative members'."*" These representative members are:
(a) the chairman of each prefectural central union (47);
(b) a person elected by a regular member cooperative 
of the National Central Union covering the whole or 
part of a prefectural area, i.e. officials elected from 
amongst the executives of unit cooperatives and their 
prefectural federations (184);
(c) one director of each federation of agricultural coopera­
tives which exceeds the prefectural area (i.e. national
2level federations) (14).
Zenchü's meeting of representatives is thus composed approximately 
3of 245 members.
The following items must be submitted for resolution at the general 
meeting of Zenchü according to Nökydhö:
(1) Amendments to the articles of incorporation;
(2) Dissolution;
(3) Expulsion of a member;
(4) Dismissal of an officer;
1 'Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaiho', op. cit. , p.128.
2 These figures are for 1973. See Central Union of Agricultural 
Cooperatives, Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, 1973, pp.6-7.
3 'Nögyö Kyödö Kumiaiho', op. cit., p.128.
 ^ This figure varies from time to time depending on Zenchü membership 
figures. The latter is affected by agricultural cooperative amalgam­
ations amongst other factors.
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(5) Establishment of and amendment to the business 
plan for each business year;
(6) Method of assessment and collection of expenses.
The above items are concerned wholly with internal matters relating to 
the establishment, membership, business and finance of Zenchü. The same 
concern is evident in the content of general meeting business at all 
levels of Nokyo. At best it impinges only very indirectly on matters 
relating to agricultural policy activities and policy representation by 
Zenchü to ’administrative authorities’.
In spite of legal guarantees of democratic executive elections and 
democratic vote-taking at annual general meetings or meetings of 
representatives, the opportunity for rank and file farmer 
members to influence the actual policy demands that are made by Nokyo's 
leaders through the representation system that has just been outlined, 
is limited. Provisions allowing for rank and file farmer members to 
participate in decision-making within the agricultural cooperative system 
definitely exist, but these structures are concerned primarily with 
internal cooperative matters, not with policy demand formulation. This 
belongs largely within the area of executive responsibility.
Executive Responsibility
Policy-making within Nokyo is very much an area of executive 
responsibility at prefectural level and above. Nokyoho places the 
policy leadership role of the agricultural cooperatives squarely on the 
shoulders of central union executives. It is concentrated particularly 
in the hands of Zenchü's leaders by virtue of the national responsibilities 
of the organisation. Each chüökai has one chairman (kaichö) , one vice- 
chairman (not more than three vice-chairmen in the case of the National 
Central Union), five or more directors (riji) and two or more auditors
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(kanji). Article 73-19 of the Nökyöhö states that ’The chairman shall 
represent (daihyo shi) the central union and shall have charge over its 
business'.^" This role is repeated in the case of both the vice-chairman 
and directors.
2According to the 1976 Nokyo executive and staff members’ list, in
addition to a chairman and two vice-chairmen, Zenchü had four full-time
managing directors (jomu riji) permanently based in Tokyo, a Board of 
3Directors of 15, four auditors, one advisor (komon)(who was the previous 
chairman), and one consultant. This executive structure is the same, 
although on a smaller scale, as those in each kenchü.
The task of running agricultural cooperative organisations at all 
levels, from Zenchü downwards, and the day-to-day decision-making, 
management planning and policy-making (where this is a relevant function) 
is undertaken by cooperative directors assisted by their staff of paid 
employees. This select group is in command of the vital information in­
put necessary for such decision-making. Cooperative executives, par­
ticularly those in Zenchü, have access to the research facilities, exper­
tise and intelligence of their own secretariats. This is particularly 
important in the case of the National Central Union which is charged 
with drafting proposals and suggestions to administrative authorities
x Ibid.
2 Zenkoku Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Yakushokuin Renmei, Ndgyo Kyodo Kumiai 
Rengokai Yakushokuin Meibo (National Agricultural Cooperative Union 
Executive and Staff Members1 League, Agricultural Cooperative Union 
Federations' Executive and Staff Membership List), 1976, Tokyo, Kyodo 
Kumiai Tsushinsha, pp.1-2.
3 Their geographic distribution was as follows: Saitama, Gifu, Gumma,
Hokkaido, Yokohama, Shizuoka, Fukui, Kyoto, Hyögo, Ehime, Fukuoka, and 
Miyazaki. From this list, it is clear that equality of representation 
amongst Japan's different geographic regions is sought in the construc­
tion of the Zenchü Board of Directors.
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relating to the cooperatives and agricultural policy as a whole. The 
Agricultural Policy Departments (Noseibu) within Zenchu detail the 
proposals which are translated into executive ’demands’, 'representations' 
and ’requests' to government. They replicate the work of the bureaucrats 
in the MAF, who are charged with the mechanics of drawing up ministerial 
'recommendations' (shimon) to the advisory councils on agricultural prices. 
Moreover, the complexity of the issues involved, of the administrative 
procedures they entail, and the fiscal and statistical knowledge that is 
often required in the formulation of concrete policy submissions, require 
a level of expertise which can only be gained from executive experience 
and staff training.
Control exercised by Nokyo rank and file over their leaders in this 
sphere is only through executive accountability. In this sense, the 
general meeting of each nökyö and of Zenchu in particular, is the 
'supreme decision-making organ' of the agricultural cooperatives. It 
provides a forum in which executive decision-making is submitted to the 
final arbitration of the membership through the medium, primarily, of 
executive elections.
Participation of the membership in the actual decision-making of 
the executive process is, however, minimal. These powers are allocated 
amongst several key structures which engage in power-sharing at the top 
level. Each is given its own set of tasks and responsibilities by Nokyo 
Law. In Zenchü's case, the supreme executive decision-making group is 
the Board of Directors (Rijikai) to which the Chairman reports, and which 
he heads. Both report in the ultimate sense to the Zenchu general meet­
ing of representatives. This can be graphically illustrated as follows:
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Figure 2.2
ZENCHÜ's EXECUTIVE DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE
General Meeting (245)* Auditors (3)
I
____________ t_____________
Board of Directors (15)*
__
_____ t_____
Chairman
t
__________t_________
Vice-Chairmen (2) 
t
____________t_____________
Managing Directors (4)*
t
+
r -------------
 ^ Zenchü
Secretariat
Note: 1 = Formal lines of accountability.
* = These figures vary from time to time.
Source: Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, Central Union of
Agricultural Cooperatives, 1973, p.6.
Given the fact that only one item in central union ’business' 
relates to the agricultural policy function, the vast bulk of Nokyo's 
ndsei katsudo are beyond the formal provisions of Agricultural 
Cooperative Union Law. These involve organisational procedures that 
have been informally developed as part of the operations of central 
union policy-making, and to rank and file activities in which local 
farmer participation is a distinctive feature. They can be analysed in
the following way:
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(i) those policy activities (ndsei katsudd) which are 
executive-dominated, and which are located within 
a formal organisational context; and
(ii) those policy activities which are executive- 
sponsored and rank and file-participatory and 
which belong more in the category of agricultural 
policy campaigns (ndsei undo) or farmers' campaigns 
(rid min undo) . The Nokyo executive branch far from 
appropriating absolute powers over policy formulation, 
makes special provision for membership consultation 
as part of its 'pressure group' activities.
Deciding Demands
There are a few select executive groupings within the Nokyo 
organisation in addition to the basic 'executive' structures already 
outlined, which are responsible for drawing up the policy demands of the 
cooperatives and for presenting them to government. An examination of 
these groupings reveals an organisation in which these executive functions 
are shared or parcelled out depending on the issues involved, rather than 
arranged in a hierarchical order of ascending power and responsibility. 
Although there does seem to be a normal sequence by which policy demands 
are progressively finalised, there is no doubt that responsibility for 
the actual presentation of these demands to government is allocated amongst 
a number of groups or executive 'branches' of the Nokyo organisation.
In another sense, all these groupings are largely one and the same, insofar 
as there is considerable overlap of executive roles in the central unions. 
This produces a situation where the same men consider the same problem 
but in a series of different organisational contexts.
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The groups referred to above are:
1. commodity central headquarters;
2. conferences of central union chairmen;
3. combined conferences of central union and federation 
chairmen;
4. the Zenchii Board of Directors;
5. other combined conferences of federation chairmen.
In matters of Nokyo decision-making on agricultural policy, an 
executive innovation of the last decade has been the installation of 
standing policy committees structured along commodity and policy 
objective lines. These groups operate under the general label of 
policy headquarters (taisaku honbu). By far the most important are 
those operating within Zenchü. At this level they are known as central 
headquarters (chuö honbu). At present there are six in this category:
1. The Nokyo Rice Policy Central Headquarters 
(Nökyö Beikoku Taisaku Chuo Honbu)
2. The Nokyo Livestock Policy Central Headquarters 
(Nökyö Chikusan Taisaku Chuö Honbu)
3. The Nokyo Dairy Policy Central Headquarters 
(Nökyö Rakunö Taisaku Chuö Honbu)
4. The Nokyo Vegetable and Fruit Policy Central Headquarters 
(Nökyö Seika Taisaku Chuö Honbu)
5. The Nokyo Urban Agricultural Policy Central Headquarters 
(Nökyö Toshi Nösei Chuö Honbu)
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6. The Nokyo Disaster Policy Headquarters
(Nokyo Saigai Taisaku Honbu).
These policy central headquarters are manned by Zenchü executives: 
the chairman of most of them is the Chairman of Zenchü himself. They 
are serviced by Zenchü's Agricultural Policy Departments (Nöseibu).
The system of commodity policy headquarters is replicated at each 
level of the Nokyo organisation. The same set of committees operate 
within each kenchü, where they are known only as policy headquarters.
It is only at Zenchü level that they are given the title of 'central' 
headquarters. There are commodity headquarters in city, town and 
village ndkyds. It is also customary for local cooperatives to set up 
more informal committees which survey planned projects and activities, 
and consult with buraku groups so as to canvass the opinions of members 
on various issues.
There is, however, a key functional difference between the national 
level central headquarters and those operating within the prefectural 
chuokai and below. The latter are essentially commodity- and policy-wise 
opinion-collecting and policy-recommending agencies. Their job is to 
'pile up' (tsumiageru) demands from within the system, i.e. from farmer- 
members and lower-level executives, and pass them on to the Zenchü 
Central Headquarters. The force of decision-making is upwards through 
the organisation (soshiki o ageru), and the commodity headquarters 
arrangement provides a convenient channel for this to take place. It is 
up to the executives that man these permanent policy committees to filter 
rank and file demands and pass them on in the form of headquarters 
resolutions. The functions of the policy central headquarters in Tokyo 
involve top-level decision-making on what Zenchü proposals to government
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are going to be in relation to a particular commodity and these are 
formulated into concrete sets of agricultural policy demands. The ohüö 
honbu then become the ’focal points of campaigns, mobilising Nokyo 
chairmen, directors, and commodity headquarters chairmen to voice 
policy demands in concert. They also generate the necessary funds to 
back these nosei katsudo' In other words, once the key decisions are 
made on what ZenchTi's demands are going to be, the force of mobilis­
ation is back down through the system. These dual principles operate 
in all Nokyo agricultural policy activities.
The role of the commodity headquarters is essentially to supple­
ment existing decision-making procedures which still operate and with
2which they integrate. According to one writer, customary decision­
making procedure can be broken down into several stages: the initial
step involves kenchü commodity headquarters in each prefecture. They 
collect the opinions of agricultural cooperative leaders, federation 
leaders, and the commodity headquarters leaders. These are transmitted 
to the Zenchii commodity central headquarters which passes its own reso­
lutions. The latter are adopted as resolutions of conferences of 
central union chairmen and joint conferences of central union and 
federation chairmen, which lend the weight of the national Nokyo leader­
ship to a particular request or set of requests. There is no dis­
agreement amongst these various executive bodies, because the consensus­
building process has already taken place prior to the resolutions of the 
central policy headquarters. The most crucial discussions are held
Nosei Katsudo Taisei ni tsuite , op. cit. ,  p . 3 .
2 Sakurai Makoto, 'Nokyo no Nosei Katsudo' (Nokyo's Agricultural 
Policy Activities), Nögyo Kyodo Kuiniai, Vol.19, No.2, 1973, p.62.
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before the commodity central headquarters release their 'demands'. In 
the final stages, the matter comes before the Zenchu Board of Directors 
and its formal decision-making procedure.
The steps and stages of Nokyo's policy formulation process is 
progressive' rather than hierarchical. The participation of the 
various groupings of Nokyo executives is mutually reinforcing: they all
endorse what the others are saying. In rare situations of disagreement, 
the ultimate arbiter is the Zenchu Board of Directors, but each one of 
the decision-making organs discussed above, separately or in concert, 
has the authority and does issue agricultural policy demands and conduct 
agricultural policy activities of its own accord. Not all issues are 
subject to the resolutions of each grouping. This varies according to 
the importance of an issue, its general or more specific relevance to 
Nokyo, or sections of Nokyo. The most vital policies do, however, 
receive the endorsement of the Zenchu Board of Directors.
The impetus behind the establishment of the policy headquarters' 
system was the need for centralised opinion-collecting, executive 
decision-making, and campaign-directing agencies on a number of key 
policy issues. Not only did it provide for greater consultation of rank 
and file opinion, but it developed a procedure of specialised executive 
decision-making in policy areas that suddenly became vitally important 
in the late 'sixties and early 'seventies. The taisdku honbu (apart 
from the rice headquarters which had been created earlier) were estab­
lished in 1970 by Zenchu as part of its recognition of the need for 
specialisation and consolidation of policy representation activities 
after the 1969 confrontation with the LDP over the latter's institution 
of a rice price freeze and the leading role played by the Nokyo Rice 
Policy Headquarters in this. They represented 'the crystallisation of
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a totally new direction in the agricultural policy activities of Nokyo 
and its federated organisations'."^ Hitherto, general agricultural policy 
campaigns on basic problems affecting the farming industry and the 
policy demand activities involving each branch of agriculture had been 
undertaken in an undifferentiated fashion under the banner of Zenchü, 
backed up by its Agricultural Policy Departments. This system had worked 
well enough until 1965, but became less efficient subsequently as a 
result of the selective expansion of agriculture promoted under the 
Agricultural Basic Law of 1961 (particularly in the livestock, fruit and 
vegetable areas), the enlargement of the administrative price support 
system, and the institutionalisation of separate government decision­
making and consultation procedures for each set of products. This 
created a corresponding need for differentiation and specialisation 
within Zenchü's own decision-making structure, particularly for the 
technical expertise of specialist and informed policy-makers who could 
draw up support price demands, handle the technical and statistical 
input that was required for these decisions and then act as spokesmen 
and policy representatives for Nokyo in administrative, Parliamentary, 
and party committees with a credible degree of professionalism.
Not all Nokyo policy demands are processed through the commodity 
and policy headquarters system. Farm products not included in the 
'rice, livestock, dairy, fruit and vegetables' list, are handled 
differently. These come within the general purview of the Zenchü 
Board of Directors and the various conferences of Nokyo chairmen.
 ^ Yamaji Susumu, 'Atsuryoku Dantai Toshite no Nbkyo' (Nokyo As a 
Pressure Group), in Kondo Yasuo(ßl*)j op. cüt. i p . 2AO.
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Although the commodity headquarters system has assisted in the 
creation of efficient channels for the movement of policy demands from 
the base level Nokyo organisations (the tarikyö) to the top, there are 
still complaints that at the most vital connection point - that between 
the farmer and Nokyo itself - the pipeline is too thin (hosoi), and 
that consultation procedures are too inadequate and intermittent. Nokyo 
staff members are those with their ear closest to the ground, but there 
are none at this level officially involved in agricultural policy 
functions. The commodity divisions within the sogo nokyo tend to 
concentrate on more immediate issues of agricultural management and 
marketing, not policy demand formulation.
Furthermore, the agricultural policy functions of kenohü and 
Zenchü are legally sanctioned and areas of staff competence provided 
for them in the formal structure of the central unions. But this is not 
so in the case of the tankyo. Here the concern of executives and staff 
members is first and foremost with the business operations of 
cooperatives as enterprise groups. The establishment of the commodity 
headquarters system was designed to alleviate this problem to some 
extent, but they remain areas largely of executive competence.
Direct Democracy: The Nokyo Conventions
The agricultural cooperative system makes provision for the direct 
input of farmer opinion into top-level Nokyo decision-making through the 
medium of ZenchTi-organised national conventions (taikai) . These 
represent one of a number of executive-sponsored, rank and file- 
participatory nösei katsudö or agricultural policy campaigns (riösei undo) .
A series of mass meetings are held every year in Tokyo with Nokyo 
delegates representing all parts of the country gathering in vast crowds
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in convention centres. One in particular is a well-known annual event: 
the 'National Nokyo Representatives' Convention for Realising the 
Demanded Rice Price' (Yokyü Beika Jitsugen Zenkoku Nökyö Daihyösha Taikai). 
Another is a tri-annual event: the National Nokyo Convention (Zenkoku
Nokyö Taikai). Until 1952, this was known as the National Nokyo 
Representatives' Conference (Zenkoku Nökyö Daihyösha Kaigi). It con­
siders problems internal to the cooperatives, such as Nokyo management, 
business operations and organisational planning, 'in order to confirm and
unify the will and to determine the future direction of the whole move-
, 2men t .
From these Nokyo conventions issue some of the most direct 
expressions of cooperative demands in agricultural policy. Between April 
1972 and January 1973 for example, a series of conventions was held by 
Zenchü on various agricultural policy issues. These are listed in Table
2.3.
The conventions serve a variety of purposes. They are mass exer­
cises and form part of Nokyo's strategy of putting pressure on government 
and party leaders: a visible demonstration of the mass membership and
voting power of the agricultural cooperatives. They are also a direct 
channel of communication between Nokyo and government leaders and farm 
politicians, who are invited to attend and to deliver addresses at such 
gatherings. Invitations are extended by Zenchü to Diet politicians from 
relevant electorates to appear on the podium before the farmers (thereby 
demonstrating their solidarity with their constituents), to speak to the
1
2
Until 1961, these conventions were held yearly.
Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, 1973, op. cit. , p.7.
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farmers, and generally join forces with the agricultural cooperatives 
in jointly putting pressure on the government. The support of large 
numbers of farm politicians (it has been known to reach several 
hundred) is enlisted by Zenchu in this manner as part of a campaign 
for government acceptance of Nokyo's policy demands (yokyu) and 
requests (yosei).
Another function of the conventions is to demonstrate to government 
leaders national membership endorsement of Nokyo executive demands.
These emerge from the conventions as mass resolutions (ketsugi). The 
conventions legitimise the policy proposals on producer prices and 
other issues worked out by Zenchu leaders in their decision-making 
organs, such as the combined conferences of chairmen and policy head­
quarters. Occasions where there is violent protest from rank and file 
at the proposals put before them by the Zenchu leadership are uncommon, 
because the conventions are beyond the final stage of the consensus­
building process within Nokyo. This has already taken place at each of 
the various levels of the Nokyo organisation, and it is during this 
process that disagreement is most frequently expressed. One of the 
purposes of setting up the commodity and policy headquarters system at 
each of the three levels of agricultural cooperative organisation was 
to facilitate this consensus-formation process internally. At the same 
time, however, Zenchu leaders also appreciate the opportunity which the 
conventions provide to allow rank and file generally to air their 
grievances and let off steam, particularly before the eyes of their
Prime Minister Miki himself addressed the National Nokyo Convention 
for Realising the Demanded Rice Price in 1976. On this occasion 
he appeared as a rural Diet member from the constituency of 
Tokushima rather than as Prime Minister.
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elected Diet members - an exercise not usually lost on the latter.
The conventions also enable Nokyo leaders to fire the enthusiasm 
of their membership, and to motivate them to continue with further 
demonstrations of opposition to government policy and support for Zenohu 
demands. They provide a direct channel of communication between 
executive and membership strata, and are a very clear example of the 
dual focus of Nokyo agricultural policy activity. Pressure radiates 
from the centre (at which the Zenohu leadership stands) in two 
directions: upwards towards the government and LDP leaders, and down­
wards towards lower echelon executives and farmer-members. Zenohu 
leaders frequently expend as much energy in mobilising their own rank 
and file as they do in pressuring government. The former is as much 
part of agricultural policy activities as the latter.
Other public operations which are Zenohü-organised and which serve 
essentially the same purpose as the conventions, include marches to 
present petitions to Diet members and to the MAF, demonstrations, 
assemblies (shükai) of farmers (smaller versions of the conventions), 
interviews on the mass media, newspaper advertisements, and the presen­
tation of 'opinions' to politicians and MAF bureaucrats. These highly 
ritualistic but sometimes unruly expressions of the 'will' of the 
nation's farmers have earned Nokyo its reputation as a pressure group.
In Japanese eyes, the production of noise and public drama is the 
defining characteristic of such organisations. The relative importance 
of the various groupings which play a crucial role in nosei katsudo 
including the conventions, the particular areas of 'issue specialisation' 
which exist amongst these internal Nokyo sub-structures, and the varying 
proportions of their agricultural policy 'load', can be gained from a 
breakdown of their activities for any one year. Table 2.4 lists the
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Nokyo groups which presented demands entitled 'resolutions', 'requests' 
and 'declarations' (ketsugi - yosei - seimei) to government for the 1977 
year, and their content. This table shows that Zenchu 's particular 
area of competence is any matter which relates to agriculture as a 
whole (for example, the MAF budget, basic agricultural policy, agricultural 
taxes etc.). Problems involving more specific areas of agriculture are 
represented by Zenchu commodity and policy headquarters and the various 
conferences of Nokyo chairmen from main commodity producing prefectures.
Presenting 'official' Nokyo demands is thus the job of certain 
select executive institutions: Zenchu\ Zenchu policy groups such as 
the central headquarters; and combined conferences of Nokyo central 
union and federation chairmen, supplemented by the Nokyo representatives' 
conventions. It is also clear that agricultural policy leadership is 
exercised by Nokyo executives at prefectural level, and is not restricted 
to those who hold positions in the central unions. The importance of 
agricultural price issues to the Nokyo marketing federations is both 
logical and apparent in the prominence of Zenno demands alongside Zenchu.
Nokyo chairmen and full-time executives, especially those at the 
head of national organisations, actually 'do the representing' on behalf 
of their members. This involves testifying to members of different 
committees and making submissions in a variety of institutional contexts. 
These include :
(a) select groups of MAF officials;
(b) government advisory councils;
(c) Parliamentary Standing Committees on Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries (Norzn Suisan Iinkai);
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(d) government and opposition party agricultural policy 
committees (particularly the LDP's Agriculture and 
Forestry Division (Borin Bukai) and its Comprehensive 
Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee (Sogo 
Nosei Chosakai);
(e) informal Diet members’ leagues (giin renmei);
(f) select groups of government party leaders;
(g) the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry (and other 
relevant ministers);
(h) the Prime Minister
At every stage of the decision-making process, Nokyo officials seek 
and obtain access to policy-makers. In the key area of agricultural 
prices, this procedure is facilitated by a large number of 'admini­
strative prices' in the agricultural field, which require set admini­
strative, consultative, and decision-making procedures to be followed 
in their determination."^
Agricultural (administrative) prices are decided by procedures
2which follow virtually the same pattern regardless of product. With 
regard to other issues in farm policy, however, there are variations 
in procedure, tactics, and the targets on which Nokyo leaders concen­
trate their pressure. In the process leading to amendments in relevant 
legislation for example, the Diet Standing Committees on Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries are an important focus of discussion.
There are price stabilisation laws relating to rice, wheat and 
other cereals, soya beans, livestock products, raw milk for processing, 
raw silk, fertiliser, starch, beets, sugar cane; and partial price 
support (usually through the medium of price stability funds) for 
animal feed, vegetables, feeder calves and Japanese mandarins (mikan) 
for processing.
2 These are examined in detail for rice, livestock and dairy products 
in Chapters 5 and 6.
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The same is true in this area, of LDP policy committees. The target 
for pressure in relation to MAF budget formulation is the MAF itself, 
and the LDP's Morin Bukai which concerns itself specifically with this 
issue.
The Nokyo 'Detached Corps': The Women's and Youth Divisions
Although it is clear from the preceding discussion that nosei 
katsudo are very much an executive-dominated activity, there are other 
groupings attached to the agricultural cooperative system, which although 
formally autonomous, assist the mainstream Nokyo organisation in the 
conduct of agricultural policy activities. They not only supplement 
the activities sponsored by Nokyo executives, they operate in this area 
on their own initiative, thereby contributing generally to the weight of 
agricultural cooperative pressure on government. These are the Nokyo 
Women's Division (Nökyö Fujinbu) and the Youth Division (Seineribu).
They are essentially promotional groups which function to enhance the 
efficiency and productivity of Nokyo's business, livelihood and agri­
cultural policy activities.
The Women's Division is organised at the grass-roots level in each 
buraku, and these buraku groupings come together in each unit nokyo.
The latter unite to form Prefectural Nokyo Women's Division Councils 
(Ken Nokyo Fugiribu Kyögikai), with some slight variation in title from 
prefecture to prefecture. The prefectural councils form a National Nokyo 
Women's Organisation Council (Zenkoku Nökyö Fug in Soshiki Kyögikai, or 
Zennöfukyö). In 1976 this brought together a substructure of 3,971
This description (betsudötai) is used by Aono Bunsaku, NdkyD:
Soshiki to Hito to Senryaku (Nokyo: Organisation, People and Strategies),
Tokyo, Daiyamondosha, 1976, p.47.
Ill
member organisations, with an individual membership of 2.6 million.'*'
This number represents 82.7 per cent of all Nokyo women members. The
financial system of the Women’s Division is theoretically independent
of the mainstream Nokyo organisation as is its executive and membership
structure, but in practice there is some degree of subsidisation by Nokyo
Its activities are conducted both independently and in concert with
Nokyo-sponsored campaigns, in the political as well as other fields.
Its overall political colouring is reputedly conservative. In 1977 its
program of campaigns included movements ’to strengthen its organisation’
2’to protect agriculture’, and 'livelihood protection activities'.
The Women’s Division also participated in the 1977 rice price campaign
by means of a ’rice price demand car relay' which began in all parts of
the country and ended at the National Nokyo Convention for Realising the
3Demanded Rice Price.
Political activities conducted by this branch of the Nokyo organis­
ation are determined by means of autonomous decision-making procedures 
within the Women's Division itself. Whether or not their demands 
coincide or conflict with those determined by Zenohu is a matter for 
their own determination. In practice, however, Zennofukyo has not been 
known publicly to disagree with the policies and demands put forward 
by the national executive leadership.
■*■ Nokyo Nenkan, 19 78, op. cit. , p . 100 
2 Ibid., p.99. Its campaign to protect agriculture involved a series 
of activities including the holding of an ’Assembly to Present Demands 
on Livestock Commodity Prices to Political Parties' (Chikusaributsu Kakaku 
Yokyu Seito Yosei Shukai) which aimed selectively at the government party 
This program of nosei katsudo, also extended to a campaign of demands by 
the permanent executives of the Zennofukyo to the Livestock Industry Pro­
motion Advisory Council.
3 Ibid.
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The same cannot be said for the Nokyo Youth Division, which gives 
more substance to its organisational independence. The Seinenbu has 
identical organisational characteristics to the Women’s Division in 
terms of both its internal structure and its relationship with the main­
stream Nokyo organisation. Buraku Youth Division units combine into 
tankyo Youth Divisions. The latter come together at prefectural level 
in the form of Prefectural Nokyo Youth Division Councils (Ken Nokyo 
Seinenbu Kyogikai) (in some prefectures the title ’youth league' (renmei) 
is used), and at the nationwide level, a National Nokyo Youth Organis­
ation Council (Zenkoku Nokyo Seinen Soshiki Kyogikai, or Zenseikyo) 
operates.
The Nokyo Youth Division has on several occasions adopted a
'confrontationist posture’ with both the Zenchu executive and the
government party. This has occurred in both nosei katsudo and in electoral
activities (senkyo katsudo).^ As a result, the Youth Division has
earned the label ’progressive’ (kakushinteki) although at its inception,
2it formally adopted a posture of political neutrality. Compared to the 
Fujinbu, however, its membership rate is inferior. It organises only 
44 per cent of its potential membership, and has only one sixteenth 
the number of members of the Women’s Division (161,122 members in 1,849
3
organisations as of 1976). Women's Divisions operate in all pre­
fectures, but in some areas, in Saitama, Gifu, Nara, Okayama and
These are examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
2 A comprehensive discussion of Seinenbu political activities can be 
found in Zenkoku Nokyo Seinen Soshiki Kyogikai, ’Nokyo Seinenbu to Seiji 
Katsudo' (National Nokyo Youth Organisation Council, ’The Nokyo Youth 
Division and Political Activities’), Chijo, August 1967, pp.88-97.
3
Nokyo Nenkan, 1978, op. cit. , p.100.
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Kagoshima for instance, there are no Youth Divisions at all. They are 
strongest in Northern Japan: in prefectures where the left wing
farmers’ unions are still active (Hokkaido, Akita, Niigata, Yamagata and 
Nagano); and in Kyushu (particularly in Kumamoto, Fukuoka, Saga and 
Miyazaki), which was the former stronghold of the National Rural Youth 
League. (The Nokyo Youth Division usurped many of the functions of 
this organisation.)
The Youth Division puts much greater effort into its agricultural 
policy activities than the Women's Division. It also incorporates agri­
cultural policy divisions within its internal organisation. It has 
rice, urban agriculture, livestock, dairy farming and fruit and vegetable 
policy councils which parallel the commodity and policy headquarters 
system of Zenchü, kenohü and so go nokyo. These committees perform the 
same function as those within the mainstream Nokyo organisation, 
although on a smaller scale. They 'accumulate' or ’pile up' (tsumiageru) 
the opinions and demands of the membership, and translate them into 
constructive policy proposals and campaigns at the national level.
In 1977 ndsei katsudd conducted by the Youth Division involved a 
series of activities along much the same lines as the Women's Division. 
The Youth Division organised a rice price car relay during the rice price 
campaign, and after the Rice Price Convention, the permanent executive 
leadership of Zenseikyö took the lead in holding three 'Request 
Assemblies' (Yosoi ShukcLt-) and 'All-party Demand Assembles (Toi-tsu Sß't'to 
Yösei Shukai), aL  which Diet politicians from each party met face-to- 
face with Youth Division delegates.^
 ^ The Youth Division, like the Women’s Division, also participated in 
the 'Campaign on Livestock Product Prices', and the permanent executive 
leadership launched a special campaign on this issue which included hold­
ing 'Assemblies to Present Requests to Political Parties . Ib'ici. , p.101.
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Like the Women's Division and Zenchü, the Youth Division holds its 
own annual national convention with an average of about 1,000 in attend­
ance. Prefectural youth divisions which are individually strong engage 
in similar activities at a regional level: organising conventions and
assembles around certain agricultural policy issues, setting up special­
ist commodity divisions, undertaking budget requests to prefectural 
assembles, and making representations to national and local public 
officials.^
Farmers' Policy Groups
Another form of executive mobilisation of rank and file in agri­
cultural policy activities takes the form of Nokyo-sponsored farmers' 
political or policy groups.
Nokyo's limitations as a political group are widely and officially 
acknowledged by its own leadership, who recognise the constraints 
imposed by their statutory obligations, and also the need to mobilise 
the farmers on certain policy issues.
One particular strategy adopted by national and prefectural agri­
cultural cooperative leaders has been to provide the organisational 
impetus for the formation of political associations (seiji kessha) or 
farmers' political leagues (nömin seiji renmei, or nöseiren), or 
farmers' federations (nömin verunei). The rationale for these groupings 
stems from what Zenchu and prefectural leaders perceive as a required 
strategy for waging successful agricultural policy activities: that is, 
the need to provide for rank and file policy participation in an 
organised context. These groups have the advantage of continuous and
9 — —These activities are discussed in full in 'Nokyo Seinenbu to Seiji
Katsudö', op. c i t pp.91-92.
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not: ad hoc operation, and they can handle a range of policy campaigns 
in succession. Just as Nokyo creates business organisations outside 
the purview of Nökyöhö, so it creates political groups to which the 
restrictions and practical limitations on the activities of the agri­
cultural cooperatives do not apply. Although these groups are not agri­
cultural cooperatives in any sense, and do not incorporate 'Nokyo' in 
their title, they are in fact entirely Nokyo-based and Nokyo-sponsored 
organisations: agricultural cooperative directors are elected to group
leadership positions; local cooperatives provide office space; national 
and prefectural Nokyo organisations offer guidance in policy activities; 
and agricultural cooperative members become group members (although on a 
strictly voluntary basis). Finance for these organisations comes from 
members' subscriptions, fund-raising campaigns, and funds supplied by 
Nokyo organisations through the use of such budgetary channels as 
'expenses for activities' and 'miscellaneous expenses'.
Many Nokyo-sponsored farmers' policy groups have a brief and un­
noteworthy history, often linked to a particular issue, election, or 
regional problem. A more permanent and substantial series of organis­
ations, however, were established in the latter half of the 1950s, with 
dual electoral and agricultural policy objectives. Tactically, these 
two functions were highly complementary: electing supportive candidates
to all levels of political office was viewed as an effective way of 
getting policies realised, in addition to purely pressure group-type 
activity.
One of the dominant concerns of these farmers' political leagues 
was the issue of urbanisation. They were identified by one writer as 
part of a rural, grass-roots 'populist' movement emerging from the 'deep
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sense of resentment towards urbanization in the villages',"*“ and the 
desire to ensure the representation of rural interests in the new 
cities, towns, and villages created by local government amalgamations 
(shichoson gappei) of the 1950s. A number of prefectural governors were 
elected in the expectation that they would slow the pace of urbanisation 
and ameliorate its pernicious effects on rural communities.
In 1960, the national Nokyo leadership decided to capitalise on 
these prefecturally-based developments by advocating the establishment 
of a movement involving the mobilisation of Nokyo member farmers nation­
wide. To this they gave the title 'Mobilisation of the Farmers'
. . - 0Political Power' (Nomin no Sezjiryoku Kesshu). The 196$ National Nokyo 
Convention was chosen as the venue for launching this movement nation­
wide, and a resolution was passed to this effect. With this push from 
the centre, and with further initiatives from prefectural Nokyo leaders, 
farmers ' political leagues were set up in prefectures where none already 
existed. In October 1960, Zenchü decided to amalgamate all these dis­
parate regional groupings into a national umbrella organisation, the
National Farmers' Political League (Zenkoku Nomin Seiji Renmei, or
2 _
Zennoseinen). In 1963, the Zennoserren amalgamated with the National
Farmers' Federation (Zenkoku Nomin Renmei, or Zenridren), which was the 
organisational remnant of the National Rural Youth League, to form the 
National Farmers' General Federation (Zenkoku Nomin Sorenmei, or 
Zennösören) which continued to operate henceforth as Nokyo's political 
offshoot.
Takeshi Ishida, 'Organizations and Symbols in Contemporary Politics:
A Political Scientist's View of Postwar Japan', Annals of the Institute 
of Social Science, No.20, 1979, p.129.
n —
Not to be confused with the National Rural Youth League (Zennoseiven) 
mentioned earlier.
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The primary function of both the national and prefectural branches 
of this organisation was to act as the 'advance corps' of the Nokyo 
electorate (senkyo botai)^  which represented the strongest aspect of 
activities. Another was to operate as the 'lynch pin' (kaname) of 
joint Nokyo agricultural policy struggles with the farmers' unions 
(Ze?inichino and Zenriö) .
The general policy concerns of the Zenriösöven were agricultural
prices, and according to one description, it 'took the initiative in the
2price war for each agricultural commodity'. It also played an import­
ant role in other farmers' campaigns, such as the 'movement to protect 
lands' {tochi o mamovu undo) , which sought to retain the farmers' use 
of common lands with demands for compensation when this was disallowed.
A specific target of opposition was the buying up of agricultural land 
by developers who turned it into housing estates and factory land. The 
Zennosoren also became involved in opposition to agricultural trade
liberalisation, and the application of residential taxes to urban agri- 
3cultural land.
Centre Versus Periphery
Although these regional, Nokyo-based farmers' political leagues 
have been utilised by the national agricultural cooperative leadership 
to present to government the appearance of widespread local farmer 
support for Zenchit's demands, they have also been vehicles for the 
political ambitions of prefectural Nokyo leaders. Most of these groups 
originated in conferences of prefecture-wide agricultural cooperative
Okamoto, op. cit., p.44.
2 Okamoto, op. cit., p.45.
3 Ibid.
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chairmen. The latter contributed the initial impetus to their estab­
lishment and the energy for their continued functioning. This was 
especially true of the electoral activities of these groups.
There exists a very strong feeling amongst prefectural Nokyo 
leaders that Japanese agricultural policy is too much the product of 
Tokyo-based bureaucrats, and too often the outcome of a compromise 
worked out between government representatives and Zenchü leaders. Local 
grievances, they argue, tend to be ignored in the effort to apply 
’national’ solutions to problems. The result is that regional differ­
ences emerge diluted from the melting pot of national agricultural 
policy formulation. The spur to action amongst many prefecturally- 
based farmers' political leagues has been a desire to present to 
government and their own national Nokyo leadership insights into the 
needs of farmers in particular areas. In many respects, the character­
istic feature of these local political movements has been their anti­
centrist, anti-bureaucratic stance. Although these groups have 
willingly participated in farmers’ campaigns ([ridmin undo) organised 
and defined by the Zenchü leadership, duly recognising the need for 
unified national action on such policies as the rice price, the MAF 
budget, agricultural taxes, and opposition to the liberalisation of 
agricultural trade, they have also called for an emphasis in nosei 
katsudö on what they term 'daily activities' (nichijö katsudo). This 
involves eliciting the feelings and demands of the farmers in the 
buraku.1 The prefectural farmers’ political leagues with their policy
Nagase Meitoku, 'Nosei Kyogikai no Kaiso to Nosei Domei no Kessei’ 
(The Reorganisation of the Agricultural Policy Council and the Form­
ation of the Agricultural Policy League), Nögyö Kyödö Kumiai, Vol.19,
No.2, February 1973, p.54.
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orientation often built around local issues and grievances were in an 
ideal position to perform this function, thus helping to restructure 
the balance in ndsei katsudo from national to local. The strength of 
localism was often behind the electoral successes of the farmers' 
leagues.^
Many local Nokyo leaders have strong feelings of alienation towards 
Zenchü and particularly its bureaucracy staffed by salaried white- 
collared officials. The latter are sometimes viewed as out of touch and 
out of sympathy with local agricultural conditions and farmer grievances. 
This dispute is sometimes phrased in terms of 'democracy versus 
bureaucracy'. Democratic management amongst the farmers tends to be 
equated with responsiveness to the demands and needs of cooperative 
members, not the needs of Nokyo.
The centre versus periphery cleavage runs through Nokyo the length
and breadth of Japan. The alienation of rank and file from Zenchü was
aggravated in the decade after 1969 by what rice farming members of the
agricultural cooperatives saw as the capitulation of the national Nokyo
leadership to the government's policy on freezing the producer rice
price, instituting rice production adjustment, and the changeover to
2indirect controls on rice marketing. Some regions of Japan (the 
generally less prosperous single-crop producing areas of Töhoku for 
example) suffered the negative effects of these policies much more 
acutely than the warmer, double-cropping and more diversified farming 
areas of Western Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu. Single-crop rice farmers 
felt that they had been sold out by a leadership willing to compromise
These are examined in detail in Chapter 3.
This debacle is examined more closely in Chapter 5.
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its basic protective function in exchange for the maintenance of special 
concessions to the cooperatives under the Food Control System. This 
produced a paradoxical situation where the government and the central 
Nokyo leadership hammered out a mutually acceptable policy in Tokyo, 
only to have it opposed by local executives and rank and file in many 
rural areas. The hardest task facing Zenohu leaders in this situation 
was not to obtain the government's acceptance of their policy proposals, 
but to convince local agricultural cooperative members to cooperate 
with a negotiated policy outcome.
Staging a full-scale revolt against the national Nokyo leader­
ship is not, however, an easy task. Redress for those in opposition to 
the central executive on any particular issue is limited. Operating 
outside the framework of Nokyo's official nosei katsudö requires an 
independent power base. The main weaknesses of local farmers' 
movements, including the farmers' political leagues, are membership 
apathy and lack of funds. Holding conventions and assemblies of 
farmers requires finance. If these activities are to be conducted 
without direct Nokyo organisational and monetary backing, funds have to 
be collected by the farmers themselves solely through subscriptions 
and fund-raising campaigns. Unlike the cooperatives, groups outside 
the cooperative system lack a solid financial base and are totally 
reliant on the good will and interest of their membership. Even the 
Nokyo-based farmers' political leagues are forced to rely on subsidies 
from the cooperatives which restrict the freedom of action of their 
leadership. They commonly depend on a combination of membership fees 
and subsidies or 'donations' from the ohuokai. They are also dependent 
on fluctuating levels of activism and apathy amongst their membership, 
inherently an ephemeral and unreliable source of support.
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Another factor increasing both the psychological and geographic 
distance between agricultural cooperative members and the Nokyo leader­
ship strata has been the highly successful program of 'amalgamation’ 
(gappei) begun in the early 'sixties. Amalgamation both reduced the 
total number of agricultural cooperatives (general-purpose and 
specialist) and expanded the membership quota in each group.
Between 1967 and 1977, this process halved the number of cooperatives 
in Japan from 20,651 to 10,687. Soad nökyö numbers declined from 7,209 
to 4,473. Specialist cooperatives were reduced even more drastically 
from 13,442 to 5,924.1 In many villages, the local co-op disappeared, 
to be replaced by a more modern, bureaucratised and streamlined version 
in a distant town, which serviced a number of villages. These develop­
ments undermined the close contacts and relationships between farmers 
and tankyö that previously existed everywhere. The co-op was an 
'institution' in the village. Not surprisingly many farmers began to 
feel isolated from their own organisation and to experience an 
unprecedented degree of alienation from what they regarded as a distant, 
unresponsive Nokyo leadership.
There are, however, three factors which offset this tendency. One 
is the three-tier executive election system whereby all nationally 
elected executives are selected from among currently serving prefectural 
executives, which are likewise elected from among currently serving local 
Nokyo officials. This means that each national Nokyo elected executive 
concurrently holds a position at the prefectural and local level. This 
maintains a constant and direct decision-making link amongst all levels 
of the federated Nokyo organisation.
1 Nokyo Nenkan, 1978, op. cit. , p.403.
3
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Co-operative principles'.1 Local co-op leaders tend to be more thoroughly 
imbued with the cooperative spirit not only because the scale of their 
business and financial operations is smaller than the prefectural and 
national federations, but also because of the need to stimulate the 
loyalty and support of local farmer members to the cooperatives by means 
of attachment to the mutual self-help ideology. This helps keep the 
tankyd economically viable.
Tliis principle also seems to operate in reverse. Farmers feel the
greatest amount of loyalty to their local co-op, with a sharp decline
occurring the higher up the Nokyo organisation one goes. Dore wrote:
'The federations, indeed excite the least loyalty of all; they tend
rather to be part of ’the authorities' whose interest conflict, rather
2than coincide, with the farmers . . .'. To some extent the 'business 
versus cooperativism' cleavage that divides Nokyo coincides with the 
'centre versus periphery' cleavage. It also extends beyond agricultural 
policy and into the area of cooperative economic functions. The basic 
problem is that the perceived 'needs' of farmers and the imperatives 
and goals of agricultural cooperative management are frequently at odds, 
and the principal management objectives of the various levels of the 
cooperative organisation are also at variance. Much of the criticism 
of the business-minded orientation of the big Nokyo federations comes 
from local farmers. They object to being treated as potential consumers 
of keizairen-distributed products and Zenkyöven insurance rather than as 
agricultural managers, and there have been a number of complaints against
Ronald P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan, London, Oxford University 
Press, 1966, pp.291-292.
2
Ibid., p. 291.
Secondly, there is the notion of equitable geographic distribution 
of executive positions in national federations and Z&YickiU.. The nation 
is divided up into a series of regions: Hokkaido-Töhoku, Kantö, Shinshü
fokai-Hokuriku, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu, and executive 
representation is guaranteed from each.
Thirdly, there are the internal organisational reforms of the 
1970s allowing the tankyo to become direct members of Zenchü, in 
addition to their indirect membership through the prefectural central 
unions . This allows local—level cooperatives direct representation in 
Nokyo's national policy-making organisation.
Business Versus Cooperativism
The centre versus periphery cleavage has an economic as well as a 
political dimension. This has taken the form of a second ideological 
cleavage within the agricultural cooperatives: between the imperatives
of successful business operations and the cooperative spirit.
The psychological ’gap* between leadership and membership has been 
heightened by Nokyo’s tremendous expansion in the financial and business 
fields. This has led to accusations that those who run the agricultural 
cooperatives, particularly upper level federation leaders, have sold 
their souls to the profit motive, forgotten basic principles and 
abandoned the spirit of the Nokyo Law. Dore noted in the early ’fifties 
that 'The federations tend . . . to be the weakest links in the system. 
With some exceptions, the higher up the village-prefecture-national 
chain one goes the smaller the sense of responsibility to the individual
Co-operative member, the greater the semi-official-enterprise character 
of the organization, and the weaker any conscious adherence to
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the high-pressure salesmanship techniques of Nokyo officials who have 
an eye to increasing cooperative business turnover. There is also the 
feeling amongst some farmers that cooperative preoccupation with 
business and 'economics' leads to a neglect of other duties more vital 
to the farmers such as agricultural extension services.
In many respects, the existence of a 'business versus cooperative' 
cleavage within Nokyo is an inevitable by-product of its fundamentally 
contradictory organisational principles- between cooperativism 
and economic enterprise. There is also a historical side to this 
problem. As Nokyo increasingly attained 'giant enterprise' status, its 
primary 'cooperative' face began to take a secondary position as an 
organisational objective. Nokyo's cooperative spirit was much stronger 
in the 1950s than in the 1960s and stronger in the 1960s than in the 
1970s. Even now, however, there are appeals both within and without 
Nokyo to 'get back to basics' (kyödö kumia.'i no genten ni kaere) ,^  
particularly to the Rochdale spirit of cooperativism and anti­
commercialism from which the first Japanese cooperative adherents took 
their ideological cue.
Nokyo officials have defended their economic and business priorities 
by pointing out that increased prosperity for Nokyo is to the greater 
benefit of all farmers, and produces higher standards of living in the 
agricultural sector as a whole. One writer has argued, however, that 
the funds generated by Nokyo profits have not been ploughed back into 
rural areas in the form of long-term, low interest loans to farmers for 
capital investment (these are largely supplied by government agriculture,
The debate on this subject was at its height in the early 1970s. 
Details are reported in Arai Yoshio, 'Kyodo Kumiai Genten Rongi no Yukue' 
(Where the Debate Stands on the Fundamentals of Cooperative Unionism) , 
Ndrin Keizai, June 28, 1973, pp.2-7.
125
forestry and fisheries finance institutions). On the contrary, more
than half those excess funds have been channeled into the more lucrative
fields of loans to 'related' industries and the purchase of securities.^
He described the role of Nokyo banks as 'pipes to siphon money out of
the rural communities', adding: 'The net effect is a growing tendency
for the cooperatives' financial agencies to drain money from the village
2without replacing it'. He appealed for Nokyo to 'give the farmer
priority. It must never forget that it exists for his benefit and not
3for the sake of creating a new zaibatsu'.
Policy-Sharing
The existence of internal organisational cleavages, some of which 
have been examined above, make it difficult for Nokyo to 'speak with one 
voice' on behalf of all farmers. The policy demands presented by ZenchTi's 
leaders to government can at best only coincide with the wishes of certain 
sections of its membership. Nokyo executives have commented themselves 
that one of their hardest tasks is to overcome the mutual distrust amongst 
the different levels of the organisation caused by such factors as 
differences of emphasis in business, differences in scale of organisation, 
and regional differences among agricultural cooperatives and federations 
of agricultural cooperatives. They have to strike a compromise policy 
which will satisfy competing interests within Nokyo and yet be workable 
within the limits of existing policy and therefore acceptable to govern­
ment. Nokyo's all-embracing character and nationwide orientation makes 
this standard a difficult one to attain. In other words, what at first
KöTchi Nishimoto, 'Nokyo: Pressure from the Co-ops', The Japan
Interpreter, trans. by V. Dixon Morris, Vol.7, 3-4, Sum-Aut 1972, p.328.
Ibid.
3 Ibid., p . 331.
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sight would appear to be one of the principle strengths of the agri­
cultural cooperative system emerges as an in-built organisational 
weakness. Nokyo, although a single unified body, is in fact an umbrella 
institution and a complex amalgam of diverse interests. In reality, 
it is also a much more politically decentralised organisation than would 
appear from a reading of Agricultural Cooperative Union Law, which places 
leadership of nösei katsudö so squarely on the shoulders of the central 
unions. Nokyo's political leadership at the national level is not con­
fined to the activities of Zenchü's executives. There are other 
executive structures within Nokyo that present alternative or 'additional' 
policy leadership for groupings within the agricultural cooperative 
organisation.
The basis of recent developments in this area has been Nokyo's 
extension of its octopus-like spread over the entire agricultural economy 
and the expansion of its volume of business. Both have dramatically 
multiplied the numbers of policy-related problems on which Zenchü has 
been required to make representations. Additional laws and amendments 
have been passed to allow Nokyo organisations to assume a greater variety 
of functions, and the issues generated as a result have proved too vast 
in range and complex in content for the Zenchü organisation to be able 
to handle alone. The outcome has been an encroachment into the area of 
agricultural policy activities by other Nokyo organisations. The 
rationale for these operations has been that each Nokyo national 
organisation conducts nösei katsudö which relate solely to its own 
business and spheres of activity, on the grounds that its knowledge of 
its own affairs best enables it to represent its own interests. We find 
therefore that policy-related activities have been incorporated into the 
planned range of operations and even the internal structural forms of
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other top Nokyo bureaucratic organisations: Chukin, Zenno and Zenkyoren,
'which depending on the issue come into action independently as well as 
being mobilised by Zenohu.
What these policy representations have in common is that in each 
case, they involve matters which are the specific concern of a particular 
cooperative organisation. In this sense, these other Nokyo federations 
are not taking over the job of Zenchu but merely supplementing it in 
their own specialised fields. Furthermore, the nosei katsudo of groups 
other than Zenchu tend not to encroach on the traditional spheres of central 
union activity such as the sponsorship of national conventions and other 
sorts of mass action. By and large they are confined to fairly low key 
administrative contact, and to testifying before Parliamentary and party 
committees concerned with particular aspects of legislation. Of course, 
the leaders of all prefectural and national federations also represent 
their organisations and participate in the joint chairmen's conferences 
which are an integral feature of Nokyo's nosei katsudo. Those conferences 
issue policy 'demands', 'requests' and 'submissions' as was noted earlier 
in the chapter, but they are always collective affairs and are in many 
cases under the guidance of the chuokai executives present. The sort of 
specialised nosei katsudo discussed above involves the federations as 
separate and individual groupings acting on their own behalf instead of 
being represented by Zenchu via their membership of the National Central 
Unions.
In many cases policy-related functions have been formally incorpor- 
ated into the organisational structure of the federations by means of
Yamaji, op. cit., p.239. For example, Zenno in 1973 put forward its 
own program of countermeasures to cope with the sudden price jump in feed 
grains. It suggested a diversion of very old rice in storage into this 
area. Chukin customarily conducts its own campaigns on amendments to its 
governing legislation, the Covin Chuo Kinkoho. Zenkyoven for its part, 
appeals to government on the application of general insurance regulations 
to agricultural cooperative mutual aid operations.
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policy divisions. Zenriö for instance, has a 'Policy-Making Department 
for Rice and Wheat' within its Rice and Wheat Division, a 'Policy-Making 
Department for Horticultural and Agricultural Production' within its 
Horticulture and Farm Produce Division, and a 'Policy-Making Department 
for Feedstuff and Livestock' within its 'Feedstuff and Livestock 
Division' .
In a sense each of these national Nokyo federations has a membership 
base of equal size to Zenchü. The farmers through their membership of 
the agricultural cooperatives are linked to each type of national Nokyo 
organisation.
The Generalist Versus Specialist Cleavage
The greatest challenge to Zenchü's policy leadership has come from 
the national specialist federations. This phenomenon has an historical 
aspect insofar as it relates to the gradual government-imposed, de­
emphasis on rice production combined with the selective expansion of 
Japanese agriculture under the guidance of the Agriculture Basic Law of 
]961. Those specialist federations which have expanded most vigorously 
into the policy field are those operating in the growth sectors of 
Japan's farm industry: the livestock (including dairying) and horti­
cultural (especially fruit) sectors. This development has been 
substantially assisted by the passage of additional laws relating to 
different commodities as the agricultural price support system has been 
extended to include greater numbers of products.
A further reason for the increasingly conspicuous policy activities 
of the national specialist federations was the emergence of an anti­
liberalisation movement amongst Japanese farmers in the face of the 
growing trend in the late 'sixties and 'seventies for freer access to
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the Japanese market for overseas agricultural products. In response to 
this vital policy development in Japanese trade relations, the national 
federations representing those farm industries facing competition from 
imports (particularly the livestock, dairy and fruit sectors) became 
openly involved in agricultural policy activities. Their motivation was 
essentially defensive: a feeling that the specialist interests of their
members had to be protected at a particularly vital time.
The push towards agricultural trade liberalisation in government 
took place at the same time as positive de-controls were instituted in 
the Food Control system. These accompanied even more sensitive changes 
in rice policy such as the producers’ rice price freeze and rice pro­
duction cutbacks. Zenchu and Zennö (the national cooperative federation 
in charge of marketing rice to government) responded to these policy 
changes with a strategic concentration of energies into policy activities 
opposing changes in Food Control. They laid themselves open to the 
accusation from specialist cooperatives that their overwhelming concern 
with rice led them to neglect the vital concerns of specialist farmers.
There is the additional question of the extent to which the pre- 
fectural central unions and Zenchu can be said formally to represent the 
interests of the specialist cooperatives. The rate of affiliation of 
senmon nökyö in the prefectural central unions and ZenchTi is extremely 
low.^ Their primary affiliation is to their own prefectural specialist 
federations. As the latter are members of Zenchü, this is the only link 
for the vast majority of specialist nökyö to the Zenchu system.
As of 1977, there were 4,883 tankyö members of kenchü and the 
National Central Union. Only 120 of these were specialist agricultural 
cooperatives. Nökyö Nenkan, 1978, op. cit., p.132.
2 In March 1976, there were 17 national federation members of Zenchu. 
Of these 15 were specialist federations, including Zenyöven, Zenvakuven 
and Nichzenren.
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The line of affiliation between the specialist tankyo and Zenchu 
is therefore a very indirect one.
For the sögö nökyö, the line of affiliation is direct. They are 
members of both kenchü and Zenchu. The poor rate of membership of the 
specialist agricultural cooperatives in the central union system1 is 
substantiated by figures for the amount of 'guidance' and 'auditing' 
services undertaken by the kenchü for tankyo members. In 1976, they 
audited the accounts of 1,323 sögö nökyö and only 36 senmon nökyö.
In the same year, Zenchu undertook auditing for 10 sögö nökyö and no 
senmon nökyö.
Specialist agricultural cooperatives also lack financial functions, 
and this is an additional factor in their inferior status in the Nokyo 
system and the dominance of the general-purpose agricultural coopera­
tives. The specialist co-ops are forced to go to the sögö nökyö to 
request credit.
Certain features of the senmon nökyö, however, endow them with 
strengths which the sögö nökyö do not possess. The specialist coopera­
tives vastly outnumber the general-purpose cooperatives, and as they 
have developed their capacities in the marketing of 'specialist' 
commodities, increasing numbers of them have become capital-stock 
cooperatives. The changing figures for capital-stock specialist nokyo 
are set out in Table 2.5.
Affiliation of se>vvon nokyo to credit and economic federations is, 
however, much higher.
2 Nokyo Nenkan, 1978, op. c z t . , p.142-143. One factor accounting for 
the low rate of auditing in the specialist cooperatives is the fact that 
a majority as non-capital stock cooperatives (hishusshi kumiai) do not 
require it.
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Table 2.5
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF CAPITAL-STOCK 
SPECIALIST COOPERATIVES FOR DIFFERENT YEARS
Year Number Percentage
1950 19,787 18.3
1960 17,682 30
1970 11,420 41
1977 5,924 45
Source: Nökyö Nenkan, 1978, p.403.
The sögö nökyö have a strong geographic focus as regional 
cooperatives, which gather together all the farmers within a particular 
area. The senmon nökyö, on the other hand, are product- and activity- 
oriented. Their respective principles of organisation are therefore 
entirely different. 'The former enrolls all farm households in a given 
geographic area, regardless of the crops they raise, while the latter 
accepts those who grow specific crops no matter where they live.'^ This 
difference between the two types of agricultural cooperatives is mani­
fested in the concrete physical sense insofar as the areas which 
specialist cooperatives service do not coincide with those of the 
general-purpose cooperatives. Specialist farmers generally belong to 
both types of organisation, which opens up the question of divided 
loyalties. Membership ties to the specialist cooperatives are often 
stronger than those to the general-purpose cooperatives, because they 
are more focussed on a particular product or activity.
1 Nishimoto, op. cit., p.326.
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The principal areas of contention between the generalist and 
specialist side of Nokyo can be summed up as follows: problems of
overlapping membership, intersecting areal boundaries, and the 
traditional emphasis of Zenchü 's n ö se i katsudo on maintaining Food 
Control and fighting for ever higher producer rice prices. The 
latter, in addition to the poor rate of affiliation of specialist 
nökyö to the central unions has led to a conviction amongst specialist 
cooperatives that they must assume responsibility for policy-related 
activities .
There has, however, been a far more serious area of conflict 
between the general-purpose and specialist sides of the Nokyo organis­
ation. This has involved marketing, especially where both types of 
cooperative handle the same products within a given area. As the 
consumer demand for rice and the production of non-rice grain crops 
has declined, the so go nokyo have attempted to expand their marketing 
activities in other more specialist areas of Japanese agriculture. In 
consequence, the sermon iwkyö have felt under increasing threat of 
encroachment into their own commodity areas. In some localities, 
rivalry between the two sides of the Nokyo organisation has become 
open competition, compounded by the resentment amongst the specialist 
co ops against the type of conflict resolution applied by the oh.uökcL'i 
in this sort of situation. There has been a tendency to adjust con- 
fliets of this kind by advocating the extension of general-purpose 
business and the contraction of the specialist cooperative share.
Another related problem in the field of marketing has been the
development of close ties between specialist cooperatives and non- 
cooperative marketing and supply business groups outside the Nokyo system.
This has been viewed by the general-purpose side of the organisation
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as undermining the strength of the agricultural cooperatives as a 
whole. In response, they have poured a substantial amount of pressure, 
finance, and managerial expertise into developing cooperative farming 
complexes (eind danchi) . These are particularly strong in the live­
stock and horticultural sectors/ in addition to rice. The aim of these 
agricultural management projects has been to strengthen and integrate 
agricultural cooperative production, processing, marketing, distri­
bution and retailing functions in opposition to the private trade.
Where rivalry between the general-purpose and specialist coopera­
tives has become intense over the marketing and control of a particular 
product in a particular area, political steps have been taken by both 
sides to get their interests represented more powerfully. In Ehime
Prefecture for example, 'the two camps actually ran separate candidates
2for the governorship in a bitter electoral campaign'.
Another political technique which the specialist branch of Nokyo
has developed more keenly, is the formation of close associations
with informal LDP Diet members' leagues (gi-in renmei), whose membership
is dominated by politicians from constituencies in which specialist
farming is concentrated. These leagues act as internal pressure groups
both within party policy-making circles and in the Diet. Some of their
strongest operations have been launched on behalf of the anti-
3liberalisationis ts.
The specialist versus generalist cleavage represents an institutional­
ised conflict relationship within the agricultural cooperative organis­
ation. It is built into the system in the sense that it receives official
 ^ These are discussed more fully in Chapter 6.
2 Nishimoto, op. cit. , p.327.
3 See Chapter 6.
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recognition in the provision of separate structural divisions catering 
to different interests, and some degree of functional specialisation 
amongst the cooperatives. This differentiation of internal structural 
forms has a dual purpose : it allows for both the expression and con­
tainment of conflict. Competition between different sections of the 
same organisation is openly acknowledged and therefore managed through 
legitimate channels. This is the theory at least. Occasions where 
competition has spilt over into direct confrontation between opposing 
groups has been the exception rather than the rule. In the last ten 
years, however, there have been increasing signs that containment of 
specialist versus generalist rivalry within Nokyo has become more 
difficult for the Zenchü leadership. Where this has manifested itself 
most clearly has been in the political arena where the national 
specialist federations have assumed a growing amount of Zenchü's 
political prerogative.
Rural Versus Urban Interests
Changes in Nokyo's social and economic environment have presented 
the national agricultural cooperative leadership with yet another problem 
of internal adjustment. Suburban encroachment into the countryside and 
the gradual urbanisation of rural areas has produced a division of 
interests within the organisation between urban-consumer members and 
rural—farmer members. In some areas ’the number of farmers has decreased 
to such an extent that the farm population alone is incapable of 
supporting any business’. The decline in Nokyo s agriculture-related 
activities in the most rapidly urbanising regions serviced by the co-ops, 
has forced them to develop their purely financial and business operations
1 Nishimoto, op. cit., p.323.
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in order to survive. They have assumed the character more of regional 
or local financial and service organisations than farmers' groups.
This has produced an underlying change of emphasis in the whole Nokyo 
system as increasing numbers of agricultural cooperative executives 
have adjusted to their new economic imperatives and adapted their 
cooperative services to cater to the needs of urban residents. The 
changing balance of urban versus rural interests within Nokyo is illus­
trated in Table 2.6. It indicates that in spite of the amalgamation 
program, the number of co-ops in 'urbanised rural areas' declined only 
marginally between 1966 and 1973, while those in 'genuine rural' and 
'remote rural areas' decreased substantially.
Table 2.6
THE CHANGING BALANCE BETWEEN RURAL AND URBAN COOPERATIVES
Year
No. of Co-ops 
in Genuine 
Rural Areas
No. of Co-ops 
in Remote 
Rural Areas
No. of Co-ops 
in Urbanised 
Rural Areas
1966 4,396 857 1,507
1973 2,9 36 657 1,504
-1,460 -200 -3
Source: Norinsho, Norin Keizai Kyoku, Nögyö Kyödö Kumiaika, Sdgd Nokyo
Tdkeihyo (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Agriculture and 
Forestry Economics Bureau, Agricultural Cooperative Union 
Section, A Statistical Table of General-Purpose Agricultural 
Cooperatives), 1971, p.2, and 1974, p.2.
There are, however, in-built safeguards in Nokyo Law which guarantee 
the supremacy of farming over urban interests within the organisation. 
Non-farming residents who live in areas serviced by the co-ops are granted 
only associate membership which carries no voting or election rights.
In addition, executive control remains firmly in the hands of Nokyo's 
farming members. Article 30, Paragraph 10 of Nokyo Law states that 'at 
least three quarters of the established number of the directors of a 
cooperative shall be of its membership (excluding associate members)'.^
Nevertheless the changing balance between cooperatives in highly 
urbanised areas in which Nokyo exists practically as a bank or insurance 
company, and those in remote farming areas, has produced a tremendous 
disparity of interest between the least urbanised and the most rural 
nökyö. Zenchü is faced with hammering out policy requests which are, 
for example, equally responsive to the needs of agricultural cooperative 
members in Yokohama City and the remote mountain villages of Fukushima.
Conclusion
The central theme of this chapter has been the conduct of Nokyo's 
agricultural policy activities: the quality of democratic input from
agricultural cooperative members; the formal structures charged with 
agricultural policy-making and policy representation within the organis­
ation; and how the system actually operates in practice. Several con­
clusions emerged from this analysis. The conduct of agricultural policy 
activities is an executive-dominated function with rank-and-file 
participation most often in the form of executive-sponsored exercises 
such as the mass conventions of Nokyo representatives and farmers' 
political leagues. Zenchü's domination of the agricultural policy 
process is still very much in evidence, although it has come under 
increasing challenge in the last decade. Its difficulties in policy 
formulation have been compounded by the development of a number of
136
1 Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaiho', op. cit., p.118.
internal cleavages within the Nokyo organisation. These have been 
analysed in terms of a set of competing interests: centre versus
periphery, business versus cooperativism, general versus specialist, 
and urban versus rural. In the face of these diverse intra- 
organisational pressures, Zenohu has a mammoth task of containment 
and adjustment to maintain organisational unity and strength in its 
presentation of policy demands to government.
NOKYO AND ELECTIONS
138
CHAPTER 3
THE POLITICAL ALIGNMENT OF NOKYO'S DIET MEMBERSHIP, 1949-1977
One of Nokyo's strategic activities as an interest group is the 
election of its own officials to the Diet.
The promotion of group leaders to national and local government 
office as representatives of specific sectional interests is standard 
practice amongst Japanese organisations.^ In this respect the agri­
cultural cooperatives exhibit features which are common to a large 
number of Japanese voluntary associations. The sense in which this 
custom differs from the norm in Western democratic systems lies in the 
extent to which primarily non-political organisations seek national 
political representation in this manner, and the relatively large pro­
portion of Japanese Diet politicians who maintain explicit organis­
ational ties .
The Japanese model also implies a much greater degree of allegiance 
on the part of interest group leaders to their original organisation.
This characteristic derives not only from the custom amongst Japanese 
Diet members of combining professional roles in outside organisations 
with Parliamentary careers, but the extent of their reliance on 
organised group backing for voting support. This produces a degree of 
policy 'debt’ which exceeds that normally observed in Western systems 
between Parliamentary representative and constituent. Organisational 
definition of policy demands is consequently much greater.
This particular feature of Japanese interest group behaviour has been 
identified by a number of Western analysts including William E. Steslicke, 
Doctors in Politics: The Political Life of the Japan Medical Association,
New York, Praeger, 1973; and Donald R. Thurston, Teachers and Politics in 
Japan, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973.
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Nokyo incorporated a tradition of direct political representation in 
national (and local) politics from the time of its re-establishment in 
1947. The numbers of Diet members representing the prewar farmers’ 
associations and the producer cooperatives increased from the beginning of 
the twentieth century until 19)3, there were forty nine officials of the 
sangyo kumiai in the Diet. This constituted 11 per cent of total Diet 
membership.^
This chapter addresses itself primarily to a series of questions 
which relates to the issue of party allegiance. With what political 
groupings have Nokyo’s Diet members aligned themselves? Measured in terms 
of the party affiliations of its representatives, does Nokyo conform to 
the stereotype of a ’conservative’ farm organisation? Since the form­
ation of the LDP in 1953, has it been an exclusive appendage of the 
government party in the countryside?
The approach is generally historical: the analysis seeks to identify
discernible trends in the political composition of Nokyo's Diet represent­
ation over time. It includes a survey of early attempts by agricultural 
cooperative Diet leaders to set up a Japanese farmers’ party. Later 
sections examine the foundation of Nokyo-based farmers’ political leagues 
which concentrated their efforts on mobilising support for the election 
of Nokyo officials. The period under review extends from the first post­
war election in 1946 to the Lower House election of 1977.
At the same time, they occupied 39 per cent of the seats in pre- 
fectural assemblies. These figures were obtained from Takeshi Ishida, 
Interest Groups in Japan, Monograph, n.d., p.22. The custom of direct 
representation of cooperative interests in the Diet was greatly encour­
aged by the anti-cooperative movement launched by private enterprise in 
the 1930s. This forced the cooperatives to safeguard their interests 
by increasing their Diet representation. The membership of this national 
political institution was, by and large, anti-cooperative.
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'Nokyo Diet Member1 Defined
For purposes of analysis, the category of Nokyo Diet member (/Ilokyo
giin) is defined restrictively to denote a Parliamentarian who has at one
time held an official position within the Nokyo organisation (executive
or staff), including the post of advisor (komon) (a category often
reserved for politicians); but not including those who have been
cooperative union members (kumiaiin) . This definition incorporates those
Qeswkx.
who hold Diet office concurrently with Nokyo positions {Nokyo gonyaku) 
and those who have held them prior to entry into Parliament.^ The number 
of Nokyo officials in the Diet at any one time will be smaller than the 
total number of Nokyo Diet members thus defined, because a certain pro­
portion relinquish their agricultural cooperative leadership roles on 
entry into national politics. This definition does not take into account
individuals who took up Nokyo positions after holding Diet office, nor
2officials of the 100 or so Nokyo-related groups with which the 
cooperatives maintain formal ties. The value of such a restrictive 
definition, however, is that it enables the researcher to reach finite 
conclusions about the political character of Nokyo Diet members as a group.
The validity of these criteria were confirmed by the results of a 
questionnaire distributed to members of the Diet members' organisation 
attached to Nokyo: the Agricultural Policy Research Association (Nosei
Kenkyukai). The questionnaire was distributed in November 1976 and May 
1977. Respondents were asked whether they considered themselves to be 
Nökyö giin. Replies accorded with the above definition in 87 per cent 
of cases.
These are listed in Zenkoku Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Yakushokuin Renmei, 
Nögyö Kyödö Kumiai Rengdkai Yakushokuin Meibo(National Agricultural 
Cooperative Union Executive and Staff Members' League, Agricultural 
Cooperative Union Federations' Executive and Staff Membership List), 
1976, Tokyo, Kyodo Kunmai Tsushinsha, pp.4-8. The best known amongst 
these are the Central Cooperative Bank for Agriculture and Forestry, and 
the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation.
1 Al
This chapter attempts an historical treatment of the party member­
ship characteristics of this group between 1949 and 1977^ with an 
introductory section on the political representation of pre-Nokyo
agricultural organisations. Data are organised into a series of time 
2
frames: 1946 to 1955, 1955 to 1967, and 1967 to 1977. The criteria
for this periodisation are based on fundamental shifts in the national 
political environment as recorded in changes in the electoral performance 
of political parties, and in party organisation. The chapter focusses 
on the interrelationship between this changing political environment and 
the nature of Nokyo representation. Historically significant trends in 
the character of Nokyo's political affiliations in the national Diet are 
identified together with the establishment of certain patterns of party 
support.
This covers the period until July 1977, including the Upper House 
elections in that month.
2 Nokyo was not formally established until December 1947. There were 
three Diet elections prior to this: a joint Diet election in April 1946;
and the first House of Councillors’ and House of Representatives’ 
elections in April 1947. For the purpose of this analysis, current or 
past leaders of Nokyo's organisational predecessor, the agricultural 
associations (nogyokai) are treated as equivalent to the later status of 
Nokyo Diet member. Information on the actual members of these cate­
gories was collected from a number of sources including: Shügiin Yöran
(House of Representatives’ Survey), various issues; Kokkai Benran (Diet 
Handbook), 1976 and 1977; Betsubetsu Kokkai Benran (A Compilation of Diet 
Handbooks), 1955-74; Shüsan Benran Shöwa 48 (House of Representatives' 
and House of Councillors’ Handbook 1972); Sangiin Benran (House of 
Councillors' Handbook), 1971; Diet members' listings in Asahi Nenkan 
(Asahi Yearbook), 1946 to 1977; Nokyo Diet members' career details as 
given in Tanaka Toyotoshi, Nihon no Nökyö (Japan's Nokyo), Tokyo, Nökyö 
Kyökai, 1971, especially Chapter 12 entitled 'Nökyö no Senkyo Katsudo'
( Nokyo's Election Activities ) pp.424-481; Miyagawa Takayoshi (ed.),
Seigi Handobukku (A Handbook of Politics), Tokyo, Seiji Köho Senta, 1972; 
and organisational affiliations as reported by respondents to the 
questionnaire distributed to members of the Nosei Kenkyukai.
3 The cut-off points for these three respective time periods have been 
used elsewhere. See for example, Hajime Shinohara, 'Postwar Parties and 
Politics in Japan', The Developing Economies, Vol. VI, No.4, December 1968, 
pp.393-394, who based this periodisation on changes in the party system.
See also Scott C. Flanagan, 'The Japanese Party System in Transition', 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No.2, January 1971, pp.231-253.
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LDP Dependence on the Rural Vote
The question of significant variations in Nokyo's Diet membership 
over time is a logical one, given the economic and social restructuring 
of rural areas that took place in the postwar period. This was a by­
product of land reform and the dual processes of urbanisation and 
industrialisation. The most dramatic effect of these changes on the 
countryside was the decline in the percentage of the workforce engaged 
in agriculture. Where similar processes took place in other developed 
capitalist economies, prospects for the establishment and maintenance 
of farmers' parties steadily diminished. In the face of declining 
electoral prospects, farm organisations in the main discarded the option 
of parties servicing their own interests, and opted for representation 
within existing conservative groupings with a broader spectrum of appeal.
In Japan, early attempts to establish a farmers’ party also proved
a failure. A series of embryonic farmers’ political groups appeared in
the Diet between 1947 and 1952 with much of the impetus behind these
groupings coming from voluntary farm organisations associated with the
agricultural cooperatives. They were, however, symptomatic of the early
postwar period of party upheaval and change, and ultimately faced a choice
similar to many other such temporary intra-Diet alliances: electoral
extinction or incorporation into major party groupings.
At the time, the question of the survival of a farmers’ party in 
Japan was not related to the usual sequence of socio-economic change 
producing a decline in farm population and a consequent narrowing of an 
electoral base. It was a matter of the organisational viability of a 
minor political grouping which contradicted the general trend towards 
party consolidation in the Diet. By the early ’fifties, the majority 
voting preferences of farming constituents who simultaneously formed the
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bulk of Nokyo1s membership, began to demonstrate a strong trend towards 
support for the two major conservative parties, particularly after the 
completion of land reform and the demise of the farmers’ union movement. 
The recognition that a considerable part of their support base lay in 
the countryside further encouraged the conservatives to give due con­
sideration to policies affecting the farmers and the cooperatives, and 
the development of a close association between Nokyo and conservative 
government parties began. This was the primary factor obviating the 
need for a specific farmers' party in Japan's case. The key element in 
the nexus between Parliamentary party and extra-Parliamentary grouping 
was the electoral factor: namely, the dependence of successive conserv­
ative governments on rural voting support. If anything, the reliance of 
the ruling conservatives on rural and semi-rural votes as a proportion of 
their total seat and vote tallies increased rather than decreased over 
time. What was true for the Liberal Party (J'iyuto) which led the govern­
ment for most of the postwar period, and later the Democrats (Minshutö), 
applied with even greater force to the Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyü 
Minshutö) which took power in 1955.
A number of studies have substantiated the dependence of the LDP on 
rural support. A statistical documentation of this phenomenon was com­
piled by Soma Masao using a five-category conceptualisation of House of 
Representatives' electorates into metropolitan, urban, semi-urban, semi- 
rural and rural types.^ He demonstrated that in the 1972 elections, the 
LDP's polling rate rose from 29.8 per cent in metropolitan constituencies, 
to 46.3 per cent in urban, 53 per cent in semi-urban, 56.3 per cent in
Soma Masao, Kokumin no Sentaku: 1972-nen Sösenkyo no Bunseki (The 
People's Choice: An Analysis of the 1972 General Election), Tokyo,
Sanichi Shobö, 1974, pp.249-265.
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semi-rural, to 62 per cent in rural constituencies. By a selective
combination of these totals, Soma showed that in the 1972 elections,
the LDP won a majority of its supporting votes (61.5 per cent) from
semi-urban, semi-rural and rural constituencies. He concluded that
there was an inverse correlation between levels of urbanisation and
levels of support for the LDP."*' As the former declined, the LDP voting 
2rate increased. Another study correlated shifts in voting population 
with the percentage of votes obtained by the LDP between 1958 and 1967, 
reaching the same conclusion that the major stronghold of support for 
the conservatives continued to lie in the countryside rather than in 
urban areas.^
Soma demonstrated the opposite to be largely true of the Japan 
Communist Party (JCP), Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), and Clean 
Government Party (CGP), with the CGP and JCP more dependent on metro­
politan and urban votes than any of the other parties. The distribution 
of support for the JSP, he found, was remarkably evenly balanced across 
all types of electorates.
2 Shigeki Nishihira in a similar study of the results of the 1976 
House of Representatives' elections using a five-grade classification of 
electorates in terms of a 'population concentration rate' produced the 
same result. See his 'An Anatomy of the 1976 Election', Japan Echo,
Vol. IV, No.2, 1977, pp.67-76. He showed that as the 'population concen­
tration rate' rose in his different categories of constituency, the per­
centage of votes obtained by the LDP dropped. He also came to the same 
conclusion as Soma as to the respective types of support given to the 
opposition parties.
3 See Shinohara, op. czt., pp.401-403. He correlated shifts in voting 
population with the percentage of votes obtained by Japanese political 
parties between 1958 and 1967. Moving from the least populous through to 
the most populous districts in any one election, the percentage of votes 
for the LDP decreased, and over time, it declined in all areas, although 
at a slower rate in rural constituencies.
See also Taguchi Fukuji, 'Sosenkyo to Nominhyo no Yukue' ('General 
Elections and Trends in Farmers' Votes'), Nogyö Kyodö Kunriai (Agricultural 
Cooperative Union), February 1973, pp.16-17. He borrowed heavily from 
some of Shinohara's later work published in the Asahi Janaru (Asahi Journal), 
December 1972, showing that over the five preceding general elections to 
the Lower House (1960, 1963, 1967, 1969 and 1972), the LDP's voting rate, 
although it declined by 8.47 percentage points in rural constituencies over 
this period, was still above 60 per cent in 1972. (contd.)
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Measurement of the LDP's level of dependency on rural and semi- 
rural constituencies in terms of seats rather than votes, showed that 
the LDP consistently held more than 60 per cent of semi-rural and rural 
seats in the House of Representatives in three spaced elections (1958, 
1967 and 1972), and over the same period, the percentage of its com­
bined dependence on these seats as a proportion of its total rose from 
55 per cent in 1958 to 57 per cent in 1967 and still further to 61 per 
cent in 1972 .'*" This substantiates the increasing ratio of LDP dependence 
on rural and semi-rural constituencies.
Although the rural vote (nösonhyö) is a much broader category than
the farm vote (nöminhyö), several factors endow the farmers with a
strategic position in the electoral system. Firstly, it is axiomatic
that primary industries, of which agriculture is the main component, are
concentrated in rural and semi-rural areas, and a high correlation has
been established between conservative votes and per cent of farm house- 
2holds. One survey demonstrated that 74.2 per cent of those who were 
self-supporting in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries industries 
voted for the LDP in the 1969 elections. The figure for 1972 was 71 per
(from previous page)
For further documentation, see Tanaka, op. ait., p.424, which put 
LDP dependence on rural constituencies in the 1969 election at 64 per 
cent, with a corresponding decline in support with the shift from rural 
through semi-rural to urban and metropolitan types.
See also Chae-Jin Lee, 'Socio-Economic Conditions and Party Politics 
in Japan: A Statistical Analysis of the 1969 General Election', The
Journal of Politics, Vol. 33, No.l, February 1971, p.166.
See Table 11, in J.A.A. Stockwin, Japan: Divided Politics in a
Growth Economy, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975, p.100. The latter 
calculations are also derived from the same table.
2 See Lee, op. cit., p.162.
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cent.  ^ In addition, 69 per cent of those who professed to be members of 
Nokyo and other agricultural groups said they voted for the LDP, which
2was higher than any of the other voluntary membership groups surveyed.
Secondly, in spite of massive shifts in population from rural to
urban sectors from 1960 onwards, the accompanying redistribution of seats
3to compensate for population movements was insufficient to prevent 
increasing rural over-representation and urban under-representation.
The disequilibrium amongst House of Representatives' electorates in 1972 
for example, was such that 50 per cent of seats were shared amongst 38 per 
cent of eligible voters.^ At its extreme, the imbalance placed a value on
a rural vote in the least populous constituency of Hyögo (5) 4.98 times 
higher than on a vote in the most heavily populated constituency of
This is based on research conducted by the Clean Elections League 
(Kömei Senkyo Rerunei) and reported in Soma, op. cit. , pp.128-135.
According to a survey of 3,000 voters done by the Home Ministry in 1958 
and reported in Kobayashi Naoki, Shinohara Hajime and Soma Masao, Senkyo 
(Elections), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1960, p.93, 70 per cent of men 
employed in farming, forestry or fishing industries voted for the LDP 
(as against 19 per cent for the JSP) and 61 per cent of women likewise 
(as against 17 per cent for the JSP).
2 Soma, op. cit., pp.131-132.
3 Forty-four new seats have been created in metropolitan constituen­
cies since 1964, but there has been no corresponding reduction in the 
number of seats in the least populous constituencies. The distribution 
of seats in the current House of Representatives is basically that founded 
on population distribution patterns derived from the special population 
survey conducted in April 1946.
4 In 1972 there were 247 rural and semi-rural seats out of a total of 
491 (50.3 per cent). These contained 27,941,165 eligible voters out of 
a total of 73,770,000 (or 37.8 per cent) in the same year. These figures 
were calculated from data on the percentage of population in each elector­
ate living in cities as opposed to counties (shigunbu hiritsu) found in 
Seiji Handobukku, op. cit. pp.203-264. All electorates were ranked from 
1 to 124 on the urbanisation continuum with the lower two quartiles classed 
as semi-rural and rural. Categorised in this manner 'semi-rural' falls 
between 55.95 and 67.48 per cent of population being in cities, and 
'rural' between 12.84 and 55.48 per cent.
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Osaka (3). Continuing urbanisation combined with an almost fixed
number of Diet seats has only exacerbated the imbalance in the electoral 
2system.
Although the causes of the unequal representation of Japanese
voters are widely acknowledged, rectification of this situation has been
viewed as a political problem requiring solutions which are unacceptable
to the conservative government party. The reason for this is clear
enough: so far the LDP has benefited more than any other party from the
excessive representation of rural areas because of the rural bias in the
3party’s electoral support base.
1946 to 1955: Introduction
Political divisions amongst farm spokesmen in the early postwar 
period mirrored the development of two distinct types of agricultural 
organisation in postwar Japan: the farmers' union movement on the one
hand, and groups associated with the agricultural cooperative system on 
the other. Each of these organisations inherited a discrete historical
These figures are for 1972. Soma in his analysis of the 1972 Lower 
House election, demonstrated that a JSP candidate for Tokyo (7) garnered 
144,415 votes and lost, whereas an LDP candidate received 37,258 votes 
(the lowest number received by a winning candidate over the whole country) 
in Gumma (3) and won. The former was 20th place in terms of votes 
received over all candidates. There were in fact seven candidates who 
got more than 100,000 votes who lost in this election. Op. cit., pp.117- 
119.
2 According to research based on data for 1955, the imbalance at its 
extreme meant that a vote in Tochigi (2), Gumma (2) or Hyögo (5) was 
worth a rating of 1.4 as against 0.5 in Kanagawa (1), Osaka (1) or 
Hyögo (1). As was pointed out, the ratio of 3:1 in 1955 became almost 
5.1 by 1972. See Kobayashi, Shinohara and Soma, op. cit., Furoku, p.ll.
3 Taketsugu Tsurutani in Political Change in Japait, New York, David 
McKay Co. Inc., 1977, pp.214-217, showed that in the 1972 elections, those 
elected with the ten lowest vote tallies were either LDP members or pro­
conservative Independents.
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tradition of political activity which influenced later party affili­
ations. The intervening wartime control situation and the unprece­
dented reforms instituted by the Occupation authorities interrupted but 
did not radically alter the pattern of historical continuity.
The agricultural associations (nögyökai) which filled the organis­
ational vacuum until the re-establishment of the agricultural co­
operatives represented an amalgam of prewar 'establishment' agricultural 
groups, which had been dominated by the land-owning class and had 
incorporated a strong tradition of cooperation with agricultural 
administrators and conservative parties.
The farmers' unions had a historical pedigree that was equally 
considerable. They traced their origins to the prewar tenants' rights 
movement spearheaded by left wing politicians. Although they expanded 
their popular following at the grass-roots level, Socialist Diet members 
continued to dominate executive leadership positions within the movement.
In comparison with the more clearly defined and predictable party 
attachments after 1955, the immediate postwar years represented a 
transitional period when political alignments reflected the rapidly 
changing contours of party organisation in the Diet and also the plethora 
of Independent and minor party candidates who successfully contested 
Diet elections.'*"
Against this background of fluid party loyalties and less strongly 
developed group identities, farm organisations participated in a common 
struggle for official recognition of farmers' demands of all kinds,
In the 1946 General Election, Independents polled 20.4 per cent of 
the total vote and minor party candidates 11.7 per cent. In 1947, these 
figures were 5.8 per cent and 5.4 per cent respectively. See Kobayashi, 
Shinohara and Soma, op. oit. , Furoku, p.4.
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rather than for concessions to particular organisational interests.
A platform shared by almost all groups was the need for land reform and 
the redevelopment of the agricultural cooperatives. This was under­
scored by an awareness amongst agrarian leaders of all political lean­
ings that unprecedented changes in the nature of farm organisation were 
inevitable under the Occupation.
Apart from their semi-administrative functions in the land reform
program, the activities of local farmers’ union branches concentrated
chiefly on providing an organisational and electoral base for the
mobilisation of farmers' votes in support of Socialist party Nichinö
2executives in Diet elections. The membership strength and electoral 
involvement of large numbers of farmers’ union branches undoubtedly 
contributed to the support shown for the JSP in rural areas in the 
elections of 1946 and 1947.^
This point was made by Fukuji Taguchi, 'Pressure Groups in Japanese 
Politics', The Developing Economies, Vol. VI, No.4, December 1968, p.478.
2 In the 1946 elections, this group included the Chairman of Nichino, 
Sunaga Ko, and its Secretary-General, Nomizo Masaru. In the 1947 House 
of Representatives' election, 31 of the 143 JSP Diet members were reputedly 
either national or prefectural leaders of Nichino. See Ronald P. Dore,
'The Socialist Party and the Farmers', in Allan B. Cole, George 0. Totten, 
and Cecil H. Uyehara, Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan, New Haven and 
London, Yale University Press, 1966, p.381. Robert A. Scalapino and 
Junnosuke Masumi in Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1962, p.164, reported 
that there were 44 Socialist Party Diet members who were farmers' union 
leaders or affiliated members in the post-1947 House of Representatives.
3 In the 1946 elections, JSP candidates won more than 20 per cent of 
the total vote in a number of agricultural constituencies, and in the 
Lower House election of 1947, '50 per cent of the Socialists elected to 
the House had come from 69 of the most rural constituencies.'
Dore, op. cit. , pp.378-379 and p.386.
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The climax of land reform in 1947, however, is generally regarded as
coinciding with the peak in the political influence of the farmers’ union
movement. The completion of both stages of land reform deprived Niohino
of its principal raison d'etre and undermined the basis of its popular
appeal.^ Repeated ideological and factional splits from 1947 onwards
2also contributed to the organisational decline.
One of the by-products of the intense factionalism within the 
farmers' union wing of the JSP was the creation of a Worker Farmer Party 
(Rödösha Nomintö, or Rönötö) in 1948. Although led by former JSP agrarian 
leaders operating from a base within a number of agricultural constituen­
cies, the Ronoto never managed to escape its factional Socialist Party
3origins and emerge as a farmers' party proper. The concept of a worker- 
farmer alliance had limited appeal in the face of the burgeoning sense of 
petty proprietorship amongst a majority of emancipated tenant farmers 
whose conservative proclivities were increasingly revealed in successive 
elections after 1947.
Ibid., pp.378-391.
2 The extreme right wing of the farmers' union movement broke away and 
established a separate organisation, the All-Japan Farmers' Union 
(Zennihon Roxnin Kumiai, or Zenno) in July 1947. A subsequent division 
split Niohino along Socialist-Communist lines in 1948.
3 Set up by the expelled pro-Communist Nich'Lno leader Kuroda Hisao in 
December 1948, the Ronoto won seven seats in the House of Representatives 
in 1949. In the Lower House poll of 1952 it won four seats, five in 1953 
and four in 1955. In the 1950 House of Councillors'elections, two Ronoto 
members were successful, but the party had no success in either the Upper 
House election of 1953 or 1956. It was reabsorbed into the Socialist 
Party in 1957.
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The organisational decline of the farmers' unions was most evident
at the local level where membership numbers decreased substantially.
This merely emphasised their essential character as groups dominated
by politician-leaders with regional branches serving as little more
2than surrogate electoral organisations for the various Socialist and 
Communist groupings with which they were respectively allied.
The Formation of Farmers' Parties
The impetus behind the formation of farmers' parties came more from
the centre and conservative end of the political spectrum: chiefly the
prefectural branches of the National Rural Youth League (Zennoseiven) in 
_ 3Hokkaido (the Hokkaido Farmers' League ) and in Fukuoka. These groups 
were very active on the national political scene. In the early postwar 
elections, they sponsored some of their leaders as Independent candidates 
to the Diet, but prior to the joint Upper and Lower House elections in 
April 1947, they organised a Japan Farmers' Party (Nihon Nominto).
The major Socialist Party split in 1951 contributed to a further 
splintering of the farmers' union movement, with the formation of a Right 
Wing Socialist Party General Federation of Farmers' Unions (Nömin Kumiai 
Södömei) . The mainstream Niohiriö organisation divided internally into 
two practically separate groupings: the Independence faction (Shutaiseiha) ,
and the pro-Communist Unity faction (Tditsuha). Diet representation of 
the farmers' unions reflected the substantial dip in Socialist Party 
support in the 1949 elections, but as the Socialists generally picked up 
seats in the early 1950s, it again rose to previous levels. According to 
Scalapino and Masumi, op. oit. , pp.165-166, farmers' union membership in 
the Diet amounted to 11 in 1949, but by 1953, it had increased to 32.
2 This point was made by Dore, op. cvt., p.391.
3 -The Hokkaido Farmers' League (Hokkaido Nomin Domei) was the prefec­
tural branch of Zenndseiren in Hokkaido.
4 Independent representatives included Kunii Junichi, the Founding 
Chairman of the Zennöseiren, elected to the House of Concillors for the 
national constituency from 1947 to 1950, and Kaneko Yojurö, elected to the 
House of Representatives for Gumma (1) constituency in 1949, who was 
backed by the Gumma Prefecture Rural Youth League.
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The party began essentially as a splinter group of former Japan 
Cooperative Party (Nihon Kyödötö) members from the Cooperative Democratic 
Party (Kyodö Minshuto), who formed a second Japan Cooperative Party. The 
Cooperative Democratic Party was successor to the original Japan 
Cooperative Party organised by Sengoku Kotaro in December 1945, also 
strongly based in Hokkaido. The latter was the official party represent­
ing the general philosophy of cooperative unionism (kyodö knmiai shugi) .  ^
The original Japan Cooperative Party and the political groupings that
succeeded it constituted the mainstream of the cooperative political
2movement in Japan, and they continued to maintain strong agricultural 
links. The second Japan Cooperative Party founded in September 1946 was 
also led by an agriculturalist from Hokkaido, Kita Katsutaro, a former 
Director of the prewar prefectural agricultural association (nökai). It 
sought to return to the original purpose of Sengoku's Japan Cooperative 
Party, which was to unite the spirit of cooperativism with rural interests. 
The change of name to Japan Farmers' Party gave an even clearer indication 
of its founders' philosophy.
Asahi Nenkan, 1946, p.109. Sengoku, as a prominent dairyman, had 
been a leading figure in the prewar industrial cooperatives and Minister 
of Agriculture and Forestry in the first postwar cabinet. He collaborated 
with another dairyman, the so-called Hokkaido 'Butter King', Kurasawa Torizo, 
in setting up the Nihon Kyödötö. The party itself, however, was not 
devoted solely to representing the rural sector. It also sought to 
encourage the support of urban, middle-class, industrial and business 
interests. See Harold S. Quigley and John E. Turner, The New Japan, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1956, p.85.
2 At the same time as the Japan Farmers' Party was established, the 
Cooperative People's Party was successful in its second attempt at uni­
fication with the People's Party (Kokumintö), and the People's Cooperative 
Party (Kokwnin Kyödötö) led by Miki Takeo was set up in March 1947. It 
became the mainstream cooperative party in the Diet.
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Only one of the small group of early Japan Farmers' Party members 
survived the purge and the 1947 House of Representatives’ election, and 
he became leader of the party.^ He was joined by three successful Japan 
Farmers’ Party candidates in the 1947 Lower House election (of 12 candi­
dates put up) and four more who joined subsequently. With eight members,
2the party was the second smallest in the House. More than half its 
membership represented farmers' groups associated with the rural youth 
league movement, particularly the Hokkaido Farmers' League and the 
Fukuoka branch of the Zennoseiven, both of which took the lead in the pre- 
Nokyo grass-roots farmers' movement. The official political philosophy 
of the party was by no means uniformly conservative. It was essentially 
a centre party which aimed to adopt a political stance independent of 
both left and right. Party philosophy specifically rejected 'the
3dictatorship by left or right wing parties'. It 'looked forward to the 
establishment of a peaceful Japan based on the principle of cooperative 
unionism (kyödö kunrlai shugi) ' , ^ and it recognised the need for strong 
representation of farmers' interests in the re-establishment of Japanese 
agriculture based on a rapid increase in production and improvement in the 
self-sufficiency ratio for food.^
Nakano Shirö, political representative of a local farmers' organis­
ation in Aichi Prefecture.
2 _Apart from Nakano, its members were: Kawaguchi Yoichi from Hokkaido
(2) constituency, member of the Hokkaido Ncnnin Domei, who became Secretary-
General of the party in November, 1947; Kita Jirö from Hokkaido (4) and
Takakura Sadanori from Hokkaido (5), both agriculturalists; Kato Yoshitaro
from Fukui, Tsunejima Masaoki from Nagasaki (2), later Chairman of the
successor to Zennoseiven, the National Farmers' Federation (Z enkoku Nömin
Renmei, or Zenndven)\ Nakamura Torata from Fukuoka (1), who was Secretary
General of Zennoseiven, and Terasaki Kaku from Fukuoka (3), who was an
executive member of the Fukuoka Prefecture Rural Youth League.
3
Asahi Nenkan, 1948, p.165.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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In spite of the strong organisational connections between the agri­
cultural associations and the rural youth leagues, and the existence of 
a Japan Farmers’ Party allied with the latter, nögyökai officials elected 
to the Diet in 1946"^  divided their allegiance amongst three major group­
ings: large and more established parties of the right (the Liberals and
the Progressives [Shinpotö]), Independents, and the Japan Cooperative
Party. It was a specific organisational precept of the latter to
2’utilize the agricultural associations to influence elections'. There 
also existed a general coincidence of interests between the nögyökai, 
which had incorporated the prewar industrial cooperative organisation, and 
a party which sought to combine the spirit of cooperative unionism with 
agricultural and business interests. For the same reason, former nökai 
executives were also strongly represented in the Japan Cooperative Party.
The connection between the agricultural associations and the main­
stream cooperative group, the People's Cooperative Party which succeeded 
the Cooperative People’s Party, showed up even more strongly in the 1947 
House of Representatives' election.
Nogyokai officials elected to the House of Councillors in the first 
Upper House poll in April 1947 figured prominently in the independent
Six members of this group were later to take up executive positions 
in Nökyö. Three later became Nökyö Diet members, holding concurrent 
office in both the national Parliament and the agricultural cooperative 
organisation. The remaining three were to relinquish national politics 
for careers as Nökyö leaders.
2 Quigley and Turner, op. oit., p.85.
3 This group included Yanagawa Sozaemon, Chairman of the National 
Agricultural Association (Zenkoku Nögyökai), who gained second position 
in the list of successful national constituency candidates with over four 
million votes (compared with the combined total of 280,000 votes won by 
the two Nichino candidates). He was later disqualified as a Diet member 
under the purge and also resigned as Chairman of the National Agricultural 
Association.
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pro-conservative Green Breeze Society (Ryokufukai), although leading 
nögyökai members who later became chairmen of national agricultural
cooperative organisations allied themselves to the People's Cooperative
„ 1 Party.
The fact that nögyökai officials in the main chose major conservative 
or cooperative party representation and not perhaps the more obvious 
preference for Japan Farmers' Party affiliation, reflected not only the 
strong regional focus of the latter in Hokkaido and Fukuoka 
and its lack of major party status, but also a more fundamental political 
division in the early postwar agricultural cooperative movement. This 
set apart local agarian activists representing grass-roots farmers' 
organisations such as the rural youth leagues and farmers' leagues, from 
officials of more establishment agricultural groups such as the nögyökai. 
The former were thoroughly imbued with notions of organisational demo- 
cratisation and political independence, while the latter found it diffi­
cult to shake off more elitist notions of agrarian leadership and a 
tradition of compliance with governmental directives and closed alliances 
with conservative parties.
Although the nögyökai were no longer politically relevant from 1948 
onwards following their legal dissolution in August 1948, these two 
streams of the pre-Nokyo agricultural movement, one locally-based, acti­
vist and politically independent, and the other more bureaucratic, 
central government-oriented and uniformly conservative, continued to 
exist in separate organisational locations. The former was to be found
This included Yonekura Tatsuya, Chairman of Nagano Prefecture Agri­
cultural Association, who became the first Chairman of Zenchü; and 
Okamura Fumijiro, who later succeeded to the position of Zenkyovcn 
Chairman.
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amongst Nokyo-associated prefectural farmers' political groups, the latter
amongst the national Nokyo executive leadership.
The Japan Farmers’ Party continued to operate as a minor party in
the Lower House until November 1948, when Zenridseiren sought to inject new
impetus into the farmers’ political movement by sponsoring a National
Council for the Mobilisation of Farmers' Political Power (Ndmin Seiji-
ryoku Kesshü Zenkoku Kyogikai) The Council was united in its desire to
set up a new party, and the Ndminto was subsequently dissolved. In
December 1948, some of its former members joined with a small splinter
group from the mainstream People’s Cooperative Party to form the New
Farmers’ Party (Ndnrin Shinto) with seven members. It polled one per cent
of the vote in the January House of Representatives’ elections, and had
210 members in the post-election Lower House.
The 1949 House of Representatives’ election was the first in which 
the new category of ’Nokyo politician’ appeared, and almost half the
This phraseology was to become part of the standard vocabulary of 
Nokyo-associated political groups.
2 On this basis it deserves classification as a minor party, although 
this was only one seat less than the Rdndtd which has attracted a great 
deal more attention from scholars. It was also one more than the Zenno 
(farmers' union) leader, Hirano Rikizö’s socialist splinter group, the 
Social Reform Party (Shakai Kakushintd) . New Farmers’ Party members were: 
Kawaguchi Yoichi, Hokkaido (2), ex-Nihon Uomintd; Matsumoto Rokutarö, 
Hokkaido (1), formerly People's Cooperative Party; Kodaira Tadashi, 
Hokkaido (4), who stood on a Ndmin Shinto ticket, and was newly elected to 
the House; Kita Jirö, Hokkaido (2), ex-Nihon Ndminto; Takakura Sadanori, 
Hokkaido (5), ex-Nihon Ndminto; Iida Yoshishige, Hokkaido (5), former 
People’s Cooperative Party member; Hatano Jirö, Oita (1), who joined the 
party having been elected as an Independent; Nakamura Torata, Fukuoka (1), 
ex-Nihon Ndminto; Terasaki Kaku, Fukuoka (3), ex-Nihon Ndminto; and 
Mizuno Hikojirö, Shizuoka (1), who later reverted to non-party alignment.
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membership of the New Farmers’ Party came from this group. Naturally 
enough the party reflected the continuing sponsorship of the Hokkaido 
Nömin Dömei and the rural youth leagues and was therefore strongly 
represented in Hokkaido and in Fukuoka where the prefectural ndseiren 
was very active.
The principal tenet of party policy was 'stabilisation of the
national economy on the basis of the principle of cooperative union
. 2socialism (kyodo kumiai shakai shugi)'. The proximity of the party to 
the centre and extreme right of the socialist movement was exemplified 
by its participation in the New Politics Council (Shin Seiji Kyogikai) 
formed in May 1949. Seven members of the New Farmers’ Party (there had 
been three reversions to the ranks of Independents) joined this group 
together with the 14 members of the centre People's Cooperative Party 
(which had had its strength more than halved in the January 1949 Lower 
House election), six members of an Independent group, the Justice Club 
(Kösei Kurabu), and five from the right wing socialist group, the Social 
Reform Party. The New Politics Council never developed beyond the stage 
of a temporary political alliance amongst minority parties, however, and 
soon dissolved into the same political factions that had given it birth.
These were: Kawaguchi Yöichi, Chairman of the National Agricultural
Cooperative Union Liaison Council in 1948 and later Hokkaido Purchasing 
Nökyo Federation Chairman; Matsumoto Rokutaro, Chairman of the Hokkaido 
Guidance Nökyo Federation; Kodaira Tadashi, who had a considerable history 
in the agricultural cooperative movement as a prewar staff member of the 
National Purchasing and Marketing Federation (Zenköhanren) (of the sangyd 
kumiai), as a wartime staff member of the National Agricultural Associ­
ation, and after the war, as a Managing Director of the Hokkaido Production 
Federation (Seisanren), an interim agricultural cooperative-type 
organisation (he has been depicted as a 'true-blue cooperative man' by 
Tanaka, op.  ait. , p.435); and Hatano Jirö, who was Chairman of Oita Pre­
fecture Marketing Nökyo Federation.
2 Asahi Nenkan, 1950, p.303.
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Amongst the group of Nokyo Diet members who made their political 
debut in the January 1949 Lower House elections, members of the New 
Farmers' Party were outnumbered by those endorsed by the governing 
Democratic Liberal Party (Minshu Jiyütö). The overwhelming superiority 
of the latter in the 1949 elections undoubtedly contributed to this 
picture. The remaining Nokyo Diet members were fairly evenly divided 
amongst People's Cooperative, Democratic and Socialist parties. This 
varied picture was merely an aspect of the fragmented party configur­
ation in the Diet at the time. It also reflected the uncertainty of 
party loyalties amongst many new agricultural cooperative leaders and 
members. The dominance of the Nokyo-Democratic Liberal connection, 
however, can be viewed in retrospect as representing the beginning of a 
trend which was to be sustained without exception from 1949 onwards: 
preference by the largest group of Nokyo Diet members for 
endorsement by the conservative government party.
The Decline of Farmers' Parties
Between 1949 and 1952, much of the effort of a small group of
Nokyo's earlier Diet members continued to be directed towards finding a
discrete avenue of political expression via the organisation of a
separate farmers' party. An attempt was made to infuse new life into
this concept in December 1949 with the dissolution of the New Farmers'
Party and the establishment of a Farmers' Cooperative Party (Nowin
Kyödötö). It was hoped that the party would provide unitary political 
leadership for the agricultural cooperative movement and Nokyo-
associated farmers' groups. With only nine members in the Lower House,
however, its status was that of a minor political grouping.
This was, nonetheless, more than double the membership of the 
Rond to or the Shakai Kakushintd.
159
The Farmers' Cooperative Party platform, like that of its pre­
decessor, advocated the construction of a national economy based on 
cooperative socialism (kyödö shakai shugi). Its principal goal was the 
establishment of a policy which emphasised increases in agricultural 
production.^
Although the party by no means had a monopoly on Nokyo represent­
ation in the Diet, it deserved the la?el of 'Nokyo party' by virtue of
its agricultural cooperative leadership and the high proportion of Nokyo
2officials in its ranks. Once again, like its predecessors, it was
largely sponsored by the Nokyo-associated rural youth movement in Fukuoka
3 4and the Hokkaido Farmers' League. The party successfully elected three
candidates to the House of Councillors in 1949, which represented 2.27
per cent of seats and 1.2 per cent of the national vote. All were
affiliated to the Hokkaido Nömin Dömei. 5
Kyoto Daigaku Bungakubu Kokushi Kenkyu Shitsu (eds) , Nihon Kindaishi 
Jiten (Kyoto University, Faculty of Literature, National History Research 
Room, A Dictionary of Modern Japanese History), Tokyo, Töyö Keizai 
Shinposha, 1964, p.496.
2 The first leader of the Farmers' Cooperative Party was Matsumoto 
Rokutarö, Chairman of the Hokkaido Guidance Nokyo Federation 
and later Vice-Chairman of the National Guidance Nokyo Federation. He was 
followed as leader in June 1950 by Kawaguchi Yöichi, a leading Hokkaido 
Nokyo official. Other members were Kodaira Tadashi, Hatano Jiro, Iida 
Yoshishige, Takakura Sadanori, Terasaki Kaku, Nakano Shiro, and Nakamura 
Torata, a majority of whom were Nokyo officials.
3 The party's Secretary-General was Nakamura Torata, also Secretary- 
General of the Tjennöseinen. Another member, Terasaki Kaku, was an execu­
tive of the Fukuoka Rural Youth League. Kawaguchi Yöichi and Kodaira 
Tadashi were also affiliated with the Hokkaido Nomin Dömei.
 ^ These are listed in Gikai Seido Nanajünenshi: Shügiin3 Sangiin,
(A 70 Year History of the Diet System: House of Representatives, House of 
Councillors), Tokyo, Ökurasho Insatsu Kyoku, 1961, p.956. Another source 
puts its Upper House membership at four. See Nihon Kindaishi Jiten, op. 
oit. , p . 496.
These were Matsuura Sadayoshi, Chairman of the Hokkaido Nömin Dömei 
Prefectural Committee, Azuma Takashi, previously elected to the Diet in 
1946 as a Japan Cooperative Party candidate and Managing Director of 
Hokkaido Prefecture Agricultural Association, and Ishikawa Seiichi, Chair­
man of the Hokkaido Nömin Dömei, a Nokyo Federation Chairman and Vice- 
Chairman of Zennöseiven.
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Although the Hokkaido and Fukuoka farm groups were very activist,
the strong regional orientations of the party'*" severely limited its
capacity for attracting additional members to its ranks from amongst
Nokyo political aspirants based in other localities. A majority of
Nokyo Diet representatives elected to the Upper House in 1950 chose
either pro-conservative Independent or Ryokufükai membership.
The life-span of the Ndrrtin Kyödötö in the House of Councillors
proved extremely short. Almost immediately after the election, its
representatives joined a grouping of nine other Independent agricultural
members including other Nokyo Diet officials called the No.1 Club 
2(Daiichi Kurabu). In the House of Representatives, however, the party
continued to exist until July 1952.
Upon dissolution, a majority of its members went to the right into
3the Reformist Party (Kaishintö) , and the remainder to the extreme right 
wing of the socialist movement. The latter group together with Hirano 
Rikizo’s Social Democratic Party (Shakat Minshuto - previously the 
Shakai Kakushinto) rejected a call for unification with a third group, 
the Right Wing Socialist Party, preferring the alternative of a limited 
amalgamation between their own groupings. The outcome was the organis­
ation of a Cooperative Party (Kyödötö) established in August 1952, which
In addition to its three Hokkaido representatives in the Upper House, 
of its 10 members in the Lower House, six represented Hokkaido elector­
ates and two Fukuoka.
2 This group included Okamura Fumijiro, whose Nokyo career details 
have been referred to earlier, and Mori Yasoichi, who was to become the 
best known and longest standing Nokyo figure in the Diet, with a joint 
Parliamentary and Nokyo career lasting from 1950 to 1974, during which 
time he served as Chairman of Zenchü.
3 This group included Kawaguchi Yoichi, leader of the party, Nakamura 
Torata, Takakura Sadanori, Terasaki Kaku, Nakano Shirö and Iida 
Yoshishige.
161
incorporated the Farmers’ Cooperative Party goal of reforming the
economic structure of Japan through cooperative socialism (kyödö shakai
s h u g i). Hirano led the new party with a Nokyo Diet member as Secretary-
General.^ The 1952 elections, however, saw very few of the former
2Nomin Kyödötö members still in the Diet.
The dissolution of the Farmers' Cooperative Party marked the end 
for the time being, of attempts by Nokyo activists and leaders of 
associated farmers' organisations to carve out a separate niche for 
farmers' and agricultural cooperative interests by means of party organis­
ation. The formation of the K a ish in tö, the direct successor of the 
People's Democratic Party which had People's Cooperative and Democratic 
Party origins, also heralded the end of attempts to sustain a political 
party based on the economic philosophy of cooperative unionism.
The immediate cause of the Nonrin K yodöto's dissolution was simply 
erosion of membership and consequent lack of organisational viability, 
a process that was greatly hastened by declining public support for 
minority parties and the general trend towards party consolidation. To 
some extent, the very existence of this series of small farmers' parties 
in the early postwar period was symptomatic of an early transitional 
period of fission and fusion in Japanese party politics.
The Farmers' Cooperative Party also suffered from a decline in the 
popularity of its national backing organisation. After reaching a peak
Hatano Jirö (referred to in an earlier listing), who joined the 
Kyödötö together with Kodaira Tadashi, who later became a Right Wing 
Socialist Party member. Neither survived the 1952 elections, however, 
which left the Kyödötö with only two members, Hirano and Oishi Yoshie, 
both of whom later joined the Right Wing Socialist Party.
These were Nakano Shiro, Takakura Sadanori and Nakamura Torata.2
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of 430,000 members in 1949, the membership of the National Rural Youth 
League declined markedly after 1950. It altered its official title to 
the National Farmers’ Federation (Zenkoku Nomin Renrnei or Zennoren), and 
by the end of 1950, it had only 220,000 members, half the number of 
Zennöseiren in 1949. By 1952, its membership had fallen even 
further to 148,000.^
A contributory factor in this decline was the successful launching 
of the agricultural cooperative system which achieved the principal aim 
of the Nokyo-associated farm groups. The result was a shift in focus 
away from farmers' rights to a voluntary, democratic cooperative organis­
ation to the scope of Nokyo’s activities, which was the concern of its 
own leadership. Cooperative executives, moreover, increasingly utilised 
the expanding Nokyo system and its practically universal membership 
structure to build their own local power bases. The farmers' unions were 
organisationally too weak to present any real alternative to the spokes- 
manship role of the cooperatives. The Zennoren also was hindered by 
dwindling finances derived solely from membership fees. Unlike Nokyo, 
it lacked economic functions so vital as a basis for membership.
The Zennoren elected its Chairman to the House of Councillors in
31950 for two terms as a member of the Ryokufukai. Its other political
1 Nihon Kindaishi Jiten, op. cit. , Furoku No.36.
2
Ibid. In 1951, a Nokyo Youth Division was created which made the 
rural youth leagues redundant, and this was an additional reason for the 
change in nomenclature to farmers' federations (ricmin renrnei), the 
lower-level groups of the Zennoren. There were long deliberations pertain­
ing to the supposed connection between the old and the new youth organis­
ations .
3 Ishiguro Tadayuki, who had had a long-established career in agri­
cultural circles as a former Chairman of the National Agricultural Associ­
ation, and Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. The only former member 
of the rural youth league organisation left in the Diet after 1952, was 
Nakamura Torata, who later joined the LDP.
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representatives during this period were predominantly Socialists from
Hokkaido who were also affiliated to the Hokkaido Farmers' League."^ In
the early 1950s, the League was depicted as being far closer to the
2progressives than to the conservatives, and after 1952, its represent­
atives were either Independents or Right or Left Socialist Party members.' 
Although these Nokyo-associated farmers' groups now lacked a specific 
party organisation in the Diet, they did retain the political philosophy 
of the early activists in the Nokyo movement which advocated steering a 
political course between both right and left wing parties. This was 
reflected in the generally more radical affiliations of their small group 
of representatives in the Diet from 1952 onwards, compared to the 
majority of Nokyo members elected during this period. The retention of 
power by the Liberal Party in the Lower House elections of 1952 and 1953 
saw by far the largest group of Nokyo Diet members in its ranks, and for 
similar reasons, within the governing Democratic Party (Minshutö) in 
1955, with a number of Nokyo Diet members actually shifting allegiance 
to the party as members of a Liberal breakaway group.
One of these was former Japan Cooperative Party member Matsuura 
Sadayoshi from Hokkaido (5), who was a Zenndren advisor (komon) , and Haga 
Mitsugu, from Hokkaido (2), a member of Zennoren's Central Committee.
2 Dore, op. o%t. , p.391. Since the 1950s, the League has undergone a 
process of 'creeping conservatism' and is currently closest to the LDP.
3 Haga Mitsugu, Left Socialist, then Socialist member in the House of 
Representatives from 1952; Azuma Takashi, Right Socialist, then Socialist 
member in the House of Councillors from 1950; Yasui Yoshinori, JSP member 
in the House of Representatives from 1958; and Matsuura Sadayoshi, also 
JSP member in the House of Representatives from 1958.
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Nokyo’s Party Alignment at the End of the First Postwar Decade
Apart from the predominance of government party affiliation amongst 
Nokyo’s political representatives, the overall trend during this period 
was for the adoption of major party membership. A vital factor in this 
process was the reversal of the movement towards party proliferation and 
the decline in the number of Independents and minor parties in both 
Houses.^ By 1955 a conservative-progressive cleavage between major 
political groupings (the Liberals and Democrats on the one hand, and the 
Right and Left Socialists and the Communists on the other) had replaced 
the multi-party configuration of the early postwar years.
Characterised in terms of their location on the political spectrum 
rather than in terms of party allegiance, a majority of Nokyo Diet 
members became conservative by 1955, a minority Socialist. Minor party 
and Independent Nokyo representation disappeared from the Lower House 
altogether by 1955 with parallel developments taking place, although at 
a slower pace, in the Upper House. Here the overwhelming preference as 
shown in the 1953 election results was conservative, with a fairly even 
division between Liberals and Independents including Ryokufüka.'i members, 
and a small minority Right or Left Socialists. The retention of 
Independent status or effective independence in the pro-conservative 
Ryokufukai remained more popular for a longer period amongst Nokyo’s House 
of Councillors’ members.
Independents in the House of Representatives x^ on 20.4 per cent of 
the total votes in 1946. Their polling rate fell to 5.8 per cent in 
1947 and by 1955, it had declined even further to 3.3 per cent. The same 
was true of minor parties. In 1946, minor party candidates won 11.7 per 
cent of the vote. This figure was more than halved in 1947 and 1949, and 
declined progressively after that until it reached a low point of 0.4 per 
cent in 1953. In the 1955 elections it was 1.3 per cent. See Kobayashi, 
Shinohara and Soma, op. cit. , Furoku, p.4.
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These developments in the party alignment of Nokyo's Diet members 
corresponded essentially to the emerging pattern of voting behaviour in 
the countryside. In the post-land reform era, farmers’ voting prefer­
ences rapidly assumed a conservative bias. As early as 1952, they were 
being depicted as ’an impregnable fortress of conservatism'.^" This was 
particularly true of the more agricultural prefectural constituencies of 
the Upper House which the conservatives and pro-conservative Independents
completely dominated. In the Lower House, the Liberals and Democrats won
2a total of 90 seats (72 per cent of the total) in the 33 'rural' constit­
uencies in the 1955 House of Representatives' elections. The combined
3Right and Left Socialist tally was 32 seats or 26 per cent. After their 
major defeat in 1949, the Socialists recovered somewhat in the country­
side from 1952 onwards, and this was reflected in a greater proportion of 
Nokyo Diet members linked to the progressives in the Lower House. In 
rural and semi-rural Lower House electorates, they came to represent an 
alternative, albeit minority voice in opposition to the dominant conserv­
atives. Socialist Nokyo representation constituted a fundamentally new 
element in the political orientation of the postwar edition of legally 
defined, government-initiated agricultural organisations. The landowning 
class which by and large had dominated Nokyo's predecessors in the prewar 
period had been displaced from their established positions of political
Tanaka, op. cit. , p.438.
2 These have been categorised according to a typology set down in 
Okino Yasuharu, Shöwa 30 nendai ni okeru toshika3 kögyoka to tohyd ködö 
henka (Urbanisation, Industrialisation and Changes in Electoral Behaviour, 
1955-65), Tokyo, Minshushugi Kenkyukai, 1966, pp.18-19, quoted in 
Stockwin, op. cit., pp.92-95.
3 This figure accords with Dore who pointed out that in the Lower House 
election of 1955, the Socialists secured 28 per cent of the seats in the 
69 most rural constituencies. Op. cit., p.409.
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leadership. The effect of land reform was not only to remove the 
economic and social foundations of their political power, but the prime 
cause of class differentiation within agricultural society. This factor, 
combined with the democratisation of agricultural organisations, meant 
that Nokyo incorporated within its membership the totality of a much 
broader and less stratified class of owner-farmers. At the same time, 
this group exhibited a much greater degree of natural political variation. 
The early successes of the left wing farmers’ union movement is evidence 
of this. Nokyo’s membership in fact overlapped with that of Nichinö and 
this inhibited the development of an exclusive attachment by agricultural 
cooperative leaders to conservative parties.
1946 to 1955: Summary
Farm organisations connected to the early agricultural cooperative 
movement were largely behind the formation of a series of minor farmers’ 
parties in which a number of Nokyo representatives figured prominently in 
the Diet.
The agricultural associations which acted as interim organisations 
until the cooperatives were well established, elected large numbers of 
their own executives to the Diet in 1946 and 1947. They displayed an 
overwhelming preference for the conservatives in addition to a special 
organisational link to cooperative parties.
Although the attempt to organise a farmers' party by regional 
agricultural groups and some early agricultural cooperative leaders proved 
a failure by 1952, it did mirror the resolve of these organisations to 
back their own leaders as independent representatives of the agricultural 
sector. This particular philosophy of grass-roots, activist farmers’ 
groups associated with Nokyo was to persist well into the 1960s.
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The preference amongst Nokyo Diet members for conservative govern­
ment party membership was to become an enduring feature of the political 
affiliations of agricultural cooperative politicians.
A variety of factors, electoral, ideological and tactical, contributed 
to the establishment and maintenance of this pattern. Firstly there 
existed the 'natural’ alliance between two conservatively-oriented 
organisations which in effect shared the same set of 'constituents’ or 
'supporters’. A majority of Nokyo's members were at the same time con­
servative voters.
The relative proportions of party support amongst Nokyo’s Diet members 
also reflected the electoral performance of political parties, and conse­
quently, the continuing numerical superiority of the government ranks.
This electoral factor also showed up in the support patterns of Nokyo 
Diet members for other parties, with rises and falls largely correspond­
ing to the vicissitudes of these parties' performances in elections. The 
continuing electoral victories of conservative parties, in a circular 
process of reciprocal cause and effect, both reflected and provided an 
on-going justification for government party alignment. The alliance was 
reinforced by success, and by the resulting tactical advantage of govern­
ment party endorsement which offered more attractive electoral prospects 
than a candidacy with a minority opposition grouping. This incentive was 
buttressed by the resulting positive and practical budgetary and policy 
advantages of alignment with the government party, a strategic necessity 
for a group like Nokyo which sought to benefit from administrative 
subsidies. This argument was one frequently advanced by Nokyo leaders 
themselves in pre-election speeches: 'If our representatives do not belong
to the party in power, we cannot expect policies to be realised.'^
1 Tanaka, op. cit. , p.475.
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1955 to 1967: Introduction
The amalgamation of the Liberals and Democrats in late 1955 and the 
re-unification of the Right and Left Socialists completed the polaris­
ation of the national Diet into conservative-government versus progressive- 
opposition forces. In successive elections throughout the next decade, 
the LDP consolidated its hold on the countryside. The JSP remained the 
only other major alternative party in rural and semi-rural Lower House 
electorates. The LDP almost completely dominated the more agricultural 
prefectura.1 constituencies of the Upper House. The emergence of the 
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) in 1960 had only a minor effect on basic 
support patterns in the countryside. The JCP was even less successful in 
making inroads into the farm vote during this period.
The great expansion of Nokyo's economic activities after 1955 gener­
ated pressure on agricultural cooperative leaders to widen their sphere 
of operations on the political front. Nokyo's coming of age as a pressure 
group dated from this period.^"
In the area of electoral politics there was a major burst of activity 
amongst newly created Nokyo-based farmers' political leagues, centring on 
the promotion of prefectural agricultural cooperative leaders to positions 
of national and prefectural political prominence. Focussing originally on 
successive gubernatorial elections between 1955 and 1959, these groups 
later broadened their electoral objectives to the House of Councillors' 
elections of 1959 and 1962, and the Lower House elections of 1960 and 1963. 
As the newly founded conservative party increasingly felt the lack of a 
strong grass-roots organisation, it began to co-opt substitute groupings
Fukuji Taguchi, 'Pressure Groups in Japanese Politics', The 
Developing Economies, Vol.VI, No.4, December 1968, p.479.
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into a symbiotic relationship with the party for the specific purpose of 
mobilising votes. The agricultural cooperatives, together with their 
related political organisations, gradually assumed the role of LDP 
substructural organisations, and in fact constituted the principal 
organisational force behind the mobilisation of support for LDP candidates 
in the countryside in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties.^- The relation­
ship was not an exclusive one, however, and in the initial stages of the 
prefectural operations of Nokyo-associated political groups, a variety of 
party-political standpoints were countenanced.
The Farmers' Political Leagues
In the space of five years, six Nokyo executives were elected 
governors of prefectures (Ishikawa in 1955, Toyama and Miyazaki in 1956, 
Fukushima in 1957, Shiga in 1958 and Ibaragi in 1959). The farmers' 
political leagues originated as specific support mobilisation organis­
ations for Nokyo gubernatorial candidates in these elections. In 
Miyazaki for example, a prefecture-wide Agricultural Policy Reform League 
(Nösei Kakushin Renmei) successfully backed a Nokyo Economic Federation 
Chairman to the governorship in September 1956. A similar organisation 
in Fukushima, the Agricultural Policy Reform League (Nösei Sasshin Renmei) 
mobilised the necessary support to elect their Combined Nokyo Prefectural 
Federation Chairman to the governorship in 1957.
In July 1958, the National Nokyo Executive and Staff Members' League 
(Zenkoku Nokyo Yakushokuin Renmei) adopted a 'Resolution Relating to the 
Strengthening of the Farmers' Political Power' and at the national Nokyo
See Scalapino and Masumi, op.  cit. , p.90, where it was claimed that 
the agricultural cooperatives were 'undoubtedly the most vital affiliation 
for the conservatives at the mass level'.
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convention later in the year, prospects for a general 'mobilisation of 
the farmers' political power' (nomin no se'ijivyoku kesshu) - the old 
catch-cry of the Zenndseiren - were energetically canvassed^- in the 
light of the success of local Nokyo-affiliated political leagues in 
gubernatorial elections. One of the central themes of the convention 
was the question whether farmers as a group should adopt the standpoint 
of a third political party independent of the Socialists and the LDP. 
Although no concrete political grouping emerged from the 1958 Congress, 
activities recognised as part of an umbrella movement officially desig­
nated as the nomin no seijiryoku kesshu spread to other prefectures in 
the following year.
It was with such a stimulus that a Political League for Promoting 
Agriculture (Könö Seiji Renmei) was launched in Ibaragi Prefecture in 
1959. This group was instrumental in electing a Nokyo Central Union 
Chairman to the governorship in that year. The Ibaragi group, like its 
predecessors, took the agricultural cooperatives as its organisational 
base. It explicitly affirmed its political identity, however, and 
developed the ideology of the farmers as a third political force. This 
entailed recognition of the limitations of Nokyo as a political body.
The agricultural cooperatives were circumscribed in their range of 
activities by the provisions of the Nokyo Law, the growing emphasis of 
the central Nokyo leadership on acquiring subsidies which limited in 
practice the alternatives of party support, and by the fact that Nokyo's 
smallest organisational unit hinged entirely around the hamlet (buraku)
Nagase Meitoku, 'Nosei Kyögikai no Kaisö to Nosei Domei no Kessei' 
(The Reorganisation of the Agricultural Policy Council and the Formation 
of the Agricultural Policy League), Nögyö Kyödö Kumiai, February, 1973,
p.53.
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group, thereby encompassing all classes of farmers. The rejection of a
class-based view of farmers’ interests was intrinsic to agricultural
cooperative ideology. It contrasted with the doctrine of the farmers'
unions, which imposed a fairly rigid class interpretation on rural
society. The egalitarian emphasis of Nokyo was construed by the Kono
Seiji Renmei as a factor undermining the agricultural cooperatives’
2capacity to formulate constructive political demands. As an interest 
group, at best Nokyo could provide only a weak common measure of the 
political and economic goals of farmers.
The inherent shortcomings of the agricultural cooperatives as 
political organisations were therefore employed as the main rationale for 
the establishment of the farmers’ political leagues. Their aim was to 
act as spearheads of an agrarian political movement (nomzn undo) which 
would express farmer dissatisfaction, consolidate and unify the political 
activities of the agricultural cooperatives at the local level, and act 
as agencies for the election of Nokyo leaders. To some extent, these 
groups were anti-centrist (i.e. antl-Zenahu), exemplifying the old local- 
activist versus central-bureaucratic theme of the early Nokyo-associated 
groups. ZenchTi-formulated policies dominated the demands and activities 
of the agricultural cooperatives nationwide. It was hoped that the 
prefectural farmers’ political leagues would reorient the focus of Nokyo 
political and policy activities on to regional issues and organisations 
which were more in touch with the farmers and local conditions.
 ^ In 1959, Nokyo had yet to undergo the organisational amalgamations 
of the 1960s, which expanded the geographical focus of the smallest unit 
cooperative from the hamlet to the administratively defined ’village’.
2 The views of the Ibaragi Prefecture Political League for Promoting 
Agriculture can be found in Soma Masao, Nihon no Senkyo Seiji (Election 
Politics in Japan), Tokyo, Aoki Shoten, 1963, p.152.
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The keynote of the farmers’ political leagues' relationship with 
existing political parties was independence. They aimed to promote 
the sectional interests of farmers as a distinct and separate group in 
society, utilising where necessary major party connections for the sole 
purpose of achieving electoral and policy objectives.
The Ibaragi and Miyazaki groups were the impetus behind the spread 
of the farmers’ political movement to 26 other so-called 'agricultural' 
prefectures in 1959 where similar groups sought to establish themselves. 
Although their official titles varied, they collectively referred to
I
themselves as 'farmers' political leagues’ (nomin seiji renmei, or
ndseiren). Their common goal was the realisation of 'politics for the
_ . ... 2farmers' (riömin no tame no se^ji). The Oita Prefecture Agricultural
Policy Promotion League (Ndsei Suishin Renmei) summarised the party-
political philosophy of the movement: 'Neither the LDP, which speaks for
monopoly capital, nor the JSP, which is tethered to the Sdhyd organisation, 
3are our allies.'
In each case, electoral backing for Nokyo gubernatorial 
candidates embodied the principle of political independence, steering a 
non-commit ted course between left wing and right wing parties. Full use 
was made of judicious political alliances which were dictated by consider­
ations of electoral expediency. With the exception of the Miyazaki 
gubernatorial election of 1956 where the Nokyo nominee stood on a JSP
Not to be confused with the rural youth leagues (ndson seinen renmei, 
or ndseiren) referred to earlier.
2 Nosei Janarisuto no Kai (ed.), ’Senkyo to Nomin1 (Association of 
Agricultural Policy Journalists, 'Elections and Farmers'), Nösei no Ugoki, 
No. 7, June 1959, Tokyo, Kyodo Kumiai Kyokai, p.92.
3 Ibid. , p.87.
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ticket, Nokyo candidates campaigned in opposition to the officially 
endorsed LDP candidates as Independents. All presided over temporary 
but extremely successful alliances between breakaway LDP factions and 
the JSP. The Fukushima victory in 1957 for example, was the successful 
result of a political combination involving the progressive faction 
within Nokyo and organised workers.1 It was interpreted by the
Secretary-General of the LDP at the time as a defeat not at the hands of
2the JSP but at the hands of the Nokyo organisation. Similar alliances
3produced success in Shiga and Ibaragi where Nokyo gubernatorial 
candidates benefitted from divisions in conservative party prefectural 
federations and received joint support from LDP splinter groups and 
progressives. This series of progressive-Nokyo successes was attributed 
more to dissatisfaction amongst Nokyo-sponsored political groups with 
LDP agricultural policies rather than positive support for JSP farm 
programs as such.^
In this election the LDP candidate was defeated by Sato Zennichiro, 
the Nokyo candidate, who was a former LDP Lower House member. He broke 
from the party, making the agricultural cooperative organisation in which 
he was prefectural central union chairman, his main back-up organ­
isation. He undertook cooperation on policy matters with the JSP and 
stood as an Independent candidate with JSP recommendation.
2 Soma, Nihon no Senkyo Seiji, op. ait., p.151.
3 In the Ibaragi election, the Nokyo candidate managed a success­
ful alliance of one section of the LDP (in the main, prefectural assembly 
members who had split from the incumbent LDP faction), agricultural 
cooperatives, farmers’ unions and youth groups. These were all 
mobilised into the Kdno Seiji Renmei. At the time it was regarded as a 
victory for a joint farmer-labour struggle.
4 Senkyo to Nomin’, op. ait., p.92.
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The JSP as a whole made significant advances in the 1958 Lower 
House elections, including rural and semi-rural constituencies.^ This 
swept into power a greater number of JSP-aligned Nokyo candidates than 
ever before without a corresponding proportional increase amongst 
conservatively-aligned Nokyo politicians. The rise in the number of 
JSP Nokyo Lower House Diet members also partially reflected the success 
enjoyed by joint progressive party-Nokyo nominees in gubernatorial 
struggles. An additional advantage to the Socialists in this election 
was a unified electoral strategy for the first time in a House of 
Representatives' poll since the amalgamation of the Right and Left 
Socialists in 1955.^
The Farmers' Leagues and National Elections
The first national election tackled by the farmers' leagues was 
the 1959 Upper House poll, in which they made a concerted effort to 
elect as many as possible of their prefectural Nokyo chairmen to Diet 
office, in addition to a range of other candidates who pledged their 
support to the cooperatives. For the most part their electoral targets 
were accomplished in the success of a majority of the LDP candidates
Dore reported that support for the Socialists rose amongst the 
farmers (from 15 to about 20 per cent) during the late 'fifties. Op. cit. , 
p.140. Soma also noted that compared with 10 years previously, the pro­
gressives had increased their voting support in the so-called agricultural 
prefectures by the late 'fifties. They received 20 per cent or less of 
the vote in no prefectures in 1958 compared with three in 1947 (Aomori, 
Chiba and Kagoshima), and received between 20 and 40 per cent in 11 rural 
prefectures in 1958 (Yamagata, Chiba, Yamanashi, Shizuoka, Toyama,
Ishikawa, Fukui, Ehime, Saga, Kumamoto and Kagoshima) compared with seven 
in 1947. See Nihon no Senkyo Seiji, op. cit. , p.130.
2 There was a similar surge in JSP popularity in the 1956 House of 
Councillors' election, which was the first held after unification.
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backed by prefecture-wide Nokyo-based political groups. Inde­
pendent and Ryokufukai candidates supported by the noseiren enjoyed 
a much lower success rate. Although this type of non-party affiliation 
had declined much more slowly in the Upper House than in the Lower House, 
the general process of party consolidation, particularly after the 
establishment of the two-party system in 1955, caught up with the House 
of Councillors in the late 1950s. By the 1959 poll, the LDP had expanded
its hold over the Upper House by filling former Ryokufukai seats. As a
2result, this particular group virtually disappeared from the Diet.
The conscription of the farmers’ political leagues into the
electoral service of a number of LDP Nokyo Diet candidates brought the
nöseiren-LDV connection to the fore as a significantly new phenomenon in
Japanese electoral politics. It was explained in terms of the conservative
3party’s need to compensate for its lack of a strong local organisation.
1
This group included Nagasaki Prefecture Nokyo Central Union 
Chairman and incumbent Diet member, Fujino Shigeo; and amongst the newly 
elected group, Hyogo Prefecture Nokyo Trust Federation Chairman and 
Director of the Central Cooperative Bank for Agriculture and Forestry, Aota 
Gentaro, and Kagoshima Prefecture Nokyo Economic Federation Chairman and 
Chairman of the National Nokyo Transport Federation, Taniguchi Keikichi.
Two prefectural Nokyo Chairmen supported by farmers’ political groups 
who stood as Independents lost.
The activities of these groups were not confined to providing back­
up for Nokyo executives. The Ibaragi Kdrid Seiji Renmei did not formally 
recommend any candidates, but it did give informal support to a member of 
the Ryokufukai whose supporters' association had thrown its weight behind 
the Nokyo aspirant for the prefectural governorship in the same year, in 
addition to a JSP candidate who had a good record on agricultural policy 
matters. Farmers' political leagues also recommended Ryokufukai 
candidates in Shiga and Oita prefectures.
2 The only Ryokufukai Nokyo Diet member left in the Upper House after 
1959 was Mori Yasoichi.
3 Senkyo to Nomin', op. cit., p.92.
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The creation of these explicitly political, Nokyo-based groups, more 
than any other factor, facilitated and encouraged the growing relation­
ship between the government party and the cooperatives at the electoral 
level. Although party affiliation was rejected as a criterion of 
nöseiven support, in practice a majority of nöseiven-backed Nokyo 
candidates were members of the LDP. This particular period in Japanese- 
political history also marked the beginning of semi-permanent LDP rule, 
and as the opposition's chances of coming to power receded, the tactical 
advantage of an electoral strategy of political neutrality correspondingly 
declined. This development was reinforced by Nokyo's growing dependence 
on the government party as a source of patronage. As a result, there was 
a corresponding retreat by progressively-aligned factions of local and 
central Nokyo leaders within the agricultural cooperative organisation.^- 
After the patent political successes of 1959, the nöseiven expanded 
their scale of organisation by setting up a nationwide grouping, the 
National Farmers' Political League (Zenkoku Nomin Seiji Renmei, or
Zennöseiven) prior to the 1960 Lower House election. Farmers' political
2leagues in 22 prefectures subsequently joined this organisation. It
operated in addition to the Zennöven which was still in existence, and
3which was gradually displaying closer ties to the LDP. The farmers'
Tanaka, op.  cit. , p.443.
2 The number of prefectural groups who joined the Zennoseiven varies 
according to source. The above figure was taken from ibid., p.453, but 
in Okamoto Matsuzo, 'Nomin Dantai no Genjö to Undo no Tokuchö' (The 
Current State of Affairs Amongst Farmers' Groups and the Special Features 
of Their Campaigns), Nögyö Kyödö Kumiai, Vol.19, No.2, 1973, p.44, 29 
prefectural groups are mentioned as joining.
3 Tsunejima Masaoki, former Japan Farmers and Liberal Party member in 
the Diet between 1947 and 1949, and from 1952 onwards, succeeded Ishiguro 
Tadayuki as Chairman of Zennöven. In 1955 he joined the LDP. In 1959, 
the Chairman of the Miyazaki Prefecture nömin venmei, Nukumi Saburö, a 
Nokyo official, was elected to the House of Councillors for the LDP.
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political leagues had a choice of joining either the ZennÖven or the 
Zennöseiren. There were also personnel links at the executive level 
between the two organisations.^
The Zennöseiren officially sponsored itw own candidate, Koga Ry5,
in the 1960 elections for Saga constituency. Koga was Saga Prefecture
Nokyo Central Union Chairman and campaigned on the nöseiren slogan of
'mobilising the political power of the farmers', topping the polls in 
2the election. Various prefectural noseiren also sponsored their own
3leaders in a number of other constituencies, but these candidates stood
with either government or opposition party endorsement.
Koga's rejection of any party affiliations and his nomination as a
Zennöseiren-endorsed candidate, was a positive reaffirmation of the
organisation's support for the principle of political Independence. The
Zennöseiren also declared its formal independence of the agricultural
cooperative system, although it acknowledged Nokyo as its organisational
base. It undertook to cooperate and liaise with Nokyo, but it reserved
the right to agree or disagree with Nokyo policies in the light of its
4own interpretation of agricultural sector interests.
Chairman of Zennöseiren was Miyagi Prefecture Nokyo Central Union 
Chairman; Vice-Chairmen were from Hyögo,Ibaragi, and Fukuoka; and Chief 
of its Secretariat was Nakamura Yoshijirö, who was serving concurrently 
as Secretary-General of the Zennören.
2 Saga Prefecture's noseiren was the No.3 strength in the prefectural 
assembly with six members.
3 _In Miyagi (1) for example, the prefectural Nosei Kakuritsu Remiei
(League for the Establishment of an Agricultural Policy) elected its 
advisor Nishimiya Hiroshi to the Lower House as a JSP candidate. The 
same group was also behind his election in 1963. Nishimiya has success­
fully contested every election since, but no attachment to a prefectural 
nöseiren was acknowledged after 1963.
4 Soma, Nihon no Senkyo Seiji, op. cit. , p.153.
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The increasing involvement of Nokyo and its associated farmers'
political leagues in electoral activities was confirmed in the 1962
House of Councillors’ election. In addition to the successful candidacy
of a prefectural riöseiren leader in Kumamoto,^ the advance made by
currently serving LDP-endorsed Nokyo prefectural executives in the 1959
Upper House elections was consolidated and increased to include five new
members. An initiative was made to form a House of Councillors’ Nokyo
Diet Members' Group (Sangiin Nökyö Giindan). Membership was restricted
to current Nokyo executives. This excluded in practice a JSP Zenchü
2staff member newly elected to the House. It has been suggested that
this membership proviso was aimed at prohibiting membership not on
3grounds of rank, but on grounds of party. There had been considerable
opposition within Nokyo to the JSP candidacy of one of the agricultural
cooperative staff members because it directly contravened Zenchü's Diet
policy which concentrated selectively on utilising government party
members to influence agricultural policy formation.
Prior to the 1963 House of Representatives’ election, the Zenndseiren
moved to consolidate its position and increase its organisational strength
4by amalgamating with the National Farmers' Federation {Zennoren) .
The functions of the latter group and its locally-based farmers’ federations 
(nomin renmei) had been largely taken over by the farmers' political
L This was Sonoda Kiyomitsu who stood on an LDP ticket.
2 Watanabe Sadayoshi, elected for Iwate prefectural constituency who 
had been Chief of Zenchü's Agricultural Policy Department. Watanabe’s 
success was regarded as a victory for JSP organisational votes plus Nokyo 
and farmers' votes. Tanaka, op. cit., p.454.
^ Ibid.
4 The only remaining Zennoren member in the House, its Chairman 
Ishiguro Tadayuki, did not stand for re-election in 1962.
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leagues. The new organisation adapted its title in recognition of its 
broader popular base to National Farmers' General Federation (Zenkoku 
Nönrln Sörenmei, or Zennösören).
The year 1963 marked the turning point in the national political 
fortunes of the farmers' political leagues. Koga Ryö was ignominious]y 
defeated in the 1963 Lower House elections in Saga constituency. This 
spelled the end of non-party independent representation for Nokyo- 
based political groups. The short-lived success of the Zennöseiren 
as an independent political force was due to its very insistence on the 
principle of non-attachment to party at a time when the two-party system
had become well established in the Diet and the popularity of Independent
2and minor party candidates had declined drastically. Moreover,the 
existence of a party devoted solely to farmers' interests was being pre­
empted by the obvious benefits of close links with the LDP. 1960 
marked the beginning of a decade of rapid and sizable increases in the 
producer rice price, and in 1961, the Agricultural Basic Law was passed. 
This anticipated massive financial assistance to the rural sector in the 
name of a farm incomes policy which sought to equalise 'wages' in the 
industrial and agricultural sectors. Clearly the pay-offs for close 
alignment with the conservative government party in terms of favourable 
legislation and agricultural subsidies were already becoming evident.
At the time of its establishment, Zennösören consisted of 46 groups 
in 26 prefectures and it was said to have had 700,000 supporters. Its 
Chairman was the former Chairman of the Zennöseiren. Okamoto, op. cit. , 
p .44.
2 In 1955, Independent and minor party candidates won 1.7 per cent of 
seats, in 1958 2.8 per cent, in 1960 1.3 per cent, and in 1963, 2.6 per 
cent.
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Even Koga Ryo had become aware of the weakness of his position in 
’no man's land' in the Diet and the impracticalities of his neutral, non- 
party stance.’*' This prompted him to request (unsuccessfully) LDP endorse­
ment prior to the 1963 election campaign. His lack of influence in 
agricultural policy-making during his stint in the Diet had been a severe 
disadvantage for the Zenndseiren organisation at the time, given the 
intense debate being waged in agricultural circles over the Basic Law 
proposals and the strong policy orientation of the farmers’ political 
leagues.
The results of the 1963 election, particularly in Saga Prefecture, 
prompted a drastic reappraisal of prospects for setting up a separate 
Nokyo-sponsored political grouping in the Diet representing the farm 
sector. The Zennösören rejected the standpoint of the Zenndseiren in 
putting up its own candidates and opted for a weaker interpretation of 
the notion of a middle course between the conservatives and progressives. 
This guaranteed support for farmers' representatives irrespective of 
party. Even this diluted concept of political support, however, departed 
from the already established trend amongst a majority of Nokyo Diet 
members to display conservative colours. This was encouraged by the 
split in the opposition ranks with the formation of the DSP in 1960.
With the socialist vote again divided, JSP electoral fortunes began to 
decline. The number of JSP Nokyo Diet members elected to the Lower House 
in 1960 was a much reduced version of the 1958 figure, and their number 
fell even further in 1963. The composition of opposition Nokyo 
representatives also changed in 1960, with the appearance of DSP Nokyo
The same realisation prompted five of the six nöseiren. representatives 
in the Saga Prefectural Assembly to desert to the LDP.
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membership. This was augmented in 1963 as the party began to pick up 
seats, particularly in semi-rural electorates. The proportion of DSP 
Nokyo Diet members to the total Nokyo contingent was relatively more 
significant than the general level of popularity of the party in the 
countryside. This reflected the choice of many cooperative leaders for 
the more conservative option of socialist representation.
Nokyo and the Zennosoren
The relationship between the Zennosoren and its parent agricultural 
cooperative organisation in the area of electoral support displayed 
consistent lack of co-ordination. Evidence of this was the tendency 
amongst Zennosoren candidates to stand with the endorsement of opposition 
socialist parties, sometimes in competition with LDP Nokyo candidates.^"
Although the Zennosoren continued to function as the only nationally
2organised political grouping attached to the agricultural cooperatives, 
it remained formally independent of the Nokyo organisation and at 
no stage assumed the role of national co-ordinator of Nokyo electoral 
activities as its officially designated political arm. It was never given 
the task of centralising or directing agricultural cooperative electoral
In 1965 for example, a two-way rivalry for Nokyo votes developed 
between a Zennosoren candidate and a Nokyo executive in the House of 
Councillors’ election for the national constituency. The clash involved 
the Secretary-General of the Zennosoren standing as a DSP candidate 
(Nakamura Yoshijirö), and the Chairman of the National Mutual Aid Nokyo 
Federation {Zenkyören), who was an LDP incumbent (Okamura Fumijiro).
The Zenkyören faction within Nokyo mustered enough nationwide support to 
guarantee a successful result for their leader, but the division in 
Nokyo votes overall was sufficient to ensure the defeat of the Zennosoren 
candidate who proved weaker. That this clash took place at all is evi­
dence of a certain lack of co-ordination between these two organisations, 
particularly in view of the general acknowledgement within Nokyo that 
agricultural cooperative votes could only support one official Nokyo 
candidacy in the national constituency.
2 It is referred to in the literature as ’Nokyo’s political organis­
ation’ (Nokyo no seiji soshiki) . See Soma, Kokumin no Sentaku3 op. cit. , 
p.124.
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activities. These remained decentralised and very much the prerogative 
of separate cooperative leadership groups. Furthermore, the locus of 
executive power within Nokyo remained in the hands of Zenchü and national 
federation leaders. The Zenriösoren was essentially a formal umbrella 
structure with a small national staff embracing a host of prefecture! 
farmers’ political leagues whose electoral activities were concentrated 
at local prefectural and constituency level. The more highly activist 
of these grass-roots organisations were manned by core groups of 
politically motivated and policy-oriented prefectura] agricultural 
cooperative leaders with a farmer membership that usually formally 
incorporated local Nokyo members throughout the prefecture. The former 
as a group, tended to be very much locality-oriented and rather more 
radical and independent than the mainstream Nokyo organisation, par­
ticularly its central executive leadership. The farmers’ leagues could 
afford to be more politically idealistic than Nokyo itself. The latter 
was dominated by its economic priorities and traditions of compliance 
and cooperation with agricultural administrators in the implementation 
of policy. It tuned its demands more to what was 'reasonable' in the 
light of existing government measures.
The farmers' political leagues did, however, serve a useful purpose 
as political 'front' organisations. As explicitly 'political' groups, 
they belonged to a different legal genre from the agricultural coopera­
tives. They escaped the statutory restrictions on Nokyo imposed by its 
legal origins, and could devote themselves unequivocally to political 
and electoral operations. The agricultural cooperatives themselves, 
continued to issue recommendations and provide all forms of sup­
port to election candidates rather than relinquish these tasks to the 
sole direction of the farmers' political leagues. After setting the
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initial electoral pace in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties, the latter's 
organisational impetus began to wane, particularly as Nokyo's economic 
operations expanded at a rapid rate. The farmers' political leagues 
became one set of groups amongst a host of agricultural cooperative and 
Nokyo-related organisations engaging in electoral support functions.
Moreover, the organisational division between the farmers' political 
leagues and the mainstream agricultural cooperative organisation was often 
reinforced by differences in political philosophy. The Nokyo executive 
class was acutely conscious of the need to forge personnel links with 
the government party as the influential arbiter of agricultural policy.
This factor was often at the bottom of differences between the agri­
cultural cooperatives and the farmers' political leagues over electoral 
support issues.
1955 to 1961; Summary
Between 1955 and 1967, voting alternatives for farmers in rural and 
semi-rural constituencies of the Lower House and in agricultural prefec- 
tural constituencies of the Upper House remained for the most part polar­
ised into LDP versus JSP preferences. The LDP won 69 per cent of rural 
seats in 1958, 71 per cent in 1960 and 72 per cent in 1963. Support rates 
for the JSP declined in rural seats from 31 per cent in 1958, to 26.5 per 
cent in 1960 and 27 per cent in 1963."^  The small number of seats the DSP 
won in the countryside in 1960 and 1963 were predominantly in semi-rural 
districts and affected LDP and JSP performance almost equally.
The LDP and JSP percentages were derived from data based on the 
classification system in Okino, op. cit. , pp.18-19.
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At the grass-roots level, the farmers’ unions attached to the JSP 
became moribund in many areas, although in certain specific prefectures 
like Niigata, Yamagata and Okayama where they were traditionally more 
active, they continued to function as supporters’ associations for JSP 
candidates. The intense factional disputes of the early 1950s were 
largely resolved in the formation of a new nationwide grouping of 
farmers’ unions, the All-Japan Farmers’ Union (Zennihon Norrtin Kumiai, or 
Zennichinö) in 1958."*" The number of Socialist Diet members connected 
to the farmers’ union movement remained at virtually the same level as 
in the pre-unification period.
The DSP created its own farmers' organisation, the National Farmers' 
League {Zenkoku Nömin Domei, or Zenno) in 1960. It functioned in much 
the same fashion as the JSP-attached farmers' union group: as a
Parliamentary appendage of the Democratic Socialist Party.
The year 1955, however, marked a turning point in the relationship 
between Nokyo and political parties. With the firm establishment of LDP 
rule, the development of a close policy and electoral connection between 
the agricultural cooperatives and the government party began in earnest. 
The failure to sustain the notion of an independent third party 
representing farmers’ interests through sponsorship by the national 
Nokyo-based political group of its own official candidate in the Diet, 
merely served to legitimise closer ties with the government party. The 
powerlessness of Diet members who eschewed major party attachment 
seriously questioned the principle of strict political neutrality.
At the time of its establishment, Zennichinö's membership figure 
was announced publicly at 250,000 (almost the equivalent of Nichinö's 
at the height of land reform. Its actual membership strength was, how­
ever, only a third of this figure. See Kobayashi, Shinohara and Soma, 
op. cit. , p .84.
a 85
As the various facets of the LDP-Nokyo q u id  pro quo relationship 
stabilised, the difference in the relative proportion of conservative 
versus socialist alignment amongst Nokyo representatives in the Upper 
House compared to the Lower House became even more evident. Not only 
did the LDP take over the representation that had formerly gone to the 
Ryokufiikai and Independent members, but it had almost a complete 
monopoly on Upper House rural prefectural representation. In addition, 
there was a positive anti-JSP movement against the token force of 
Socialist Diet members in the House of Councillors by the more numerous 
LDP Nokyo group.
The difference in Nokyo representation between the two Houses of the
Diet, and in particular the dominance of government party-aligned members
in the Upper House, was due principally to the differing constituency
systems of each House. Prefectural constituencies of the House of
Councillors (as distinct from the national constituency) by their very
size, are large and populous electoral districts. This factor greatly
increases the number of votes required for a successful candidacy and
tends to favour majority parties. This is particularly true of the 25
two-member constituencies^ (30 per cent of the total of 83) which elect
one member in each poll making them virtually 'first-past-the-post'
single-member districts. This type of electorate is predominantly found
in the more rural and agricultural prefectures because Upper House
districts more nearly reflect population distribution and geographical
2
size of prefectures than do Lower House constituencies. (Thus Tokyo
This increased to 26 in 1971 with the addition of Okinawa.
2
Even so, the fact that the House of Councillors’ prefectural con­
stituencies no longer reflect population distribution and are, therefore 
imbalanced, was recognized in a joint plan presented by the JSP,
DSP, CGP and JCP to the Upper House in April 1977. This called for increases 
in seats in eight predominantly urban prefectures such as Kanagawa, Tokyo, 
Osaka, Saitama, Chiba etc.
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and Hokkaido are the largest with eight members each.) In single­
member electorates, Japan's smaller progressive opposition parties 
suffer from the division in their ranks which reduces the size of their 
supporting votes. This makes it much harder for them to win seats in 
the type of electorates where Nokyo candidates are more likely to stand. 
(47.3 per cent of Nokyo's successful House of Councillors' prefectural 
district membership represented this type of electorate between 1956 and 
1965.) Between 1955 and 1967, the JSP (the only opposition party to win 
seats in these 'rural' electorates) won only 12 seats out of a total of 
100 contested. Independent or Ryokufukab candidates won three, and the 
rest were LDP.
Factors built into the electoral situation therefore contributed to 
the lack of success by Nokyo candidates with socialist affiliations in 
prefectural districts of the House of Councillors. In addition to this 
constituency-related factor, the LDP tended to poll extremely well (at 
over 50 per cent of the vote) in 23 Upper House prefectural constituencies 
(mainly in Tohoku, Northern Kantö, Hokuriku, Shikoku and Kyushu), which 
were predominantly agricultural prefectures. Not all of these were 
single-member electorates. Agricultural districts in general were 
characterised by their whole-hearted support for conservative candidates.
1967 to 1977: Introduction
The House of Representatives' election in 1967 marked the beginning 
of a period of relatively greater change in party configurations in the 
Diet. The fragmentation amongst opposition parties was accentuated with 
the emergence of the Clean Government Party (Kömebtö) in the 1967 
elections, and developed even further in 1977 with the appearance of the 
breakaway New Liberal Club (Shin JiyTi Kurabu) . LDP popularity declined
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below 50 per cent of the total vote for the first time in 1967. The
party's polling rate was to decrease progressively in subsequent
elections.1 The LDP’s fall-off in performance, however, was more rapid
in metropolitan and urban constituencies of the Lower house than in rural
and semi-rural electorates, and this served to actually increase,
proportionally, its dependence on rural support. The LDP also maintained
its predominance in 'agricultural' electorates of the Upper House. On
2balance, it became more of a rural party than ever, and this tended to 
reinforce its identity as the party representing the farmers and the 
agricultural cooperatives.
The Stable LDP-Nokyo Connection
These trends were reflected in the stability of the LDP-Nokyo 
connection in both Houses. There was a marginal increase in the number 
of Socialist members representing the more agricultural districts of the 
Upper House in 1971 as a result of the advance by the.JSP in single­
member constituencies in that election, but in 1977 all these Socialist- 
won seats reverted to the conservative party. Amongst current Upper House 
Nokyo representatives (post-1977 elections) there are no opposition party
In the 1967 House of Representatives' elections, the LDP's share of 
the total vote fell to 48.8 per cent. In 1969, it declined still further 
to 47.63 per cent, and in 1972 to 46.85 per cent. In 1976 it was 41 per 
cent.
2 Soma used his five-category constituency classification system to 
evaluate the LDP's performance over three elections (1967, 1969 and 1972), 
relative to constituency type. He also traced the LDP's overall perform­
ance in these three elections and compared the two. As a result of his 
calculations, he was able to state that the LDP's support rate declined 
by approximately two per cent in each election as a whole, and also in all 
types of electorates except for rural constituencies, where it declined 
by only 0.5 per cent: from 62.5 per cent in 1967, to 61.7 per cent in
1969, to 62 per cent in 1972. This demonstrated in his opinion, that the 
LDP, if anything, was becoming more dependent on the rural vote. Kokumin 
no Sentaku, op. cit. , pp.262-263.
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or Independent members. This group is therefore, more pro-government 
than it has ever been.
The pattern in the Lower House has also remained largely unchanged 
with government party Nokyo representatives constituting almost double 
the total of all the opposition parties combined. In spite of the JCP's 
doubling its support rate in rural and semi-rural electorates, over­
taking the DSP in semi-rural districts in 1972 and in rural electorates in
1969, and the even greater relative increase in rural support for the
2Kömeito , neither of these parties has succeeded in infiltrating the 
ranks of Nokyo Diet members. The JCP has managed to gain the support of 
a small number of local agricultural cooperative leaders in a few 
selected areas, but considerable antipathy to the Communists still exists 
amongst the top Nokyo leadership. The Kömeito on the other hand, has 
retained its identity as an urban party in spite of its increase in rural 
support, winning four times as much support in metropolitan constituen­
cies as in rural constituencies in 1972.
The 1976 Lower House elections produced a more varied support 
pattern amongst Nokyo Diet members insofar as a single Nokyo candidate 
successfully contested with the endorsement of the New Liberal Club 
(Shin Jiyu Kuvabu) and another stood as an Independent having fled the 
LDP as a result of his role in the Lockheed scandal.
In 1967, the JCP won 3.1 per cent of the vote in semi-rural elector­
ates and 2.6 per cent of the vote in rural electorates. In 1972 these 
figures were 7.1 per cent and 4.9 per cent respectively. In 1969 the 
DSP's polling rate in rural electorates was 2.9 per cent and the JCP's 
was 3.2 per cent. In 1972, these figures for semi-rural electorates were 
2.1 per cent and 7.1 per cent respectively. See Ibid., p.263.
2 The Komeito won 0.6 per cent of the rural vote in 1967 and 3.6 per 
cent in 1972. Ibid.
189
The Zennösören: Current Membership and Structure
During the 1970s, much of the force has evaporated from the concept of 
'mobilising the farmers' political power' which Inspired the activities 
of the farmers' leagues in the late 'fifties and 'sixties. It has become 
more of a traditional catch-phrase tying together a rather loosely knit 
bunch of groups than a meaningful call to action. The Zennösören con­
tinues to function as the national umbrella organisation uniting a host 
of prefectural farmers' leagues all sharing the general label of nöseiren. 
Although they take Nokyo as their organisational base an official position 
within the cooperatives is not an automatic guarantee of riöseiren sup­
port, nor is leadership or Diet representation of the political leagues 
dependent upon an official role within the agricultural cooperative 
organisation.^ The farmers' political leagues are much more prepared to 
countenance alliances with and support for Independent and socialist 
candidates. This automatically classes the movement as more 'progressive' 
than the Nokyo organisation itself as indicated by the conservative con­
nections amongst a majority of Nokyo's Diet members.
The structural forms of the prefectural-based groups of which 
Zennösören is composed, are fairly diverse. Some directly organise agri­
cultural cooperative farming members collectively within a prefecture, 
but this is often only in a nominal sense. Not all local cooperative 
members are necessarily actively involved in the leagues even though
Nakamura Yoshijiro mentioned earlier for example, and also Inatomi 
Takato, another DSP member who has held a seat in the Lower House for the 
constituency of Fukuoka (3) virtually from 1953 to 1977. He was the 
first Chairman of the DSP-attached Zenkoku kömin Dömei, and before that 
was a prominent leader in the Right Socialist Party farmers' union move­
ment. He fought the 1972 elections with a voting base in the Fukuoka 
Prefecture farmers' political league, one of the historical strongholds 
of the movement.
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they may be on the membership books. The majority of Zennösören groups 
are composed of representatives of local cooperatives (tankyd). Amongst 
the latter, conference- or council-type bodies (kyögikai) are common.
In 1972, 15 prefectural groupings constituted the formal membership of 
the Zennösören: those from Hokkaido, Aomori, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaragi,
Kanagawa, Nagano, Fukui, Mie, Shiga, Shimane, Fukuoka, Kumamoto,
Miyazaki and Kagoshima. Farmers’ political leagues in Akita, Gumma,
Chiba, Yamanashi, Tottori, Saga and Oita cooperated with the Zennösören 
in its activities as ’friendly’ groups.^
Conclusion: 1946-1977
This chapter has attempted an historical analysis of Nokyo’s 
political representation in the Diet and the formation of Nokyo-associated 
parties and political groups. Explanations for some of the more signifi­
cant features in the pattern of political alignment of agricultural 
cooperative Diet members encompassed two basic causal categories: 
factors in the general political environment such as major shifts in 
party organisation, the overall election performance of parties which 
endorsed Nokyo officials, and characteristics inherent in Upper House and 
Lower House electoral systems which helped to determine resulting party 
configurations in the Diet; and secondly, factors involving the critical 
element of conscious choice: a prospective Nokyo candidate's political
preferences and choice of party. The latter was conceived not only as a 
product of historical and environmental factors of the sort listed above, 
but of the fundamental political and ideological orientation of the 
agricultural cooperative movement, its associated political groups, and
1 Okamoto, op. cit. , p.44.
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its leaders and members who made up the nation’s farm voters. This 
orientation was predominantly but not exclusively conservative, an 
ideological bias frequently reinforced by certain practical consider­
ations such as the strategic electoral and policy advantages of endorse­
ment by the government party.
All the variables noted above, although not providing a total 
explanation, contributed in complex fashion to the overall historical 
pattern of political alignment amongst Nokyo's Diet members. Examined 
in these terms, the electoral representation of the agricultural 
cooperatives can be linked to its appropriate historical, organisational 
and systemic context. The significance of major shifts in Parliamentary 
party organisation for example, was demonstrated particularly well in 
the period leading up to the 1955 party amalgamations when the more 
varied political affiliations of Nokyo members declined in parallel with 
the trend towards party consolidation. The failure of attempts by a 
select group of Nokyo leaders to establish a farmers’, and later a Nokyo 
party, was also part of this process. The effect of developments in 
party organisation was apparent once more in the 1960s and 1970s with the 
reversal of this movement and the increase in party fragmentation (tatöka). 
In 1960, DSP-aligned Nokyo candidates appeared in the Diet for the first 
time, and in 1977, a Nokyo official endorsed by the New Liberal Club was 
also elected. These variations, however, remained within the confines of 
a basic pattern of majority-conservative: minority-socialist alignment
with the greatest number of Nokyo members always affiliated to the 
conservative government party. The formation of the urban-based Kömeitö 
for instance, had no effect on the constitution of Nokyo’s Parliamentary 
representation, nor did the continuous existence of the JCP have any 
observable influence on the affiliations of Nokyo Diet members.
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Conservative and socialist party labels also underwent change from time 
to time, but the distribution of party support amongst Nokyo’s represent­
atives underwent no drastic alterations in political orientation.
A contributory factor in this stability was the absence of marked 
changes in the electoral performance of parties which endorsed Nokyo 
candidates. The relative stability of conservative and socialist voting 
preferences in the more rural sections of the electorate helped to main­
tain corresponding stability in the respective proportions of LDP and 
progressive Nokyo Diet members.
Minor fluctuations in the numbers of Nokyo officials aligned with 
different parties included the advance by the JSP in rural and semi- 
rural electorates in the 1958 Lower House poll and those leading up to 
it. This was recorded in a parallel trend in Nokyo-JSP affiliations in 
the House of Representatives which reached a peak in 1958, with a similar 
phenomenon occurring in the House of Councillors in 1971. Socialist 
affiliation declined subsequently, with a sudden fall occurring in 1969, 
which corresponded to the party's Lower House electoral setback in that 
year. The JSP decline was balanced by an increase in LDP-affiliated 
Nokyo representation, but here again after 1969, LDP membership also 
began to fall as the party’s decline in the countryside accelerated.
This was particularly evident in the 1976 elections, when LDP support 
in House of Representatives’ rural and semi-rural districts dipped 
more sharply than in previous elections. The Socialists, however, 
declined absolutely and relatively to the LDP, which produced a slightly 
more conservative orientation in Lower House Nokyo representation after
1967.
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In contrast, increases in Komeito and JCP polling rates in the 
countryside, particularly after 1967, did not register at all in Nokyo's 
Diet membership. Here the importance of political choice as a deter­
minant of party alignment is evident. The JCP and CGP operate outside 
the boundaries of agricultural cooperative political representation.
Party decisions on candidate endorsement constitute yet another 
strategic element of choice built into the total pattern of political 
attachment. This consideration may account for the trend in the 1970s 
towards increasing LDP affiliation relative to other parties amongst 
Nokyo's Diet members. As the LDP became increasingly aware of the 
threat to its major electoral stronghold, it consciously sought to main­
tain its popularity in rural areas by consolidating its relationship 
with the farmers and Nokyo. One area where this strategy could be adopted 
was in the party endorsement process.
The electoral stability which provided a firm basis for the LDP- 
Nokyo majority connection, was also considerably assisted by the insulat­
ing effects of a largely unreformed electoral system. This helped to 
prevent socio-economic changes such as the huge drop in the agricultural 
workforce and the exodus of rural population, from registering in vast 
increases in progressively-aligned, urban and semi-urban members in the 
Diet.
These stability factors also prevented drastic alterations in the 
absolute number of official Nokyo representatives in the Diet, although 
in the period of almost three decades under review, there was a marginal 
decline in Nokyo's total Diet membership. Nokyo representation in the 
Lower House was at its highest level in 1953, with 35 members. It 
subsequently fell gradually to a figure of 22 in 1976, a variation of 
approximately three percentage points: from 7.4 per cent of the membership
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of the House of Representatives, to 4.3 per cent. In the House of 
Councillors, a numerical peak in Nokyo representation was reached in 
1962 with 19 members. This coincided with the 'boom' period in the 
activities of the farmers' political leagues which concentrated on 
electing prefectural Nokyo leaders to Upper House seats. By 1977 the 
total had dropped steadily to 14, or a variation of between 7.6 per 
cent of Upper House membership in 1962 and 5.5 per cent in 1977. Nokyo's 
official representation in the Diet was at its lowest level in 1977, 
which correlates with the long-term decline in popularity of the LDP and 
the gradual fall in rural population.
Statistical analysis of Nokyo's Diet membership over the whole 1949- 
1977 period serves to confirm the most significant feature of Nokyo's 
Parliamentary representation by its own leaders: consistent attach­
ment by the largest number to the conservative government party. This 
was evident in every post-election Diet between 1949 and 1977. It was 
very clearly indicated in the Upper House, with opposition Nokyo 
representation principally confined to the Lower House. Since 1955, 
majority conservative affiliation has meant the LDP, with the picture 
slightly more complicated prior to 1955 by the existence of two main 
conservative parties. Even during this period, however, the largest 
number of Nokyo officials were affiliated to the governing Liberals, and 
later the Democrats.
For purposes of the following composite analysis, parties are divided 
into conservative and socialist rather than government and non-government, 
although conservative and government have meant the same thing for the larger 
part of postwar Diet history. The varying Diet records of Japanese 
political parties make straight statistical comparison of the percentage 
of Nokyo members attached to each party difficult, but this can be overcome
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by classing parties in terms of their organisational lineage. In this 
way, the following picture emerges: the conservatives captured 63 per
cent of Nokyo representation, the Socialists(JSP, and Right and Left 
Socialists) 19 per cent, and the DSP five per cent (this may be added to 
the previous figure to make a combined Socialist and Democratic 
Socialist total of 24 per cent, which compensates for the DSP's relatively 
shorter Diet history). Independents and minor parties gained 13 per cent 
(approximately 80 per cent of this group could be considered as pro­
conservative) .
There were also variations in the ratios of party support between 
Houses. In the House of Councillors, the proportion of conservative to 
Socialist members was significantly higher: 68 per cent of all Nokyo Diet
members belonged to conservative parties, 21 per cent were Independent or 
minor party members, and 11 per cent were Socialist Party members, with 
none belonging to the DSP. In the House of Representatives, the range of 
party affiliations was greater and more evenly balanced: the total per­
centage affiliated to conservative parties was lower at 59 per cent, and 
the percentage of Socialist Party members higher at 25 per cent. In spite 
of its relatively short Diet history, the DSP captured 10 per cent of 
Nokyo official Diet membership, to make a combined socialist opposition 
total of 35 per cent. A much smaller percentage than in the Upper House 
(six per cent) were Independent or minor party members.
These variations in the proportions of each party's Nokyo Diet 
members in each House correspond with few exceptions, to the relative 
success rates of those parties in 'rural' constituencies in terms of 
seats won. Socialist Party Nokyo members were disproportionately better 
represented in the Lower House than in the Upper House. This accords with 
the general picture of the Socialists' performance in 'rural'
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constituencies in each House. In the House of Representatives for 
example, the JSP and its forerunners consistently obtained over a 
quarter of 'rural’ seats. Similarly 25 per cent of all Nokyo's Lower 
House representatives were allied to the party.
The number of DSP-aligned members in the Lower House was higher 
than their overall performance in 'rural' electorates would warrant.
This was due mainly to the fact that DSP Nokyo members represented 
predominantly 'semi-rural' and 'urban' border districts where the party 
scored much higher seat tallies than in rural electorates and also the 
tendency amongst Nokyo leaders to choose the more 'conservative' of the 
opposition socialist parties. The fact that Nokyo officialdom was not 
represented at all in the ranks of the DSP in the Upper House, however, 
accords with the electoral disadvantage of being a small minority party 
contesting for a single seat, or for two seats in large, populous pre- 
fectural constituencies. The DSP has in fact never won a seat in the 
single-member prefectural constituencies of the Upper House.
Similarly, the greater proportion of Independent and minor party 
Nokyo members in the House of Councillors (it was approximately three 
times more popular) reflected the relatively higher success rates of 
Independent representatives in the Upper House and the fact that this 
type of representation remained popular in the House of Councillors long 
after it had almost disappeared from the Lower House. The latter 
became major party-oriented much earlier in its postwar Diet history.
These figures also reveal that Nokyo's relationship with conservative 
parties, as defined in terms of its official representation in the Diet, 
reflects no more than the 'natural' electoral bias of the type of con­
stituencies which Nokyo leaders in the majority represent. The above 
figures also refute the supposition that the cooperatives are exclusively
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tied to the conservatives. The proportion of conservative government 
and opposition socialist alignment amongst Nokyo Diet members is merely 
a reflection of the general bias revealed in voting patterns in the 
countryside. It is no greater than one would expect from an organisation 
which claims to represent the rural sector.
Observed in these terms, Nokyo is not an exclusive appendage of the 
Parliamentary LDP in the countryside. The associated political groups 
which inherited a tradition of political independence are even less so.
This sets it apart from opposition party-associated farmers' unions 
groups which operate closed alliances with socialist parties (Niohind and 
later Zennichind with the JSP, and Zenriö with the DSP). The farmers' union 
organisations are party-parasitic, with virtually no independent non- 
party leadership. In spite of early differences in the farmers' union 
movement when pro-Socialist and pro-Communist groupings were formed, the 
political orientation of the movement has always been exclusively pro­
gressive, and predominantly socialist for a large part of its history. 
Instances of Nichiriö or Zennichirid leaders affiliating with the LDP in 
the Diet are rare.^  These exclusive party ties are generated by a top 
heavy Diet and local assembly leadership, and by the farmers' unions' 
origins as groupings created by Socialist Party politicians. Their 
organisational rationale after the displacement which followed the com­
pletion of land reform, was in large part electorally-based. They
According to Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., pp.164-167, there were 
two farmers' union Diet representatives belonging to the Democratic Party 
in 1947, one in 1949, another belonging to its successor, the Progressive 
Party in 1953, and one in the ranks of the LDP in 1958. The latter was 
one-time Zennören chairman, Tsunejima Masaoki, who was originally elected 
to the Diet as an Independent who later joined the Japan Farmers' Party.
He joined the Liberal Party in 1949 and unsuccessfully contested the 1949 
election for a seat in Nagasaki (2) constituency. He won for the 
Liberals in 1952 and subsequently joined the LDP.
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assisted in the mobilisation of support for opposition socialist 
candidates amongst the farmers. Membership of the farmers’ unions 
carried with it a vote for the JSP or DSP.
Nokyo on the other hand, had legal-administrative origins, and 
maintained its own independent economic and political power base.
Although it displayed certain features of a semi-administrative arm of 
government, at no stage did it assume the characteristics of an organis­
ational appendage to a Parliamentary party. Its electoral representation 
in the national Diet merely served as an extension of its official 
objective which was to conduct cooperative activities for the benefit of 
the farming community. First and foremost, it always sought to further 
its own organisational aims. These were defined by its own independent 
executive and staff leadership, and not by the conservative government 
party. The decision as to how its leaders and members aligned themselves 
politically was kept strictly as a matter for personal decision and was 
not predicated on the adoption of agricultural cooperative membership.
In each case, the relationship between a former or current Nokyo official 
seeking office and a political party, was one between two separate and 
independent organisations.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ELECTORAL ACTIVITIES OF THE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
In the preceding chapter, Nokyo's political alignment was defined 
historically in terms of the party affiliations of agricultural cooper­
ative officials in the Diet. This chapter focusses on the broader 
issue of Nokyo's electoral participation and the nature of its political 
backing. Particular emphasis is given to identifying the range of 
agricultural cooperative electoral behaviour and the mechanics of the 
procedures involved. The criteria on which Nokyo's political support 
is based, and the strengths and weaknesses of its electoral operations 
are also specified.
Electorally speaking, Nokyo is perhaps more significant than any 
other Japanese interest group. Not only does it seek direct represent­
ation in the Diet by its own officials and supporters, but the agricultural 
cooperatives engage in a wide range of vote mobilisation activities for 
farm politicians in general. The fact that the agricultural cooperatives 
are ubiquitous in the Japanese countryside and incorporate the 
strategically important farm electorate within their membership consider­
ably enhances this role. Nokyo is not a mere interest group but a power­
ful electoral force in its own right. These factors, together with the 
importance of rural and semi-rural support as the underpinning of LDP 
one-party rule, necessitate a detailed examination of Nokyo's electoral 
role as a very crucial sector of its activities.
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1The National Nokyo Electorate
One of the most patent sources of NokyoTs influence is the extremely 
large number of votes that allegedly come within the scope of the agri­
cultural cooperative system. In the broadest sense, agricultural 
cooperative membership could be considered as equivalent to 'the farmers'. 
On these grounds, Nokyo's membership outnumbers any other organised group 
in the nation. Calculating the magnitude of the national Nokyo electorate, 
however, is complicated by overlapping categories of membership and 
organisation. This makes the following task at best an approximate exer­
cise in electoral logistics.
If defined in terms of the sum of individual farmer members of multi­
purpose agricultural cooperatives (excluding specialist Nokyo members
because of the problem of overlapping membership and therefore duplication
2of voters), the pool of Nokyo votes stood at 5.76 million in 1975. To
this figure, however, must be added agricultural cooperative associate
membership (i.e. non-farmer members of Nokyo), who numbered 1.84 million 
3in 1975; and Nokyo staff members or employees (not including the execu­
tive class of officials because the majority of these are elected from
4amongst Nokyo farming members, and have therefore, already been included).
The concept of the 'national electorate' of an organised interest 
group is borrowed from Donald R. Thurston, Teachers and Politics in Japan, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973, p.229.
Nokyo Nenkan, 19 78, p.405.
3 Ibid.
4 Article 30 (10)of Nokyo Law states that at least three quarters of 
the established number of directors of a cooperative shall be elected 
from its members (excluding associate members and members who are 
juridical persons). See 'Nögyö Kyödö Kumiaihö' (Agricultural Cooperative 
Union Law), in Nörinsho Kanshu, Nögyö Roppö (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry Editorial Supervision, A Compendium of Agricultural Laws), Tokyo, 
Gakuyo Shobo, 1976, p.118.
201
1
These numbered 352,239 in 1975. This produces a basic minimum figure
2of 7.95 million individual Nokyo voters in that year.
On the other hand, calculated in terms of individuals over the age 
of 20 years (i.e. with the right to vote) residing in farm households
3
with agricultural cooperative membership (all farm households in 1975'),
4the size of the national Nokyo electorate increases considerably. In 
February 1975, farm household population over 20 years totalled 16.57 
million.^ This represented 21.8 per cent of the estimated total of
This figure represents the sum total of staff members in general- 
purpose co-ops (271,199); specialist co-ops (9,574); prefectural feder­
ations (61,603); national federations (6,378); prefectural central unions 
(3,339); and Zenchü (146). These figures were obtained from Nokyo Nenkan, 
1978, op. cit., pp.103, 104, 106; Nokyo Nenkan, 1977, p.135, and Nökyö 
Nenkan, 1976, p.136.
2 _Aono Bunsaku in Nokyo:Soshiki to Hito to Senryaku (Nokyo: Organis­
ation, People and Strategies), Tokyo, Daiyamondosha, 1976, p.21, attempted 
a similar computation of Nokyo's potential ’mobilisation power’. His 
calculation went as follows (all figures were for 1973 although he 
incorrectly states they were for 1975): 5,818,249 regular members in
co-ops (individuals 5,818,336 and groups 4,913); 1,720,166 associate 
members in co-ops (individuals 1,674,330 and groups 45,836); executive 
and staff members in general-purpose co-ops 352,264 (this is in fact the 
total figure for staff members in the entire Nokyo organisation); in 
specialist co-ops 28,879; in prefectural federations 62,918; and in 
national federations 6,419; plus an unknown quantity of those employed in 
Nokyo’s 1,000 or more ’related companies’, which he designated as a 
’plus alpha’ factor. ’Group' membership of agricultural cooperatives has 
been excluded from the computation attempted in this chapter because of 
overlap with the individual farmer membership category. Group members of 
tankyd are farmers' group corporations, other agricultural cooperatives, 
and organisations composed chiefly of farmers.
See Table 1.1.
4 Although not all farm household members are engaged in farm work, 
this does not negate their membership link with the cooperatives. Further­
more, residing within a farm household is sufficient to guarantee a stake, 
however indirect, in the farm economy and in agricultural affairs in 
general, for these matters affect the whole household as a unit.
This figure was obtained from a breakdown of the age structure of 
farm household population in Norinsho, Tokei Johobu, Poketto No Tin Suisan 
Jtdkei (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Statistics ‘and Information 
Department, Pocket Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Statistics), 1976, 
Tokyo, Norin Tokei Kyokai, 1976, p.126.
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76 million voters in the national electorate in February 1975. The 
earlier more conservative measurement of 7.95 million individual 
Nokyo voters in 1975, represented 10.4 per cent of the national 
electorate.
These figures indicate the maximum possible range of Nokyo voters. 
By any standard of measurement they constitute a significant pro­
portion of the national electorate. To conclude, however, that the sum 
of ’Nokyo votes' is at the disposal of the agricultural cooperative 
leadership, or is even open to Nokyo 'control', is to exceed all the 
available evidence. This points to the involvement of the agricultural 
cooperatives in diverse electoral activities, and to a belief amongst 
farm politicians that 'to harm Nokyo leads to certain political death'. 
An additional factor highly relevant to these calculations is the over­
representation of rural and semi-rural constituencies in elections for 
the national Diet which magnifies the weight of the agricultural 
cooperative vote considerably.
Categories of Farm Politician
An indirect measure of Nokyo's actual abilities to influence its 
members' votes is the ratio of agricultural cooperative Diet members 
to the total Nokyo electorate. This has relative significance in 
comparison with the performance of other groups.
This figure is based on the recorded growth of the national voting 
population (NVP) between December 1972 and December 1976. The mean 
growth of the NVP between December 1972 and July 1974 was 1.00 million 
per annum (from 73.77 million to 75.35 million); between July 1974 and 
December 1976, it was 1.08 million per annum (from 75.35 million to 
77.92 million). The NVP figures for December 1972, July 1974 and 
December 1976 were obtained from Asahi Nenkan, 1975, p.262 and 1977, 
p.321.
Aono, op. ait., p .21.2
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Nokyo Diet members averaged approximately 27, or 5.6 per cent of
Lower House membership between 1949 and 1976. In the Upper House they
averaged 16,"^  or 6.9 per cent between 1950 and 1977. This produces a
combined average of 43, or 6.25 per cent of the national Diet, which
represents a ratio of one Diet member per 185,000 Nokyo voters on 1975
2national Nokyo electorate figures. This compares with a ratio of one
Japan Teachers' Union (JTU) Diet representative to 20,370 JTU members
3between 1959 and 1971. By this standard of measurement, the JTU would 
appear to be much more successful in directing its members’ votes than 
Nokyo in spite of the advantages which the majority of agricultural 
cooperative election candidates enjoy, such as government party endorse­
ment and election from rural and semi-rural constituencies where voting 
patterns have traditionally been more stable.
A number of factors account for the relatively small number of Nokyo 
officials in the Diet in proportion to its total voting membership. These 
do not necessarily reflect on its powers of vote mobilisation. Generally 
speaking, agricultural interests are already over-represented in the Diet 
owing to the large number of Diet members elected from rural areas (rioson 
giin). A related factor is the alignment of a majority of these farm 
politicians with the LDP, which guarantees a strong voice to agricultural 
interests within the policy-determining government party. The motivation 
of the LDP to give priority to questions of electoral survival and to
The figures on Nokyo Diet members are derived from data on Nokyo 
giin found in the sources listed in Chapter 3, page 141, footnote 2.
2 This figure was obtained by dividing the total number of individual 
Nokyo voters (7.95 million) by 43. Using the alternative farm household 
membership figure, a much higher ratio of 385,000 Nokyo voters per Nokyo 
Diet member is obtained.
3 This ratio was calculated from data on JTU membership and Diet 
representation given in Thurston, op. cit., pp.225-229.
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maintain its rural support base has generally produced policies highly 
favourable to the farmers.
The LDP’s Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee 
(Sögö Nösei Chosakai) according to 1974 membership lists, had 199 members, 
and its Agriculture and Forestry Division (Novin Bukai), both within the 
party's Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), had 154.^ The former in 
particular provides a concrete numerical indication of the full complement 
of LDP agricultural Diet members. Clearly, 200 or so government party 
members regard themselves as having a large enough farm component in 
their electorates to nominate for this committee.. Joint membership of 
both committees is common. Regardless of any active Nokyo role in 
elections and policy representation, the significance of the rural vote to 
the government party is sufficient to endow Japan's major rural organis­
ation with enormous residual influence. This, to some extent, reduces the 
need for direct agricultural cooperative representation.
Secondly, Nokyo benefits from a highly developed system of contacts 
with the MAF. In the first instance, this derives from the agricultural 
cooperatives' statutory origins, which require that agriculture and 
forestry bureaucrats monitor Nokyo's activities closely. This has been 
enhanced by the organisation's long-standing functions as a semi- 
administrative arm of government. The cooperatives have become so well 
integrated within the administration of the farm sector that one of the 
key targets of interest group pressure (the relevant ministry) is already 
'subsumed' within a day-to-day working relationship between two profes­
sional bureaucracies. The need to supplement this highly developed system
Both these sets of figures were taken from Jiyu Minshuto, Seimu 
Chosakai Meiho (Liberal Democratic Party, Policy Affairs Research Council 
Membership List), 1974, pp.26-28, and pp.51-53.
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of contacts with mediation and pressure from Nokyo politicians as such, 
is perhaps not as great as in the case of some other interest groups 
which do not enjoy such favoured status within their respective 
ministries.^ In addition, the weight of rural interests within the 
government party assists generally in the constant presentation of 
Nokyo’s demands to MAF officials by LDP politicians.
Furthermore, although Nokyo Diet members represent an important 
sub-category of farm politician, there are a large number of other 
agricultural organisations in Japan which maintain representation in 
the Diet. These groups perform economic and other functions comple­
mentary to those of the cooperatives. Their affiliations to Nokyo are 
various, ranging from formal organisational ties and joint leadership,
to personal connections and overlapping membership. Those officially
2listed as Nokyo-related groups number almost 100.
Two possible rivals to Nokyo for the position of farm spokesman 
have already been mentioned: the farmers’ unions and the agricultural
committee system. Executives from both sets of groups combine their
Two examples are the Japan Medical Association and the Welfare 
Ministry, and the Japan Teachers’ Union and the Ministry of Education, 
where the dominant relationship has often been one of confrontation 
rather than cooperation.
2 -  -A formal listing of these groups can be found in Zenkoku Nogyo
Kyödö Kumiai Yakushokuin Renmei (ed.)_, Nögyö Kyödö Kumiai Rengökai 
Yakushokuin Meibo (National Agricultural Cooperative Union Executive 
and Staff Members’ League, Agricultural Cooperative Union Federations’ 
Executive and Staff Members' List), 1976, Tokyo, Kyodo Kumiai Tsushinsha, 
pp.4-8.
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professional roles with Diet office.' In the case of the agricultural 
committee system, the link with Nokyo is institutionalised within its 
formal organisational structure; in contrast, the relationship between 
Nokyo and the farmers’ unions on the official level is more one of 
temporary alliance formation for the purpose of joint presentation of 
demands to government.
The majority of these other agricultural organisations, however, 
belong in the category of 'extra-departmental groups' (gaikaku dantai), 
which exist to supplement the functions of central government. They 
are administratively parasitic in the sense that they are attached to 
different ministries and operate by means of allocations from the 
national budget. They also provide employment for retired ex­
bureaucrats and other administrative nominees. Some have specific 
functions within agricultural legislation. The range of interests they 
encompass is extensive, ranging from administration of special 
subsidies for agricultural development and price stabilisation, to
Diet representation of the farmers' unions was discussed more 
extensively in Chapter 3. With the National Chamber of Agriculture, its 
prefectural agricultural councils and local agricultural committees, 
political representation of all levels in the Diet has been common. Some 
examples are: Nabeshima Naotsugu, LDP member in the Upper House for Saga
Prefecture from 1959 onwards, Chairman of the National Chamber of 
Agriculture and Saga Prefecture Agricultural Council; Horimoto Senjitsu, 
LDP member in the Upper House for Ehime Prefecture between 1956 and 1974, 
Vice-Chairman and Chairman of the National Chamber of Agriculture and 
Chairman of the Ehime Prefectural Agricultural Council; Someya Makoto,
LDP member in the Lower House for Chiba (1) and (4) from 1972 onwards, 
Chairman of Chiba Prefecture Agricultural Council and member of the 
National Chamber of Agriculture; and Shimada Takuro, JSP member in the 
Lower House for Hokkaido (5) from 1972 onwards, Chairman of a town agri­
cultural committee, and divisional chairman of Hokkaido Prefecture 
Agricultural Council.
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technical, advisory, informational and promotional roles. It is common 
for these groups to nominate prominent Diet politicians into top 
positions within their own organisational leadership.
The functions, leadership structure, membership and connections 
of these groups place their political representatives within the orbit 
of Nokyo's influence, thereby augmenting the total number of Diet 
members to whom the cooperatives are linked. This also helps to 
explain why the absolute number of Nokyo officials in the Diet is small 
in proportion to the very numerous Nokyo electorate. In addition to 
their own direct official representation, the cooperatives maintain very 
close ties with politicians connected to these other agricultural 
organisations.
There are various informal ways of describing farm politicians, 
including ’rural Diet members' (nöson giin) (i.e. Parliamentarians who 
represent rural and semi-rural constituencies; 'agricultural and forestry 
Diet members' (nörin giin); and 'agricultural policy Diet members'
([nösei giin) .
Former bureaucrats from the MAF who successfully attain Diet office 
are usually known as norin giin, as are the members of Diet Standing 
Committees on Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Nörin Suisan Iinkai), 
members of party agricultural and forestry policy-making organs, and 
supporters of informal Diet groupings centring on more specific
These include the National Association for a Price Stabilisation 
Fund for Beef (Nikuyögyü Kakaku Antei Kikin Zenkoku Kyokai), the Central 
and Prefectural Livestock Associations (Chuo Chikusankai, Ken Chikusankai), 
the National Beef Association (Zenkoku Nikuyögyü Kyokai), the 
Federation of Land Development Corporations (Tochi Kairyö Jigyö Dantai 
Rengökai), the Agriculture and Forestry Statistics Association (Nörin 
Tökei Kyokai) and the National Agricultural Mutual Aid Association 
(Zenkoku Nögyö Kyösai Kyokai) .
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agricultural policy issues. The members of these committees and
groups are also referred to as nöset gttn. Clearly there is substantial 
overlap amongst all these categories, which are not used with any great 
precision in general speech, partly because it is possible to belong to 
all four categories (Nökyö giin, nörin giin, nösei giin and nöson giin) , 
at the same time. The first classification in this list is the only 
one defined restrictively for purposes of this analysis.
All these different categories of agricultural Diet member belong, 
to a greater or lesser degree, within the agricultural cooperative 
sphere of influence. This is due not only to the various connections 
amongst different farm organisations, but also to the fact that Nokyo's 
leaders and members are actively engaged in providing electoral support 
for a whole range of agricultural candidates in addition to their own 
officials.
Categories of Nokyo-supported Diet Member
The literature on Nokyo's electoral involvement, although scanty, 
does contain references to connections between farm politicians and 
agricultural cooperative organisations which have supported them in 
elections. It is, however, difficult to place a precise figure on 
this group in any particular Diet, because of the complexities of the 
relationships involved, and the difficulties of tracing what in many 
cases is a matter of personal political connection and not official 
electoral activity.
One writer claimed that '(p)olitically, Nökyö claims the loyalty 
of all dietmen from rural constituencies . . . .'  ^ Another put the
Koichi Nishimoto, 'Nokyo: Pressure from the Co-ops', The Japan
Interpreter, trans. by V. Dixon Morris, Vol. 7, 3-4, Sum-Aut 1972, 
pp.321-322.
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total number of Diet members who owed some sort of electoral debt to
Nokyo at around 150.^ These large but unsubstantiated figures are
balanced by specific references to the actual numbers of Diet candidates
supported by the agricultural cooperatives in individual elections.
According to one source, Zenshiven (the forerunner of Zenchu) ,
recommended 53 Nokyo-connected candidates (Nökyö kankei kohosha) in the
21952 Lower House election. Elsewhere it was stated that in the 1958
3
Lower House election, Zenchu put up 110 candidates for election and
that there were 30 Nokyo-connected candidates in the 1959 Upper House
4election. Logically enough these figures vary for each election, but 
the numbers involved do show that agricultural cooperative electoral 
support is not given solely to Nokyo leaders.
A more accurate and consistent indicator of the numbers of Diet 
members who receive electoral backing from the cooperatives, is the 
organised grouping of Nokyo Diet supporters, the Agricultural Policy 
Research Association (Nösei Kenkyükai). This is the only extra- 
parliamentary Diet members’ grouping connected to the Nokyo system.
It has existed continuously since 1920 when it was known as the Rural 
Diet Members' League (Nöson Giin Renmei) . It adopted its current title 
in 1947.
Hanaoka Taro, 'Zaibatsuka Sareta Nokyo' (Nokyo Has Become a 
Zaibatsu), Hoseki, February 1974, p.112.
2 . _ _Tanaka Toyotoshi, Nihon no Nokyo (Japan's Nokyo), Tokyo, Nokyo
Kyokai, 1971, p.437.
3 _ _
Nosei Janarisuto no Kai (ed.), 'Senkyo to Nomin' (Association of 
Agricultural Policy Journalists, 'Elections and Farmers'), Nösei no 
Ugoki, No.7, June 1959, Tokyo, Kyodo Kumiai Kyokai, p.87.
4 Ibid., p.91.
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The Agricultural Policy Research Association (APRA) is led from 
an office inside Nokyo's central headquarters in Tokyo. It includes 
individual Diet members on the one hand, and agricultural groups (riögyö 
S a n t a ' i on the other. National Nokyo organisations such as Zenchü,
Zenrio, and Zenkydren make up these ’agricultural groups'.
The overt and publicised aim of the APRA as set down in its 
organisational charter is to undertake joint research and investigation 
into agricultural policy problems. In practice it serves as a two-way 
information channel between Nokyo and its political supporters in the 
Diet enabling Zenchü and other key national agricultural cooperative 
organisations to present Nokyo policy demands, particularly in relation 
to the MAF budget. It also provides a means for Diet members to obtain 
the necessary information and intelligence about current agricultural 
problems for effective performance of their supportive activities within 
the Diet and political parties on Nokyo's behalf.
A questionnaire was distributed by the writer to the members of the 
APRA in December 1976, and again in May 1977 to those who had not replied. 
Out of a total of 84 members, 35 replies were received (i.e. a 41 per 
cent reply rate). To the question: 'What do you think is the main
function of the Nosei Kenkyukai1]', the respondents were virtually united
Nosei Kenkyukai, 'Nosei Kenkyukai Kaisoku' (The Constitution of the 
Agricultural Policy Research Association), Kaiin Meibo (Membership List),
1972.
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in the 'policy emphasis' of the organisation.
A distinctive feature of APRA membership appeared to be an electoral
connection to the agricultural cooperatives. This was substantiated by
replies received in answer to the question: 'Have Nokyo groups (for
example, Nokyo leaders and members) supported your election campaigns?'.
Out of a total of 35 replies received 31, or 88.5 per cent, responded in 
2the affirmative. For nearly all of those who answered the questionnaire, 
membership of the APRA was therefore coincident with some form of backing 
from the cooperatives in elections.
Twenty respondents answered this question (the remaining 15 gave no 
answer). Their replies ranged as follows:
To promote a comprehensive and constructive agriculture', 
research and inquiry into agricultural policy', 
agricultural promotion',
a pipeline to the agricultural policies of government and 
opposition parties', 
members plan for policy promotion', 
the study of agricultural policy', 
to investigate new agricultural policies ' , 
research on an agricultural policy framework', 
to treat topics in agricultural policy in order to realise 
and resolve food problems etc. in such a way as to improve 
the farmers' livelihood',
general research on agricultural policy and liaison with 
Nokyo',
to establish a national agricultural policy', 
to promote an agricultural policy for the farmers', 
in order to guarantee food for the nation, the APRA
negotiates with the administration on matters relating to 
agricultural policy in general', 
it performs political activities for the advancement 
agriculture',
to improve the farmers' livelihood and build prosperous 
rural villages',
promotion of agricultural policy activities', 
proposals concerning agricultural policy, the improvement 
of agricultural finance and budget acquisitions', 
it functions as a pipeline between the farmers and politics', 
to advance the promotion of agriculture',
the APRA is inactive except during budget time when it holds 
formal meetings'.
Two answered in the negative, and two failed to answer the question.
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Replies to the questionnaire also confirmed that the agricultural 
cooperatives were engaged in support activities for a much wider range 
of candidates than their own leaders and officials. Of the 31 members 
who admitted having received electoral support from Nokyo, only 14, or 
45 per cent, were Nokyo giin.
On the other hand, further examination of the backgrounds of APRA 
members between 1963 and 1977 revealed that a majority but not all 
Nokyo Diet members in any one year were members of the organisation. In 
this period, 72 per cent of Lower House Nokyo Diet members belonged to 
the APRA and 86 per cent of Upper House Nokyo Diet members. On these 
grounds, the APRA could be described as offering a representative rather 
than a comprehensive sample of Nokyo-backed Diet members.
An organisation and career analysis of the members of the APRA is 
attempted below with the aim of establishing the strength of Nokyo’s 
official contingent of supporters in the Diet, the type of farm 
politician for which the agricultural cooperatives provide electoral 
backing, and indirectly, the criteria on which this support is based.
Between 1963 and 1977, APRA membership averaged 94 members in the 
Diet, 63 in the Lower House and 31 in the Upper House. This constituted 
an average of 13 per cent of Diet membership over this period, and 
displayed comparatively balanced representation over both Houses relative 
to the total membership of each. For this reason, it would 
appear that the agricultural cooperatives do not concentrate their 
electoral support activities on Parliamentarians of either House.
A cross-sectional analysis of APRA members for a selected time 
period (from the Lower House election of December 1972 to the Upper House 
election of July 1974) reveals that they fall within one of three type- 
categories of Nokyo-connected Diet members (Nokyo kankeisha) .
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These are largely organisationally-based, and correspond to the close­
ness of Diet members’ affiliations to Nokyo and other agricultural 
groups.
Type I is the category of Nokyo giin: that is, Diet members 'with
direct connections to Nokyo'.^ Between 1972 and 1974, there were 29 
Nokyo giin in the APRA out of a total of 92, or 31.5 per cent of the 
total average membership of the APRA for the same period.
Type II and Type III have several factors in common. They represent 
categories of Nokyo sympathisers (Nökyö shimpa): politicians with no
career background in agricultural cooperative organisations, but who wish 
to undertake activities supportive of Nokyo in the Diet in exchange for 
Nokyo's electoral backing outside it.
Using Tanaka's phraseology, Type II is a category of politician
3
'with a deep understanding of Nokyo'. It is made up of Diet members 
with indirect connections to the agricultural cooperatives, and this 
group falls into two fairly distinct types. One is the Diet member 
with a specialist expertise in agricultural policy as a result of long 
career experience, the former MAF bureaucrat or riovin g'i'in. Amongst APRA 
members between 1972 and 1974, there were 14 in this category (or 15 per 
cent of the total), almost all from the MAF bureaucracy. The other is 
the Diet member with connections to agricultural groups other than Nokyo 
mainstream organisations. Between 1972 and 1974, the membership affili­
ations of this sub-category of APRA members spanned a range of groups
These type-categories correspond to a classification proposed by 
Tanaka, and his wording is quoted here. Op. cit., p.437.
2 Between 1963 and 1977 they averaged 30 out of a total average member­
ship for the same period of 94.
3 Op. cit. , p.437.
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most of which had links to the cooperatives. Diet members with
connections to agriculturally-related industries also belong amongst
2agricultural organisation representatives. Between 1972 and 1974, 
this sub-category within APRA membership numbered 31, or 33.6 per cent 
of the total. On these figures, it would appear that total 
representation of other agricultural organisations in the APRA is 
equivalent to that of the Nokyo leadership.
The total number within Type II, including former bureaucrats, was 
45, or 49 per cent of APRA membership. This constitutes the largest 
category of members in the APRA. Nokyo gUn are in fact outnumbered by 
Diet members representing other agricultural groups and the MAF bureau­
cracy .
The third category of APRA members, or Type III, are those with no 
specific connections to Nokyo or other agricultural groups (i.e. no 
career or organisational role in agricultural groups, institutions or 
industries),but who nevertheless possess a strong constituency-dictated 
interest in agricultural policy as representatives of rural and semi- 
rural electorates. In Tanaka's terminology, they constitute the group
These were: the Central Cooperative Bank for Agriculture and
Forestry, the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation, 
the National Agricultural Mutual Aid Association, the National Federation 
of Forestry Associations, the National Beef Association, the National 
Japanese Beef Cattle (Wagyu) Association, the Central Livestock Association, 
the National Chamber of Agriculture and prefectural Agricultural Councils, 
the Food Demand and Supply Research Centre, the National League for the 
Promotion of Mountain Villages, prefectural farmers' political leagues, 
farmers' unions, the National Land Development Association, the National 
Federation of Land Development Corporations, the Agriculture and Forestry 
Statistics Association and the National Federation of Timber Associations.
2 Amongst APRA members between 1972 and 1974, there were Diet represent­
atives of the Timber Industries Co. (Mokuzai Kögyösha), the Imperial 
Afforestation Co. (Teikoku Zorinsha), Kyowa Fisheries, and Tohoku 
Agricultural Construction Co. (Töhoku Nöken).
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'with a relative understanding of Nokyo’. There were 18 members in
2this group of noson giin within the APRA between 1972 and 1974, or 
19.5 per cent of the total. This was the least numerous of all three 
type-categories. This emphasises the organisationally-based represent­
ation of Japanese agriculture in the Diet, at least as indicated by the 
background of APRA members.
The party affiliations of Nokyo-suppor.ted Diet members within the 
APRA between 1963 and 1977 reflect almost exactly the same proportions 
of political support as Nokyo Diet members for the period 1949 to 1977. 
Table 4.1 illustrates this phenomenon.
The Nokyo Diet members' survey covered the period prior to 1955 
when Independent and minor party representation was relatively more 
common, but at least 80 per cent of the latter group could be considered in 
fact pro-conservative in political orientation. Added on to the Upper 
and Lower House totals of Nokyo Diet members, they bring each up to 
almost exactly the LDP APRA figures for each House. In other words, 
this group of APRA members, connected with and electorally supported by 
Nokyo, reflects the same ratio of majority-conservative to minority - 
socialist political alignment as Nökyö giin as a whole. The absence of 
JCP- and Kömeitö-affiliated members in the APRA is also consistent with 
their absence amongst Nokyo gzi^ n and the urban concentration of these 
parties.
Op. cit. , p.437.
2 Amongst this group were a number of so-called 'rice Diet members'
(kome gtiri) : Tamura Hajime from Mie (2); Tamura Ryohei from Kochi; and
Nakagawa Ichiro from Hokkaido (5). Other constituencies represented 
by farm-politicians in the APRA were Tottori, Gumma (3), Aichi (3), 
Fukushima (1), Akita (1) , Kumamoto (2), Aomori (2), Gumma (3), Kagawa (1), 
Kumamoto (1) (an urban constituency), Fukushima (2), Aichi (2), Gifu (2), 
Iwate (1), Hyogo (5).
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Table 4.1
A COMPARISON OF THE PARTY AFFILIATIONS OF APRA AND NOKYO DIET MEMBERS
(unit:%)
Lower House Parties APRA Members Nokyo Diet Members
(a)LDP (conservatives)v 64.8 59.0
JSP (Socialists) 22.6 25.0
DSP 12.2 10.0
Independents and 
Minor Parties 0.4 6.0
Upper House Parties APRA Members Nokyo Diet Members
(a)LDP (conservatives) 85.6 68.0
JSP (Socialists) 10.4 11.0
DSP 2.4 0.0
Independents and 
Minor Parties 1.6 21.0
(a) This includes pre-LDP (before 1955) conservative parties as does 
the Upper House figure. This is relevant only to the Nokyo Diet 
member category (1949-1977).
(b) This includes the JSP and pre-1955 Right and Left Socialist 
Parties as does the Socialist percentage for the Upper House.
This is relevant only to the Nokyo Diet member category (1949- 
1977) .
Sources: For APRA members - Nosei Kenkyükai , Kaiin Meibo (Agricultural
Policy Research Association, Membership List), 1963-1977; 
for Nokyo Diet members - Chapter 3, Conclusion.
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On the question of the factional alignment of APRA LDP members, 
there appears to be an element of proportionality which corresponds to the
relative strength of the different LDP factions in the Diet, with the sole 
exception of the Miki faction which was disproportionately more numer­
ous.^ In the sample members' listing for 1972-74, the Miki faction had 
17, the Fukuda faction 14, the Tanaka faction 10, the Öhira faction 
eight, the Nakasone faction seven, the Shiina faction three, and the 
Mizuta and Funada factions two each. There were three non factionally- 
aligned members.
Another distinctive feature of APRA membership was seniority in the 
ranks of Diet members and experience in party agricultural and forestry 
leadership positions. LDP APRA members for instance, occupied a dis­
proportionately large number of positions of power in the government 
executive. In the period 1972-74, almost one quarter of this group had 
held the position of minister, including that of Minister of Agriculture 
and Forestry. About the same number had been Parliamentary Vice- 
Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry, and Chairmen of Diet Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries Committees.
These were outnumbered, however, by the even greater number who 
had been prominent in LDP policy committees on agriculture and forestry. 
More than a third of the LDP APRA membership in this period had been 
chairmen or vice-chairmen of PARC agriculture and forestry committees. 
These figures were repeated in JSP and DSP agriculture and forestry 
policy-making groups. One quarter of the JSP membership had been party 
PARC Agriculture and Forestry Division Chairmen (Borin Bucho) and almost
The Miki faction Outnumbered all others in the APRA, not because of 
its overall Diet strength, but because of Miki’s historical and career 
contacts with the Japanese cooperative movement as the former leader of 
the People’s Cooperative Party.
218
one third had been party Farmers’ Division Chairmen or Vice-Chairmen 
(Nönrin Bucho) . The same proportion (one quarter) had been Chairmen or 
Vice-Chairmen of the DSP Policy Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (/Ilörin Gyogyö Taisaku Iinkai) .
These figures support the emphasis of the APRA as a policy-oriented 
organisation whose membership is dominated by those who occupy important 
positions in party agricultural policy-making organs. This testifies to 
the strong connection between Nokyo and influential party agriculture, 
forestry and fishery leaders. Although one should maintain an analytical 
division between the distinctive features of APRA members as a group, and 
the criteria on which electoral backing from the cooperatives is made, it 
is difficult to escape the conclusion that Nokyo is inclined towards 
support for those with these particular attributes.
The Nature of Agricultural Cooperative Electoral Support Activities
The participation of the agricultural cooperatives in elections takes 
two forms: informal, unofficial involvement largely through the medium
of agricultural cooperative leaders; and official, organisational involve­
ment. This division is useful for analytical purposes but in practice, 
these two types of behaviour are highly interrelated and much more diffi­
cult to separate.
According to the original analysis by Kobayashi, Shinohara and Soma,'*’ 
one of the most important ingredients in Japanese elections is that of the 
voting base (jiban). A jiban represents a core of voters who give their 
consistent and reliable support - what has been styled a ’hard’ vote
Kobayashi Naoki, Shinohara Hajime and Soma Masao, Senkyo (Elections), 
Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1960, p.91.
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(koteihyo- to a particular candidate as a result of personal connec- 
tions (kankei).  Kankei arise from 'numerous sources and contexts - 
kinship, geographical, occupational, organizational, obligatory and so 
on - which operate to join diverse groups and individuals to a particular 
candidate through chains of personal relationships which claim the
3individual's loyalty quite apart from considerations of public policy.' 
These 'hard' or committed votes within the jiban are not open to change 
by rhetoric and persuasion from other candidates making more 'rational' 
and programmatic appeals for support. They are immutable because the 
motivations underlying them are constant.
4The corollary of the 'hard' vote is the 'gathered' vote, which 
represents a bloc of voter support collected by local leaders, bosses, 
or 'men of influence' (yüryokusha) on behalf of election candidates. It 
is based on the same set of personal obligations and relationships which 
mould the 'hard' vote. Flanagan has described it in terms of 'a system 
of multiple hierarchies . . . which links faction leaders and Dietmen to
the local yüryokusha (men of influence) at the grass roots'.  ^ Diet 
members enlist lower level political figures as core organisers of their 
jiban. The kankei that motivate the grass roots voter are very often 
with the local leader himself, whose role is that of an intermediary.
The best explanation in English of this Japanese pattern of voting 
behaviour can be found in Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese 
Style, New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1971, pp.38-41.
2 Scott Flanagan has built a model of Japanese electoral behaviour 
around the concept of personal connections (kankei), which relates it to 
both traditional and modern voting patterns. See his article 'The 
Japanese Party System in Transition', Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No.2, 
January 1971, pp.238-240.
3
4
5
Ibid. , p .238.
Curtis, op. cit. , pp.40-41. 
Op. cit. , p.233.
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He is the pivot of an interlocking framework of personal contacts and 
reciprocal political obligations linking local political figureheads at 
city, town and village level, to prefectural politicians, who in turn 
have closer connections with members of the national Diet.
This analysis places rural political elites in a crucial position 
to mobilise votes and collect blocs of voting support. It is in this 
role that local co-op leaders figure prominently in election activities.
In the prewar era, this hierarchical system centred at the grass - 
roots on leadership patterns characteristic of Japanese village 
hamlets (buraku), which constituted the primary social grouping in the 
countryside. Landlords dominated executive positions within the wide 
range of buraku-organised cooperative associations, and their ability to 
’gather the vote’ and commit it to certain political candidates was one 
facet of their total leadership role within the hamlet and the forces 
of consensus that operated to sustain it. Their powers rested on the 
internal cohesiveness of the buraku unit. The traditions of group 
solidarity and cooperative activity within the hamlet upheld motivations 
to act for the good of the whole community, whether it related to farming, 
road building, irrigation or politics.
The Occupation-instituted land reform program helped to undermine 
buraku-centred power structures and dispossess landlords of their 
political leadership. A new political elite emerged: local bosses and
other local leaders such as mayors and members of village, town and city 
assemblies and the elected leaders of major rural organisations. 
Agricultural cooperative executives became an integral part of this new 
leadership structure. In the absence of legal restrictions preventing 
them from holding political office concurrently with their professional 
roles, large numbers of them successfully obtained positions in local
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government. According to research on 5,408 cooperatives conducted by 
the MAF in August 1969, 140 prefectural assembly members were serving 
concurrently as agricultural cooperative chairmen: 900 city, town and
village assembly members as co-op chairmen or full-time officials; and 
73 city, town and village mayors as co-op chairmen.^
With so many Nokyo officials either politicians in their own right
holding electoral office as prefectural, city, town or village mayors,
governors, assembly members or chairmen, or with extremely close
connections to these various branches of local government, the dividing
line between Nokyo activity and political activity became almost
indistinguishable. Local government and Nokyo office often became fused
2in one and the same individual. As a result, agricultural cooperative 
leaders played a pivotal role in the vote mobilisation networks of Diet 
politicians, and also launched themselves into national politics in this 
manner.
One factor facilitating the development of political networks link­
ing Diet politicians to local political leaders was the function of local 
government in Japan in administering and distributing subsidies dispensed 
by central government from the national budget. According to Kobayashi, 
Shinohara and Soma, a jtban can be built up with the carefully selected 
use of these subsidies for political purposes. In this way, a position 
in local government can be used to create a voting base by generating 
obligations and motivations on the part of voters to repay their
This was reported in Tanaka, op. ctt., p.427.
2
Robert Ward made this point in his article: ’Urban-Rural Differences
and the Process of Political Modernization in Japan: A Case Study'
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 9, Part 2, October 1960, 
p.144. He wrote: 'One does not usually distinguish at the village level
among a community s political,economic, and social leaders. There is a 
high probability that they will be the same individuals.'
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benefactors in the form of votes. Flanagan also noted the importance 
of finance flows between central and local government as a key ingredi­
ent in voter mobilisation: 'local, prefectural, and national leaders
serve as the multiple links . . .  to the same central political, 
bureaucratic, and financial sources of power. The impetus of the system
is unitary, with all groups seeking to tap the flow of benefits from the, 2centre.
Nokyo's function as a channel for a variety of government subsidies 
into the farm sector also enhances the vote mobilisation powers of agri­
cultural cooperative leaders. They are in a position to justify political 
support in terms of likely policy outcomes in the form of grants, invest­
ments, subsidies and improvements via local government and the coopera­
tives. In this manner, the Nokyo office can be utilised as a means of 
creating and maintaining local power bases.
The LDP operates and benefits most from the use of the budgetary 
lever as a means of winning votes. As the government party, it is the 
chief distributor of political largesse: it controls budgetary allo­
cations and hence the flow of subsidies, grants and price supports to 
agriculture and the agricultural cooperatives. This is the dominant 
factor underlying and reinforcing the government party-Nokyo relation­
ship. A vote for the LDP can be directly translated into a vote for 
increased assistance to the farmers and the cooperatives. This philo­
sophy is behind Zenchu's publicised Diet strategy of emphasising links 
with government party members, and numerous campaign statements eman­
ating from local cooperative executives such as: 'A vote for an
1
2
Op. eit., pp.73-74. 
Op. cit. , p.233.
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opposition candidate is a dead vote'; 'the opposition parties have no
powers of decision in either the budget or the rice price'; and 'to put
people into the government party who understand us is to prevent policies
being formulated which ignore the farmers'.^- These considerations are
often powerful enough to override virulent opposition to LDP agricultural
2policies coming from certain sections of Nokyo.
The political activities which Nokyo leaders, either as politicians 
in their own right or as Nokyo officials, undertake in mobilising votes, 
in creating jiban, and in committing their own core of supporters to 
Diet candidates, often take place through the medium of personal support 
groups (köenkai). Agricultural cooperative leaders are invited to become 
'advisers’ or 'officials' of köenkai. Their involvement is sought as an 
indispensable part of a campaign strategy aimed at reaching a multitude 
of farm voters. Their local influence and political connections are 
invaluable as a means of communicating with cooperative farming members 
and opening up channels for effective voter mobilisation. Large numbers 
of Nokyo leaders and members also become party supporters and officials 
of local party organisations. These are important in determining party 
endorsements.
This type of political activity is rightly considered part of agri­
cultural cooperative electioneering, but it is conducted largely through 
the personal medium of the Nokyo leadership, a sort of political
Tanaka, op. ait., p.428.
2 In the face of the producer rice price freeze instituted by the LDP 
in 1969 for example, there emerged a threat by the Ishikawa Nokyo Youth 
Division to institute a mass withdrawal of its members from the LDP. The 
prefectural Nokyo leadership, however, argued that although voting for 
the LDP might mean compromising the Nokyo stance, without representatives 
in the government party, the rural voice within the LDP would diminish 
and inevitably the farmers would be disadvantaged. Ibid.
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participation by proxy. Those Nokyo officials who engage in support 
mobilisation activities, and particularly those who jointly hold both 
Nokyo leadership positions and political office, do it not in their 
official capacity as agricultural cooperative executives. Political 
functions such as these do not come within the purview of their 
official duties as laid down by Nokyo Law. They act as private, 
unofficial and informal representatives of the agricultural cooperative 
organisation. The unofficial involvement of Nokyo leaders in vote 
mobilisation and campaign activities is one method whereby the coopera­
tives participate in electoral support activity in a camouflaged manner.
Unofficial Nokyo involvement is not, however, limited to the role 
played by agricultural cooperative leaders. It can extend to the 
actual campaign engagement of large numbers of executives, staff members 
and farmers within a Nokyo organisation or several Nokyo organisations 
in a given constituency. The latter type of activity constitutes what 
has been described as ’conducting an election from an organisational 
base’: the phenomenon of the soshiki s e n k y o This occurs most often
when a candidate centres his jiban around the Nokyo organisation. Where 
the identification of Nokyo interest is made easy by an official Nokyo 
candidacy, the campaign may involve a full-scale electoral mobilisation 
of agricultural cooperatives within an electorate. In these circum­
stances a political campaign takes on the appearance of an intra- 
organisational agricultural cooperative operation with a cross-section 
of the more highly motivated and supportive Nokyo executives, staff 
members and farmers recruited to work in the campaign. The latter
1 Ibid. , p . 426.
become part of the volunteer campaign force (unddin) under the guidance 
of Nokyo leaders. All are volunteers in keeping with their right to 
freedom of political conscience and the cooperatives' official doctrine 
of political neutrality, but there is often a subtle kind of coercion 
at work, such as appeals to group loyalties, duty, and obligation to the 
parent organisation, and pressure to participate as Nokyo supporters 
(yüshi) in order to further the interests of Nokyo itself.
This sort of large scale operation is often undertaken within the 
framework of a kdenkai, in which Nokyo leaders and kunri-aiin participate 
as formal members, and organise the campaign as if it were a Nokyo 
operation. Amongst the respondents to the questionnaire distributed to 
APRA members, kdenkai- participation appeared to be one of the principal 
forms whereby agricultural cooperative leaders, staff members and 
farmers became unofficially involved in electoral support activities.
Of the 35 APRA members who responded to the questionnaire, 31 or 88.5 
per cent had kdenkai. Twenty five, or 71 per cent, offered a breakdown 
of the Nokyo composition of their personal support groups. The results 
were as follows:
Table A.2
THE COMPOSITION OF APRA MEMBERS' KOENKAI
Koenkai with Nokyo leaders, staff and farming members 20 
Koenkai with Nokyo leaders only 1 
Kdenkai with Nokyo leaders and staff members only 1 
Kdenkai with Nokyo leaders and co-op members only 1 
Koenkai with co-op members only _2
TOTAL . . .  25
Source: APRA questionnaire results.
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Table 4.2 demonstrates that almost all of those respondents who offered
a breakdown of their personal support group had kdenkai which embraced
1the totality of the Nokyo leadership-membership structure.
The range of private, unofficial electoral support activity by 
agricultural cooperative officials and members described above is wide­
spread throughout the Japanese countryside in elections to all levels of 
government. Analytically it should be viewed quite separately from 
more official, organised forms of support which agricultural cooperatives 
undertake. One of these is formal 'recommendation' (suisen). Official 
recommendation of candidates by non-political groups which do not norm­
ally participate in politics on an official level is extremely common in 
Japan. According to Flanagan, the mechanism of group recommendation 
performs the function of mobilising the vote in the same way as 
traditional local leaders once did. He attributes the strength of this 
type of vote direction to the weakness of the Japanese party system and 
the consequent lack of identification between voter and party: 'the
Japanese voter' he maintains, 'identifies with a primary or secondary 
group which then directs his voting decision by means of the suisensei
This can be illustrated by the example of Okamura Fumijiro's cam­
paign strategy for a seat in the House of Councillors' national constitu­
ency in 1965. As Chairman of Zenkyoren, Okamura's whole campaign .organ­
isation and kdenkai were staffed predominantly by executives and staff 
members of Zenkyoren. His electoral organisation in fact centred directly 
on the Zenkyoren organisation. His election office leaders were the 
Zenkyoren Information Section Chief and the Office Chief of the APRA.
Other section heads of Zenkyoren, prefectural kyosairen staff and ZenchTi 
managers were also involved in campaign work, such as producing posters 
and handbills and organising local electioneering tours. His kdenkai 
office chief was a Zenkyoren manager, and staff workers of Zenkyoren 
toured the tankyd in Kagawa Prefecture, making calls on each cooperative, 
conducting Zenkydven business and electoral support activities simul­
taneously amongst co-op union members. The handling and organisation of 
Okamura's campaign was typical of an election based on organisationally- 
generated support (soshiki senkyo). It also exemplified the 'organis­
ational ' route followed by many so-called vocational representatives 
(shokund daihyd) in the House of Councillors.
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(recommendation system).' The influence of these group ties derives 
from kankei. The latter serves as 'the mechanism which allows the more 
modern functionally specific associations to deliver the vote in much 
the same way as the traditional local notables once did - and still do in 
some rural areas.
One should, however, distinguish in this context between an 
organisation's official action in making formal recommendations to its 
members, and the crucial but informal role played by its leaders in 
recommending candidates. It is the leadership group which personifies 
the organisational ties of the membership and which directs their votes 
on the basis of mutual connections or kankei.
Official recommendations of the cooperatives are made known on 
campaign posters and handbills distributed to electoral offices. These 
are put up on public display together with similar recommendations from 
other organisations to the candidate concerned. The names of recom­
mended candidates may also be publicised by internal Nokyo public 
relations activities, a purpose for which the agricultural cooperative 
communications system - its newspapers, TV programs, telephone networks 
and publications output - can be put to good use.
Another form of organised participation of the cooperatives in 
elections is through the medium of the farmers' political leagues 
(nöseiven). These enable the agricultural cooperatives to engage in 
electoral support activities in substance, although not in name. In the 
latter half of the 1950s, local Nokyo leaders recognised the need for 
prefecturally-based agricultural cooperative electoral support groups to
1
2
Op. cit., p . 239. 
Ibid., pp.239-240.
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exist on a continuous basis and handle a range of elections, local, 
prefectural and national. Unlike köenkai, these organisations were not 
linked to any specific candidates, but were able to offer a variety of 
support and commitment to one or a number of candidates in any constitu­
ency .
With the establishment of the farmers' leagues, Nokyo's electioneer­
ing role underwent a very significant historical development. In the 
gubernatorial elections of this period, and even more in the expansion of 
their operations to the general elections of 1959, 1960 and 1962, the 
farmers' political leagues' efforts in 'mobilising the political power 
of the farmers' increasingly began to bear fruit in terms of the numbers 
of Nokyo officials elected to public office.'^
It was in the testing ground of the gubernatorial elections that 
concrete evidence of vote 'control' by the cooperatives increasingly 
began to be observed. What was particularly impressive about the per­
formance of the farmers' political leagues in these elections was the 
fact that by means of judicious alliances with opposition and breakaway 
LDP groups, they proved themselves able to defeat incumbent LDP candid­
ates in heavily agricultural prefectures such as Fukushima and Ibaragi.
Electorally, the role of the noseiren should be viewed as supple­
mentary to the wide-ranging direct involvement by Nokyo officials: an
additional strategy whereby farm voters can be mobilised in support of 
candidates with close ties to Nokyo. Their activities were aimed as much 
at the farmers themselves and at raising their level of political 
consciousness and involvement, as they were at governmental authorities.
1 This subject was explored in Chapter 3.
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The creation of the farmers' political leagues was also historically
significant from the point of view of the development of the electoral
relationship between the agricultural cooperatives and the LDP at the
grass-roots level. The leagues provided an organised context in which
LDP candidates could recruit agricultural cooperative leaders into their
campaigns. According to one writer, the noseiven acted as effective
substitutes for LDP grass-roots organisations in elections for rural
seats ('Jimintd no senkyo soshiki'^) . This was done by enlisting the
support of the noseiven leadership in many of the prefectures in which
the groups operated. In the light of this more restricted role as
substruetural organisations (kabu soshiki) of the LDP, the same writer
questioned whether the noseiven were fulfilling the original purpose for
2which they were founded.
The policies and electoral support activities of the nose'iven, 
however, did not always coincide with those of the LDP or the mainstream 
Nokyo leadership. On occasions candidates from these different organis­
ations were rivals for the Nokyo vote. In terms of political alignment, 
the nose'iven tended to back candidates in a fashion that was more inde­
pendent of considerations of party alignment. In practice this meant 
supporting a range of candidates - conservative, Independent and 
socialist: any candidate in fact, who guaranteed to further the organis­
ational objectives of the nose'iven. What was particularly significant 
about the political alignment of the noseiven, was that some of their 
more prominent leaders, and a number of their more successful candidates 
promoted to Diet and gubernatorial office, were not members of the LDP, 
and proportionally, displayed more progressive orientations.
'Senkyo to Nomin' , op. cit., p.92.
2 Ibid.
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Other examples of political organisations similarly based on Nokyo 
and structured along the same lines as the ndseiven but with a more 
restricted membership, are the Japan Dairy Farmers' Political League 
(Nihon Rakuno Seiji Renmei) and the Japan Settlers' League (Nihon 
Kaitakusha Renmei) . The former is the political organisation of the 
specialist dairy cooperatives (rakuno kwrtiai) . It selects its own 
candidates for recommendation and electoral support and has special 
links with Diet members from dairy farming constituencies. Although its 
executives and members overlap with the Nokyo organisation, decisions on 
electoral backing are made independently, and candidates are chosen on 
the basis of their ability to promote specialist dairy interests.^ The 
Japan Settlers' League incorporates members of the specialist settlers' 
agricultural cooperatives and is generally regarded as being inclined 
towards the progressives.
Case Study of a Nokyo Diet Member's Electoral Support Groups
The patterns of political support evident in agricultural coopera­
tive electoral behaviour: private, unofficial campaigning and vote
mobilisation, combined with formal recommendation and organised support 
through Nokyo-based political groups, were exemplified in the election 
campaign of Nokyo Diet member Someya Makoto, for a seat in Chiba (4) 
constituency in the 1976 House of Representatives' election. Someya was 
contesting his second election as a Nokyo-backed candidate, and was well 
known in Chiba as the prefectural Nokyo Central Union Chairman, Chairman of 
the prefectural Agricultural Council (Ken Nogyo Kaigi) , member of the 
National Chamber of Agriculture (Zenkoku Nögyö Kaigisho), Chairman of the
1 Details of this organisation are also given in Chapter 6.
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prefectural Agricultural Residential Association (Ken Ndjü Kyökai), 
former Chairman of Chiba Prefecture Assembly, and Secretary-General of 
the LDP prefectural federation. He had more than 50 formal recommend­
ations (suisenjo) from organisations and their leaders posted up on the 
walls of his campaign headquarters."^"
These included:
1. Chiba Prefecture Nokyo Central Union
2. Chiba Prefecture Nokyo Chairmen’s Association
3. Chiba Prefecture Nokyo Economic Federation
4. Chiba Prefecture Nokyo Insurance Federation
5. Chiba Prefecture Nokyo Trust Federation
6. Chiba Prefecture Nokyo Women's Division Council
7. Chiba Prefecture Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Groups’
Liaison Council
8. National Chamber of Agriculture
9. Japan Dairy Farmers’ Political League
10. Chairman of the Central Livestock Association - Akagi Munenori
11. Agricultural Policy Promotion Council (Nösei, Suishin Kyogikai)
12. Japan Dentists' Political League
13. Chiba Prefecture Dentists' Political League
14. Chiba Prefecture Dental Technicians' Political League
15. Hospital Nurses' Political Association
16. Chairman of the All-Japan and Chiba Prefecture Pharmaceutical
League
17. Association to Protect Farmers' Health
18. All-Japan Environmental Sanitation Service Traders' Association
19. Japan Doctors' League
20. Chiba Prefecture Doctors' League
21. National Social Insurance Promotion League
22. Japan Private Kindergarten Federation
23. Chiba Prefecture Kindergarten Association
24. Chiba Prefecture Specialist Schools'Association 
25 . Japan League of Nurseries
26. Chiba Prefecture Federation of Private School Groups
27. Japan Federation of Handicapped and Retarded Groups
28. Japan Wounded Soldiers' Political League
29. Wounded Soldiers' Wives' Association
30. President of the Japan Bereaved Families' Association
31. International Anti-Communist League
32. The House of Growth (SetcJid no Ie)
33. Shinto Political League
34. World Salvation Army Organisation
35. Japan Retired Government Officers' Political League
36. All-Japan Land Agents' Political League
37. Chiba Prefecture Accountants' Political League
38. National League of the Self-Employed
39. National Seaweed and Shells Cooperative Union
40. Chiba Prefecture Public Bath Owners' Political League (contd)
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When interviewed, Someya, as a Nökyö giin, defined the groups he 
received support from in the elections as ’agricultural groups' (ridgyd 
dantai), ’land development groups’ (tochi kairyö dantai), and social
_ . 2welfare councils (shakai fukushi kyogikai). He also claimed a special 
link with dairy farmers through the Dairy Farmers' Political League. He 
maintained that his kdenkai centred on Nokyo and agricultural groups in 
general, and that his main electoral strategy focussed on his personal 
support group activities (köenkai katsudo). Nokyo members, staff and 
leaders, he claimed, participated in his election campaign through 
membership in his koeyikai. He categorised this as the chief avenue by 
which agricultural cooperatives participated in elections.
Although a representative from an urban electorate, Someya acknow­
ledged that given his primary organisational links, his campaign empha­
sised rural interests. He endeavoured to balance this, however, with a 
general appeal aimed at the whole electorate in the light of the con­
traction of rural areas and the decline in rural population. He 
described his interests as essentially a combination of agricultural and
(from previous page)
41. National Public Bath Owners' Political League
42. Chiba Prefecture Small and Medium Enterprise League
43. Matsudo City Industrial Federation
44. Chiba Prefecture Branch of the National Oil Political League
45. LDP Secretary-General
46. Someya's factional leader - Shiina Etsusaburö
47. Governor of Chiba Prefecture - Kawakami Kiichi
48. Member of the House of Councillors - Saito Esaburo
49. Member of the House of Councillors - Kashima Toshio
50. A former member of the House of Councillors
51. A Chiba Prefectural Assembly member
52. Kashiwa City Mayor
53. Nagareyama City Mayor
54. Former Chief, Bureau of Rivers, Construction Ministry
 ^ Tokyo, January 7, 1977.
2 As a former wounded soldier he took particular care of returned 
soldiers' groups, handicapped groups, health centres (hokenjo) and groups 
concerned with food nutrition.
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social welfare interests, and he regarded his Diet member’s duties as 
consisting chiefly of acting as intermediary for his constituents with 
two ministries: the MAF, and the Ministry of Social Welfare.
Someya added a further crucial observation to the discussion on 
agricultural cooperative electoral support activity. He maintained that 
the type of support he received from Nokyo varied according to the 
organisational level from which it was derived. At prefectural level 
and below, agricultural cooperative election activity involved the supply 
of manpower: votes and campaign workers (undoin), including the role of
Nokyo leaders in nurturing a jiban and mobilising votes. These were 
primarily locally - oriented activities where personal political and 
organisational connections could be utilised. Moreover, it was chiefly 
at the tankyd level that agricultural cooperative leaders had face-to- 
face contact with the farm voter.
On the other hand, the task of prefectural federations and central 
unions, and national level Nokyo organisations also, was to furnish the 
formal 'recommendations’ (suisen) for candidates. Because prefectural 
Nokyo organisations incorporated the tankyd within the prefecture which 
related to their particular area of business, it was unnecessary for 
each agricultural cooperative within these broader-based groups to issue 
its own recommendation. Recommendation from national level federations 
or the National Central Union on the other hand, carried great areal 
significance and prestige, and was valued by candidates on these grounds. 
Someya also acknowledged that he received assistance from the coopera­
tives in the form of political funds (seiji kenkin).
He summarised the types of organisational support he received from 
Nokyo in the following terms: from Zenrid, he received recommendation
and political funds; and as Chiba Prefecture Nokyo Central Union Chairman,
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he received recommendation, political funds and campaigners from 
prefectural-level Nokyo organisations. In Someya's election campaign, 
political funding was conducted by both national and prefectural agri­
cultural cooperative organisations.
Nokyo as a Source of Political Funds
Concrete details regarding Nokyo’s political funding activities are 
extremely difficult to find, and usually emerge as part of the disclosed 
circumstances of election scandals involving breaches of the Political 
Funds Regulation Law {Seiji Shikin Kiseihö).
The agricultural cooperatives, as cooperatives, are barred from 
making political donations under the provisions of the Political Funds 
Regulation Law which restricts this activity to ’political groups' duly 
registered under the law. Also, as juridical persons (hojin) and as 
beneficiaries of a variety of subsidies from government, they cannot make 
political donations. A further restriction is the official auditing pro­
cess to which all agricultural cooperative accounts are subject.
There are, however, a number of ways in which political donations 
can be made by Nokyo organisations. In terms of the internal auditing 
process, budget loopholes such as ’expenses for activities', ’contri­
butions and subscriptions' (kifu), 'miscellaneous expenses' and 'obli­
gation payments' can be used to channel political contributions. This 
is counterbalanced by certain practical organisational considerations 
which limit the amounts certain cooperatives can divert in this fashion. 
The tankyo for instance each have a relatively small turnover compared 
to the prefectural and national federations, which prevents them from 
channelling large sums into political contributions. At this level, 
active agricultural cooperative electoral support is fundamentally geared
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to the maintenance of jiban and organisational back-up in the form of 
campaign involvement and the mobilisation of volunteer workers. If a 
candidate has access to the volunteer labour of the cooperatives, this 
will in any case tend to lower his campaign expenses to some extent.^
The central unions are limited in the amount of finance they have 
available for political purposes. Their primary functions relate to 
guidance, management and policy, not turnover. Direct subsidies from 
government for central union operations also means fairly close super­
vision from government auditors. Those cooperative organisations that 
do, however, handle vast sums as part of their daily economic operations 
are Zennö, Zenkyoren, and Chvtkin. There is, moreover, an additional 
lucrative source of funds to which Nokyo is connected: the large number
of 'cooperative companies' (kyodö kaisha). These maintain close 
financial, managerial, and personnnel links to their parent Nokyo organis­
ations, whose executives often serve simultaneously in extremely well
2paid positions as company directors. Such officials are ideally placed 
to divert company profits and use them for political purposes.
The fact that Diet members concurrently serve as Nokyo executives 
also gives them access to agricultural cooperative funds. The executive 
powers vested in the agricultural cooperative leadership structure allow
Kobayashi, Shinohara and Soma made the point that if there is a 
jiban, it can partially make up for a deficiency in kaban (funds).
Op. cit. , p .71.
2 The Zenno Chairman in 1974, Mihashi Makoto, for example, was 
President (Shacho) of 13 Zenno~Yelated companies, Chairman of the Board 
of Directors of four more, Chairman (Kaicho) of a further five, and 
Director of two others. The same was true of other Zenno Managing 
Directors (Jömu P-iji) . See_Yoshihara Shizuo, Zenno o Kiru (I Attack 
Zenno ), Tokyo, Nisshin Hodo, 1975, p.50.
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officials considerable freedom of action in determining where in fact 
co-op finances go.^
The main channel which Nokyo has utilised for the transference of 
political funds to election candidates has been through the establish­
ment of political associations (seiji kessJia) or political groups (seiji 
dantai) created for this specific purpose, and formally separate from 
the Nokyo organisation itself.
According to one source, an organisation entitled the Agricultural 
Problems Research Association (Nögyö Mondai Kenkyukai) was established 
by Zenchü prior to the 1958 House of Representatives' elections, with
the objective of collecting political funds. Its Chairman (Iincho) was
- . 3a Zenchu Manager (Kanji). It supported 110 candidates from all
4political parties in the 1958 elections, of which 103 were elected.
In the House of Councillors' elections in the following year, it supplied 
a total of about 10 million yen to 30 candidates from both the LDP and
j s p.5
The Nögyö Mondai Kenkyukai was created as the result of a corruption 
scandal involving Zenkören (the National Nokyo Purchasing Federation that
In the case of an incident of electoral violations involving 
Okamura Fumijirö in 1965, for instance, Okamura was serving concurrently 
as Chairman of Zenkyören. His köenkai received a formal donation from 
Zenkyöven after a conference of executives, in addition to a certain sum 
in the form of concealed donations(tsutsumigane) not officially reported 
in the expenses of his electoral office. This money was distributed 
amongst various national Zenkyören and prefectural kyösairen officials and 
staff members for campaign purposes.
2 'Senkyo to Nomin', op. cit., p.91.
 ^ Ibid.
4 Ibid., p .87.
5
Ibid. , p.91.
237
existed prior to the 1972 founding of Zennd) in 1957. The whole affair 
brought to light for the first time hard evidence of financial contri­
butions being lavished on politicians by agricultural groups. An 
enormous amount was allegedly distributed to a number of Diet members 
as a secret supply of election funds (jinchü mimai) as well as to MAP 
officials (kanbu). This took two forms: covert funding (ura shikin)
amounting to 70 million yen, and secret 'interest payments' (riekikin) 
amounting to 1.1 billion yen.^
The creation of a specific political group such as the Eogyo Mondai
Kenkyukai as an organ for pooling donations (kenkin püru kikan) for the
benefit of Nokyo-sponsored candidates, was designed to avoid a repeat
of the 1957 scandal by putting Nokyo's funding operations on an official
level. Its title was later altered to Agricultural Policy Research
2Association (/IJogyo Seisaku Kenkyukai) .
Another writer has cited this group as one of two Nokyo organis-
. 3ations currently involved in political funding. According to this 
source, the Eogyo Seisaku Kenkyukai (or Nöseikyü) operated a 'dual­
structure' (nijü közö) donations' system in concert with another organis­
ation: the National Nokyo Council (Zenkoku Eögyö Kyödö Kumiai Kyogikai,
or Zennökyö). Zennökyö is a 'society' or 'association' (kessha) which
^ Kobayashi, Shinohara and Soma, op. cit., p.76.
2 This has been translated by Fukuji Taguchi in his article 'Pressure 
Groups in Japanese Politics', The Developing Economies, Vol.VI, No.4, 
December 1968, p.480, as the Farm Policy Association, which he describes 
as part of the Nokyo political wing. Taguchi dates Nokyo's roles of 
'active electioneering agent' from the 1958 elections, prior to which 
this group was founded.
3 Yoshihara , op. cvt. , pp.61-62,
^ Ibid. See also Nishimoto, op. cit., p.325.
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has its headquarters in the building which houses the Nokyo publications' 
association: the le no Hikari Kaikan in Tokyo. It is a juridical person
(höjin), composed of members who belong to the full-time managing direc­
tor (jdmu riji) class of Nokyo central organisations, such as Zenno,
Zenchü, Zenkyören, and Ie no Hikari Kyökai ? Funds gathered by these 
officials from Nokyo sources, are channelled to Nöseikyü which operates 
within the Nokyo Building in Tokyo. Nöseikyü is a 'political group’
(seiji dantai) registered under the Political Funds Regulation Law. It
can therefore, legally distribute money to election candidates. It has,
/-
however, the same members as Zennokyo operating in a different legal 
capacity. It is composed of 25 Nokyo officials who are full-time manag­
ing directors (jdmu riji) of the central Nokyo organs: Zenchu, Zenno, 
Zenkyören etc. These executives created the Nöseikyü, and operate within 
it in a private capacity.2
The 'political group’ Nögyö Seisaku Kenkyükai (Nöseikyü) and Wo sei
Kenkyükai with its membership of Diet politicians, have titles which are
3almost identical, and this presents a confusing picture. The Nosei 
Kenkyükai has a long organisational history going back to 1920. Its 
organisational charter specifies that it 'liaises with agricultural groups',
Yoshihara, op. cit., pp.61-62.
2 Ibid. , p.62.
3 The confusion appears to stem from the frequency with which ’nogyö 
seisaku' is shortened to 'nösei' in the Japanese. One writer in fact 
referred to Nöseikyü as the Nösei Kenkyükai in his discussion of Nokyo's 
political funding organisations. See Nishimoto, op. cit., p.325. The 
Secretary of the Nösei Kenkyükai when interviewed (Tokyo, November 3, 
1973) denied any involvement of the organisation in political funding. 
One of the agricultural editors of the Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Tomioka 
Yoshiyuki (interviewed in Tokyo, July 4, 1974), also maintained that 
Nösei Kenkyükai funds were used for research and conference purposes 
only.
4
'Nosei Kenkyükai Kaisoku', op. cit.
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but all its leaders, apart from its office staff, are Diet members.
The replies elicited to the questionnaire distributed by the writer to 
APRA members, made it clear that the type of electoral assistance they 
reported as having received from the cooperatives did not always include 
political funds. Of the 31 respondents who answered the question on 
electoral support, only seven, or 22.5 per cent, referred to political 
funds.^
Information that came to light in 1973 as a result of the Zenriö 
'black mist' scandal (Zenriö kuroi kiri jiken) uncovered details of 
extensive involvement by full-time Zenriö executives in covert election 
funding (ura shikin). Large sums were allegedly collected from Zenno- 
related companies and reported in the Zenno accounts as 'miscellaneous 
income'. Part of the money was subsequently channelled to candidates in 
both the 1971 and 1972 Upper and Lower House elections. At the same 
time, it was reported that prior to the 1971 House of Councillors' 
election, the sum of 23.3 million yen was contributed by Zennökyö to
Ndseikyu, and 95.6 million yen in the following year before the 1972
4 _House of Representatives' election. Noseikyu, as the official 'window' 
for Nokyo political funds, redirected the money to LDP, JSP and DSP 
candidates in both elections.“*
Nogyo Kyodö Kumiai Rengokai Yakushokuin Meibo, op. cit. , p.910.
2 This low percentage may of course have been influenced by the 
reluctance on the part of APRA respondents to admit receipt of political 
donations from the agricultural cooperatives.
3 This information is presented at length in Yoshihara, op. cit., p.40,e£ 
Ibid. , p.62.
A full list of candidates and the amount each received is given in 
ibid. , Appendix I, pp.247-251.
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If we compare the sum donated by Nöseikyü to LDP candidates in 1972 
(68.8 million yen to 133 candidates)"^ with the official figures of the 
LDP's election funding organisation, the Kokumin Kyökai, then it compares
not unfavourably with some of the larger donations made by Japanese
2business and industrial groups to the LDP. ^ Nokyo must therefore, figure
in LDP calculations as a not insignificant source of election funds.
This to some extent, challenges the customary view of electoral support
for the LDP which identifies big business as the primary source of funds
and the rural areas as the primary source of votes. Clearly, not only
big business but also agriculture has made substantial contributions to
3LDP and other party's election funds from time to time.
Criteria of Electoral Support
Having discussed a range of electoral support activities involving 
both agricultural cooperative leaders and organisations, the question 
which logically follows is whether the quality of support varies accord­
ing to the nature of the relationship between the political candidate and 
Nokyo.
Tanaka for instance linked relationship to Nokyo, party affiliation
and type of electoral support received from the cooperatives, in a classi-
4fication of Nokyo-connected Diet members. He also noted that the Nogyo
These figures were calculated from details given in ibid.
2 The sum of 30 million yen is generally considered as qualifying a 
political group as one of the larger contributors to LDP election funds. 
See Asahi Nenkan, 1974, p.263.
3 A true comparison is of course, impossible, because of the 
researcher's reliance on 'official' figures such as those reported by the 
Kokumin Kyokai and Noseikyu. It is common knowledge that these do not 
reflect the real amounts donated to the LDP by its election sponsors.
4
Op. d t ., p .437 .
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Mondai Kenkyükai graded recipients of funds from its donations’ pool
into an ABC ranking and used this to calculate the amounts donated.”^
Tanaka points first to the category of current Nokyo chairmen or
full-time officials who are endorsed by the conservative government 
2party. This group receives the all-out (zenmenteki) backing (oen) of
3the cooperatives to which they are connected. Such candidates often
4use Nokyo as a foothold to obtain LDP endorsement to stand for election. 
The electoral campaigns of these candidates take on the appearance of 
organisationally-based elections (soshiki senkyo) involving a range of 
cooperatives from prefectural level downwards.”* It is at this time, 
Tanaka argues, that Nokyo demonstrates its power as the organiser of a 
voting base in support of a clearly identifiable Nokyo candidate.
Tanaka's second category is that of ’positive backing for specific 
candidates of the conservative party, where there is no direct connection 
to Nokyo',2 but where as Diet members sympathetic to Nokyo {Nökyö shirnpa 
giin) electoral support is given in the expectation of policy favours. 
Tanaka maintains that this represents by far the most common type of 
electoral bargain struck between Nokyo and the LDP. Diet members in this
Ibid., p .450.
2 Ibid., p .425.
3 Ibid.
 ^ Ibid., p.426.
3 Ibid.
6 Tanaka was able to cite only one instance in the period he surveyed 
from 1949 to 1969, of a current Nokyo official being defeated at the polls 
in a General Election. Ibid.
7
Ibid.
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category of conservative pro-Nokyo sympathisers vastly outnumber those 
in the category of current Nokyo officials.
The third category of support is common in constituencies where 
there is no specific connection or agreement between candidates and 
Nokyo. In this situation, recommendation (suisen) is offered to candi­
dates who have a special interest in agriculture and forestry with party 
affiliation being a secondary consideration. Recommendation in these 
cases tends to be formal.^ Even here, however, electoral assistance 
goes in the majority of cases to government party candidates. In single­
member Upper House prefectural constituencies for example, where one-to- 
one battles between conservatives and progressives are common, Nokyo's 
backing customarily goes to conservative candidates. Tanaka 
emphasises the fact that in this category, no instances of JCP or Komeitd 
candidates having received the recommendation of Nokyo have been 
recorded. He estimated that this type of electoral backing was compara­
tively less common than the two preceding types.
The key distinction incorporated in Tanaka's classification of Nokyo- 
supported Diet members appears to be one between current Nokyo officials, 
and politicians with more indirect ties to the cooperatives, including 
former executives and staff members. It is the former group which in 
Tanaka's estimation, receives the full-scale backing of the agricultural 
cooperatives in elections. He indirectly discounts one-time service in 
the ranks of agricultural cooperative leadership as being as vital a 
qualification for electoral support as current employment. Although 
unstated, his reasoning is obvious: current Nokyo officials are in the
best position through their joint professional and political roles to
1
Ibid.
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conduct the vital liaison between Nokyo and central government. It is 
this category which merits the label of 'Nokyo giin'.
Results of the limited survey of APRA members by the writer did 
not support the general thesis incorporated in Tanaka's classification.
No marked variation in agricultural support emerged relative to the
status of current or former Nokyo official, or to the presence or
2absence of an official connection to the cooperatives. This is illus­
trated in Table 4.3.
Several conclusions emerge from this table. All Nökyö giin amongst 
the APRA respondents received some form of electoral support from the 
cooperatives. The very small number (2) who gave 'no support' replies 
claimed no leadership connection to Nokyo either before or after entry 
into the Diet. On the other hand, Nökyö giin and non-Nökyö giin scored 
exactly equal in the receipt of recommendation (suisen) from the
Nishimoto, op. ait., p.325, makes a distinction between two groups: 
'Diet members of Nokyo', and the '200 LDP members of both houses who 
hold seats from rural districts' and who also represent Nokyo's interests 
in the Diet. Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi in Parties and 
Politics in Contemporary Japan, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of 
California Press, 1962, pp.164-167, however, refer to 'agricultural 
cooperative association leaders' as listed in the Shügiin Yoran (House of 
Representatives' Survey), which includes past and present professional 
affiliations.
2 One must bear in mind, however, that the questionnaire covered a 
limited number of respondents; that it was designed to elicit 'type' 
rather than 'degree' of support; and that APRA membership signified in 
almost all cases a basic electoral support connection to the agricultural 
cooperatives and as a result, the differences that emerged could be 
expected to be only marginal. It should also be remembered that queries 
as to the nature of agricultural cooperative electoral support activities 
touched.ona politically sensitive area for many Diet members who could not 
be expected to be entirely open in their replies as a result. This was 
balanced by the fact that the 33 respondents to the questionnaire 
represented a cross-section of APRA membership in terms of the nature of 
their connections to the agricultural cooperatives. Eight were current 
Nokyo officials, six were ex-Nokyo officials (making a total of 14 
Nökyö giin), and 21 claimed no connection to the agricultural coopera­
tives that conformed to the definitional requirements of 'Nokyo Diet 
member'.
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cooperatives (28.5 per cent of both groups), but the latter group did 
register a lower percentage for campaign assistance and lower again for 
political funds in combination with other forms of support. There were 
no significant differences between former and current Nokyo officials.
As a general comment, one might conclude that the quality of Nokyo 
assistance as shown by this table was marginally lower for those with no 
career connections to the agricultural cooperatives. I he combinations 
of types of support were also more variable for this group.
The only major area of difference between Nokyo giin and non- 
Nökyo giin which the questionnaire produced concerned the origins of 
electoral support relationships between candidates and cooperatives. 
Respondents were asked whether they were offered Nokyo support, or 
whether they had requested it. Twelve, or 80 per cent, of the Nokyo giin 
group replied that they had received electoral backing from the 
cooperatives without having had to make a direct request for it. Amongst 
the group of non-Nokyo officials, this was true in only four, or 20 per 
cent, of cases: two of these were former cooperative union members
(kumiaiin), a third was a special member of the Upper House Nokyo Problem 
Conference (Nokyo Mondai Kondankai)} and the other was affiliated to 
Chukin.2 Ten, or 50 per cent, of this group had to request Nokyo's 
support, two both requested and were offered it, two received no support, 
and two gave no answer. On these results, it would appear that past or
This is an informal .Diet members' grouping which by and large 
restricts its membership to current Nokyo officials. The Diet member 
referred to here is Higaki Tokutarö, former Permanent Vice-Minister for 
Agriculture and Forestry and Director-General of the Food Agency, whose 
connections to Nokyo were considered close enough to qualify for member­
ship of this group.
On these grounds it would appear that the definition of Nokyo giin 
set down in the previous chapter (i.e. current or former Nokyo official) 
is a restrictive one.
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present Nokyo officials are virtually assured of Nokyo’s backing, 
whereas for other rural candidates, the situation is much more uncertain.
Quite apart from the question of connection to the agricultural 
cooperatives as a criterion of quality of electoral backing, is the issue 
of party alignment. The table below relates type of electoral support 
to party affiliation.
Table 4.4
VARIATIONS IN ELECTORAL SUPPORT RELATIVE TO PARTY AFFILIATION
AMONGST APRA MEMBERS
Type of Support LDP JSP DSP Total
9 1 10Recommendation only 33.3% 14.2% -
Recommendation and 8 2 1 11
Campaign Assistance 29.6% 28.5% 100%
Recommendation, Campaign 
Assistance and Political 
Funds
5
18.5%
2
28.5% -
7
Recommendation and 1 - - 1
Political Funds 3.7 % - -
Private Nokyo executive 1 1 - 2
and Local Support Activities 3.7% 14.2% -
No Support 13.7%
1
14.2%
- 2
No Answer 27.4%
- - 2
27 7 1 35TOTAL 100% 100% 100%
Source: APRA Questionnaire results.
This table shows that the distribution of types of agricultural 
cooperative electoral backing was remarkably even for candidates of both
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major parties. Amongst this group of committed Nokyo supporters (as 
evidenced by their membership in the APRA), the issue of party affili­
ation therefore ranked even lower than their connection to the agri­
cultural cooperatives as a criterion for political backing.
An examination of the list of Noseikyu political donations to
individual candidates in the 1971 House of Councillors' election and
2the 1972 House of Representatives' election confirms this general 
thesis. The following analysis attempts to derive the criteria on which 
agricultural cooperative funding is based, from the party, career, 
organisational and Diet characteristics of the recipients of Noseikyu. 
funds .
Amongst Lower House candidates, Nöseikyü's contributions ranged
from a maximum of four million yen to a minimum of 100,000 yen. Amongst
Upper House candidates it varied from two million yen to 100,000 yen.
The fact that there were 179 recipients amongst Lower House candidates
and only 23 amongst Upper House candidates speaks volumes in itself for
Nokyo's election funding strategy. The Lower House as controller of
3legislation was clearly regarded as a key target of pressure.
The major parties referred to here are the LDP and JSP. The DSP 
hardly counts with only one respondent.
2 See Appendix I in Yoshihara, op. cit. , pp.247-251.
3 This point was emphasised by Someya Makoto in an interview, Tokyo, 
January 10, 1977. He stated that in order to make basic agricultural 
policy, it was indispensable to be a member of the Lower House because 
it was the superior legislative body, although it was generally thought 
that Nokyo's support functioned better in Upper House elections. The 
latter supposition is not, however, borne out by the facts. Over the 
30-year period surveyed in the previous chapter, the number of Lower 
House Nokyo Diet members was almost double their Upper House counter­
parts, which is in direct proportion to the relative numerical size of 
each House.
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The emphasis on establishing close links with Lower House members 
dictated Nokyo's priorities in guiding the bulk of Nöseikyü contri­
butions to Lower House candidates. The latter received a total of 92.6 
million yen, and Upper House candidates 13.5 million yen.'*' The criteria 
of electoral support which emerged from a grading of the recipients 
according to the amount received, confirmed the priority given elsewhere 
by Nolcyo (as was clear from APRA membership) to enlisting the support of 
agricultural policy leaders within the various parties. This appeared 
to be the single most important principle guiding the quantity of 
Nöseikyü political funding, not quality of connection to Nokyo, although 
this figured as a second-ranking criterion. Party considerations were 
not crucial, although it was apparent that the basic formula of 'two 
thirds conservative to one third opposition socialist (JSP and DSP)' 
was observed; just as it was evident in overall APRA membership, and the 
party affiliations of Nökyö giin as a whole. No funds were donated by 
Nöseikyü to either Kömeitö or JCP candidates.
The top-ranking group of recipients of Nöseikyü funds had in common 
proven experience and influence over agricultural policy-making within 
relevant party decision-making structures (LDP, JSP and DSP) and/or in 
prominent Diet agricultural policy positions, such as former Ministers of 
Agriculture and Forestry, and Chairmen and Directors of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries Standing Committees of the Diet. A large pro­
portion of this group had also held the Chairmanship or Vice-Chairmanship 
of the LDP Agriculture and Forestry Division and its Comprehensive 
Agriculture Policy Investigation Committee, and the JSP and DSP
These figures were calculated from the list given in Appendix I, 
Yoshihara, op. cit. , pp.247-251. They vary somewhat from the figures he 
quoted (p.62) regarding the amounts transferred in 1971 and 1972 from 
Zennökyö to Nöseikyü.
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equivalents: the JSP Farmers' Office (Nönrin Kyoku) and its PARC Agri­
culture and Forestry Committee; and the DSP's Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries Industries' Policy Committee and its PARC Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries Division and Special Committees on Livestock 
Policy and Food Policy. There were 23 recipients in the House of 
Representatives' group who received one million yen or more, and of 
these, 16, or 70 per cent, had been either chairmen or vice-chairmen of 
party committees relating to agriculture and forestry. The remainder 
were important either as Nokyo Diet members, former Ministers of 
Agriculture and Forestry, or leaders of prominent Nokyo-connected 
organisations."^ This group averaged a donation of 1.4 million yen each 
against an average of 400,000 yen per candidate over the whole group.
The second-ranking criterion appeared to be a long-standing and
high-level position in the Nokyo organisation. Twenty six Nokyo
executives (or 15 per cent of the total number supported by Noseikyu)
received 20.9 million yen. This represented 23 per cent of the total
amount given, or an average of approximately 800,000 yen each, which
was considerably higher than the average over the whole group. Within
this group of Nokyo officials, there were no significant variations in
the amounts given relative to party affiliation. Two thirds were LDP
2members and the remaining third JSP and DSP. JSP Nokyo candidates
The only one without an obvious connection to agricultural inter­
ests was Narita Tomomi, Secretary-General of the JSP.
2 The recipient of the largest sum given to a Nokyo candidate (2.5 
million yen), (also the second highest recipient overall), was a JSP 
candidate with long associations with the Nokyo movement and close con­
nections to Zennö. This was Nakazawa Moichi, Socialist Diet member for 
Nagano (1) from 1952 to 1955, and 1958 to 1976. He was former Secretary 
to Yonekura Tatsuya (the first Chairman of Zenchü and Diet member), per­
manent consultant to the Nokyo-based prefectural farmers' league, and a 
part-time staff member of the prefectural branch of Zennö, the Nagano 
Prefecture Nokyo Economic Federation,
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averaged 1.1 million yen each, which was higher than the overall average 
of the Nokyo group. LDP Nokyo candidates averaged 760,000 yen each, 
while DSP Nokyo recipients averaged 660,000 yen each.
Not all successful Nokyo Diet candidates standing in the 1972 
elections benefited from Nöseikyü donations. Eight, or 30 per cent of 
Nokyo candidates who gained Diet office, were not supported out of a 
total of 27. Almost all amongst this non-supported group had not risen 
above the position of tankyö chairman, and were therefore, on the lowest 
rung of the Nokyo organisational ladder. Half of them were standing for 
the first time, and were probably doubtful winners according to Nöseikyü 
calculations. Candidates who, on the other hand, were supported by 
Nöseikyü in the same constituencies as the unsupported Nokyo aspirants, 
were all either agricultural policy leaders or experienced Diet hands 
with consequent importance in general party executive hierarchies. Power 
within party agricultural policy-making structures and in similar group­
ings within the Diet, and in party leadership positions in general, 
appeared to weigh more heavily with Nokyo than agricultural cooperative 
connections alone. In other words, Nokyo in its electoral funding 
strategy aimed at enlisting the support of influential politicians, 
rather than building up agricultural cooperative representation in the 
Diet per se.
Amongst the group of Nöseikyü-supported prospective Nokyo Diet 
members, the most important consideration appeared to be actual Nokyo 
position, not party affiliation. Comparatively large amounts were donated 
to national Nokyo organisation staff members (and very often in conse­
quence, to members of opposition socialist parties”*") , and also to Nokyo
The conservative-progressive division within Nokyo tends to parallel 
executive-staff lines. This subject is given greater coverage later in the 
chapter. Amongst the group referred to here were Nakazawa Moichi whose 
staff connection to Zenno has already been pointed out, and Suzuki Hajime, 
a DSP member and former Zenkören Production Materials Section Chief, who 
received 1.5 million yen.
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Diet members who had successfully contested one election already (in 
1969) and were standing again. This suggests a priority of maintaining 
proven Nokyo representation. This group of second-time runners, however, 
was the least successful amongst all the Nokyo candidates. It is poss­
ible that IJoseikyu detected an electoral threat and sought to rectify it. 
Those with connections to the Nokyo marketing and purchasing (Jiö-han) 
network also received marginal preference in terms of the amount of funds 
received.
The third-ranking criterion determining the quantity of Nokyo funds 
was that of power within party hierarchies in general: that is, party
leaders, regardless of the actual party in question. Both JSP and DSP 
Secretaries-General were on Ndseikyü's list.
The fourth-ranking criterion was that of lower-level party policy 
leaders: LDP Executive Board Directors and Assistant Secretaries-General
for example; lower-level agricultural policy members such as Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries Committee Directors and members; and former 
bureaucrats with expertise in financial and tax affairs.
The fifth-ranking criterion was factional leadership in the LDP, JSP 
and DSP. Within the LDP for example, Miki, Fukuda, Öhira, Nakasone and 
Funada all received donations from Nöse'ikyu.
Other less important factors appeared to be APRA membership, the 
achievement of an equitable geographic distribution of support, and cover­
age of all types of electorates: rural, semi-rural, urban and metro­
politan in decreasing order of preference. Nöseikyü made contributions to 
75 candidates in 39 rural constituencies, 51 candidates in 29 semi-rural 
constituencies, 40 candidates in 31 urban constituencies and 10 candidates 
in 25 metropolitan constituencies. In other words, 44 per cent of its 
supported candidates were standing in rural districts, 28 per cent in 
semi-rural districts, 22 per cent in urban districts, and six per cent in
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metropolitan districts. The weighting in favour of rural areas was 
naturally predicated on the other criteria determining Nöseikyü's fund­
ing.
NokyoTs Electoral Support Measured in Terms of Votes
Measuring Nokyo's capacities for vote 'control’ and the efficiency 
of the agricultural cooperatives as vote-gathering organisations presents 
formidible methodological problems if results are required in concrete 
quantifiable terms. The questionnaire distributed to APRA members 
endeavoured to tackle this problem by asking those who had received 
electoral backing from the cooperatives what percentage of their support­
ing votes they calculated as being due to Nokyo. The question was worded 
as follows: 'If you received (electoral) support from Nokyo groups, do
you think it contributed to your successful election?' This was followed 
by another question which asked: 'If "yes", then what percentage of the
votes you received do you think was due to support from Nokyo groups?'
There were 31 replies in the affirmative to the first question (or 88.5 
per cent). The remainder were 'No Answers'. In other words, no respond­
ent maintained that Nokyo's support in the election did not contribute to 
their success. In reply to the follow-up question, 16 respondents answered 
that they did not know what percentage of the votes they received was due 
to Nokyo's support, two gave 'No Answer', and 13 offered some estimate of 
what Nokyo's support at the polls meant in terms of actual votes. Their 
estimations ranged from 5 per cent to 60-70 per cent of their supporting 
votes, with an average of 43 per cent overall. (See Table 4.5 below.) 
Percentages varied quite significantly according to party, with LDP mem­
bers estimating their Nokyo vote at an average of 49 per cent, with JSP 
members at 25 per cent. The composition of agricultural cooperative
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supporting votes was therefore, more strongly conservative. Socialists 
generally felt they owed less to the Nokyo connection. This was particu­
larly true of those who were not Nökyö giin.
The figures also showed that a majority of respondents who were will­
ing to calculate in percentage terms what Nokyo’s support meant to them, 
estimated it to be worth at least half their supporting votes or more.
It would appear that the greater the number of votes derived from Nokyo sup­
port, the greater a Diet member’s knowledge of the composition and quality 
of agricultural cooperative electoral assistance. This probably reflected 
closer ties to the agricultural cooperative organisation. It was, however, 
balanced by the fact that more than half of those who acknowledged that 
Nokyo’s support was instrumental in their success (16 out of 31 respond­
ents) , still had no idea just how this was translated into a percentage 
of their polling rate. It would obviously be an extremely difficult thing 
to establish, and at best the percentages given by the 13 APRA members 
must be considered as only approximate.
Nine of the 13 who attempted percentage guesses were Nökyö giin. In 
other words, 64 per cent of current or former Nokyo officials who answered 
the questionnaire had some idea in percentage terms what Nokyo's support 
meant to them. One could argue logically that this was due not only to 
their direct contacts with the agricultural cooperative organisation, but 
to their possession of a Nokyo-based gibcui. The calculations of these 
Nokyo leaders averaged 49 per cent which was marginally higher than the 
average, over the whole group of 43 per cent. More than half the LDP 
Nokyo Diet members estimated their Nokyo vote dependence at 60 per cent or 
above. Of the total number of Nokyo officials, irrespective of party, two 
thirds put their vote dependence on Nokyo at 50 per cent or above.
Although this survey had a limited number of respondents, it does throw
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some light on the question of how much support a particular group of 
Nokyo officials thought they drew from their own organisation at the 
polls. This can be taken further to the actual number of votes generated 
by Nokyo for each candidate, as shown in Table 4.5.
The variations in the actual size of the Nokyo vote as depicted in 
Table 4.5, are difficult to compare directly because of differences in 
the size of constituencies: from the large, populous, prefectural con­
stituencies of the House of Councillors to the medium-sized districts of 
the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, the results do allow for a 
certain amount of generalisation. Firstly, the actual numbers of agri­
cultural cooperative votes was much lower for JSP members than for LDP 
members, even amongst non-agricultural cooperative Diet members.
Secondly, the size of the Nokyo-directed vote did not decrease in the 
more populous prefectural constituencies of the Upper House. In fact the 
percentages represented by the Nokyo vote in the latter type of constitu­
ency averaged 49 per cent, with an average of 40 per cent in the House of 
Representatives. In other words, the results showed no great variation 
in Nokyo's electoral capacities between the two Houses of the Diet. More­
over, within each type of electorate, Nokyo's vote mobilisation capacities 
appeared to be remarkably consistent. The even efficiency of agricultural 
cooperative vote 'control' was also substantiated by comparisons of the 
percentages of Nokyo vote relative to constituency classification, which, 
according to the categorisation of the respondents themselves, varied from 
urban (U) to rural (R) . A majority of respondents regarded themselves as 
representing semi-rural (S-R) seats, but the Nokyo vote did not diminish 
with the transition from rural through semi-rural to urban districts.
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The highest percentage (60-70 per cent) was found to be operating in 
Fukushima prefectural constituency (R) of the House of Councillors, and 
the lowest percentage was also derived from a rural prefectural-sized 
electorate of the Lower House - Tottori. More vital factors operating 
here were clearly connection to the agricultural cooperatives and party 
affiliations. Suzuki Seigo, representing Fukushima for instance, was a 
member of the LDP and a Nökyö giin, while Nosaka Koken from Tottori, was 
a member of the JSP with no special connections to the agricultural 
cooperatives. Someya Makoto, also an LDP Nökyö giin, derived 60 per cent 
of his supporting votes from his agricultural cooperative connection in 
an urban electorate - Chiba (4). Another feature evident in the above 
table was that the lower the percentage of the Nokyo vote, the lower on 
the polling list a Diet member tended to be.
Variations in Nokyo Vote ’Control1 Relative to Constituency
One category which Table 4.5 does not include is an estimate of 
Nokyo’s performance in the national constituency.
One contemporary political analyst when commenting on NokyoTs vote 
mobilisation capacities, remarked that agricultural cooperative vote 
control declined drastically at the national level, and operated much 
more reliably within smaller geographical areas such as prefectural con­
stituencies of the Upper House, or the prefectural sub-regions of Lower 
House medium-sized constituencies."*-
A breakdown of the constituencies represented by Nokyo Diet members 
in the Upper House between 1950 and 1977 provides support for this view.
Interview with Tomioka Yoshiyuki, Agricultural Editor, Nihon Keizai 
Shinbun, Tokyo, July 4, 1974.
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Prefectural district Nokyo politicians almost completely monopolised 
agricultural cooperative Upper House membership during this period. It 
would appear that Nokyo’s efficiency rate as an electoral machine varies 
considerably between the national and other types of constituency; and 
that its vote mobilisation capacity as a national backing organisation 
is much less than has been commonly supposed. Curtis for example, argued 
that '(l)ike many interest groups, the agricultural cooperative union 
organisation functions most effectively in support of Upper House candi­
dates in the national constituency elections who run with the backing of 
the national organization The data presented in Table 4.6
below does not support this view.
The most obvious conclusion that can be drawn from this table is
that apart from 1950 when there were two Nokyo officials elected to the
national constituency, no more than one Nokyo leader has been successfully
elected to the national constituency in an Upper House poll. The large
number of candidates in 1950 was probably a reflection at the time of the
relative inexperience of the agricultural cooperative organisation in
fielding candidates in national constituency Upper House elections. In
that early period it was not yet clear how many national constituency
candidates could successfully be elected as Nokyo representatives. The
overall picture from 1950 to 1977 is one of declining performance. In
the last three Upper House elections (1971, 1974 and 1977), no Nokyo
2officials have contested the national constituency poll.
Op. cit. , p .19 3.
2 This is really only a decline from one Nokyo representative per 
national constituency poll, to no Nokyo contestant at all. The 
absence of agricultural cooperative candidates in the three most recent 
Upper House elections of 1971, 1974 and 1977, is due to personal factors, 
rather than any significant decline in Nokyo’s electoral performance. It 
hinged on the personal decision of Miyawaki Asao, Zenchu Chairman in 1974, 
not to replace Mori. Prime Minister Tanaka offered LDP endorsement to
con t .
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Table A.6
SUCCESS RATES OF NATIONAL CONSTITUENCY NOKYO CANDIDATES, 1950-1977
Elec­
tion Nokyo Candidate Official Position(s) in Nokyo Party
Votes
Received Placing
1950 Ishikawa Seiichi Kamikawa Nökyören Chairman 
Zennöseiren Vice-Chairman 
Hokkaido Ndnrin Dömei Chairman
Farmers' 
Co-op Party 
Ind. 238,339 25(a)
Mori Yasoichi Zenhanren Manager Ryokufukai 150,244 5 l( b)
Kuroda Shinichiro Zenkören Vice-Chairman Ind. 102,548 (63)
Lost
Hirao Ujirö Zenshiren Manager Ind. 42,771 (172)
Lost
Okita Tadayoshi Zenhanren Vice-Chairman Ind. 11,039 (285)
Lost
Total 544,941
1953 Sekine Kyüzö Zenyören Chairman Liberal 164,701 49
Okamura Fumijirö Zenkyören Chairman Progressive 151,859 (59) 
Los t
Total 316,560
1956 (Ishiguro Tadayuki) Zennören Chairman Ind. 283,469 37
Mori Yasoichi Zenhanren Manager
Aichi Prefecture Chuokai Chairman Ryokufukai 259,010 46
Okamura Fumijirö Zenkyören Chairman LDP 222,737 (60) 
Los t
Mori Masao Former Hokkaido Pref. Chuokai 
Vice-Chairman JSP
Total.
152,437
634,184
(93)
Lost
1959 Okamura Fumijirö Zenkyören Chairman LDP 350,124 35
Takemasa Söichirö Saitama Pref. Chuokai Chairman LDP 158,792 (72)
Lost
Total 508,916
1962 Mori Yasoichi Zenchü Director
Aichi Pref. Chuokai Chairman Ind . 536,727 19
Total 536,727
1965 Okamura Fumijirö Zenkyören Chairman Ind. 565,000 25
(Nakamura Yoshijiro) Zennosören Secretary-General DSP 273,000 (67) 
Los t
Total 838,000
1968 Mori Yasoichi Zenchü Chairman LDP 720,000 13
Total 720,000
1971 - - - - -
1974 - - - - -
1977 - - - - -
(a) According to Tanaka, op. eit. , p.436, Ishikawa received 228,010 votes, and was 
placed 24th.
(b) Tanaka, ibid. , puts Mori Yasoichi in 50th place.
(c) Those candidates whose names have been entered in brackets were standing as 
representatives of voluntary farmers' organisations affiliated to Nokyo and 
therefore they should be considered as recipients of a certain proportion of 
the Nokyo vote.
Source: Vote tallies - Asdhi Nenkan, relevant years; Asahi Shinbun, June 6, 1950.
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Tanaka, writing in the wake of the 1968 election, made the point that
as a rule, there was always one Nokyo candidate in national constituency
elections, and success required mobilising as much support as possible
within the Nokyo organisation.^ He acknowledged Nokyo 's status as a
national prominent pressure group, but he noted that success for
Nokyo leaders in the national constituency did not necessarily follow.
2Even electing one representative sometimes proved a difficult task.
The House of Councillors' national constituency is the one section 
of the Japanese electoral system which truly reflects population increase. 
The rise in the absolute numerical size of the national voting population 
between 1950 and 1977 raised the number of votes a national constituency 
candidate requires to get elected in the top 50 positions from 144,000 in 
1950, to 582,847 in 1977. This factor may be relevant to Nokyo's 
diminishing powers in national constituency elections, but not as much as 
appears at first glance. It is true that the farming electorate has 
declined absolutely and relatively to national voting population numbers. 
This is particularly striking if measured in terms of the agricultural
(cent, from previous page)
Miyawaki in the 1974 elections to carry on in Mori's footsteps and take over 
as national Nokyo representative in the Diet. Miyawaki refused, however. 
His past record as Socialist candidate for Kagawa in the 1964 elections has 
been one of failure. The reason he gave for declining Tanaka's offer 
was the political neutrality of the Nokyo organisation which he claimed 
prevented him from identifying with any particular party, and the demands 
of his job as Zenchu Chairman.
 ^ Op. cit. , p .426 
2
Ibid., p.461. In comparison with the Japan Teachers' Union (JTU) 
for example, Nokyo's performance has been inferior. The JTU consistently 
supported and successfully elected a larger number of candidates with one 
twelfth of Nokyo's membership (555,000 as against seven million). On a 
pro rata basis, Nokyo should be able to organise the election of many 
times more candidates. To some extent JTU national constituency 
performance also underwent a relative decline in the two decades prior to 
1971. It elected four candidates in 1956, but by 1971, this had fallen 
to only two. Thurston's explanation for this cited a combination of 
factors: a decline in JTU supporting votes along with increases in the 
national constituency voting populace. Op. cit., pp.229-230.
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workforce. It is far less so, however, in the case of farm household 
population, or in terms of the third indicator of social structure with­
in the farm sector: the number of farm households (which is a basic
category of agricultural cooperative membership). The actual number of 
farms in Japan is not falling at a comparable rate to the percentage of 
population engaged in agriculture, owing mainly to the growth in part- 
time farming. Furthermore, the earlier calculation regarding the size 
of the national Nokyo electorate, demonstrated its impressive dimensions 
as a percentage of the national voting population even in 1975.
If we compare the 720,000 votes garnered by Mori Yasoichi as Zenchü 
Chairman in 1968, however, with the total number in the national Nokyo 
electorate, it falls far short of the maximum possible numerical range. 
This reinforces the assessment of Nokyo*s lack-lustre performance in the 
national constituency. Tanaka's explanation for Nokyo's relatively poor 
showing in this type of electorate compared to prefectural constituencies, 
was the powerful combination of Nokyo recommendation and party (usually 
LDP) endorsement in the latter.^- He pointed out the relative frequency
2with which national constituency Nokyo candidates stood as Independents: 
Ishikawa in 1950, Mori in 1950, 1956 and 1962,^ and Okamura in 1968.
He went on to comment that in 1968, Mori received the endorsement of the 
LDP for the first time and it was in this election that he recorded his
Op. cit. , p.461.
2 Tanaka made backing for Independent Nokyo-recommended agricultural 
cooperative leaders in the national constituency a special category of 
electoral support. Ibid. , p.425.
3 It was supposedly Mori s political independence for 18 years that 
identified him as 'Nokyo*s representative' in the Diet. This was rein­
forced by his chairmanship of Zenchu , the national guiding body of the whole 
Nokyo organisation. His political independence also enabled him to oper­
ate in the demilitarised zone' between government agricultural Diet 
members and opposition parties.
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highest vote tally ever. What he failed to mention, however, were 
additional contributory factors in Mori's polling rate in 1968: the
fact that it was his fourth election and that he was standing as Zenchlt 
Chairman for the first time in his electoral career. Tanaka also ignored 
the poor record of Nokyo candidates who lost in spite of party 
endorsement. Clearly success or failure of agricultural cooperative 
leaders in national constituency elections does not hinge solely on the 
factor of party endorsement. A total explanation must include what at 
first glance would appear to be Nokyo's greatest electoral asset: its
size, and its all-encompassing role in the agricultural sector. Nokyo 
is too complex and unwieldy an organisation to be able to formulate a 
comprehensive electoral strategy suitable for national constituency 
elections and to operate effectively on a nationwide scale for electoral 
purposes. The competition between Okamura Fumijirö and Nakamura Yoshijiro 
for the national constituency 'Nokyo' seat in 1965 exemplified the 
general lack of co-ordination of Nokyo as a national electoral machine. 
Each represented different branches of the agricultural cooperative 
organisation. It was generally acknowledged within Nokyo at the time 
that, going on previous national constituency experience, only one 
official Nokyo candidate could successfully stand. Nakamura's campaign 
for a Diet seat as the Zennösöven representative was regarded as breaking 
all precedent because it meant two Nokyo candidates competing for the 
Nokyo vote.'*’ Okamura and Nakamura ended up splitting the agricultural
Although there was a general support base agreement between Okamura 
and Nakamura, it was insufficient to prevent competition between the two 
candidates. Okamura^as Zenkyoren Chairman agreed to utilise the backing 
of the insurance (kyösairen) and trust (shinven) federations, and the 
Nakamura faction chose to base its campaign on the economic (ke'iza'iren)
federations. This was practicable as far as it went in terms of the assis­
tance and support of the executive and staff of the national and prefec- 
tural branches of these organisations, but when the campaign reached the 
level of the grass-roots farm voter, there was an unavoidable clash of 
interests, because of concentration of these agricultural cooperative 
activities within the same units - the tankyö. The Zenndsören, similarly, 
was the national political leadership organisation of tankijd members, 
creating yet another intra-organisational cleavage.
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cooperative vote and Nakamura lost. A combined organisational and 
geographical support base agreement between them of the sort operated by 
candidates representing pure interest associations such as the JTU, where 
no intra-group, cross-cutting loyalties exist to divide the nationwide 
organisation vertically, was not possible. Any such geographical area 
would contain on a smaller scale a sample of each of the different Nokyo 
group interests. Okamura and Nakamura attempted a geographic agreement 
of sorts, but according to Tanaka, the number of areas where they under­
took to avoid competition was insufficient in terms of a percentage of 
regions nationwide to ensure the election of both candidates.
The Okamura-Nakamura election struggle exemplifies an additional 
impediment preventing Nokyo from operating a cohesive, well co-ordinated, 
national electoral strategy. As a group representing the farmers in to to, 
Nokyo necessarily encompasses within its membership a wide range of 
political convictions. The official position of Nokyo on its relationship 
with Parliamentary parties has always been one of political neutrality. 
Membership of the agricultural cooperatives does not carry with it a uni­
form political conviction as it does in the case of the farmers' unions or 
the JTU; nor does Nokyo operate closed electoral alliances with political 
parties. The Okamura-Nakamura rivalry was therefore, reinforced by 
political divisions: between LDP-aligned Nokyo leaders and members support­
ing Okamura on the one hand, and DSP-aligned leaders and members support­
ing Nakamura on the other. Nakamura was clearly identified within Nokyo as 
a progressive and as a representative of the Zewiosdren, which traditionally 
had rather more radical orientations than its parent organisation. He was 
also known as a spokesman for the younger generation of Nokyo leaders. 
Okamura on the other hand, was equally well known as a conservative old- 
guard Nokyo leader. He was in his seventies and had until 1965 stood 
with conservative party endorsement.
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The national farming electorate which Nokyo represents as a whole 
embraces diverse economic commodity, and regional interests. Generally 
speaking there is an agricultural cooperative organisation for each of 
these. Hence, the multitude of groupings operating within the total 
Nokyo organisation and the divisions amongst them are a potential source 
of electoral as well as organisational conflict. Intra-group loyalties 
can and often do contribute to successful agricultural cooperative cam­
paigns in elections, but they can have the reverse effect when in 
national constituency elections, Nokyo has to operate like a single, 
closely-knit, unified organisation.
Another difficulty which Nokyo faces in Upper House national con­
stituency elections is divisions in the farm vote. It is customary for 
a number of ’agricultural candidates', each representing a smaller,more 
specialist section of a very broad-based agricultural electorate, to com­
pete for votes in the national constituency. Former MAF officials for 
example, specialise in representing 'extra-departmental' agricultural 
organisations in the Diet."*“ They tend to choose organisations with which
1 With one or two exceptions, retired MAF bureaucrats do not move into 
mainstream Nokyo organisations. Those that have, include Katayanagi 
Naoyoshi, former Permanent Vice-Minister of the MAF and Upper House nation­
al constituency Diet member for the Green Breeze Society (Ryokufukai) 
between 1950 and 1956, who later became Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of Chükin, an executive of Zenchü (from Chuki-n) , Chairman of the Livestock 
Industry Promotion Corporation (LIPC), and in 1976, Chairman of the Cen­
tral Dairy Council (Chuö Rakunö Kaigi), an organisation of Nokyo dairy 
marketing groups (see Chapter 6); Yagi Ichiro, former (prewar) MAF Silk 
Bureau official, who became Chairman of the National Silk Nokyo Federation; 
Tanaka Keikichi, former MAF official who became a prefectural Nokyo market­
ing and purchasing federation chairman; Sakurai Shirö, former MAF Agri­
cultural Land Bureau Construction Division Chief, who became a Nokyo chair­
man after entering the Diet; Hayashida Yukio, former MAF Horticultural 
Bureau Chief, who became a Zenhanren advisor (komon); and Sasayama Shigetarö, 
former permanent Vice-Minister for the MAF, who became an executive of the 
National Welfare Nokyo Federation (Zenkören). Katayanagi was the only Diet 
member representing the national constituency amongst this group.
Former bureaucrats do, however, take up positions in Nokyo-affiliated 
groups such as Chukin. Examples are: Oya Hanjirö, former Chief of the
Ministry of Finance Tax Bureau, who became Vice-Chairman of the Board of 
Directors of Chuk'in; Kusumi Yoshio, former Permanent Vice-Minister of the
(contd.)
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they had close dealings in the course of their careers and in whose fields
of interest they have some expertise. In almost every case, a strong link
exists between former administrative background and current organisational
representation.^’ These Diet members linked to agricultural and forestry
affairs compete directly with Nokyo candidates for a seat in the Upper
2House as national constituency members. They are often more successful
(from previous page)
MAF who later became Chairman of the Board of Directors of Chukin, and 
Tanigaki Seiichi, former Chief of the MAF Livestock Bureau, who became a 
Director of Chukin. The reason for this is that Chukin has many of the 
characteristics of a gaikaku dantai. It operates under ministerial super­
vision, and is a receiver of government funds and subsidies.
Yamasaki Hitoshi, former Director-General of the Forestry Agency 
elected to the national constituency in 1962, became an adviser to the 
National Forestry Association; Nochi Hiroyuki, former Chief of the MAF 
Reclamation Section also elected to the national constituency in 1962, 
became adviser to the National Land Development Federation; Wakabayashi 
Masatake, former Director-General of the Forestry Agency, elected to the 
national constituency in 1968 became adviser to the National Forestry 
Association; Shigemasa Tsuneyoshi, former Okayama Agricultural Land Office 
Chief, elected to the national constituency in 1953, became Vice-Chairman 
of the National Land Development Federation; Kajiwara Shigeyoshi, former 
Director-General of the Food Agency, elected to the national constituency 
in 1953, became Chairman of the National Food Business Cooperative Union 
Federation; Kanbayashi Tadatsugu, former Japan Monopoly Corporation Pro­
duction Office Chief, elected to the national constituency in 1953, be­
came adviser to the Central Association of Tobacco Cultivators’ Unions; 
Ishitani Toshio, former Director-General of the Forestry Agency, elected 
to the national constituency in 1959, became adviser to the Forestry 
Technical Association; Kajiki Matazö, former Chief of the MAF Construction 
Division, elected to the national constituency in 1971, became adviser to 
the Federation of Land Development Corporations.
2 In 1959 for example, there were six main contenders for farmers' 
votes including the two Nokyo leaders, Okamura Fumijiro and Takemasa 
Söichirö. The remainder included three former MAF officials who repre­
sented the National Food Business Cooperative Union Federation, the 
National Agriculture and Forestry Workers' Labour Union, and the Forestry 
Technical Association respectively, plus one other full-time official from 
the National Chamber of Agriculture. The four agriculture and forestry 
organisation candidates were successful along with Okamura. Similar com­
petition for the farm vote occurred in 1962, in which there was a national 
constituency electoral confrontation between Mori Yasoichi and Yasuda 
Zennichirö, former Director-General of the Food Agency, who was a member 
of the Kono faction, and a consequent proponent of the Köno 'free rice' 
plan. Nokyo virulently opposed the latter because of its threat to the 
Food Control system. Their rivalry was complicated by the addition to the 
race of a former Director-General of the Forestry Agency and a former 
National Chamber of Agriculture Office Chief. In 1971, there were no
(contd.)
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than Nokyo contenders for the agricultural vote because they almost 
always represent nationally-oriented groups dealing in specialised areas 
of activity. The strength of these groups is their organisation around 
a single interest nationwide, which combines the advantage of geographi­
cal breadth with unity of interest. Such groups can call upon the more 
easily identifiable and limited concerns of their membership as a basis 
for support. Their smaller overall membership is not a disadvantage in 
this situation, but quite the opposite. A narrower, more clearly defin­
able interest may be more effective in mobilising votes in support of 
national representatives, than a massive nationwide membership and a 
multitude of interests. The latter is simply too large and conglomerate 
to organise easily.''"
(from previous page)
officials from Nokyo standing in the national constituency for the first 
time. Instead, the agricultural field was made up of successful con­
tenders from the National Federation of Land Development Corporations (a 
former MAF agricultural Land Office Construction Division Chief who gained 
9th place with 725,501 votes); from the National Food Livelihood Improve­
ment Association (a former Permanent Vice-Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry who gained 34th place with 575,959 votes); from the National 
Forestry Association (a former Director-General of the Forestry Agency who 
gained 35th place with 570,993 votes); and from the National Agriculture 
and Forestry Workers' Labour Union (a JSP candidate who won 46th place 
with 487,161 votes).
The power of narrower sectional interests and more specific and 
immediate organisational loyalties was demonstrated in the 1968 election 
when Mori Yasoichi, standing as the national Nokyo candidate, was beaten 
at the hustings by Kobayashi Kuniji, a former MAF Agricultural Land 
Office Construction Division Chief and agriculture and forestry engineer­
ing technical official, who became adviser to the National Federation of 
Land Development Corporations on retirement. Mori scored his highest vote 
tally ever in 1968 with 720,000 votes. It was his fourth election.
Kobayashi on the other hand, was an unknown new candidate. He gained 
780,000 votes and sixth place, the highest score of any agriculture and 
forestry candidate. His supremacy over Mori, who was at the time Chairman 
of ZenchTi, was attributed to the well-organised supporting votes he 
received from agriculture and forestry engineering technicians' associ­
ations, plus the backing of the Land Development Political League (Toohi 
Kairyo Se'iji- Renme'C) (the political arm of the Land Development Corporations) 
and the Agricultural Land League (Noch'i Dome'i) , which incorporated farmers 
involved in land development units (tochi kairydku). As the land develop­
ment industry depended enormously on government subsidy to finance its 
operations, political representation in the Diet was regarded as vital to
(contd.)
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The Nokyo vote in the national constituency is also vulnerable to 
internal divisions. This occurred not only in 1965 in the Okamura/ 
Nakamura debacle, but earlier in 1956 in Okamura’s second bid for 
election.^
Success for Nokyo leaders in the national constituency generally
requires a combination of two types of votes: organisationally-generated
votes, which derive from official positions in national agricultural
cooperative organisations (this constitutes the vertical campaign
strategy); and locality- (jimoto) or commodity-generated votes, which
appeal to closer, more meaningful interests and connections within the
Nokyo system (this forms the horizontal campaign strategy which utilises
direct regional and/or commodity loyalties). Okamura's successful
election in 1959 in which he received 350,000 votes, rested upon a voting
base organised around the Nokyo mutual aid business (Nökyö kyösai) and
the Hokkaidö-based dairy industry. The latter reputedly contributed
2150,000 votes to his total.
(from previous page)
keep open channels of communication and pressure on the MAF and the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF). Kobayashi's votes were linked directly to 
interests involved in this industry, and his advisory capacity in the 
National Federation of Land Development Corporations proved to be an 
effective pipeline to the grass-roots voter participating in this kind 
of enterprise. Kobayashi did extremely well in his second election in 
1974. He gained 867,548 votes which put him in 8th place. According to 
Tanaka, Mori’s chairmanship of ZenchTi in contrast, encompassed too broad 
a field and made votes unexpectedly difficult to collect. Op. , p.466.
Although he stood as Chairman of Zenkydven, Okamura's local support 
base was Hokkaido where he had previously been Chairman of the Hokkaido 
Agricultural Association (Hokkaido Ndgyökai) and where he was also 
Director of Snow Brand Milk, a company which began as a Hokkaido-based 
dairy cooperative. Okamura shared this same regional support base with a 
JSP national constituency Nokyo candidate Mori Masao, who was Vice- 
Chairman of the Hokkaido Nokyo Central Union at the time. The result of 
their competition for local Hokkaido farmers' votes was defeat for them 
both.
2 Tanaka, op.  cit. , p.451.
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The merging of these two types of interest was evident in all 
successful Nokyo national constituency candidacies almost without excep­
tion. In 1950 for example, Mori Yasoichi who was at the time a Zerihanven 
Manager, combined the scattered votes of the national Zerihanven system 
with support from his local Aichi voting base, which as a first-time 
candidate, was the only region in which he was personally well known.
To these he added the commodity-generated votes of the potato belt of 
each prefecture in Kyushu and other regions associated with rice straw 
products (the two commodities with which he had special connections).
The result was that he managed to scrape in on the lowest rung of 
national constituency elected Diet members with 150,000 votes. In his 
second election in 1956, however, he stood as the organisational repre­
sentative (soshiki daihyd) of the network of Nokyo federations (keitö 
Nökyö soshiki) and to this he added the electoral advantage of standing 
as Chairman of the Aichi Prefecture Nokyo Central Union. He added 
another 100,000 votes to his 1950 vote tally as a result (earning
259.000 votes and 46th place). In 1962, still as Aichi Prefecture Nokyo 
Central Union Chairman and a Zenchü Director, he doubled his vote tally 
to 500,000 votes and 19th place. And, as was noted above, in 1968 as 
Zenchü Chairman with LDP endorsement, he scored his greatest success with
720.000 votes and 13th place.^
The lack of either one of these ingredients for success: national
Nokyo organisational position plus strong regional or commodity
Ishikawa Seiichi's candidacy in 1950 also exemplified the successful 
amalgamation of national organisation-and locality-generated votes. 
Ishikawa held the position of a county {gun) Nokyo federation chairman, 
but he also benefited electorally from his position as Chairman of the 
Hokkaido Farmers' League, and in consequence, a majority of the votes he 
received came from the Hokkaido area. He also utilised his national con­
nections as Vice-Chairman of the Zenriöseiven to enlarge the scope of his 
appeal beyond Hokkaido prefecture.
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orientation, engenders failure for agricultural cooperative candidates.
As a result, prefectural Nokyo leaders do not on the whole, do well in 
national constituency elections: witness the failures of Mori Masao
from the Hokkaido Nokyo Central Union in 1956 and Takemasa Söichirö, 
Saitama Prefecture Nokyo Central Union Chairman in 1959. Similarly, 
national Nokyo positions alone are not generally sufficient to guarantee 
election either. The three unsuccessful Nokyo candidates in 1950 for 
example, traded solely on their positions in national agricultural 
cooperative organisations. In combination, however, these twin attributes 
are usually successful. As with most organisationally-backed national 
constituency candidates, Nokyo representatives have all been leaders of 
national agricultural cooperative organisations. Thurston reasoned 
logically that 'since such top leaders during their incumbency as national 
officers became known beyond the confines of the single prefecture from 
which they rise to national leadership, they are obvious choices for 
candidacy in the national constituency.’"*"
The Regional Emphasis of Agricultural Cooperative Electoral Activities
As a percentage of total Nokyo Diet membership in the House of
Councillors, national constituency members are a very small minority.
Between 1950 and 1977, they averaged 1.7 members per election, as against
211.9 successful prefectural constituency Nokyo leaders. In prefectural 
Upper House districts and in the smaller regional constituencies of the 
Lower House, the organisational powers of the agricultural cooperatives 
as political back-up groups are reinforced by all the vital regionally-
Op. cit., pp.227-228.
2 These figures are based on data for all Nokyo Diet members between 
1950 and 1977. See Chapter 3, footnote 2, p.141.
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based ingredients that are part of the jiban . According to Kobayashi, 
Shinohara and Soma, the factor that has the greatest influence on voting 
base formation within Nokyo is 'regionalism' (ohiikisei)They argue 
that Nokyo's political activities take place principally at prefectural 
level and below, especially within rural blocs which have a regionally 
unified character. The main reason why agricultural cooperative political 
activities manifest themselves so clearly within prefectural units is 
because local and regional Nokyo management structures and agricultural 
cooperative executive and staff systems culminate at the prefectural 
vertex with key executives decided at this level. In addition, pre­
fectural Nokyo executives have the task of adjusting confrontations
between groups and the regional antagonisms of blocs of groups within 
2their area. It is their job to provide internal Nokyo political leader­
ship, which is an ideal training ground for later Diet representation of 
the region. Furthermore, politically, administratively and organisation­
ally, the structure of local government and the agricultural cooperatives 
coincide, with a good deal of professional overlap between them, thus 
reinforcing the regional focus of political activity, particularly as it 
involves cooperative leaders and farmer voters. Nokyo candidates to all 
levels of political office can take advantage of regional factors to win 
political allegiance and voting support.
The strength and activism of the prefecturally-based farmers' 
political leagues are evidence of this. One writer maintained that:
'for the most part, the central Nokyo groups do not undertake election 
campaign activities. On the contrary, the ndseiren . . . which were
1
2
Op. cit. , p.78. 
Ibid. , p.79.
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organised around Nokyo in each prefecture, demonstrated a considerable 
degree of activism, with the result that prefectural federation chair­
men who launched themselves into national politics by means of those 
organisations, were conspicuously numerous.
The import of this general argument, is that electoral activities
by agricultural cooperatives are very much regionally-oriented. Further
evidence of this is the comparatively high level of representation in
the Diet of the prefectural Nokyo leadership structure. Seventy seven
per cent of all prefectural constituency Upper House Nokyo Diet members
between 1950 and 1977 had held or were holding official positions in
2prefectural Nokyo organisations at the time of election, with the cen­
tral unions best represented politically, perhaps because of the policy 
emphasis of this branch of the agricultural cooperatives. The corres­
ponding figure for national Nokyo organisational representation was 39.5 
_ 3per cent.
An additional explanation for the prefectural leadership focus of 
national Diet representation is, as one commentator put it, because 
’national Nokyo leaders are so powerful they do not have to enter politics 
to get their opinions h e a r d . B a s e d  on data collected for Nokyo giin, 
the best represented national Nokyo organisation was Zerihanren with 31.5 
per cent (prior to 1972), to which should be added the 10.5 per cent for
'Senkyo to Nomin', op. czt., p.91.
2 These figures were obtained from background studies of all Nokyo 
g'iin for this period. See Chapter 3, footnote 2 p.141.
3 Although these categories of leadership were separated for purposes 
of calculation, in practice, both levels of leadership were often repre­
sented in one and the same person.
Interview with the Secretary of the Nösei Kenkyukai, Tokyo,
November 3, 1973.
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Zenno since 1972, making a total of 42 per cent for national Nokyo 
marketing and purchasing bodies. A total of 15.7 per cent of Nokyo Diet 
members were associated with specialist national Nokyo federations, par­
ticularly the National Livestock Nokyo Federation (Zenehikuren) and the 
National Silk Nokyo Federation (Zenydren), and 10.5 per cent with Zenchü. 
The low figure for Zenchü may be partially attributable to the factor 
mentioned above regarding the relative power of different agricultural 
cooperative organisations on the national scene. Unlike prefectural 
Nokyo central union leaders, Zenchu executives carry enormous political 
weight in the their own right.^
Two other indicators confirm the general locality-orientation of 
Nokyo Deir politicians: the percentage with a career background in
local politics; and the proportion in local party organisations. Accord­
ing to the data collected on the personal histories of Nokyo giin, 52 per 
cent of their Upper House members had held positions in local government: 
6.25 per cent had risen to the postion of prefectural governor; 41.6 per 
cent to positions in prefectural assemblies (almost half of this group had 
held the job of prefectural assembly chairman); two per cent to the city 
mayoralty and the same percentage to the village mayoralty. In other 
words, a majority of the ex-local politicians group of Nokyo Diet members 
had achieved prominence in prefectural government. The fact that most 
had climaxed their local political careers in prefectural assemblies merely 
emphasises the focus of Nokyo political leaders on prefectural level 
politics, and the strong element of regionalism in their political support 
bases. According to Tanaka, the trend amongst currently serving
It was well known for instance, that during Miyawaki Asao's tenure as 
Chairman of Zenchu that he had an open line to Prime Minister Tanaka.
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prefectural Nokyo executives until 1969 was to choose prefectural con­
stituency representation in the House of Councillors.^ One of the 
reasons for this was the coincidence in boundaries between prefectural 
Upper House constituencies and prefectural Nokyo organisations which 
facilitated the formation of a prefecturally-based jiban. This enabled 
Nokyo leaders to utilise their Nokyo-centred activities to form the 
connections and establish the obligations translatable into votes on 
polling day.
The careers in local politics of a majority of Upper House Nokyo 
representatives was also often oriented towards local party politics.
One third of prefectural constituency House of Councillors’ Nokyo Diet 
members had held the position of party prefectural federation leader, 
with 77 per cent of this group combining this role with experience in 
prefectural assembly politics.
The same sort of local political career background was also evident 
amongst Lower House Nokyo members. Amongst this group, prefectural 
Nokyo organisations were the best represented of any strata of the 
agricultural cooperative organisation. Between 1949 and 1976, they con­
stituted 71 per cent of all Nokyo Lower House Diet members. Amongst 
these prefectural representatives, the central unions dominated with 31 
per cent. Other Nokyo federations (for example, economic, insurance, 
welfare etc.) gained 44 per cent, including specialist Nokyo federations 
at 24 per cent. Of the last group, livestock federations were the most
In the Lower House election of that year, however, there was a spate 
of prefectural federation chairmen elected to House of Representatives’ 
seats. Hitherto this class of local Nokyo ’big shots' (dmono), as Tanaka 
described them, had avoided the House of Representatives and it had been 
an unwritten rule to aim at Upper House prefectural representation. 
Tanaka, op. cit., p.478.
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common, with 73 per cent of specialist Nokyo Diet members affiliated to 
prefectural livestock federations.
National Nokyo leaders represented 17 per cent of the total Nokyo 
membership in the Lower House over this period. Of these, National 
Purchasing Nokyo Federation leaders constituted 36 per cent,
Zerihanven 18 per cent and the national Nokyo specialist federations 18 
per cent.
Lower House Nokyo members also exhibited extremely strong local 
political orientations with ex-prefectural assembly members predominating. 
Two thirds (exactly 66.6 per cent) of Lower House Nokyo representatives 
had held local government positions, and of these, 83 per cent had gravi­
tated to the prefectural assembly with 20 per cent of this group reaching 
the position of chairman; 9.5 per cent had been prefectural governor, 
five per cent former mayors, and two per cent city, town or village assem­
bly members.
The statistics also demonstrated a strong local party organisational 
background amongst Lower House Nokyo Diet members: 35 per cent had held 
leading positions in party prefectural federations, in most cases the 
chairmanship. The three-way combination of prefectural Nokyo organis­
ation, prefectural political position and prefectural party organisation 
leadership was also common. Of the total number of Lower House Nokyo yi'iyi 
in this period, 20 per cent had amalgamated experience in these three 
political leadership positions during their careers, but amongst former 
Nokyo local politicians, the figure was 29 per cent. The ex-town or 
village assembly or mayoralty and town or village Nokyo leadership com­
bination, occurred in 17 per cent of cases amongst this group; city 
assembly or mayoralty and city Nokyo combination,in five per cent of cases. 
Overall, the prefectural Nokyo organisation and local or prefectural
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politics combination, or local Nokyo organisation and prefectural 
politics combination, was evident amongst 50 per cent of the former 
local politician Nokyo Diet members' group.
The dominant 'locality-orientation' of Nokyo Diet members has in 
some instances been reinforced by the strong element of regionalism in 
Japanese agriculture owing to climatic and geographic variations. Farm 
politicians from a number of rural and semi-rural constituencies (not 
only Nokyo Diet members), have become strongly identified with certain 
agricultural industries and commodities: for example, the 'beef
politicians' of Kyushu, Tohoku and Southern Kanto; the 'grapefruit' and 
'mikan' Diet members from Shikoku, Western Honshu and Kyushu; the 
'dairy' politicians from Hokkaido and Southern Kantö; and the 'rice Diet 
members' from the single crop (i.e. rice) producing areas (tansaku chitai) 
of Tohoku and Hokuriku.
Regional and Organisational Concentrations of Nokyo Socialist Support
The Socialist Party is relatively more popular amongst farmers in a 
limited number of agricultural electorates, and receives comparatively 
more support in certain parts of the Nokyo organisation.
In some prefectures such as Hokkaido, Nagano, Niigata, Toyama and
Tottori, the JSP has electoral superiority in the 'agricultural belt'(nogyo
chitai).1 Similarly, the conservative influence is overwhelmingly strong in
_ _ 2Shikoku, Northern Kanto, Kyushu, and Hokuriku. Those electorates in 
which there are close associations between the Socialists and the farmers 
usually coincide with regions in which the farmers' union organisation
Ibid. , p.470.
2
Ibid.
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continues to be active. Zennichind' s influence is relatively strong in 
Northern Japan for instance, and farmers' union candidates have almost 
continuously represented Lower House constituencies such as Niigata (2), 
Niigata (3), Miyagi (1), Miyagi (2), Akita (2), Yamagata (2), Nagano (3), 
Okayama (1), Aomori (1), Fukushima (2) and Hokkaido (4) since the early 
'fifties, and similarly Upper House prefectural constituencies such as 
Niigata, Fukushima and Okayama. Likewise, there has been a very strong 
progressive influence within the Nokyo organisation in a number of pre­
fectures such as Tot tori, Shimane, Hokkaido, Chiba, Aomori and Akita.
In some specific constituencies such as Hokkaido (2) in the House of 
Representatives, a series of agricultural politicians have had close 
links with the left-wing in Japanese politics and farmers' organisations 
including Nokyo, particularly the Kamikawa district farmers' groups.^"
In those areas where the farmers' unions are more active, there may 
be close ties between these organisations and Nokyo via the joint 
affiliations of the same Diet members who have served on the executives 
of both groups. In Tottori for example, Ashika Kaku, a former Zenhanven 
Vice-Chairman and prefectural Nokyo Economic Federation Chairman was, 
early in his career, closely allied to Nichind. His continuing electoral 
successes over almost two decades were due to a support base agreement 
with the labour union representative from the JSP as to Ashika's elector­
al concentration in rural areas and the labour union candidate's in more 
urban areas. When this support base agreement broke down Ashika was
These include the Kamikawa Farmers' League (Kamikawa Ndmin Domei - 
a branch of the Hokkaido Ndmin Domei) , whose one-time Chairman and Nökyö 
giin Haga Mitsugu has occupied a Hokkaido (2) Lower House seat since 1952 
for the JSP; and the Kamikawa District Federation of Agricultural 
Committees which backed its Chairman Yasui Yoshinori as a JSP member for 
the same constituency from 1958 (Yasui also had membership in the Kamikawa 
Ndmin Ddmei). Ishikawa Seichi, House of Councillors' national constitu­
ency Independent member between 1950 and 1956, was Kamikawa Nokyo 
Federation Chairman.
defeated for the House of Representatives’ seat and then chose to run 
for the House of Councillors. This particular candidacy in 1968 pro­
duced a major conservative-progressive split within the Nokyo organis­
ation in Tottori which was styled the 'Japan Sea Showdown'.^
Ashika's success over the conservative incumbent in this election
was considerably assisted by the powerful Nichinö organisation within 
2Tottori with which Ashika had past ties. In those areas where farmers' 
organisations are strong, they can be vital to the electoral success of 
progressive Nokyo candidates. They both reflect and contribute to more 
progressive orientations amongst farm voters within a prefecture.
Diet representatives who have served on the executives of both the 
agricultural cooperatives and the farmers' unions are, however, only a 
minute proportion of the total number of Nokyo Diet members between 1949
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Ashika's candidacy for the prefectural constituency seat as a 
Socialist directly undermined the candidacy of the conservative incumbent 
who was also a Nokyo giin. Until 1968, Nokyo Diet representation for 
Tottori had been shouldered by Ashika in the House of Representatives and 
Nakahara Yoichi, an LDP member in the House of Councillors. This personal 
combat between Ashika and Nakahara operating from the same organisational 
base split the Nokyo world within Tottori into two camps, each aligned 
with a different party. It was a reluctant confrontation for both men.
The conference of agricultural cooperative chairmen within the prefecture 
decided that current Nokyo executives would recommend the LDP candidate 
Nakahara, but the Nokyo staff employees within Tottori decided to support 
Ashika. Nakahara's support lay with conservative farmers and city, town 
and village 'men of influence'. Ashika's support, on the other hand, was 
not a complete contrast. It derived from both young and old, and was 
born of a history of association with farmers' movements and campaigns 
over many years. Ashika was presented to the electorate as 'A man we 
can trust'. With rural votes split 50/50, in the final count, city votes 
were the deciding factor, and worker-farmer cooperation which combined 
agricultural votes with those of the prefectural labour council involving 
the teachers' unions, national railway and postal workers, proved 
successful. Tanaka describes this electoral battle in detail, op. oit., 
p. 467.
It was the reverse of this situation in Iwate Prefecture in 1968, 
which was largely responsible for the electoral result going in favour 
of the LDP candidate. The Chairman of the Iwate Prefecture Nokyo 
Central Union stated in an interview (June 11, 1973), that the farmers' 
union organisation in the prefecture was 'totally weak' (totemo yowai).
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and 1977. Nevertheless, this lack of joint leadership affiliation at 
the Diet representation level does not preclude a close working alli­
ance between the two groupings on policy matters. The support of the 
farmers' unions is actively sought by Nokyo in particular areas of its 
farmers’ campaigns (ndnrln undo) and agricultural policy activities 
([nösei katsudö) . The farmers’ unions tend to be much more outspoken 
and outrageous in their demands to government and so serve a useful pur­
pose in making Nokyo’s demands appear more moderate. This is especially 
true during the producer rice price campaign when Zennichinö's support is 
enlisted in the Nokyo-sponsored mass mobilisations of farmers in Tokyo, 
and in administrative councils, such as the Rice Price Advisory Council.
A similar sort of willingness to engage the support of farmers’ organis­
ations whatever their political colours is also reflected in the presence 
of JSP and DSP farmers’ union executives in the APRA. A certain level of 
mutual interest between Nokyo and other more progressive farmers' bodies 
such as the farmers' unions, the migrant farm workers' (dekasegisha) 
associations and the Settlers' League (Kaitakusha Rerunei), is inevitable 
given the overlap in their respective memberships. Farmers who belong to 
these other groups are also agricultural cooperative members and are 
therefore subject to the countervailing political influences of dual sets
This group includes Ashika Kaku and Haga Mitsugu mentioned above. 
Jitsukawa Kiyoshi, JSP member in the Lower House for Chiba (3) 1958 to 
1969; Ogawa Toyoaki, JSP member in the Lower House for Chiba (2) 1952- 
1962; Tanaka Tsunetoshi, JSP member in the Lower House for Ehime (3) 
1969-1972; and Sasa Eizaburo, JSP member in the Lower House for Kagawa 
(2) 1967-1969.
2 The All-Japan Federation of Migrant Farm Workers' Associations 
(Zennihon Dekisegisha Kumiai Rengökai) is a JSP-aligned organisation.
Its Chairman is a JSP House of Representatives' Diet member for Akita (2), 
Kuribayashi Saburo (also an executive member of Zennichinö), who held 
this seat between 1958 and 1969, and was re-elected again in 1976.
278
of leadership. Internally, this contributes to the variety of political 
orientations within Nokyo and to its general political complexity and 
non-uniformity.
In terms of its own organisational structure, the conservative- 
progressive division within Nokyo so far as it exists, tends to follow 
the fundamental divide between the executive and staff classes. Accord­
ing to the Secretary-General of the JSP in an interview,^- one of the 
main supporting groups of the Socialist Party in the countryside is that 
of agricultural cooperative staff employees, along with school teachers,
postal and railway workers, and the ever-increasing number of part-time
2farmer wage earners who have joined unions. All Nokyo staff members 
who have successfully contested Diet seats over the past 30 years have 
sought the endorsement of socialist parties. The distribution of known 
Nokyo positions amongst JSP Lower House Nokyo Diet members was as 
follows: executives 47 per cent, local agricultural cooperative chair­
men {kunrlaicho) 42 per cent, and staff members 10 per cent. Amongst the 
DSP, the figures were: executives 40 per cent, cooperative chairmen 40
per cent, and staff members 20 per cent. This distribution contrasts 
with that of LDP Nökyö gv in : executives 90 per cent, kunrlaicho 10 per 
cent and staff members zero. LDP Nokyo Diet members occupy not only 
higher positions in the Nokyo executive ladder than their progressive 
counterparts (i.e. they represent a lower proportion of local co-op 
chairmen), but all LDP Nokyo Diet members have been executives at some 
level within the agricultural cooperative organisation. Representation
Ishibashi Masashi, Canberra, December 1975.
2 Migrant farm workers (dekaseg isha) in contrast, do not tend to be­
come unionised because they form the day labour force in the big cities. 
As temporary workers they are non-unionised.
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of the Nokyo staff structure is held exclusively by progressives. The 
distribution of agricultural cooperative leadership roles amongst pro­
gressive Nokyo Diet members is much more even. Although executive 
positions are in a majority, almost half of these in the case of JSP 
and DSP members are local cooperative (tankyö) chairmanships. The small 
proportion of staff members as a whole amongst Nokyo Diet members is a 
reflection of the low rate of representation of this group generally.
This is not a role which is associated with political leadership to any­
thing like the same degree as Nokyo executive positions.
Evidence of the conservative-executive, progressive-staff cleavage 
within Nokyo also appeared in answers to the questionnaire distributed 
to APRA members. Two JSP respondents were the only Nokyo-supported Diet 
members to state specifically that the electoral backing they received 
came from staff groupings. These Diet members were affiliated to 
Zennichinö.^
Logically enough the Nokyo staff members' labour organisation, the 
National Federation of Nokyo Labour Unions (Zenkoku Ndkyö Rödö Kwirlai 
Rengökai, or Zennökyörören), is generally regarded as being progressively- 
aligned, but it is more active in some prefectures than in others.2 Those 
prefectures in which it is weakest include the predominantly agricultural 
prefectures such as Fukushima, Tokushima, Kumamoto and Kagoshima.
Watanabe Yukio, JSP member in the Lower House for Fukushima (2), and 
Zennichinö Prefectural Federation Chairman, reported that he received the 
recommendation of Nokyo staff unions (Nökyö shokuin kunriai) and campaign 
assistance {undo) by agricultural cooperative members and one section of 
the Nokyo management (Nökyö kanbu) - presumably the progressive section; 
and Nosaka Koken, JSP member in the Lower House for Tottori, and a member 
of the Central Executive Committee of Zennichinö, who stated that he receive 
recommendation and campaign assistance from Nokyo staff members (Nökyö 
shokuin).
2 Its predominant concern is staff wage levels and improved working 
conditions in agricultural cooperatives.
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Tanaka argues, however, that in spite of occasional clashes and
differences of political opinion within Nokyo along conservative-
executive, progressive-staff lines, on the question of which candidate(s)
to support in elections, conservative factions usually carry the day:
'(i)n a majority of the electorates in which current Nokyo officials
stand for election, the conservative influence is overwhelmingly strong,
and opposition progressive groups within Nokyo and its federated
organisation hardly become a problem'.'*' More often than not, the final
recommendation of the Nokyo groups involved is based on the decision of
the prefectural Nokyo Chairmen's Association (Ken Nökyö Chökai) and is
taken up by the Prefectural Nokyo Executive and Staff Members League
(Ken Nokyo Yakushokuin Renrrtei) in which the executive section is dominant.
The latter often acts as a spearhead of the agricultural cooperatives
within the prefecture in election activities. The forces of electoral
realism and the entrenched adherence to the principle of support for
government party candidates tends to override requests for back-up for
pa progressively-aligned Nokyo staff candidates.
Op. cit. , p.426.
2 In the 1968 House of Councillors' election in Iwate for example, 
progressive and conservative Nokyo forces confronted each other over the 
question of support for a JSP Nokyo incumbent and former Zenchü staff 
member, Watanabe Sadayoshi. The latter had based his 1962 electoral 
victory on labour-farmer cooperation and was competing in this election 
against the previously defeated LDP candidate who was making a particular 
effort to win farmer-Nokyo votes. As far as the Nokyo federations were 
concerned, their final political support decision was an equivocal one.
The Central Union and the Prefectural Nokyo Economic Federation took a 
neutral position, but the management of the Prefectural Nokyo Trust 
Federation and the Prefectural Nokyo Mutual Aid Federation gave positive 
backing to the conservative candidate, and the general trend amongst 
tankyö chairmen was also in that direction. The Iwate Prefecture 
Executive and Staff League (Yakushokuin Renmei), which had supported the 
JSP Nokyo candidate in the previous election, refrained from any organis­
ational decision on support in the 1968 election. Unfortunately for the 
progressively-aligned Nokyo candidate, the farmers' unions in Iwate did 
not have the numerical strength to compensate for the lack of support t 
from the bulk of Nokyo organisations within the prefecture, and Watanabe s 
second attempt at election was unsuccessful. It was a consensus of opin­
ion amongst the Iwate agricultural cooperatives that he would have won i 
he had not stood on a JSP ticket. Tanaka, Op. oit. , p.469.
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There are two other organisational sub-groupings within Nokyo 
which reputedly tend to be more progressively-oriented. In contrast to 
the Nokyo Women’s Division (Nokyo Fuj'inbu) which is uniformly conser­
vative, the Nokyo Youth Division (Nökyö Seineribu) has on occasions been 
vocal in expressing discontent with LDP agricultural policies and 
advocating a re-evaluation of the predominant government party- 
conservative connection.^" It is not unusual for the Youth Division to
support or put up candidates in opposition to those backed by the main-
2stream Nokyo organisation.
Perhaps the most serious qualification of the political independence 
of the Nokyo Youth Division as a whole, is its financial dependence on 
Nokyo itself. Eighty per cent of the campaign budgets of this branch 
derives from funds given by the mainstream agricultural cooperatives, 
and this prevents any truly independent decisions on which candidate(s) 
to support in elections. Although the Youth Division offers its own 
recommendations and other forms of electoral assistance to candidates 
in elections to all levels of government, in actual fact, the Nokyo 
executive leadership within each prefecture has a measure of veto power 
over these 'independent' farmer political activities. According to 
Tanaka, this contributes in practice to Nokyo Youth Division support for
The most publicised instance of this occurred in 1969 in the after- 
math of the LDP producer rice price increase deferment. The Ishikawa 
Prefecture Nokyo Youth Division threatened to withdraw collectively from 
the LDP in protest against this policy, a move made all the more serious 
by the fact that a full-time Director of the Ishikawa Prefecture Nokyo 
Central Union was running for election at the same time with the endorse­
ment of the LDP.
2 In the 1969 election in Saga Prefecture, the prefectural Youth 
Division made a point of supporting DSP candidate Nakamura Yoshijirö, 
Secretary-General of the Zennösören, because of its desire to assert its 
independence from the mainstream Nokyo organisation and its executives.
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conservative candidates, in spite of regional pockets of support for 
the progressives. On some occasions, too deep an involvement of Youth 
Divisions in elections has produced some internal dissension within the 
movement and resulted in the collapse of the organisation in certain 
prefectures.
As was mentioned earlier, the farmers' political leagues (noseiven)
also have a history of more radical and politically independent electoral
activity. As late as 1969, the Fukushima Prefecture Agricultural Policy
Promotion League (Nösei Sasshin Renmei) expressed the opinion that 'We
are not a sub-contracting organisation of the LDP, so let us recommend
candidates connected with the progressives as well'."*' The political
configurations that emerged amongst the various riöseiven operating
in different prefectures in the 1969 General Election tend to bear out
this view. In that election, Nokyo-based farmers' political leagues
recommended a total of 33 candidates over the whole country. The various
proportions amongst the parties were as follows: LDP - 14, JSP - 11,
2DSP - seven, and one Independent. On these figures, progressively- 
aligned noseiven-recommended candidates outnumbered conservative candi­
dates. The Hokkaido Nomin Dömei did not recommend any LDP candidates at 
all. Of the seven candidates nominated over the whole prefecture, six 
belonged to the JSP and one was a DSP member. Conservative-progressive 
proportions differed from prefecture to prefecture. Miyagi and Nagano 
Prefecture noseiven recommended the same number of government and 
opposition party candidates each, the Fukushima Prefecture group recom­
mended nine LDP candidates (in spite of its rejection of the notion that
1
2
Tanaka, op. cit., pp.474-475. 
Ibid. , p.474.
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its relationship with the LDP was one of a sub-contractural organis­
ation) , the Saga Prefecture Ndsei Kyögikai recommended all four LDP 
candidates after a conscious decision to exclude support for Nakamura 
Yoshijiro because he was standing on a DSP ticket (unlike the Nokyo 
Youth Division within the same prefecture). The farmers’ political 
leagues in Akita, Nagano and Yamagata avoided making recommendations 
for any candidates, but active elements within the leagues gave positive 
backing to progressively-connected candidates.
In the 1969 gubernatorial election in Miyagi Prefecture, the pro­
gressive allegiance of the Nökyö Seiji Renmei produced a major split in 
the Nokyo organisation within the prefecture.^"
Because of a private friendship between the progressive candidate 
jointly backed by the JSP and the JCP, and the Joint Chairman of the 
Prefectural Nokyo Federations within Miyagi who was a].so the Chairman of 
the prefectural nöseiren, there was a call for the Nokyo organisation 
within the prefecture to back the progressive candidate at the combined 
executives meeting (yakuinkai) of the prefectural level federations. The 
prefectural nöseiren organisation was strongly behind its Chairman par­
ticularly in the light of the recent LDP policy on rice production cut­
backs and deferment of producer rice price increases, but it was opposed 
by a group of conservative Nokyo executives who organised their own 
farmers' political league: the prefectural Agriculture, Forestry and
Fishery Indus tries'_General Political League (Alorin Gyogyo Seiji 
Sörenmei, or Noseisoren). The result was a battle between the two Nokyo- 
based political organisations for the support of agricultural cooperative 
chairmen within the prefecture. The latter group's tactics involved a 
general mobilisation of LDP köeyikai organisations, trading associations, 
city, town and village mayors with conservative connections, neighbour­
hood associations, buraku organisations and buraku industrial unions.
The battle virtually split the Nokyo organisation within the prefecture 
into two, with geographic concentrations of political support for one 
faction or the other. The differences between the LDP-connected 
nöseisören and their opponents, the nöseiren, were only resolved after 
the election in which the official Nokyo-backed progressive candidate lost. 
At the time, the three-way alliance amongst Nokyo, the JSP and the JCP was 
regarded as exceptional for any election. Ibid., p.449.
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The Discrete Nature of Agricultural Cooperative Electoral Activity
Although it is true to say that Nokyo in general has to some 
extent become an LDP voting base - the jiban of the conservatives - 
there are many individuals and groups within Nokyo with close connec­
tions to progressive parties, making uniformity of political allegiance 
within the organisation impossible. Even if one grants that Nokyo's 
role in generating support for the LDP is a vital one, because of 
regional particularities, the candidate- rather than party-related 
nature of jiban, and variations in the political affiliations of the 
Nokyo management and membership, Nokyo' s electoral support function is 
highly diverse and varies according to individual cases and circum­
stances. Factors such as the vast scope of the organisation, its 
nationwide spread, and the disparity of function of the groups within 
it, also prevent Nokyo from behaving in a fashion which exhibits singu­
larity of party support or a 'holistic' approach to electoral activity. 
The key attribute of Nokyo's electoral activity is that it is diffuse, 
and that even imputing an electoral strategy to Nokyo as a whole is mis­
leading because it implies that the agricultural cooperative organisation 
becomes involved in support activities in a collective and organised 
fashion. There are in fact no instances in which 'Nokyo as Nokyo' has 
conducted a campaign, or made a recommendation as one body.
Nokyo's sheer immensity can be a political and electoral advantage 
(particularly its incorporation of the entire farm population ) but 
equally so a disadvantage, as was evident from Nokyo's poor record in 
national constituency elections. When internal cleavages in the organ­
isation reinforce and aggravate political differences and rivalries 
amongst its leaders and members, then an official majority decision to 
give electoral backing to a particular candidate may in fact provoke a
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split within certain cooperatives which seriously impairs their electoral 
capacities. These divisions, however, illustrate yet another of Nokyo's 
electoral characteristics: the fact that candidate support is con­
ducted by groups of agricultural cooperatives and their leaders. These 
groups may be organisationally-, regionally- or commodity-linked, or a 
mixture of these elements. Each agricultural cooperative is virtually a 
decisional unit unto itself in political affairs, and each election, to 
whatever level of government, involving the farmers as voters within the 
jurisdiction of a Nokyo organisation, poses the question of participation 
and support,or non-involvement to the agricultural cooperative leadership 
in question.
Gubernatorial and national elections are usually a matter for 
decision centring on prefectural level Nokyo organisations as to what 
electoral procedures, if any, are going to be adopted officially and/or 
unofficially. Prefecturally-based executive bodies such as the combined 
executives meeting (the leaders of all the Nokyo federations within the 
prefecture plus those of the central union — N o k y o  k o k u r o n  yccliU'ifik.CL'i') , 
the Nokyo Chairman's Association, the Executive and Staff Members League, 
play a crucial role in this, deciding the degree of commitment, and who 
is going to receive it. This is quite apart from the personal political 
connections and support activities of these leaders themselves. The 
other organisational offshoots of Nokyo: the farmers' political leagues,
the Youth and Women's Divisions, and the staff labour unions conduct 
their own autonomous decision procedures. The end result may not be 
uniformity of political support by Nokyo organisations within a particu­
lar constituency. Nor is there necessarily a consensus within each of 
these groupings on the question of electoral assistance. Opinion may be 
divided as to which candidate(s) should be recommended, and different
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groups may agree to operate independently of each other, or to conduct 
rival campaigns. In other words, there are no hard and fast rules as 
to which candidates from which party should receive Nokyo support, 
although in Diet elections, the personal political connections of the 
prefectural leadership are a vital factor and usually predominate. 
Generally speaking, decisions on electoral backing are guided by a range 
of considerations: personal, career, party, geographic, constituency,
intra-organisational, commodity-related and philosophical. They are not 
predicated on matters of party ideology. Nokyo is not tied exclusively 
to any particular political party.
Tanaka's description of Nokyo's role in elections as being that of 
'an intermediary linking conservative party Diet members to their rural 
village voting base'^ is acceptable enough as a generalisation which 
describes a majority pattern. The relationship between Nokyo and the 
LDP is a highly interdependent one and mutually advantageous to both 
sides. It is based on a system of reciprocal favours whereby the agri­
cultural cooperatives, in substance if not always in name, in addition 
to their allied organisations, provide various forms of electoral assis­
tance for large numbers of LDP candidates, both actively in campaigns, 
and in influencing a much wider spectrum of voters through vote mobil­
isation procedures and the personal political connections of Nokyo 
leaders. In exchange, Nokyo benefits from the political patronage of 
the government party, which the latter distributes not only to the farmers 
themselves, but also to the agricultural cooperatives as separate and 
independent recipients. This in turn, helps to maintain LDP polling rates 
in the countryside, and the stability of preference for the LDP amongst
1 Ibid. , p .424.
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the farmers reinforces the electoral association between the conser­
vatives and Nokyo. It not only reduces the chances of success of can­
didates aligned with opposing parties, but excludes opposition candidates 
from the sources of power to dispense state benefits. Nokyo's dependence 
on these favours is balanced by LDP dependence on its rural voting base 
and on allied groups to function as substitute electoral organisations. 
But, and this is the main qualification to Tanaka's statement, Nokyo's 
support for conservative candidates is not automatic, and as measured in 
terms of the political alignment of all Nokyo g i i n, or alternatively,
Nöset Kenkyukai members, or the recipients of Noseikyu electoral funds 
in 1971 and 1972, Nokyo is far from being a conservative monolith. It 
is merely an organisation which gives a majority of its support to the 
conservative government party.
Among a host of factors, it is principally the decentralised, 
regionally-oriented, and candidate-specific manner in which the agri­
cultural cooperatives conduct their electoral activities that prevents 
exclusive party attachment and inhibits uniformity of political affili­
ation. The official doctrine of 'political neutrality' of the organis­
ation provides the necessary underpinning for Nokyo's non-ideological 
stance. Nokyo's electoral strategies involve the sum of activities of 
a large number of separate groups, with formal organisational support 
such as recommendation and political funding usually taking place at 
prefectural level and above, and vote mobilisation and campaign activi­
ties centred at prefectural level and below. At no time in their 
history, have the agricultural cooperatives moved as one in a totally 
organised, coherent, unified fashion.
NOKYO AND POLICY ISSUES
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CHAPTER 5
NOKYO AND RICE PRICE POLICY-MAKING
Rice has primacy over all other agricultural products in Japan as a 
political commodity. It is the key to the origins and development of the 
agricultural cooperative organisation. Functions in relation to rice 
collection and distribution dictated the timing and characteristic 
features of Nokyo’s postwar reconstruction, and they have remained the 
substance of Nokyo’s economic dependence on government. Producer rice 
price-setting continues as the primary focus of Nokyo's activities as an 
interest group.
This chapter outlines agricultural cooperative operations within the 
framework of the Food Control (FC) system (Shokuryö Kanvi Seido, or 
Shokkan Seido) , which governed the rice market in Japan from 1942 onw'ards. 
The issue of FC reform and the restructuring of traditional agricultural 
policy priorities away from rice production in the late 1960s has been 
selected for detailed historical examination as a policy case study. 
Discussion centres around a series of crucial policy decisions that were 
made by government between 1967 and 1970. The element of commonality in 
these decisions was their unacceptability to the agricultural cooperatives 
and the opposition amongst the farmers which they aroused. During this 
period of unsurpassed turmoil in Japanese agricultural policy-making, the 
traditional combatants in the rice price process exaggerated their policy 
differences and political standpoints and engaged in an unprecedented 
degree of political disputation. For this reason, examination of the 
period highlights the entrenched policy interests, established bargaining
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strategies, and relative influence of the principal participants in 
Japan’s politics of rice. Throughout, the political hand of Nokyo and its 
Parliamentary allies is a traceable influence in the routinised stages 
of decision-making on the producer rice price. This emerges as a highly 
institutionalised procedure which has changed remarkably little over the 
past three decades, either in terms of its participants or its outcome.
Rice and the Origins of Food Control
Rice since 1942 has been governed by the provisions of the Food 
Control Law (Shokuryo Kanri-ho, or Shokkariho) . Severe wartime food short­
ages forced the Japanese Government to institute a system of administrative 
direction and control over the production and delivery of this vital 
commodity. Details regarding the quantity, location and methods of pro­
duction were closely monitored and dictated by government through the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. All farmers were legally required 
to sell their rice to government-designated purchasing agents. The 
nationwide network of agricultural ’control’ organisations, the ridgyokai, 
were given the designated role as government rice collectors. Rice was 
sold on a rationed basis to consumers.
The price of rice paid to the producer and by the consumer was thus 
removed from the influence of free market forces and placed within the 
orbit of ministerial control. The costs of the system were borne by a 
Food Control Special Account (FCSA) incorporated into the national 
budget.
Although aspects of FC relating to consumer rationing were completely 
liberalised in the postwar period, the Japanese government retained its 
almost complete monopoly over rice collection and distribution. Minis­
terial intervention in the price-setting process remained the most
entrenched feature of the system.
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Nokyo and Postwar Food Control
The substance of the FC system established during the war was
retained by the Occupation authorities. The acute food shortage in the
immediate postwar period created a need for controlled rice deliveries and
1a fair distribution of rice to consumers. The agricultural cooperatives 
were allocated the role of the wartime agricultural associations as proxy 
agents of government in rice collection and storage. The need for farm 
organisations to accomplish this task was the primary objective behind 
the push by the Occupation Government for the speedy rehabilitation of 
the producer cooperative system. Although the 'control' features of the 
nögyökai were absent in the newly established nökyö, those aspects of 
the agricultural associations well suited to the performance of admini­
stratively-determined tasks under FC were retained by the agricultural 
cooperatives. These included a convenient nationwide network of 
facilities for rice collection and handling, and the incorporation of 
practically all farming families within the cooperatives.
Nokyo's integration into the postwar FC system and its functions in 
relation to rice established an early focus for its interest group 
activity. As a decision governed by ministerial responsibility, the pro­
ducer rice price became a political as well as an economic issue affect­
ing the vast majority of farmers and cooperative union members. In the 
new climate of democracy established by the Occupation, rice quickly 
became subject to pressure from farm organisations on all sides, and the 
star item in an agricultural policy process in which Nokyo shared and 
increasingly came to dominate. The agricultural cooperatives were placed
1 This involved delivery quotas for farmers and rationing for consumers.
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in a crucial intermediary role between the nation's producers of rice and 
its monopoly buyer - the State.
The Rice Price Advisory Council (RPAC)
Possibilities for the public presentation of producer rice price 
demands to government were considerably enhanced in 1949 with the estab­
lishment of the Rice Price Advisory Council (Beika Shingikai) as an 
inquiry organ (shimon kikan) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 
Provisions for hearing the opinions of those groups most materially 
affected by government rice price decisions were made through the con­
stitution of the membership of the Council (there were seven producer 
representatives and seven consumer representatives). The informed advice 
of experts was also invited through the membership of nine 'men of learn­
ing and experience' (gakushiki keikensha) , in addition to a miscellaneous 
category of 'other' members which included politicians from the conser­
vative and Socialist parties.
The task of the RPAC was to receive and discuss a government-proposed 
producer rice price presented to it by the Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry and to produce a final report containing recommendations on the 
government draft.
The position of the RPAC was therefore established very early on as 
a formal administrative channel for the presentation of producer opinions 
to government through Nokyo's representation on the Council. It has 
remained an integral part of a lively but institutionalised rice price­
setting process ever since. Its opening sessions in June each year are 
the starting signal for the 'rice price season' and the launching of 
Nokyo’s 'rice price campaign' (beika undo). Producer rice price demands 
put forward by Zenclzu executives at Council sessions are supplemented by 
more unruly demonstrations of pressure by Nokyo rank and file outside the 
Council's meeting chambers.
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Food Control Reform Before 1967
Prior to the most substantial period of FC reform beginning in 1967, 
the history of FC was punctuated by a number of attempts to de-control 
the system, but opposition to these political moves led by the agri­
cultural cooperatives successfully prevented any substantial reform.
In 1955 the most important element of compulsion in the FC system was 
removed with the abolition of quota deliveries on rice. It was replaced 
by an advance sales contract system whereby producers voluntarily con­
tracted with the cooperatives'*" as government-designated collection agents 
how much rice they wished to sell to the government. The latter in turn 
was obliged to buy whatever quantity was offered by the farmers. The 
differences in the two systems are illustrated in Figure 5.1 below:
Figure 5.1
CHANGES INSTITUTED IN THE RICE TRADING SYSTEM IN 1955 
Quota System Before 1955
Obligatory Selling Order
S I
Producer -*-»•-»--»--»■ -»--»-Government -»-Wholesaler
Advance Sales Contract System After 1955 
Advance Sales Booking 
Ordered amount for sale
I I i
Producer -»--»--»--»--»- -»--»-Government ->-»--»-->--»- -»--»-Wholesaler 
Delivery Delivery
Source: Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, Japan Agricultural
Coop News, Vol. 13, No.3, October 1972, Appendix A, p.22.
1 These made up the vast majority of official rice collection agencies.
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The replacement of the compulsory quota system by the voluntary pre­
contract system was a watered-down version of more radical reforms 
envisaged by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in the Hatoyama 
Government of 1953, Kono Ichiro. He publicised plans to remove 
controls on rice altogether, and received considerable support for his 
policy from the financial world and in the press commentaries. Nokyo 
launched a vigorous counter-attack, however, and Kono realised that it 
was too premature to contemplate abolishing FC. He enforced the pre- 
contractual system as a preliminary step in the direction of more sub­
stantial reform.
The changeover to the advanced sales contract system in 1955 and 
the more radical initiatives which it replaced, were interpreted by Nokyo 
as the forerunners of FC abolition, and the episode contributed to a 
perceptible change in Nokyo*s attitude towards rice control. The reforms 
instituted in 1955 converted the main emphasis and objective of FC alto­
gether. Until 1955, the system had been detested by the farmers because 
of its imposition of a compulsory delivery quota system, but when this 
element of coercion was removed, it became clear that the remaining pro­
visions in fact amounted to a price support system for rice producers.
This viewpoint was in no small part due to the substantial boosts in 
producer prices received by rice growers in the early 'fifties - to the 
point where the government's buying price compared favourably with black 
market prices.
The timing of the removal of the most coercive clauses in the Food 
Control Law and Kono's shelving of his plans for more substantive reforms 
were also based on party and electoral considerations. In 1955, 
the LDP as a newly united political organisation, was keenly attuned to 
its electoral fortunes, and rural areas had already been established as
a stronghold of support for the conservatives.
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As Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in 1961, Kono made a second 
attempt to reform the FC system. The ’Kono Plan' envisaged 'flexible' 
reforms of the management of FC while maintaining the basis of the system/ 
Battle lines were drawn up between the supporters of reform (the financial 
world (zaikai), the Housewives' Federation and rice retailers), and those 
who opposed it (the DSP, JSP, the Liaison Council for a National Policy on 
Food (a /öAi/ö-based consumers' group), and Nokyo). The agricultural 
cooperatives launched a nationwide campaign to prevent the Kono Plan from 
being put into effect. Kono also found himself opposed by a substantial 
section of his own party, which argued that the plan was premature, par­
ticularly in the light of the Upper House election due in mid-1962. This 
viewpoint ultimately gained acceptance in the LDP and the Plan was subse­
quently shelved.
During the 1960s, a fundamental reorientation in the objectives of 
FC magnified the political component in the producer rice price decision. 
During the 1950s, the aim of the system was to increase the supply of food 
dramatically and to maximise rice production. Regular annual increases in 
the producer rice price particularly from 1949 onwards, in addition to 
sizable over-the-quota bonus payments, had the desired effect of raising 
production levels. Rice output also responded to the dissemination of 
improved production techniques and massive injections of government funds 
in the form of production subsidies for projects such as land reclamation
Asahi Nenkan. 1962, p.393. In detail, the plan involved no change in 
the basis of the system: that is, the government would continue to buy
unlimited quantities of rice from the farmers and the distribution system 
to consumers would be maintained; but it also canvassed the idea of 
opening up new ways for the farmers to sell rice freely. In other words, 
what had hitherto been 'black market' rice, would be formally channelled 
into a free distribution system. See i-b'id.
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and improved drainage systems. The long-term effects of land reform 
also began to materialise in the increased productivity of rice farmers.
This process culminated in a record breaking harvest of 12.3 million 
tonnes of rice in 1955.
As a result, the rate of increase in the producer rice price between 
1955 and 1960 was only marginal.^ The principal aim of the FC system - to 
secure a balance in the demand and supply of rice - had been achieved by 
1955. This made use of the mechanism of price incentives to guarantee 
increased production levels no longer so vital.
The general economic situation changed dramatically in the latter 
part of the 1950s and 1960s, however, with the rapid boost in the incomes 
of urban wage earners as Japan underwent accelerated industrial growth. 
Japanese farm incomes, constrained by the limits of a small-holding 
system of agriculture, began to lag considerably behind those in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors. Farmers simply could not achieve pro­
ductivity increases at a rate which matched those in industry and there­
fore they were unable to compete with the rising wage levels of urban 
workers. From 1960 onwards, one of the most fundamental problems facing 
the LDP government was how to increase farm incomes.
As a result, political pressures from the rural sector began to 
mount. First indications of this were demands from producer representatives 
in the RPAC to achieve a changeover from the 'parity method' for calculating 
the producer rice price (which took into account general price movements) 
to a 'Production Cost and Income Compensation formula' which compensated 
farmers for increases in the wages of urban workers.
Between 1949 and 1955, the producer rice price for 150 kilos (koku) 
rose by more than 100 per cent from 4,717 yen to 10,160 yen. Between 1955 
and I960 on the other hand, it rose by only 2.4 per cent to 10,405 yen.
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In addition to instituting the new producer rice price formula in 
1960, the principle of income equality was enshrined in the Agricultural 
Basic Law passed in 1961. This Law established a number of common 
reference points for all agricultural policies, one of which was to 
narrow the gap between agriculture and other industries 'through . . . 
higher incomes for those engaged in agriculture so that they may expect 
to achieve parity in living standards with those engaged in other 
industries'."^ It also envisaged 'the selective expansion of agri­
cultural production by increased production of commodities in growing 
2demand' and its reverse directive: 'the diversion of production from
3products in decreasing demand'. These provisions did not mention rice 
specifically, but clearly they anticipated some measure of crop diversi­
fication and a reorientation of agricultural production away from a 
singular emphasis on raising rice production levels.
While simultaneously pursuing the long-term objective of crop 
diversification, the government fell back on the convenient mechanism 
of the producer rice price as a means of providing across-the-board 
increases in income to the largest group of Japanese agricultural pro­
ducers . The result was that the producer rice price increased at an 
average of just under nine per cent a year between 1960 and 1968, rising 
from 10,405 yen per koku to 20,672 yen. This was practically a 100 per 
cent rise in less than a decade. The effect of this price support-cum-
_'Nögyö Kihonhö' (Agricultural Basic Law) in Nbrinshö Kanshu, Ndgyd 
Roppo (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Editorial Supervision, A 
Compendium of Agricultural Laws), Tokyo, Gakuyö Shobö, 1976, p.3.
2 Ibid.
3
Ibid.
297
farm incomes policy was to encourage rice production and hinder the re­
structuring of Japanese agriculture. Although gradual diversification 
into other crops did reduce the share of rice in Japan’s total agricul­
tural output, rice production increased steadily. At the same time, the 
consumer demand for rice began to decline from 1962 onwards. By 1967, 
rice consumption was nearly two million tonnes less than production.
The problems of rice and FC reached a climax in that year when the 
staggering costs of the government's rice policies received a sudden 
boost in publicity by a rice harvest of 14.45 million tonnes - the larg­
est in the nation's history.
The Situation in 1967
The massive financial burden created by the policies pursued under 
FC stemmed from a complex of interrelated causes. With the large increase 
in rice production, the absolute amount paid out by the government through 
the FCSA grew in leaps and bounds. (The annual average increase in FCSA 
expenditure between 1960 and 1967 was 41 per cent."'") This was aggravated 
by the fact that greatly increased prices were being paid by government 
for larger quantities of rice. Furthermore, the expansion in the total 
rice output coincided with a decline in consumption to create a rice sur­
plus problem which presented the government with an enormous bill in rice 
storage fees and warehouse charges in addition to the large sums it was 
required to outlay in payment for the rice bought from the farmers.
Even as early as 1961, the deficit or 'red figures’ (akaji) in the 
FCSA was a topic of discussion. Between 1960 and 1961, the FCSA deficit 
doubled from 30 billion to 60 billion yen. See Asahi Nenkan, 1962, p.393. 
The size of this deficit and the rate of its increase was the fundamental 
reason behind Kono Ichiro's plan for FC reform announced just after the 
producer rice price decision in 1961.
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Over the period 1967 to 1970, the rice production surplus and 
deficit situation, far from improving, deteriorated as a result of 
further record harvests in 1968 and 1969 (each was over 14 million 
tonnes). In 1968, Japan was faced with a rice surplus problem of 
almost three million tonnes. By 1969, this quantity had almost 
doubled again to 5.5 million tonnes. As a result, the amount trans­
ferred from the General Account budget to the FCSA^ increased from 
246.7 billion yen^ in 1967 to 356.0 billion yen in 1969. The latter 
figure raised the FCSA allocation to just over 43 per cent of the MAF 
budget and 5 per cent of the national budget. These figures are all 
the more striking if compared to the situation in 1955, when the FCSA 
represented only 0.3 per cent of the MAF budget, and a correspondingly 
smaller fraction of the national budget. As a proportion of the total 
outlay by government to agriculture, the rise in the FC allocation was 
spectacular for a period of only 10 years, with the most outstanding 
causal factor being the sizable yearly increases in the producer rice 
price.
These more urgent features of the financial and economic environ­
ment formed the background to the policy debate on FC and its reform 
that took place from 1968 onwards.
The Food Control Special Account comprises three Sub-Accounts: the
Indigenous Rice Control Sub-Account which consumes more than 90 per cent 
of FCSA expenditure; the Indigenous Wheat and Barley Control Sub-Account; 
and the Imported Food Grain Control Sub-Account which (depending on world 
grain prices), usually records a profit. In other words, the expenses 
associated with FC are devoted almost, but not entirely, to rice control.
2
Asahi Nenkan, 1968, pp.360-361. Budgetary figures vary somewhat 
according to source. In Food Agency figures supplied directly to the 
author, the FCSA allocation was listed at 241.5 billion yen in 1968 and 
353.0 billion yen in 1969.
3 Asahi Nenkan, 1971, pp.342-343.
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Participants and Vested Interests in Rice Price Decision-Making 
(a) Japanese Rice Producers
In spite of the 'selective expansion' principle postulated in the 
Agricultural Basic Law of 1961, 3.5 million or 66 per cent of Japanese 
farm households still sold rice to the government in 1968.^ Although 
some areas in Northern Japan such as Tohoku and Hokuriku were classed as 
'single crop areas' (tansaku chitai) - meaning concentrated rice pro­
ducing areas - rice as a crop was geographically well distributed over 
the entire country.
(b) The Agriculture and Forestry Bureaucracy
The Minister of Agriculture and Forestry has formal responsibility 
for deciding the producer rice price. The MAF as a whole has tradition­
ally been protective of its agricultural clientele and can point to the 
fact that farmers in almost all industrial countries enjoy some measure 
of protection and price support from the State. Part of the reasoning 
behind the MAF's advocacy of sizable allocations of treasury funds for 
agriculture has been its desire to maximise its share of the national 
budget. In spite of the declining contribution of agriculture to the
Net National Product (it was 10.2 per cent in 1960, 8.2 per cent in 1965
/
3and 4.7 per cent in 1971), the MAF successfully defended its share of
In 1968,the total number of farm households was 5.3 million. These 
figures were obtained from Norinsho, Tokei Chosabu, Poketto Borin Suisan 
Tokei (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Statistics and Research Divisioi 
Pocket Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Statistics), 1971, Norin Tokei 
Kyokai, p.154. As a proportion of gross agricultural revenue of the farm 
household, rice accounted for 49.1 per cent in 1960 and 43 per cent in 
1965. Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, Central Union of Agri­
cultural Cooperatives, 1973, p.17.
2 This assessment of the most fundamental principle of ministerial bud­
get behaviour is so widely accepted as to be almost a truism. See John 
Creighton Campbell, 'Japanese Budget Baransu', in Ezra F. Vogel (ed.),
Modem Japanese Organization and Decision-Making, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1975, p.78.
Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, op . cit,, p.16.3
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the national budget allocation to agriculture and even increased it 
during the 1960s (it rose from 7.9 per cent of the national budget in 
1960, to 9.2 per cent in 1965, and 10.4 per cent in 1971).
From 1961 onwards, the MAF position on producer rice price increases
2was to argue for 'moderate* gains for the farmers. Its guiding principle 
(legally buttressed in the Agricultural Basic Law), was its objective to 
maintain farm incomes at a level commensurate with workers in the cities. 
The ’Production Cost and Income Compensation’ formula for deciding the 
producer rice price introduced in 1960, translated the general precepts 
of a farm incomes policy into more concrete guidelines for determining 
the MAF's 'preliminary calculated' rice price (shisan kakaku).
Although the MAF successfully set up the original framework of an 
agricultural incomes policy, as the political content of the producer 
rice price expanded in the 1960s, the Ministry was gradually dispossessed 
of its primary influence in producer rice price-setting by the LDP's rural 
politicians. The shifting balance of power between the party and the 
Ministry was accelerated in the second half of the decade by the increas­
ingly apparent failure of the Agricultural Basic Law to fulfil its policy 
objectives. This revealed the ineffectiveness of MAF solutions to the 
problems of agriculture. As a result, energy for truly reformist policy 
proposals emanating from the agriculture and forestry bureaucracy 
diminished, and the MAF program for the rationalisation of agriculture 
lost impetus. Ministerial initiatives for reform of the FC system shifted 
to the financial agencies of government.
1 Ibid.
2 The meaning of the word moderate' as it is used here is relative, 
and based on the almost invariable ranking of MAF producer rice price 
recommendations between the lower MOF recommendation, the higher govern­
ment party proposal, and the even higher Nokyo 'demand' price.
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The Food Agency (Shokuryooho) which administers the Food Control 
Law is a subordinate Agency within the MAF. It supplies the raw data on 
prices and costs for the government producer rice price proposal and for 
the Rice Price Advisory Council, which is attached to the Agency.
Abolition of the FC Law would practically consign the Food Agency to a 
position of redundancy, hence it has not been a leader in pioneering 
changes in the system.
(c) The Liberal Democratic Party
Because of the importance of rice to a majority of Japanese farmers, 
and the electoral over-representation of rural interests in general, a 
very large number of conservative party politicians regard themselves as 
representing the interests of rice producers. The more vocal and active 
members of this group are called rice Diet members (kome giin). Focussing 
on rice enables LDP politicians to promote the special interests of the 
largest bloc of their voting supporters. The great interest the LDP shows 
in the producer rice price decision is also due to the widely held belief 
that pricing policy has a direct influence on vote-gathering, and to the 
primacy of rice interests within Nokyo, an organisation with which a sub­
stantial number of government party members are connected.
Given the political importance of rice under a government-administered 
system of FC and the electoral significance of the farm vote to the LDP 
from 1955 onwards, no rice price decision has been allowed to go unques­
tioned by the party. Not only did LDP members have a direct and public 
voice in RPAC sessions, but official and unofficial party organs actively 
involved themselves in rice price decision-making every year. This 
pattern became even more entrenched during the 1960s. Growing monopolis­
ation by conservative party rural members over producer rice price deter­
mination was symptomatic of the increasing politicisation of the decision.
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The greater its political consequences, the greater the political inter­
ference in what officially should have been a government decision on an 
'administrative price' subject to consultation and negotiation amongst 
three Ministers: the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, the Minister
of Finance and the Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency.
This was also reflected in RPAC sessions which became more disrupted as 
dissension between the supporters and critics of FC grew. This develop­
ment reached a climax in 1967 and 1968 when opinions within the Council 
were so divided that it could not produce any recommendations at all.
In the 1967 House of Representatives' elections, voting support for 
the LDP fell to its hitherto lowest level. The decline, however, was 
much more evident in metropolitan and urban districts than in semi-rural 
and rural electorates. In consequence, the balance between rural and 
urban interests within the party became even more biased in favour of 
country districts.
One hundred and forty three LDP Diet candidates"*" were elected to
rural and semi-rural seats in 1967. This number roughly corresponded to
the size of the informal intra-party lobby group of rice Diet members,
2which reportedly had around 150 members. The effectiveness but unortho­
dox tactics of this group during the 1960s earned it the label of 'rice 
Vietcong'. More formal titles such as the Rice Price Policy Conference 
(Beika Taisaku Kydgikai) have also been used.
This figure was calculated from election data reported in Asahi Nenkan, 
1969, pp.266-270, in combination with a constituency classification formu­
lated by Okino Yasuharu, Shöwa 30 Nendai ni okeru Toshika, Kögyöka to Tokyo 
Ködö Henka (Urbanisation, Industrialisation and Changes in Electoral 
Behaviour, 1955-65), Tokyo, Minshushugi Kenkyükai, 1966, pp.18-19.
2 Michael W. Donnelly, 'Setting the Price of Rice: A Study in Political
Decisionmaking’, in T.J. Pempel (ed.), Policymaking in Contemporary Japan, 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1977, p.165.
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An official party committee also conducts producer rice price 
deliberations. It holds sessions simultaneously but quite separately 
from the informal party pressure group. The key negotiations and investi­
gations leading to the party rice price decision are conducted by a sub­
committee of this group, and particularly its leaders (chairman and vice- 
chairmen) . There is considerable membership overlap between the formal 
and informal rice price groups. The official LDP committee currently in 
charge of producer rice price deliberations is the Comprehensive Agri­
cultural Policy Investigation Committee (Sögö Bösei Chösakai) with approxi­
mately 200 members. During the 1960s, the same role was performed by 
smaller committees set up each year with between 50 and 60 members, and 
variously known as the Rice Price Round Table Conference (Beika Kondankai), o 
the Rice Price Investigation Committee (Beika Chösakai) . The power of 
numbers and the significance of the rural vote are such, however, that no 
final party decision on the producer rice price can be made without being 
submitted for the endorsement of the informal group of LDP rice Diet 
members. According to one writer, this group has ’a veto power over the 
decisions made by the formal Party structures and leaders’.^  Most of its 
membership comes from the Sogö Bösei Chösakai but with one difference: 
the top men in the Sogö Bösei Chösakai are not members. They are in fact 
the object of pressure from the internal party lobby of rice politicians.
LDP groups enter rice price negotiations at about the same stage each 
year. Once the RPAC has made its recommendation to the Minister, the 
locus of decision-making shifts immediately to the government party: to
the party policy committee concerned with the rice price; to the Executive
 ^ Michael W. Donnelly, Politics and Economic Constraints in Japan’s 
Rice Price Policies3 Monograph, n.d. p.73.
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Council which determines the final party position; and to conferences 
of LDP leaders and the government, represented by the Minister of Agri­
culture and Forestry and the Minister of Finance. This process usually 
takes two to three days leading up to a Cabinet decision. (In the period 
under discussion below, it often took two to three weeks or even longer.)
The Minister of Agriculture and Forestry although charged with for­
mal responsibility for the producer rice price decision, remains publicly 
silent during this crucial round of party negotiations and party- 
government discussions. Even if the MAF recommendation proposes an 
increase, the Minister's passive role in these final stages is one of 
deliberate intent in order that the input into the decision by the 
farmers' allies in the party be fully magnified. The political merit 
that accrues to the party each year over the producer rice price takes 
the form of a 'political addition' (seiji kasan) which represents the 
difference between the MAF recommended price and the final rice price 
decision that emerges after negotiations between the government and the 
LDP. Table 5.1 illustrates this for the years 1961-1968, which encompasses 
the period of the greatest gains in the producer rice price by the farmers.
In spite of annual criticisms in the press of the LDP's injection of 
a blatant political element into the pricing process, the same procedure 
is repeated year after year. Deliberate political engineering by the 
LDP's agricultural leaders for the benefit of their farming constituents 
becomes even more apparent if one is to accept the information of one 
participant,^ who remarked that the upper limit of the LDP's producer rice 
price is already set before the rice price season gets underway. This is
This information was given to the writer by a key LDP official inter­
viewed in Tokyo, January 1977, who wishes to remain unnamed.
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done by a select group of party agricultural leaders, namely the leaders 
of the Sögö Nösei Chösakai, after extensive consultations with the 
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and the MAF, prior to the Minister's 
announcement of the MAF 'preliminary calculated' rice price. In other 
words, the lower-level MAF recommended producer rice price, and the upper- 
level LDP producer rice price incorporating the 'political addition', are 
interrelated aspects of the same decision, and are fixed by key LDP 
agricultural leaders before the rice price battle. Furthermore, there is 
a strong political element in the MAF recommended price. It is made 
intentionally below what the party is actually prepared to countenance, 
in order that full credit falls on the LDP's rural politicians for 
'persuading' the party leadership to offer a higher price. Although in 
the timing of producer rice price deliberations, the submission of the 
MAF recommended price to the RPAC is made well before the announcement of 
the final decision, it is nevertheless made 'relative' to the former which 
actually precedes it in secret. Consequently the final bargaining 'process' 
between the LDP leadership and its rural members has a large component of 
political drama. The informal rice lobby has no voice in the early 
crucial discussions which establish the upper limit of the party offer.
For this reason, its role has been described as a necessary but ritual­
istic one, and exercising very little actual power over the producer rice 
price decision."*' More often than not, their activities in outflanking the 
LDP leadership are an embarrassment to the party.
In spite of Lhe obvious contribution of political and electoral con­
siderations to the rice price process, the producer rice price
1 Ibid.
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has never satisfied the demands of the farmers as presented by Nokyo and 
the farmers’ unions.
(d) The Agricultural Cooperatives
The focus of Nokyo’s economic and political power since 1947 has 
been rice. Its financial and economic stake in the FC system is immense. 
Under FC Law, the agricultural cooperatives have an officially-sanctioned 
share of the market that runs as high as 94 per cent.^ A practical 
monopoly of rice collection on behalf of government, channels the marketing 
commission on rice sales into the Nokyo organisation. The position of the 
cooperatives in the rice distribution system is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2
THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FOR GOVERNMENT SALE RICE
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Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1970, p.362.
Koichi Nishimoto, 'Nokyo: Pressure from the Co-ops', The Japan
Interpreter, trans. by V. Dixon Morris, Vol. 7, 3-4, Sum-Aut 1972, p.324.
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FC has also brought the cooperatives sizable commissions in the form
of handling, packing^ and storage fees and has continued to provide
financial backbone to Nokyo economic operations in general. One writer
estimated that Nokyo earned 'most of its operating expenses directly or
2indirectly from the special food control account'. The profits generated 
by cooperative functions in the FC system often made up for badly 
managed activities in other fields which ran at a loss.
A further indirect benefit of the system has been government utilis­
ation of the financial network of the cooperatives for rice payment to the 
3farmers, thereby channelling the principal item in co-op members' income 
through Nokyo savings' accounts. The Central Cooperative Bank for 
Agriculture and Forestry (Chukin), acting as receipt agent of government, 
repays to farmers through the prefectural trust associations and unit 
co-ops. This gives the Nokyo financial apparatus the use of substantial 
funds from a guaranteed source of supply thus strengthening the coopera­
tive banking and credit institutions, materially assisting capital invest-
4ment in agriculture, facilitating payment to cooperative purchasing and 
insurance branches by farmers, and supplying Nokyo with funds for use in 
other business and financial fields.
According to figures available in ibid. , as a service fee for 
collecting and packing the rice, Nokyo received 112 yen per 60 kilogram 
sack (year not specified) .
2 Nishimoto pul this at 1,300 billion yen for one year, although which 
year is not stated. Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 The Central Cooperative Bank for example, makes use of the surplus 
of cooperative funds at harvest time by supplying the general financial 
market with funds by means of call loans and short-term loans to commer­
cial banks.
309
Some indication of the significance of Nokyo's rice-related functions 
within the FC system in the total pattern of its economic operations can 
be gained from the following figures. In 1969, the cooperatives as rice 
collection agents, earned 13.3 billion yen from marketing commission on 
rice for government sale. Total marketing commission profits for that 
year were 34.7 billion yen 2  Rice thus represented 38.3 per cent of total 
marketing commission on all products. The figures for cooperative ware­
housing business are equally impressive. In 1969, 5,485 co-ops operated
29,449 government-designated warehouses holding 11.1 million tonnes of 
2rice. The profit in storage fees which the cooperatives earned from
3warehousing this rice for government sale was 17.9 billion yen, or almost 
exactly half of their total marketing commission for the year. On these 
figures, warehousing business generated profits which exceeded those on 
government rice marketing, which gave the cooperatives a vested interest 
in storing rice. Because rice stock accumulation was a profitable 
business for Nokyo, there were obvious economic benefits to be gained from 
a rice surplus situation. This is substantiated by trends in figures 
corresponding to the vast increases in production that occurred between 
1965 and 1970. Total profit of the agricultural cooperatives on their 
warehousing business in rice rose from 8.4 billion yen in 1966, to 22.4 
billion yen in 1970.^ (Likewise, as a result of government-instituted
These figures were obtained from Norinsho, Worin Keizai Kyoku, Nogyo 
Kyodo Kumiaika, Sögö tiökyö Tökeihyö (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
Agriculture and Forestry Economics Bureau, Agricultural Cooperative Union 
Section, A Statistical Table of General-Purpose Agricultural Cooperatives), 
1971, pp.122, 138.
2 Calculated from figures given in ibid., pp.144, 147.
q This figure represents 88 per cent of the total warehousing profits 
on rice for that year, or that percentage of rice held in government- 
designated warehouses. It is calculated from figures given in ibid., 
pp.143-147 .
 ^ Ibid. , p.143 .
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policies of rice production adjustment from 1970 onwards, cooperative 
profits from rice-related warehousing business fell back to 15.8 
billion yen by 1974,^ a loss of 6.6 billion yen.)
It is not possible to measure in concrete monetary terms the 
economic benefits Nokyo derives from government utilisation of the 
cooperative banking system for rice payments, but on figures for 
marketing commission and rice warehousing alone, one can calculate 
the financial stake which the cooperatives had in rice for government 
sale. This is shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2
PROFITS ON MARKETING AND WAREHOUSING GOVERNMENT SALE RICE IN 1969
Type of Profit Profit(yen)
Marketing Commission on Rice for Government sale 13.3 billion .
Profits from Warehousing " " " " 17.9 billion
Total 31.2 billion
Source: Norinsho, Norin Keizai Kyoku, Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaika,
Sogo Nokyo Tokei,hyo (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
Agriculture and Forestry Economics Bureau, Agricultural 
Cooperative Union Section, A Statistical Table of General- 
Purpose Agricultural Cooperatives), 1971, pp.122, 143-147.
The 31.2 billion yen profit earned on two items in relation to 
government sale rice represented almost as much as the total profit on 
cooperative marketing for 1969. (This was 34.7 billion yen.) It also
1 Sogo Nokyo Tokeihyd , 1974, p.158.
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represented 10.8 per cent of the total profit on all cooperative 
business which was 288.9 for the same year.^
Given these facts and figures on Nokyo's financial stake in rice 
control, and the long-standing nature of its functions in the system, 
it is not surprising that it regarded the maintenance of FC as central 
to its very existence, and in fact as an economic prerogative.
The priority given by Nokyo to rice issues is also revealed in the 
tremendous emphasis on rice-related campaigns in its agricultural policy 
activities. The producer rice price campaign (beika undo) has been the 
traditional focus of Nokyo's pressure .group activities. It attracts 
more publicity than any other Nokyo activity through the exercise of mass 
mobilisation techniques such as conventions, assemblies, petitions, 
marches, newspaper advertisements, and general 'human wave tactics', all 
under the aegis of Zenohü. In the period under review, the average Nokyo 
representatives' convention (ta'Lka.'i) mustered about 14,000 participants.
In its 'demand rice price' {yökyü bei-ka) calculations, Zenohü 
duplicates the process being undertaken in the MAF and the Food 
Agency regarding the formulation of government recommended price. Where 
these twin processes have traditionally tended to differ, however, has 
not been in the mechanics of applying'objective' statistical formulae to 
a set of indices to produce a final rice price, but in the manipulation 
of the economic variables fed into the calculation, and in the actual 
selection of which particular formula to apply. Depending on these latter 
two subjective factors, the outcome in the form of a 'recommended' or 
'demand' rice price differs greatly.
1 Sogo Nokyo Tdkeihyo, 1971, op. cit., p.60.
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In the battle over 'objective’ measurement of such variables as 
'costs' and 'incomes', Zenchii draws on the professional expertise of its 
permanent executive staff backed up by its Agricultural Policy Depart­
ment (Nöseibu), which conducts parallel surveys to those of the MAF on 
such items as production costs - the most frequently challenged factor 
input into the government's recommendation. It then produces its own 
price, which Zenchii formally presents to the RPAC.
Although the technicalities are left to Nöseibu staff, the political 
decisions that produce the agricultural cooperative 'demand' price are 
made by the Nokyo Rice Policy Central Headquarters {Nökyö Beikoku Taisaku 
Chüö Honbu) after extensive consultation and canvassing of national and 
prefectural central union and federation leaders, and the executives of 
prefectural Rice Policy Headquarters. The Central Headquarters leads the 
rice price campaign sponsored by Zenchii, and its membership is dominated 
by National Central Union executives and the chairman of other national 
federations which are directly involved in rice handling such as Zennö.
A good deal of the policy emphasis on rice within the Nokyo organisation 
is due to the fact that it is marketed nationally by Zennö to government. 
This places it as a high priority item within the national Nokyo market­
ing and purchasing federation. Logically enough, Zennö's policy priorities 
become reflected in those of Zenchii.
Official representations to government agencies, the RPAC, Parlia­
mentary committees, LDP and other party committees conducting their own 
investigations into rice price policy are usually handled by Zenchii 
permanent executives (its Managing Directors), but Zennö is also 
represented on the RPAC. Zenchii's approach in the campaign is multi- 
focussed. It ignores no section of government, the Diet, or political 
parties which is connected in any way to the issue.
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(e) The Opposition Parties: JSP, DSP, Komeito and JCP
Although the opposition parties are identified much more firmly 
with the urban worker and consumer sectors, they tend to ignore the 
fundamental contradiction inherent in seeking to satisfy both high 
price producer advocates and low price consumer interests by simul­
taneously demanding price levels that would satisfy both. The 'reverse 
margin' between the government's buying and selling price for rice they 
would finance by even larger allocations from the FCSA. Without the 
pressing need to balance budgets, they are in a position to outflank the 
LDP on such issues as price support. Opposition spokesmen, especially 
those within the JSP and DSP to which the agricultural cooperatives are 
linked both organisationally and electorally, are employed to act as 
critics of government policy in order to embarrass the LDP politically.
The 1960s saw increasing activity by the JSP and JCP in the form of 
questions in the Diet on rice price policies. Until 1968, JSP members 
also served directly on the RPAC, and as the 'alternative' party in 
rural areas (in the 1967 Lower House elections, it won 75 seats, or half 
the LDP quota in rural and semi-rural constituencies)"'", its object has 
been to increase its support amongst the farmers.
(f) Other Farmers' Organisations
Allied to the JSP and DSP are the farmers' union organisations 
Zennxchzno and Zenno which marshall their own followers in Tokyo for rice 
price demand conventions. Zey^ nichino is represented on the RPAC. Both 
the JSP and JCP in the 1960s tried to exert increasing power on the demand 
activities of Zennichzno at the RPAC conference table. The rice price
"'" This figure was obtained from election data reported in Asahz 
Nenkan, 1969, op. oit., pp.266-270, in combination with a constituency 
classification formulated by Okino, op. cit. 3. pp.18-19.
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demands of the farmers' unions are usually so unrealistic that they 
serve the useful purpose of making those of Nokyo appear quite moderate 
in comparison. The political objective behind the inflated farmers' 
union demands is to make the actual increases granted by the LDP appear 
hopelessly inadequate and thus raise the general level of discontent 
amongst the party's farmer supporters. Zennichino's more exaggerated 
claims and strategies are reflected in the emotive and extreme nature of 
the terminology and tactics it uses in presenting its demands to govern­
ment. In the farmers' union scheme of things, the rice price campaign 
is a 'rice price battle' beika töso, and the campaign to achieve their 
demands is described in optimistic terms as a 'national uprising'. Their 
mass activities tend to be more unruly and undisciplined than those 
hosted by Nokyo. The rice price 'battles' of the 1960s did, however, 
have the effect of providing a focus for action and organisation 
for the newly amalgamated Zennichinö, particularly in the strong rice 
producing areas of Hokuriku and Northern Japan. In consequence, the 
farmers' unions were galvanised into a more cohesive force at the 
national level for the first time since days of the land reform.
The Establishment-oriented National Chamber of Agriculture has 
representatives on the RPAC and liaises with Zenchu in the formulation 
of producer rice price demands. The Nokyo 'demand' price is often 
presented jointly with the National Chamber of Agriculture demand. With 
a strongly developed administrative base, however, the agricultural 
committee system is not in a position to mount a serious policy challenge 
to government. It more readily and rapidly falls into line with the MAF 
position on any issue, and this, on occasions, has been the cause of 
differences of opinion with Nokyo.
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(g) Consumer and Labour Groups
These exercise a legitimate voice in government advisory councils, 
such as those on price stability, the financial system and the RPAC.
Labour organisations such as Söhyö and Zenrö, allied as they are to 
socialist parties and to socialist party agricultural policies, concur 
with the general policy of government in subsidising the difference 
between high producer rice prices and low consumer rice prices. Consumer 
organisations such as Shufuren on the other hand, without specific 
electoral objectives and the need to cultivate the farm vote have con­
sistently spoken out against the government's policy of artificially 
inflating the price of a staple food item as a special concession to a 
minority sector. Consumers also foot the bill for rice control through 
their contributions to the national budget. They are, therefore, doubly 
penalised by FC. Although the consumer voice is represented on the 
RPAC, it does not have the political clout to act as a countervailing 
influence to producer interests. Part of this is attributable to its 
lack of organisational cohesion compared to the farm sector.
(h) The Economic World
Big business leaders and their several organisations, the> Federation 
of Economic Organisations (Keidanren) and the Japan Committee for Economic 
Development (Keizai Döyükai) although proponents of fiscal efficiency and 
economic rationality generally adopted an attitude of passive acquiescence 
towards the government's rice price support scheme. Marxist writers have 
described their tolerance towards FC as the conscience money of Japanese 
capitalism to the farmers"*" and the price that had to be paid for a policy
Ito Toshio, 'Nokyo to Seiji Katsudö' (Nokyo and Political Activities), 
in Kondö Yasuo (ed.), Ndkyö Nijügonen (Twenty Five Years of Nokyo) Ochanomiz 
Shobö, 1973, p.157.
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of expanding productivity in the industrial and commercial sectors at 
a rapid rate. The dramatic rises in wage levels during the 'income 
doubling' decade of the 1960s allowed scope for sizable increases in the 
domestic expenditure of urban workers on rice. In other words, industry 
could tolerate wage levels which enabled workers to pay high prices for 
food. Another factor in the reasoning of Japan's business leaders was 
political. Although there was a clear and logical clash of economic 
interest between industry and agriculture over the prices of farm 
commodities, big business representatives had the political acumen to 
realise that the farmers were the base of LDP power, and the conservative 
party was looked on as the factor which provided them with the stability 
necessary for economic growth.
During the period under discussion, however, industrial spokesmen 
became actively involved in the debate on FC and in government advisory 
councils reviewing the fiscal situation. They expressed much stronger 
opposition to high producer rice prices than ever before.
(i) The Mass Communications Media
Consistent and vocal opposition to high producer rice prices by 
editors and news writers in the press was an established feature of the 
public discussion of rice issues during the 1960s. The mass communications 
world almost unanimously supported revision of the FC system from the 
first moves towards reform in the mid-1950s. These views were also 
expressed by media -journalists who were an established category of
participant in the RPAC.
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(j) Government Financial Agencies
The Ministry of Finance and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA), both 
directly involved in the rice price-setting process, saw themselves as 
guardians of the nation’s financial health. The customary stance of the 
MOF in negotiations on the producer rice price was to advocate little or 
no increase at all. It repeatedly called for drastic reform measures and 
even abolition of the FC system. The FCSA which financed the rice price 
became an increasing headache for the MOF Budget Bureau during the 1960s. 
By 1967, the size of the transfer payments from the General Account budget 
and the need for supplementary budgets to be passed every year to cover 
the FCSA deficit, was providing what the MOF saw as sufficient grounds 
for a radical change in the system.
The EPA's primary interest on the other hand was in general economic 
issues such as price and wage stability. It was particularly concerned 
with the de-stabilising effects on the economy of large producer rice 
increases.
Pressures for Reform
The year 1967 has been described as a period in which Japanese agri­
culture reached a turning point: ’Japan stood on the verge of the largest
rice harvest in history and in a situation of financial inflexibility. 
Vigorous discussions were exchanged on all sides concerning reform of the 
FC system. The repercussions of producer rice price increases were felt 
in terms of an increased deficit in the FCSA, which in turn led to higher 
consumer rice prices which in turn affected prices in general'.’*'
1 Asahi Nenkan, 1968, p.396.
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The following analysis seeks to identify the major participants 
and arguments presented at this most critical juncture in postwar agri­
cultural policy.
In the light of the financial and budgetary implications of the 
massive rice control deficit in the FCSA, it is not surprising that the 
first calls for reform of the FC system came from government financial 
agencies. As early as 1966, a report from an EPA advisory committee 
recommended that the government restrain both producer and consumer rice 
prices. Financial and business leaders reasoned that continuing producer 
rice price increases would inevitably push up the consumer rice price.
This added to general inflationary pressures and provided additional 
ammunition for workers' demands in the annual spring wage offensive.
The consumer rice price was in fact increased for three consecutive years 
beginning in 1965. The largest rise of 14.4 per cent was incorporated 
into the 1968 budget to take effect from the following October.
In September 1967, a newly created Council for Promoting Stable 
Prices (Kakaku Ante'i Suishin Kctigi) - an advisory organ to the Prime 
Minister - set up a Special Committee on the Rice Price Problem. One of 
its recommendations was that the 'outline' of both the producer and 
consumer rice prices should be decided during the annual budget 
negotiation period in December-January. Its report, however, was 
limited in its content by the confrontation between producer and women's 
groups in the Council.
In addition to the opinions expressed in the Council, it was reported 
at the time that owing to the financial burden imposed on the national 
budget by the FCSA allocation, discussions increasingly began to centre 
on the concept of a 'Budget Rice Price'(Yosan Beika) as a means of solving
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the problem. This policy proposed that any increases in either the
producer or consumer rice prices would have to be made during the budget
formulation period and incorporated into the budget at that time. The
Budget Rice Price would be accompanied by the introduction of a ’slide
system' whereby any further increases in the producer rice price during
the annual rice price season in June-July would be transferred to an
2equivalent increase in the consumer rice price.
The Economic Advisory Council (Keizai Shingikai) attached to the 
Prime Minister's Department also concerned itself with the rice price 
problem as a function of its inquiry into current problems of fiscal 
management. Rice was one of a series of basic prices or public charges 
(like postal rates, national railway fares etc.) which could be adminis­
tratively manipulated as part of price stabilisation policies. Although 
the argument contained over-simplified notions of economic causality, it 
postulated that any rise in the retail price of a main consumer item like 
rice would have an inflationary effect on prices in general. Moreover, 
it was anticipated that further steep increases in the consumer rice 
price were a natural follow-on from higher producer rice prices if a 
massive rise in the FCSA allocation were to be avoided. As a result5 in 
December 1967, the Economic Advisory Council presented to the Prime 
Minister proposals for sweeping reforms of the financial system centring 
on FC. At this very time, the Diet was passing a supplementary budget 
allocating an extra 118 billion yen to cover the deficit in the FCSA for 
the 1967 year.
Ibid. , p . 398.
2
Ibid.
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In the same month, the government decided to adopt as its 
fundamental method of budget formulation for the 1968 year, the 'Principle 
of a Comprehensive Budget' or CBP (So go Yosan ShugY), which was a slight 
adaptation in title of the concept of a budget rice price. The latter had 
the advantage of not specifying its target for restraint. The notion of a 
'comprehensive budget' was designed specifically to obviate the need for a 
supplementary budget to be passed later in the year. This principle aimed 
directly at containing the producer rice price, for it was out of the 
supplementary budget that producer rice price increases (not allocated in 
the original budget) were financed. It was argued that in 1968, a supple­
mentary budget would not be compiled to cover the FC deficit. If the 
producer rice price were raised, then according to the CBP, whatever 
financial deficit was created would have to be covered by a rise in the 
consumer rice price. Because it was anticipated that considerable pressures 
would exist for the prevention of an increase in the consumer rice price 
for the fourth year in succession as part of a general policy of holding 
down prices, it was hoped that this would indirectly put a brake on an 
increase in the producer rice price.
Although termed the Comprehensive Budget Principle, the MOF's budget 
rice price policy aimed at a reduction in the FC deficit by means of a 
partial depoliticisation of the producer rice price. If there were no 
prospect of a supplementary budget, the decision on the amount to be 
allocated to the FCSA from the General Account had to incorporate projected 
producer and consumer rice price increases. These decisions were, there­
fore, implicit in the budget and had to be made during the government's 
negotiations on its budget draft. At this time, the General Account 
allocation to cover the FCSA deficit would be competing against all other 
MAF budget demands. In fact, the CBP was used in 1968 as a pretext for 
setting the FCSA at 1967 levels with the prospect of no supplementary
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budget to be passed later in the year to cover any increase in the FCSA 
deficit caused by higher producer rice prices. This is shown in detail 
in Table 3.3.
Table 5.3
A COMPARISON OF FOOD CONTROL BUDGET ALLOCATIONS IN 1967 AND 1968
1967 Yen 1968 Yen
Original Budget 128.7 billion Comprehensive
Budget 246.4 billion
Supplementary
Budget 118.0 billion
Total 246.7 billion Total 246.4 billion
Note: * This was not in fact the total FCSA allocation in 1968.
It was subject to an additional allocation of 37 billion yen 
from a supplementary budget passed later in the year.
Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1968, pp.360-361.
This policy allowed for the event of later adjustments to the pro­
ducer rice price as a result of the usual political negotiations, but 
it would be constrained by the 'slide system' which linked the producer 
to the consumer rice price. In other words, if the producer rice price 
were raised during the customary June-July period, then the burden of 
the increase would have to be borne by a rise of equal proportions in 
the consumer rice price. The logic of the slide system required that 
producer rice price increases be held to a minimum if only to keep a 
tight rein on the consumer rice price.
Linking the consumer price to the producer rice price was unprece­
dented in the history of the FC system. Both prices had been decided 
separately and according to independent sets of criteria.
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Opposition to the introduction of the slide system and the insertion 
of the rice price into the budget was jointly displayed by both Nokyo and 
the MAF in December 1967 during the negotiations on the MOF’s draft 
budget which incorporated these two new principles. Nokyo also partici­
pated in a ’National Liaison Council to Protect the FC System’ sponsored 
by consumer organisations, which made submissions to both the MAF and MOF 
opposing the slide system and the incorporation of the rice price into 
the budget.
The Reconstitution of the RPAC
The next major break with precedent was selection by the Minister of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Kuraishi Tadao, of 22 members to the RPAC in 
January 1968, from which Diet members, producer and consumer representatives 
were excluded.^ The only important categories of membership left were 
academics and journalists. For this reason it was called 'The Learned and 
Neutral Members' (Gakushiki Chüritsu Iin) Council.
Nokyo opened the rejectionist campaign by maintaining that the
exclusion of representatives of producers and consumers who had the most
vital and material interest in the deliberations on the rice price was a
2denial of democratic politics. A Conference of Central and Prefectural 
Nokyo Rice Policy Headquarters' Chairmen passed a resolution proposing an 
alternative: that the rice price should be decided in the Diet (thus
allowing scope for the injection of ample political pressure into the 
decision). In February, ZenchTi spokesmen made representations to the
The exclusion of Diet members from the RPAC was part of a general 
policy of removing Parliamentarians from all advisory councils, and was 
not confined to the RPAC.
2 -  -  -  -  -'Nogyo-Nokyo Kankei Shuyo Nisshi' (Diary of Main Events Relating to 
Agriculture and Nokyo), Nögyd Kyodö K u n rla i, March, 1968, p.156.
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Lower House Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee, the Budget 
Committee, and the Diet Management Committee on this proposal.
Other farmers' groups (Zennösören, Zennichirid and Zennd) , 
consumer groups (Shufuren and the Liaison Council to Protect the FC 
System), Söhyö, and political parties (the Kömeitö, JSP and DSP), each 
expressed opposition to the government's policy. There was strong 
support within the JSP and LDP for the Diet rice price decision idea 
and for a delay in the opening of the newly constituted RPAC. Kuraishi's 
reply in the Diet centred on the inability of the RPAC with its four-part 
composition of producer and consumer representatives, Diet members, and 
men of learning and experience, to reach agreed recommendations for the 
previous two years. He argued that some sort of agreement in the Council 
was now imperative in the light of strong demands for reform of FC 
emanating from the financial world.
Although the LDP leadership remained firm on the issue of RPAC 
membership, in a partial concession to producer interests, it decided to 
set up a Rice Price Round Table Conference within the MAF and also a Rice 
Price Investigation Committee (Beika Chdsakai) within the LDP. The 
latter's specific function was to give sufficient hearing to producer 
demands in the light of their exclusion from the RPAC. The Party also 
promised Nokyo that it would produce a 'political rice price'. Having 
settled the issue in this fashion and after receipt of Nokyo's rice price 
demands by the LDP Committee in May, the RPAC was finally given the go- 
ahead to meet - five months after its members were appointed.
The effect of the exclusion of Diet members from the RPAC was much 
more drastic for opposition party JSP participation in rice price 
proceedings than for the LDP whose members were given scope for partici­
pation in government party policy-making machinery. The JSP was now
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denied any opportunity of formally exercising influence in rice price 
decision-making, and the LDP gained a monopoly position.
The 1968 General Election Campaign
At the end of May, LDP Secretary-General Fukuda Takeo announced that 
a settlement of the producer rice price would not be made until after the 
election in early July. This allowed the government maximum political 
flexibility in its decision and avoided any potentially unfavourable 
electoral repercussions from an unpopular decision.
In order to put before the government a demonstration of its mass 
voting power before polling day, Nokyo set its rice price campaign in 
motion. The Nokyo Rice Price Policy Central Headquarters opened a 
Combined Conference of Central Union and Prefectural Nokyo Rice Policy 
Headquarters’ Chairmen, and set its demand price for 150 kilos at 23,210 
yen. This was an increase of 18.9 per cent over the previous year. Two 
days later, the Nokyo Rice Policy Central Headquarters as campaign leader 
amassed 14,000 Nokyo representatives from all over the country in a 
’Convention of National Nokyo Representatives to Achieve the Demanded Rice 
Price’. This meeting resolved on a ’Proclamation of Demands' including 
the Nokyo demand price, the establishment of a food self-sufficiency 
policy, the maintenance of FC, and opposition to the new RPAC. The ZenchTi 
leadership emphasised the fact that the 1968 rice price campaign would be 
extraordinarily tough because of the changes already made to established 
procedures of deciding the rice price, and because of the prevailing ’mood’ 
within government to hold down the demand price in the light of the deter­
ioration in the financial apparatus of FC.
With strategic timing four days before the elections on July 7,
Fukuda announced that 'although there was a need for reform, there would
325
be no change in the ’fundamentals of the FC system'.^- His statement was 
designed to reassure farmers about to go to the polls, that there were no 
anticipated reforms radical enough to require changes in the FC Law. It 
deliberately ignored the report of the MOF Advisory Council on Finance 
(Zaisei Sh'ingikai) presented as early as April, which suggested that 
there was a need for fundamental reform of the FC system. The Council 
had called for the presentation of materials from the MOF on ways to 
reform FC in the light of the four months surplus of 'old' rice in ware­
houses. It also warned that if the 'reverse margin' (gyakuzaya) between 
the government's buying and selling prices continued to grow, the financial 
burden would be substantially aggravated.
Prime Minister Sato on an election tour of rural areas endorsed 
Fukuda's statement with similar reassurances that it was still too prema­
ture to discuss reorganisation of the FC system, and that the LDP's 
record on the matter could be gauged from increases granted in the pro­
ducer rice price in previous years. The government party in other words, 
could be relied upon not to let its traditional supporters down. Both 
sets of statements were patent vote-catching gestures and typified the 
contrast between the LDP leadership bending to the dictates of election­
eering and the more rational, balanced determination to move towards 
reform which it showed at other times.
1 'Nogyo * Nökyö Kankei Shuyö Nisshi', Nogyo KyodD Kumiai, September 
1968, p .156.
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First Steps in the Deployment of a Comprehensive Agricultural Policy (CAP)
The Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Nishimura Naomi, delayed his 
policy initiative until after the elections. In a special ministerial 
conference of executive-level bureaucrats within the MAF, he launched a 
set of proposals for the structural reform of agriculture involving the 
deployment of a comprehensive or 'integrated' agricultural policy (sogd 
nosei). This was the MAF answer to the delicate political issue of the 
rice surplus and the FC deficit. It sought to attach these problems 
indirectly through changes in the structure of production rather than 
through fiscal measures.
The essence of Nishimura's suggestions were crop diversification 
and FC reform. He admitted that hither to,agricultural policies had been 
too much inclined towards rice, and that rice production henceforth 
should strive for quality improvement rather than increased production.
He recognised the need for a fundamental reorientation in policy thinking 
away from a singular emphasis on rice production, and towards a broader 
or more 'comprehensive' view of agriculture, giving due emphasis to the 
growth sectors of farming such as livestock, vegetable and fruit products. 
As far as rice control was concerned, he anticipated a continuation of 
surplus conditions. This, in his opinion, justified an investigation 
into possible reforms in the FC system, although he recommended moving 
with caution.^
On receipt of these suggestions, the MAF set up an intra-Ministerial 
Agricultural Policy Promotion Council (Nosei Suishin Kaigi), which made 
the Permanent Vice-Minister its Chairman and began its investigations into 
a CAP in mid-August.
1 Asahi Nenkan, 1969, op. cit. , p.402.
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Nishimura’s announcement in July 1968 proposed a major new direction 
in official government thinking on agriculture. It defined in concrete 
commodity terms what had been anticipated in the selective expansion and 
reduction clauses in the 1961 Law: it specified rice as a product for 
de-emphasis and nominated those commodities for increased production 
assistance. The CAP was also an unofficial acknowledgement of the failure 
of the Agricultural Basic Law successfully to achieve its objectives in 
relation to alterations in the structure of production, the out-migration 
of farmers and an expansion in the overall scale of farm production. It 
also revealed the practical contradiction of using producer rice price 
increases as the basis of a farm incomes policy while encouraging crop 
diversification on the other.
Nishimura subsequently submitted his proposals to the Agricultural 
Policy Advisory Council (Noset- Shingikai) whose function it was to inquire 
into all major changes in agricultural policy.
The MAF approach to solving the FC problem was followed almost 
immediately by proposals from the Minister of Finance, Mizuta Mikio, for 
a 'Free Rice Plan' (Jiyümai Köso) as the first step in a change-over to 
the indirect control of rice. His concept of the liberalisation of rice 
marketing involved a series of measures which the MAF had been considering 
relating to less controlled buying of rice by consumers. This was the 
first occasion on which the MOF had formally clarified the concrete 
direction of reforms of the FC system.
The 1968 Rice Price Campaign
The 1968 rice price campaign was launched as soon as the general 
election was over. It proved to be one of the most tumultuous and pro­
tracted ever held. Nokyo began its campaign with a'National Assembly of
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2,300 Representatives to Achieve the Demand Rice Price' sponsored by the 
Nokyo Rice Policy Central Headquarters. Miyawaki Asao, Chairman of 
ZenchTi, warned Nokyo members that in view of the mood favourable to hold­
ing down the rice price, the full power of the farmers would have to be 
mobilised. The next move was the transportation by truck of a petition 
containing 4.7 million farmers' signatures in support of Nokyo's demands 
to the MAF, MOF and the Prime Minister's Office. After the convention, 
groups of Nokyo representatives dispersed to seven different locations: 
the Prime Minister's Office, the MAF, MOF, and LDP, JSP, DSP and 
Komeito headquarters. In addition, those in attendance at the convention 
made calls on their local Diet members.
On the same day, Zenniöhiriö sponsored its own 'Convention for the 
General Uprising of the Nation's Farmers to Achieve Rice Price Demands' 
which amassed 10,000 farmers' union members. Prime Minister Sato's 
residence in Setagaya Ward in Tokyo was visited by 500 of those in 
attendance, and demands were presented for a producer rice price of 
28,500 yen,a 46 per cent increase over the previous year. Placards were 
waved expressing opposition to the neutral RPAC and to proposals to shift 
to indirect controls on rice. Three thousand Zenn'ichinö marchers gate­
crashed the MAF and 1,500 invaded the MOF, crowding into the corridors 
demanding to see the Ministers in question. One thousand five hundred 
farmers demonstrated outside LDP headquarters. Zennichiriö members then 
linked up with Sohyd and consumer group representatives opposing a rise in 
the consumer rice price. Approximately 15,000 attended a convention to 
'Destroy the Comprehensive Budget Principle, Maintain the FC System, and 
Launch a Mass Uprising of Labour and Agriculture'.
At the same time, pro-producer LDP rural back benchers organised an 
informal intra-party pressure group, the Rice Price Policy Conference
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(Beika Taisaku Kyögikai), which outnumbered the official LDP Rice Price 
Investigation Committee (Beika Chosakai) by more than three to one. The 
latter with only 50 or so members could not accommodate the number of 
Dietmen who were willing to show their support for the farm groups’ 
demands’.^" Although there was considerable overlap in membership, 
investigations by the informal LDP Rice Price Conference paralleled those 
being conducted by the official Investigation Committee which had begun 
calling on interested parties including producer and consumer represent­
atives and ministerial officials to testify from June onwards. One of 
the official tasks of the Beika Chosakai was to decide on the formula for 
party calculations of the producer rice price. The Rice Price Conference 
or ’rice Vietcong’ on the other hand, called on Nishimura to explain his 
Ministry's attitude towards reforming the FC system at its second meeting 
in mid-July. Nishimura replied that the FC Law would not be amended, but 
that changes would be instituted in the rice distribution system under FC.
While these intra-LDP investigations were taking place, the Lower 
House Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee also discussed the 
rice price issue.
Shortly before the scheduled opening of the first RPAC deliberations 
at the end of July, the financial and business world expressed its views 
on FC and the producer rice price through a declaration from the Japan 
Committee for Economic Development {Keizai Döyükai). It acknowledged the 
significance of the 1968 rice price decision as a political problem involving 
reform of the FC system and deployment of a comprehensive agricultural 
policy. It recognised that the method of resolution of the rice problem
 ^ Donnelly, ’Setting the Price of Rice: A Study in Political Decision
making', op. cit., p.193.
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would have an important influence on the future economic and social 
development of the country, and for this reason, it was time for economic 
groups to put forward positive proposals on the rice price problem.^
The declaration recommended that the producer rice price decision should 
reflect the situation of supply and demand, the financial situation and 
the national economic situation. On these grounds, it advocated strict 
control of producer rice price increases. The Committee also recommended 
linking the consumer rice price to the producer rice price, a re­
examination of the present FC system, and the promotion of a shift to an 
indirect system of control. On a more constructive note, it proposed 
that the necessary financial outlays and government investments be made 
in order to develop a comprehensive policy which revolved around the 
promotion of independent manager farmers with a high level of production 
and which moved away from a posture of dependence on rice price policies.
With yet another Nokyo rice price convention timed for the opening 
of the RPAC a few days later, the MAF 'preliminary calculated' rice price 
(shisan bebka) became official at 20,105 yen per 150 kilos which repre­
sented a modest 2.9 per cent increase over the previous year. This was 
the lowest percentage increase recommended by the MAF for a decade and 
was generally a response to pressures for the introduction of fiscal 
restraint into the price-setting process. The MAF also clearly antici­
pated a favourable reception for a conservative increase from a 'neutral' 
RPAC. A new element introduced by the Ministry was its argument that the
rice price should reflect the situation of over-supply. In recognition 
of this, the MAF altered its standard of calculating the producer rice
The Keizai Döyukai had in fact been periodically presenting formal 
proposals on the state of agriculture since 1955, when it first recom­
mended a change-over to indirect controls on rice.
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price. Although decided by the 'Production Cost and Income Compensation 
Formula' employed since 1961 (this arrived at a producer rice price by 
adding together such expenses as land, production material and wage costs 
in rice production), it replaced the 'marginal' farmer with a low pro­
duction level and high production costs as its standard of reference, 
with the 'average' farmer. By changing the selection of key input 
variables, the MAF was thus able to lower the production costs that had 
to be taken into account in its calculations. This had the function of 
depressing the standard producer rice price by 377 yen per 150 kilos.
The MAF argued that it had given due deference in the past to the farmer 
with a low productive output, and its viewpoint received the support of 
the RPAC.
The MAF submission to the RPAC was followed immediately by the 
official presentation of the LDP recommended price from the Sub-Committee 
of the LDP's Rice Price Investigation Committee. This stood at 21,102 yen, 
almost 1,000 yen above the MAF price, and an 8.1 per cent increase over 
the 1967 price.
The RPAC in line with the principle of a comprehensive budget, 
deliberated on both the producer and consumer rice prices and issued a 
report which endorsed the MAF submission. It recommended that the two 
rice prices be linked as interrelated aspects of the same decision; that 
in setting the consumer rice price, there was a need to reduce as much as 
possible the reverse margin in the government's buying price for rice 
(the difference between the cost of the producer rice price to govern­
ment and the price at which it sold rice to wholesalers); and that due 
consideration be given to the demand-supply situation for rice in the 
government decision on the producer rice price, and to the influence of 
the latter on consumer prices and on the financial situation in general.
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At the same time as he submitted the report of the RPAC to the 
government at the end of July 1968, the Chairman of the RPAC made a 
number of proposals aimed at reforming the FC system. He recommended 
that the government should establish appropriate levels of rice pro­
duction which took into account the commitment to a CAP and the outlook 
in the demand and supply of rice; that it should make the necessary 
amendments to the FC law to enable the introduction of the market 
mechanism into the rice trading system; and that it should examine its 
policies of distribution control and the purchase of the total rice 
crop for marketing as was currently operating under the rice control 
system.
After the RPAC's submission of its report, it took almost 20 days 
of negotiation between the government (represented by the Minister of 
Finance and the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry) and the LDP to finalise 
the producer rice price. In the political negotiations between these two 
groups, the government maintained that it would raise the producer rice 
price by a maximum of five per cent and the consumer rice price by a maximum 
of eight per cent, thus upholding the principle of an interrelated budget. 
There was strong opposition within the LDP, however, to the concept of 
'holding down' the producer rice price advocated even by the MAF. It was 
agrued that the new method of calculating the rice price would destroy the 
small rice farmer. Internal party dissension reached the exceptional 
situation where the LDP Executive Council rejected the compromise plan 
decided on between the government and the LDP leadership. The latter put a 
freeze on further discussions and decided to delay its final decision until 
after the close of a Diet extraordinary session scheduled for early August. 
Nokyo re-opened its rice price campaign, the LDP readjusted its offer and 
finally decided in Cabinet on a 5.9 per cent increase, or 20,672 yen per
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150 kilos. This represented 0.9 of a per cent more than the government's 
upper limit set during the negotiations and made the 'political addition' 
for 1968,567 yen. The final price was, however, still below the 21,102 
yen demanded by the LDP's Rice Price Investigation Committee. The 
government also warned that it would apply the new standard of calcu­
lation for the producerrice price from 1969 onwards.
As additional compensation for the 'low' rice price increase, it was 
decided in Cabinet to make a further financial outlay of 60 billion yen 
to farmers in the form of delivery adjustment fees, and to make a payment 
of 120 billion yen from the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance 
Corporation as capital investment for long-term government food storage 
construction (i.e. warehouse policy fees). Neither of these government 
allocations came under the FCSA, thus helping in a limited fashion to 
relieve the financial pressure on this Account. The additional 
subsidies to farmers, however, merely shifted the budget load from one 
category to another. Their primary value was political: they reduced
the political liability of the FCSA.
Three weeks later the RPAC began its deliberations on the consumer 
rice price in line with the principle of interrelated rice price manage­
ment. The Cabinet subsequently endorsed the MAF recommended price 
increase of eight per cent, thus instituting the concept of the slide 
system. This provoked criticisms from the RPAC that the Government was 
passing the 'political addition' in the producer rice price on to the 
consumer.
Finalisation of a Comprehensive Agricultural Policy
Dissension within the LDP was so rife after the 1968 producer rice 
price negotiations that a Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation 
Committee (So go Nösei Chösakai) was set up within the PARC under the
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leadership of Ohira Masayoshi. Its aim was to formulate a constructive 
party attitude towards the impending changes in agricultural and FC 
policy.
Within the MAF, discussions continued under the auspices of the 
internal ministerial Agricultural Policy Promotion Council (Nösei 
Suishin Kaigi) which deliberated for more than three months from August 
onwards. Both groups were under pressure to translate the general 
provisions of the CAP into quantifiable ministerial requests for 
subsidies to be incorporated into the 1969 MAF draft budget. The 
Minister of Finance also declared his intention to confer with the MAF 
to determine the exact nature of prospective reforms to FC prior to the 
compilation of the 1969 budget. The prospect of budget negotiations on 
the horizon made constructive initiatives for FC reform imperative.
In the light of these pressures for reform, some minor changes were 
made in the rice distribution system in September de-controlling certain 
aspects of the trader-consumer relationship (for which the government was 
subsequently rebuked by the RPAC for not moving far or fast enough). 
Protests were held throughout the autumn by a number of groups: the
consumer-based Liaison Council to Protect the FC system sponsored a 
demonstration of 3,000 consumer representatives; the Nokyo Rice Price 
Policy Central Headquarters held conferences of regional chiefs concern­
ing the maintenance of the FC system; Zennosöven set up a 'Committee to 
Fight Against the Deterioration of the FC System'; and the JSP passed a 
resolution at its annual conference which called for a 'check to the 
deterioration of FC ' .
The impetus for further reforms came once again from the so-called 
'financial authorities'. In October, the Advisory Council on Finance
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attached to the MOF, began drafting the essentials of a plan for reform­
ing the FC system, and in the same month, the Director-General of the EPA, 
Miyazawa Toshio, presented his 'New Miyazawa Plan for a Three Year Rice 
Price Freeze' to the LDP's Basic Policy Round Table Conference. This 
plan set out his fundamental ideas on the economy and financial situation 
for the 1969 budget. In it, he made a number of suggestions regarding FC 
reform. He recommended that there should be a three year producer rice 
price freeze and a freeze on the 1969 consumer rice price. He also 
proposed that a certain proportion of the rice bought by government 
should be placed under free distribution from the 1969 season onwards, 
and that the system as a whole should shift from one of direct control 
of rice to one of price support.
Nokyo set in motion its own discussion and consultation procedures 
in parallel to the processes of deliberation taking place within govern­
ment and the LDP. It formed an 'Agricultural Policy Committee' (Nögyö 
Taisaku Iinkai), and conferences of National and Prefectural Central Union 
Chairmen were held in order to decide on the agricultural cooperative 
attitude to prospective changes in the FC system and on demands to 
be presented to government. The Zenchu Board of Directors then received 
the report of its Agricultural Policy Committee (its Chairman was Mihashi 
Makoto, National Nokyo Purchasing Federation Chairman). The Report 
demanded that the government increase the total amount of rice it bought 
from the farmers, and strongly opposed the idea of a limit on the 
government's rice buying. It argued that even if a small proportion of 
rice were shifted to a system of free trading, it would destroy the 
fundamentals of FC. The report did, however, recognise the existing rice 
over-supply situation, and for this reason supported a policy of control­
ling rice production, but only if the government subsidised rice farmers
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with production conversion incentive payments which raised their income 
to the same level as if they had been producing rice. The attitude of 
the Nokyo Policy Committee towards rice production control was therefore, 
basically favourable.
The day after this report was presented to ZenchTi, however, strong 
dissent was expressed with its conclusions by certain Nokyo leaders 
attending the Prefectural Central Unions’ Chairmen's Conference, 
especially those from Hokkaido, Töhoku, Hokuriku and Kyushu, Japan's most 
important rice producing regions. They argued that the rice surplus 
situation was the government's fault, and they rebuked those who had 
expressed opinions in the report favourable to production control. They 
suggested that only after the government had shown a concrete plan for 
a comprehensive agricultural policy, should Nokyo decide its attitude 
towards such changes.
The report that reflected the thinking of government financial 
authorities on alterations to FC came from the MOF Advisory Council on 
Finance at the end of November. It proposed a number of steps the 
government should take in order to shift from a system of direct to 
indirect control of rice. These included lowering the producer rice 
price by 20 per cent; providing subsidies for crop conversion and fallow 
areas in order to step up the conversion of rice to other crops; making 
the amount of rice bought by government negotiable between the government 
and agricultural groups and limited to a specific amount; and releasing 
the consumer rice price from price control ordinances,with the government 
deciding only the price at which rice was to be sold to wholesalers and 
not the retail price which should be determined by the free market.
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The MAF's Agricultural Policy Promotion Council produced the result 
of its investigations at the same time as the Advisory Council on Finance. 
These mapped out the long-term outlook for production and supply of 
agricultural products taking rice production conversion as a prerequisite. 
The Minister submitted the Council's report to the LDP's Agriculture and 
Forestry Division,and to the Agricultural Policy Advisory Council in the 
form of an inquiry. The latter concluded that it considered the govern­
ment's proposals as an appropriate policy. The long-term outlook that 
emerged from the MAF's Promotion Council was described as the 'compass 
needle’’*" for future comprehensive agricultural policies. The Advisory 
Council warned that if the government did not push for a policy of pro­
duction conversion and controlling the development of new paddy fields, 
rice production levels would reach a level of 14.25 million tonnes in an 
average production year, which was 1.8 million tonnes in excess of demand. 
The need was obvious to switch to the planting of other crops, including 
the conversion of farm land to residential and factory uses, so that in 
the space of 10 years, the total land area given over to paddy fields 
could be reduced by 400,000 hectares.
The next major policy development which emerged was the presentation 
of the MAF's 'Rice Conversion Plan' at the end of November. This antici­
pated a conversion of 50,000 hectares of paddy to other crops between 1969 
and 1971, with a target of 10,000 hectares for 1969, in addition to a 
strengthening of assistance to horticultural, fruit and livestock farming. 
This would take the form of a series of 'Structural Improvement Works' as 
the appropriate budgetary title. The plan proposed the payment of 17,000 - 
18,000 yen per 0.1 hectare as a machinery and equipment subsidy for con­
version to other crops, and over three years, the sum of 20,000 yen per
1 Asahi Nenkan, 1969, op, oit,, p.402.
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0.1 hectare (for a total of 60,000 yen) as a conversion incentive pay­
ment for paddies allowed to lie fallow or cultivated with other crops. 
These amounted to the concrete MAF's terms which Nokyo had been waiting 
for. Clearly, incentive payments were to be the means for bringing 
farmers into line with MAF long-term production plans. The Ministry’s 
'Rice Production Conversion Plan' and its estimate for subsidies went 
to the LDP's PARC Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation 
Committee for the approval of its members. This body had been simul­
taneously producing its own report on a CAP. Explanations of the MAF 
proposals were also made by officials to the LDP's Agriculture and 
Forestry Division. The party subsequently gave the nod to the MAF plan 
and it was incorporated as a ministerial request in the 1969 MAF draft 
budget.
The response from Nokyo to these policy presentations from different 
sections of government was a burst of activity. The MAF had consulted 
with Nokyo prior to the presentation of its proposals but these were not 
entirely to Nokyo's satisfaction, and so it staged various forms of pro­
test. Zenchü objected to the fact that the proposals emanating from the 
Advisory Council on Finance were drafted solely from the point of view 
of financial policy and advocated FC reform for the sole purpose of 
improving fiscal management. It maintained that the effects on producers 
and consumers were largely ignored.
The Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Hasegawa Shiro, announced 
at a press conference at the end of November that as the whole basis of 
FC was crumbling, there was unanimous agreement amongst government and 
LDP leaders at the conference on the formulation of the 1969 budget, that 
they should proceed towards a long-term reform policy of the FC system.
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Nokyo responded to this united government front with a series of mass 
activities in December. The Nokyo Rice Policy Central Headquarters 
held a national convention of Nokyo representatives in Tokyo for 
’Maintaining the FC System and Establishing a Basic Agricultural Policy' 
followed a week later by a ’Convention for A Mass Uprising of One 
Million Strong to Prevent the Destruction of the FC System’. This was 
capped by an emergency conference of national and prefectural Nokyo 
central union chairmen which decided to respond to the government's 
initiative by threatening to oppose to the utmost any attempt to introduce 
a free rice trading system, and any enforced conversion of rice planting.
A convention of 10,000 national Nokyo representatives was held 'To 
Maintain the FC System' and to 'Stage an Uprising to Preserve the MAF 
Budget'. The Nokyo argument was substantially weakened, however, by the 
announcement that 1968 had produced yet another bumper crop of 14.4 
million tonnes of rice. By November 1968, the government was hold­
ing the largest amount of old rice in history, including 'old, old' rice 
which had become unsuitable for eating because it had been in storage 
for more than two rainy seasons. The rice in storage now exceeded 2.65 
million tonnes which was the equivalent of five months supply. In spite 
of the continuous rises in the consumer rice price for the previous four 
years, government expenditure on the producer rice price and increases 
in the latter had created a financial burden in the FCSA of 300.1 billion 
yen at the time of the 1969 budget formulation. This figure anticipated 
no subsequent increases in either the producer or consumer rice prices in
1969.
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The Institution of an Independent Rice Trading System
By the end of 1968, the economic constraints on policy relating to 
rice control had considerably tightened. Reform now appeared impera­
tive to a government faced with a massive rice surplus and the actuality 
of yet another sizable increase in the FCSA deficit. Intensive dis­
cussions took place in the first half of 1969 on the organisation of an 
independent or autonomous trading system (jishu ryutswnaifor a certain 
proportion of the rice for distribution - a proposal that first appeared 
in the Miyazawa 'Free Rice Plan'. These changes were already formally 
anticipated in the 1969 budget.
With FC reform clearly in the system, Nokyo prepared its own 
response. Zenchü held a meeting of its Rice Policy Central and 
Prefectural Headquarters' Chairmen in which agreement was reached on the 
agricultural cooperative attitude to the establishment of an autonomous 
trading system in rice. The view which had majority support was that 
changes were inevitable, that the inauguration of an independent trading 
system was unavoidable, and that the task facing Nokyo was to exert as 
much influence as possible on the government and the LDP,to ensure that 
the new system would not operate to the disadvantage of Nokyo and its 
member-farmers. The course of action recommended by the meeting was a 
rapid consolidation of the cooperatives' organisational defences to 
enable Nokyo to take the initiative and dominate the autonomous distri­
bution system as thoroughly as it monopolised government controlled rice.
This has been variously translated as rice for 'independent', 
'autonomous', 'voluntary' or 'free' distribution.
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The Nokyo leadership agreed to continue its overall opposition to 
the concept of an independent rice trading system, but there was a subtle 
reorientation in its position away from unconditional opposition to one 
of acceptance of the reality of the impending changes. The Nokyo 
management feared several things. If it persisted in a thoroughgoing 
rejection of FC reform, it might bring down the FC system altogether.
In this eventuality, the government funds which Nokyo gained directly 
through the operations of rice control might cease entirely. On the 
other hand, with a voluntary marketing system under Nokyo's management, 
any potential takeover by independent rice wholesalers could be pre­
vented .
This reasoning produced a subtle change of emphasis in Nokyo’s 
campaign. Its objective shifted to one of extracting as many 
financial guarantees as possible from government as a condition of 
agricultural cooperative compliance with the establishment of a free 
market rice system. The result was a 'battle over terms' (joken toso) .
Continued negotiations on the establishment of an autonomous rice 
trading system took place between Nokyo and the MAF throughout the first 
half of 1969. Zenhanren as the Nokyo organisation most materially 
concerned with rice trading, held extensive talks involving its 
prefectural economic federation chairmen on how such a system could 
be operated within Nokyo. Miyawaki, Chairman of Zenchü> subsequently 
presented a series of demands to the MAF for funds for Nokyo's rice 
operations under a non-government controlled system. Zenhanren decided 
to set up a Free Market Rice Office within its organisation and detailed 
the route for Nokyo's Free Market Rice funds. This constructive planning 
contrasted with the barrage of criticism of the proposal for a free 
rice trading system coming from ZeYiyi'ic’h'iYio and ZeviYiosoveYi, both of which
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engaged in various mass demonstrations of opposition to the government’s plan,
The day before the announcement in May by the Minister of Agriculture
and Forestry, Hasegawa, of a draft amendment to the FC Law setting up the
free rice trading system, he made public the membership list of the RPAC for
1969, in which producer and consumer representatives had been reincorporated
(but not Diet members). This concession to Nokyo was a deliberate move to
soften the blow of the introduction of FC reform.
The establishment of the Independent Rice Trading System (Jishu
Ryutsumaz Seido)_, or 'rice for distribution which the government does not
touch’  ^required an amendment to a Ministerial Ordinance of the FC Law.
It simply meant that rice producers could sell a certain proportion of
their rice to the cooperatives or other designated collection dealers
who could then sell to wholesalers without government intervention and at
2a price which was freely determined. All that was required for the 
cooperatives was prior receipt of approval of the amount for sale from 
the MAF in order that the movement of rice conform to its Plan for Free 
Traded Rice, ana a subsequent report to the MAF on the amount traded.
Shortly after the FC Law amendment was passed, Zerihanren announced the 
essentials of its own plan for handling free market rice.
Figure 5.3 summarises in graphic form the changes in the FC system 
instituted by these reforms.
Although the government supervised the movement of free traded rice, the 
independent rice marketing system aimed at exempting it from its legal oblig­
ation to buy all that the rice farmers wished to sell, thereby reducing the 
FC deficit.
The government's success in introducing the new scheme and in 
obtaining Nokyo’s cooperation was much advanced by the particular strategy
 ^ Asahi Nenkaris 1970, p.362.
2 In practice, because the government continued to set the price for 
most rice sold in Japan (i.e. ’controlled’ rice), the price of free market 
rice tended to be similar to the government-determined price. Personal 
communication, Ivan Roberts, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Canberra,
16 May 1979.
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it employed in winning the cooperative organisation over to its side in 
spite of strong initial protests. The Nokyo leadership first took the 
view that it was illegal to set up an independent distribution framework 
for a certain proportion of the rice available for sale. It argued that 
one of the fundamental principles of FC was government purchase of the 
total amount of rice for distribution. The MAF's reply to this was an 
effective application of the 'carrot and stick' approach. The 'stick' 
was the threat that if free rice trading failed, there would be even 
stronger arguments for dismantling FC entirely. The 'carrot' was the 
opportunity the MAF opened up for the cooperatives to dominate the new 
as well as the traditional rice collection market and the proposed 
supply by government of a number of subsidies to assist the free trading 
system off the ground. These were promised to Nokyo if it participated 
in the scheme. According to MAF reasoning, there was no reason why the 
cooperative organisation should not make substantial profits out of free 
traded rice, side by side with the benefits it received from government 
for handling controlled rice. Government protection would still enable 
Nokyo to pick up the collection, warehousing and marketing commission on 
rice handled outside the FC system. It was the logic and appeal of this 
argument that won Nokyo to the government's side.
Certainly the stick that the MAF waved on this occasion was one that 
they had used before. As early as 1935 and the first reforms to the FC 
system, the most powerful argument which gained the acquiescence of 
Nokyo to the institution of the advance sales contract system, was the 
threat that '(i)f the precontractual system fails, then the abolition of 
the FC system comes next'.^
Itö, op. ait., p . 152. Ronald P. Dore in his Land Reform in Japan, 
London, Oxford University Press, 1966, p.296, also reported that the argu­
ment used by a Food Agency official in 1955 in explaining the (contd)
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Nokyo's final position was to accept the inevitability of some 
measure of reform to FC, on the grounds that only a revised system 
could survive budgetary constraints and the anti-FC lobby within govern­
ment financial and big business circles. The forces pushing for change 
at this time were overwhelming and left Nokyo little room for manoeuvre. 
While opposing the general concept of an autonomous rice trading system 
as antipathetic to the basic principles of FC, it conceded on the 
details and actualities of its introduction.^ In order to safeguard 
its position within the system, Nokyo had no choice but to work within 
it. The force of this logic also helped to reduce opposition to the 
government's plans amongst Nokyo's Parliamentary allies in the ruling 
conservative party. Both groups redirected their efforts to extracting 
as far as possible terms favourable to the cooperatives for the intro­
duction of the partially liberalised system of rice collection and 
distribution. As a result, the safeguards and guarantees of assistance 
to Nokyo built into the new system by the MAF helped to cushion any 
possible negative effects of the changes on the cooperatives.
Nevertheless, considerable resentment was aroused amongst Nokyo's 
rank and file to their leadership's acceptance of reform. They argued 
that Nokyo had a primary duty to act as an agent of protection of farmers, 
and defend the standard of living of rice producers. The Nokyo 
executive was accused of doing a 'U' turn: of initially directing its
(from previous page)
pre-contractual system to farmers was that 'they should do their best 
to make the system work; if it should fail . . . the chances are that 
controls will be abolished "and you know what to expect then"'.
1 Ito, op. cit. , p .153 .
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pressure at government and then redirecting it against cooperative 
members in an effort to persuade them to accept unpopular government 
proposals . ^
In consequence of FC reform in 1969, Nokyo's method of reporting 
its profits in the rice trade adapted itself to a new system of 
categorisation. The marketing commission received on rice was re­
classified into commission on government rice and marketing commission 
on free rice. When added together, the two totals equalled the previous
single total; evidence enough that Nokyo did not suffer in this area of
2profit from the changes.
The Producer Rice Price Freeze
The 1969 producer rice price freeze was the political climax of 
the LDP government's attempts to control the steadily worsening problems 
of the FC deficit and the rice surplus. It also created a shortlived 
internal crisis within the Nokyo organisation and unprecedented threats 
from cooperative members to stage an electoral revolt at the polls.
The way in which this dispute was resolved has generally been interpreted 
as indicative of the balance of power between the government and the 
cooperatives.
Of all the proposals emanating from government financial authorities 
and advisers as to alternative courses of action on the producer rice
This was reported in ibid.
2 In 1969 for example, Nokyo made 13.3 billion yen in marketing 
commission on rice for government sale. In 1970, Nokyo's marketing 
commission on rice was made up of 10.9 billion on government sale rice, 
and 3.0 billion on free marketed rice, which produced a combined total 
of 14.0 billion yen, an increase and not a fall in its marketing com­
mission. These totals were calculated from figures given in Sogb Nökyö 
Tokeihyö, 1971, op. cit., p.122.
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price, it was the suggestion of a price freeze on rice made by Miyazawa, 
the Director-General of the EPA in October 1968, which the government 
chose as a means of containing the producer rice price. The government's 
approach involved the slow build-up of an impenetrable united front 
from which it never retreated.
Hasegawa, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, announced in 
the Upper House Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee as early 
as December 1968 that the government would not 'lower' the producer rice 
price the following year. A producer and consumer rice price freeze was 
also incorporated into the 1969 budget compilation in the same month. 
Hasegawa's announcement was followed by a speech on government policy 
delivered by the Prime Minister, Sato, to a plenary session of the Upper 
and Lower Houses at the end of December 1968. Sato emphasised recent 
changes in the nation's eating habits, and the need to promote a compre­
hensive agricultural policy which corresponded to trends in demand. He 
advocated a policy of moving away from the traditional preponderance of 
rice cultivation and 'putting a brake on rice price increases'.
Deferring increases in both the producer and consumer rice prices, he 
maintained, would help to restrain price increases in general.
The reaction from Nokyo was immediate. Miyawaki, Chairman of ZenchTi, 
protested to the LDP's Chief Cabinet Secretary that freezing the producer 
rice price was unlawful in the light of stated objectives of the FC 
Law. This was backed up by a general announcement from the Nokyo Rice 
Policy Central Headquarters questioning the propositions advanced in 
Sato's speech. The latter was, however, reinforced by a statement from 
the Minister of Finance in April which confirmed that the Ministry's 
policy was one of deferring rice price increases, and leaving the 
producer rice price at the 1968 level of 20,672 yen per 150 kilos for
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three years in order to reduce the FCSA deficit and improve the 
demand/supply ratio for rice. He argued that a pricing policy was 
necessary in addition to rice planting conversion and the establishment 
of an independent trading system in order to achieve government 
objectives. These sentiments were echoed in a subsequent statement by 
the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry to the LDP’s Rice Price Policy 
Council (Beika Taisaku Kyogikai) that a deferment in producer price 
increases was inevitable. The informal government pro-rice producers’ 
lobby group had been organised as early as February. The Nokyo rice 
price campaign for 1969 also got underway with exceptional speed.
The Nokyo Rice Policy Central Headquarters held its first meeting in 
February and this was followed by a conference of Rice Policy 
Central and Prefectural Headquarters’ Chairmen to settle on a plan of 
activities for the 1969 season. It was later supplemented by a program 
set up by the National Nokyo Youth Organisations' Council (Zenseikyö) .
Zenn'ich'ino announced its producer rice price demand at 27,499 yen 
per 150 kilos, a 33 per cent increase over the previous year. The 
agricultural cooperative demand price was set at 24,132 yen per 150 
kilos (a 16.7 per cent increase) at a Combined Conference of Chairmen 
of Central and Prefectural Rice Policy Headquarters, organised by the 
Standing Committee of the Central Headquarters.
The beginning of the RPAC's deliberations on the producer rice 
price in early June was the signal for the start of mass activities and 
conventions by Nokyo and Zennichind. The Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry incorporated a 'zero increase' into his submission on the producer 
rice price to the Council. This was suppressed by changes 
in MAF producer rice price formulation. The standard used for calculating 
the production costs of rice was no longer the marginal farmer (geyikci'l
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nöka), but the farmer with a level of production at the national average. 
This had the effect of lowering the production cost variable in the 
formula. The Ministry’s stated justification was the rice surplus situ­
ation .
The reconstituted RPAC (no longer the ’neutral’ RPAC) composed of 
producer and consumer representatives and men of scholarship and experi­
ence, gave the notion of a deferral in producer rice price increases its 
majority support. Although there was confrontation in the Council 
amongst the different sector representatives, the viewpoints of each 
were successfully incorporated into a single report. A minority recom­
mended an increase, a majority a rice price freeze, and a further 
minority a lowering of the rice price. The report containing these 
views was presented to Hasegawa on June 7. The day before this Miyawaki 
had personally called on Sato and demanded a producer rice price increase.
The government and LDP leadership on receipt of the RPAC report 
moved towards a formal decision on a zero increase. It only remained 
for the LDP leadership to bring its rural Diet members into line, but 
within the party, the informal Rice Price Policy Council was making strong 
demands for a 2.1 per cent increase and would not be put off. Electoral 
considerations six months hence appeared to be an important consideration.
At a crucial moment in the party negotiations on June 8 (the day 
after the RPAC submitted its report) , the Nokyo Rice Policy Central 
Headquarters held a conference of its Central and Prefectural Chairmen 
and passed a motion making an explicit electoral threat against the 
government. It said, '(a) confrontation between Nokyo and the LDP in 
the elections is unavoidable’.^  This statement was handed to the LDP on
1 Asahi Nenkan, 1970, op. cit. , p.362.
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June 9. It represented the ultimate, last-ditch strategy available to 
the cooperatives in the face of the government's direct attack on the 
most sacred preserve of FC: the producer rice price. The following day,
the sub-committee of the LDP Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investi­
gation Committee handling the producer rice price issue decided that the 
producer rice price should be 21,090 yen per 150 kilos: an increase of 
1.79 per cent. It took another day of political negotiations between the 
government and the LDP to produce a final decision. On June 10, Cabinet 
announced that producer and consumer rice prices would be left at the 
1968 level, but subsidies of 22.5 billion yen would be paid to rice 
farmers as 'Special Policy Works' Expenditure for Rice Planting' for 
fertiliser, chemicals and other materials.
The sum of 22.5 billion yen was the equivalent in actual terms of 
a 2.1 per cent producer rice price rise. It required the same amount in 
budgetary expenditure. The LDP's rice Diet members gave their consent to 
the government's price freeze only on the condition that the farmers 
received some other form of compensation for prospective income lost. 
Their concession on subsidies enabled the government to hold on to its 
increase deferment policy in formal terms, while conceding on its 
substance. The end result was a partial shift of the financial burden 
of rice control from one budget category to another. It was the same 
course of action which the government had resorted to in 1968 in order to 
help reduce the political liability of the FCSA deficit. Once again 
subsidies were used as a political lever: in this case to avert an 
electoral threat to the party.
Nokyo which had been demanding a 16.7 per cent increase in the 
producer rice price, expressed strong dissatisfaction with the LDP 
leadership's decision. Miyawaki as Chairman of Zenchu and the Nokyo
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Policy Central Headquarters, however, also opposed the decision 
of the Conference of Rice Policy Central and Prefectural Headquarters 
to confront the LDP in the elections. He maintained that ’it violated 
the cooperative union principle of political neutrality’.^" He then 
resigned as Chairman of Zenchü in an emergency Zenchü Board of Directors' 
meeting, giving as his reason the fact that he took responsibility 
for the rice price freeze. There was, however, no one else in the Nokyo 
organisation who wished to take his place, and in consequence, the entire 
Zenchü Board of Directors resigned. In an attempt to contain the internal 
disunity within the top level executive structure of the cooperatives, 
however, it was re-elected in to to two weeks later, and Miyawaki was 
re-elected Chairman.
Miyawaki's resignation was as much an act of protest at the prospect 
of an internal revolt within the Nokyo organisation as it was a protest 
against government policy. He was placed in the unenviable position of 
being attacked on both sides: he had to accept the government decision
on the freeze even though it was monstrously unacceptable to large 
sections of his membership, and at the same time, to field criticisms 
from rank and file cooperative members that the central executive leader­
ship had 'sold out' to the powers-that-be. Ultimately, the benefits 
granted to the cooperatives through rice control were dependent on what 
concessions could be extracted by farm politicians from the government 
party leadership with electoral considerations duly taken into account.
Although the prospect of a revolt at the polls by farmers and Nokyo 
members was taken seriously by certain sections of the LDP, the distance
1 Ibid.
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in time between the June producer rice price decision and the December 
elections and subsequent LDP concessions on agricultural subsidies was 
sufficient to heal the rift in government party-Nokyo relations. The 
most seriously disaffected group within the agricultural cooperative 
organisation was the Youth Division in Ishikawa. It threatened to 
withdraw collectively from LDP membership in protest at the government's 
policy, a move that had serious implications for Betsukawa Yukio,
Ishikawa Nokyo Central Union Chairman who had declared his candidacy 
in the December elections with LDP endorsement. The prefectural Nokyo 
leadership, however, argued that a withdrawal of support from the 
government party would only weaken the farmers' and cooperative position 
on the national political scene, and Betsukawa was successfully elected. 
Even when it was potentially vulnerable as in Ishikawa, the LDP did not 
suffer at the polls from the Nokyo electoral threat.
Voluntary Production Adjustment
In spite of the reforms already instituted and the 1969 rice price 
freeze, there was yet another crop of 14 million tonnes in 1969, and the 
FCSA allocation to rice control climbed to 350 billion yen. The 'reverse 
margin' between the government's buying and selling prices increased 
from 38,000 yen to 45,000 yen per tonne in 1970. The main ingredients 
in the rise were increases in the rate of interest on old rice, storage 
charges and interim expenses. The campaign of opposition to the burden 
this imposed on taxpayers, rice consumers and the national budget by 
big business and the mass communications world continued.
The MAF's rice conversion scheme did not prove very successful in 
1969 and it became clear that the government was not giving the farmers
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sufficient incentives to desist from rice production. The area converted 
from rice fell short of the 10,000 hectare conversion target of 1969, 
amounting to less than 5,400 hectares. In particular, the conversion 
schedule proposing a diversion of 8,300 hectares of rice to feed crops 
brought an adjustment of only 1,700 hectares.
As a result of this poor response a whole new set of policy 
initiatives was prepared in time for 1970 budget formulation in order to 
implement a fully-fledged rice acreage reduction policy from 1970 on­
wards .
The Agricultural Policy Advisory Council (Nosei Shingikai) which the 
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in July 1968 had first asked to 
report on a comprehensive agricultural policy, and which had been asked 
again to report on 'Items to be Considered with Respect to Promoting 
Agricultural Policy'"*" finally presented its report in September 1969.
Taking this as their cue, all political parties, Nokyo and the National 
Chamber of Agriculture announced their respective positions on a policy 
of rice production adjustment in the last half of 1969. With a national 
poll scheduled for December, the whole matter became an election issue, 
particularly in the eyes of the LDP which was mindful of the Nokyo threat 
to confront the government party at the polls.
The MAF reconvened its Agricultural Policy Promotion Council and 
called on interested parties to testify. These included LDP Diet members, 
opposition party representatives and Nokyo executives. The Council hoped 
to construct a policy consensus on rice conversion. This emerged in a 
paper entitled 'Concerning the Deployment of a Comprehensive Agricultural 
Policy' at the beginning of September.
1 Ibid., p.360.
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Later in the month, Zenchu held a Board of Directors meeting and 
set up its materials for research into ’The Establishment of a Basic 
Agricultural Policy' (Kihon Nosei). On the same day, the National 
Chamber of Agriculture published its own paper entitled 'Concerning the 
Establishment of a Comprehensive Agricultural Policy'.
Farm groups were joined by political parties. The Komeito at its 
party convention in July decided on a 'Policy for Agricultural Modern­
isation' , and the JSP announced a '10 Year Plan for Agricultural Reform' 
in September. These proposals were incorporated into their policy 
platforms for the December 1969 election. This was also true of the 
LDP which produced by far the most thoroughgoing set of proposals. 
Government party investigations were conducted by the Comprehensive 
Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee which had carried over 
its sittings from the middle of the rice price season in June. A 
sub-committee of this Committee led by a farm politician from Iwate,
Nohara Masakatsu, announced a series of plans: 'An Outline for a
New Long-Term Plan in Agricultural Policy': 'Proposals for a Comprehensive 
Agricultural Policy' (which emphasised the production adjustment of rice 
and aimed to reduce the total national rice acreage from 3.2 million 
hectares to 2 million hectares in the space of 10 years, and to promote 
the 'constructive' abandonment of agriculture by farmers in order to pro­
mote the consolidation of land holdings); a paper entitled 'Concerning the 
Powerful Deployment of a Comprehensive Agricultural Policy'; and finally 
in November 1969, 'An Outline for the Execution of a Comprehensive 
Agricultural Policy'. This became the formal party position adopted by 
the PARC. This plan showed how far in fact the LDP's agricultural 
members recognised the need for change in the light of the rice surplus 
situation. They settled on a course of action which they believed was
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necessary to preserve the FC system. They recognised that there was a 
need to answer demands for improvement in farmers' incomes, but they 
questioned whether the mechanism of the producer rice price constituted 
as handy an instrument for increasing farm incomes as it had in the past. 
The Investigation Committee's plan proposed to deal with the rice surplus 
problem in much the same way as the MAF: through production consolidation
(seisan seibb) and it promised incentive payments for compliance with 
rice planting conversion. It also contained pricing policies for con­
version crops such as soya beans, vegetables, fruit and livestock 
products. As measures for increasing farmers' incomes and raising 
agricultural production, it cited agricultural road consolidation on a 
large scale; reform of the Agricultural Land Law to allow for the 
practical use of state forests and to promote the transfer of agricultural 
land; strengthening the agricultural structural policy which focussed on 
the encouragement of integrated agricultural management complexes (einö 
danchi) managed by the cooperatives and which co-ordinated production, 
processing and marketing functions; and the introduction of a farmers' 
pension scheme from 1970 onwards to encourage farmers to leave the land. 
The LDP plan did not, however, specify the concrete terms under which 
the immediate target of reducing rice production by 1.5 billion tonnes 
or 350,000 hectares in 1970 would be met.
The opposition parties which entered the agricultural policy debate 
at this critical juncture aimed to resolve the rice surplus problem with 
proposals not radically different from those of the government party.
The JSP for example, proposed to undertake a high speed conversion of one 
million hectares of paddy over five years, the DSP to accomplish a basic 
adjustment of 2.5 million hectares over a 10 year interval, the Komeito 
to provide special encouragement to production conversion, and the JCP to
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guarantee prices for agricultural products other than rice. There was 
no fundamental questioning in any of these sets of proposals of the 
basic principle of special consideration and financial support for the 
farm sector.
The report of the Agricultural Policy Advisory Council also geared 
its suggestions to the rice surplus. It proposed that the government put 
into effect a policy of 'voluntary' production adjustment (jishu chdsei), 
involving the fallowing of rice paddies and crop diversion in cooper­
ation with agricultural groups and the farmers and if necessary, the 
institution of a legal basis for planting limits. It also recommended 
that the government restrict the amount of rice it bought and lower the 
producer rice price.
The debate then shifted to one key issue: the 'voluntary' nature
of the farmers' compliance with government proposals. Zenchü and other 
agricultural groups interpreted the Advisory Council's report to mean 
that if its primary recommendation proved unsuccessful, that is, if pro­
duction adjustment failed with the 'voluntary' cooperation of farmers 
and agricultural groups, then the more severe secondary proposals of the 
report would be applied: legal restrictions on rice production, buying
limits on government rice, and a lowering of the producer rice price. 
Consequently, Zenchü's 'Set of Proposals for a Comprehensive Agricultural 
Policy' (Sögö Nösei Taisaku) centred its discussions around the question 
of 'voluntary' production adjustment. The debate that followed between 
the government party and Nokyo took up this theme. The basic question 
that had to be resolved was the price in terms of subsidies and incentive 
payments which the farmers should be paid in exchange &r their 'voluntary' 
cooperation. Nokyo argued that subsidies were necessary to compensate 
farmers for any loss of income due to crop diversion. In October,
Miyawaki attended a meeting of the LDP's Comprehensive Agricultural Policy
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Investigation Committee’s sub-committee and presented Nokyo's requests 
on income compensation for farmers engaging in planting conversion. The 
following day he gave his assurances that if voluntary adjustment of 
rice cultivation were undertaken on the initiative of the government and 
the LDP, the farmers and agricultural groups would be in a position to 
cooperate with it.'*'
Two days later, Hasegawa, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry,
met with Miyawaki and other leaders of ZenchTi and formally requested the
cooperation of Nokyo and the farmers in the production adjustment of rice
from the 1970 production year, after promising to give due consideration
to support for the income of farmers undertaking planting conversion.
The aim of these measures he argued, was ’to maintain the basis of the FC 
2system'. He reasoned that if the rice surplus situation continued, it 
would be extremely difficult to maintain the essentials of the FC system. 
This justified the need for production adjustment from the 1970 season.
He added that if Nokyo and the farmers gave their cooperation to pro­
duction adjustment, then the government would be in a position to maintain 
3FC. His argument hinged on the familiar threat that if the rice surplus 
problem were not solved in the immediate future, a continuation of the 
system of rice control in its current form would be an impossibility.
This was combined with the offer of monetary incentives for compliance 
with government policies. Miyawaki's reply clarified his understanding of 
the concept of production adjustment: that it would be undertaken with
This was reported in 'Nogyo • Nokyo Kankei Shuyo Nisshi’, Nögyo 
Kyödö Kumiai, December 1969, p.128.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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administrative guidance which he accepted, provided there was no element
of coercion or the use of strong authority on the part of government.
What he advocated was mutual agreement on the concrete conditions (that
is incentives) under which production adjustment was to be instituted.
He demanded a promise from government to maintain FC and to provide
subsidies to farmers to indemnify them for income lost from desisting
from rice production. Clarification of the concrete terms for production
adjustment, he requested, should be decided in Cabinet prior to Prime
Minister Sato's trip to the United States in mid-November."^
From within Nokyo itself, however, there was considerable objection
to the leadership's acceptance of the concept of reducing rice production.
From the main rice producing regions of Hokkaido, Tohoku, Hokuriku and
Kyushu, local Nokyo leaders propagated the view that the central leader-
2ship was acting alone and did not have their support. Representatives 
from single crop rice producing areas, put forward the alternative
plan that principal rice producing areas should be created to which the 
rice acreage reduction policy did not apply. The presentation of this 
alternative solution exacerbated the internal conflict within Nokyo, but 
the central leadership argued that rice was too important as a staple 
crop to reserve such special treatment for particular areas. The leader­
ship had no alternative but to accept uniform acreage reduction over the 
whole country. Their main task as they perceived it, was similar to the 
one they faced with the first crop diversion program: to act as mediator 
between the government and the farmers, and to campaign for the most 
favourable terms under which the farmers could be persuaded to comply with
1
2
This was reported in 'ibid. 
I to, op. cit. , p.155.
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an unpopular policy. The Zenohil leadership also repeated Hasegawa's
implied threat to its own membership: if the FC system collapsed, those
in jeopardy would not be MAF officials, but Nokyo and the farmers.^
The MAF, LDP and Zenohu unanimously agreed on the LDP Comprehensive
Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee's proposal that 350,000
hectares should be subject to production adjustment in 1970. This
amounted to a uniform 10 per cent acreage reduction nationwide. The
major area of contention was the matter of incentive payments. The MAF was
offering 30,000 yen per 0.1 hectares, and Zenohu was demanding 40,000 yen
with no distinction made between planting conversion and leaving paddies
fallow. The MOF circulated the view that incentive payments which
induced farmers to switch from rice production to leaving paddies fallow
was a waste of money, and that those financing it, the taxpayers, had not
2given their consent. The LDP was not prepared, for political reasons, 
to indicate its answer before the general election, a tactic previously 
employed whenever a rice price decision coincided with a national poll. 
Miyawaki and Sato held direct discussions on rice production adjustment 
immediately prior to the Prime Minister's departure for the United States. 
The Chairman of Zenohil still insisted that Nokyo be given the government's 
concrete terms for voluntary compliance by mid-November and hence before 
the election. Satö promised that he would clarify these on his return at 
the end of November. The government and LDP held discussions at this 
time as promised, and decided to make a decision on the amount they were 
prepared to outlay as incentive payments per 0.1 hectares on December 1, 
and present these to Nokyo on December 2. The policy on which it finally
Ibid.
2
Ibid.
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settled amounted to an election manifesto. It guaranteed to maintain 
the basis of the FC system (one of Nokyo’s specific demands); to institute 
the production adjustment of more than 1.5 million tonnes of rice; to 
grant incentive payments which would be differentiated according to the 
crop content of the conversion and the harvested amount of rice per 0.1 
hectares with the highest amount offered being not less than 40,000 yen; 
to establish a Rice Production Adjustment Promotion Council made up of 
administrative bodies and agricultural groups at central, prefectural, 
city, town and village levels which would decide on the distribution of 
conversion targets. The government refused at this juncture to commit 
itself to an average production adjustment payment, which it argued, 
could not be finalised prior to the 1970 budget draft. It had, however, 
been forced under direct Nokyo pressure to commit itself to the 40,000 
yen figure as the highest level of incentive payment it was prepared to 
offer, thus incorporating this strategically important figure as part of 
its election policies.
Zenchü responded to these proposals with a Combined Conference of 
National and Prefectural Central Union and Federation Chairmen (in other 
words the entire executive leadership of the agricultural cooperative 
organisation) which expressed its dissatisfaction with the agreement 
reached between the government party and the government. It criticised 
the government for its lack of clarification of a concrete sum to be 
offered as an incentive payment to farmers. Under sporadic threats from 
Nokyo members that they would confront the LDP at the polls (which was 
also part of the legacy of the 1969 producer rice price decision), local LDP 
candidates campaigning in the countryside focussed on the incentive pay­
ment issue, guaranteeing that the government party, if elected, would
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’pay well in its subsidies'. This helped to avert the threatened 
electoral confrontation between Nokyo and the LDP which had first been 
raised over the producer rice price freeze. The government party was 
successful in maintaining its electoral hegemony in rural areas.
Nokyo then shifted its pressure to the January budget campaign in 
which it concentrated on obtaining favourable terms for rice production 
adjustment. The MOF's recommendations as part of its 1970 budget draft 
proposed to make a payment of an average of only 21,000 yen per 0.1 
hectares, with favourable treatment given to conversion crops rather 
than leaving paddies fallow. The MAF was demanding 31,000 yen. Nokyo 
fiercely rejected the MOF proposal and put direct pressure on LDP Diet 
members in the Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation 
Committee and the Agriculture and Forestry Division. Rice Diet members 
made strong representations to government leaders to make a subsidy of 
35,000 yen with no distinction applied to farmers undertaking planting 
conversion or fallowing paddies. In the final negotiations between 
the government and the LDP leadership, the political arithmetic of the 
LDP rural lobby (the difference between the MAF recommended price and the 
final government price) , was successfully applied to produce a final 
figure of 35,070 yen as an average incentive payment to be paid to farmers 
per 0.1 hectares, irrespective of crop conversion or fallowing of 
land. The targeted amount of rice for production reduction was also 
reduced from 1.5 million tonnes to 1.0 million tonnes.
Once the basic financial guarantees had been obtained from 
government, Nokyo cooperated to the fullest with the institution of 
voluntary production adjustment. ZenchTi held a conference of National
1 Ibid. , p . 156.
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and Prefectural Central Union Agricultural Management and Agricultural 
Policy Department Chiefs to discuss the problem of rice acreage reduction 
and production adjustment. An explanation of government policy was 
presented to the conference by the Chief of the MAF Planning Room, and 
Nokyo’s corresponding policy was also discussed. Each prefectural 
central union worked out its plan for guidance to farmers from the agri­
cultural management and works point of view, and established guidelines 
for central union participation in the Promotion Council, in addition to 
group management by Nokyo of conversion crops and methods of conversion.
The targeted amounts were then apportioned to each prefecture by 
the Promotion Council, which began its work as soon as the budget of 
expenses for rice production adjustment had been received. Nokyo was 
allocated a crucial role in the program as manager of liaison between 
city, town and village governments, which decided the amount of rice 
acreage reduction for each farmer, and the farmers themselves. The 
government entrusted much of the adjustment on this to the internal 
decision-making of Nokyo itself.
Conclusion
The period 1967 to 1970 was a time of deliberate policy decision in 
response to what could only be called a critical situation in the 
Japanese farming industry. The LDP was given the long-awaited opportun­
ity and ample justification for applying rational economic solutions to 
the staggering problems of Japanese agriculture. A series of ever more 
radical reforms were instituted as the crisis in the FCSA deficit and 
rice surplus deepened. The government’s success in its task was only 
partial in the period under review. It could have moved much further 
and faster had it not been constantly called to account by LDP rice Diet
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members shielding their farming constituents from the unfavourable 
financial repercussions of government measures. In the policy debate 
that took place between 1967 and 1970, the government, represented by 
the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and the Minister of Finance 
(who in turn represented the Prime Minister and Cabinet), and the LDP 
leadership represented by the top three leaders of the party (the 
Secretary-General, the Chairman of the Executive Board and the Chairman 
of the Policy Affairs Research Council) had quite different sets of 
priorities from the internal party agricultural lobby made up of farm 
politicians who manned the LDP agricultural policy committees, and 
particularly the chairmen and vice-chairmen of these committees. The 
government and party leadership were the target of pressure emanating 
from within the party itself in the form of the rice lobby, and were 
generally more willing to contemplate reforms and restraints in the 
face of the increasingly unfavourable economic and fiscal situation. 
Rural Diet members on the other hand, shared the attitude of Nokyo and 
the farmers who opposed any prospective changes in the FC system and 
the policy of income support.
The Nokyo leadership did, however, show itself to be flexible 
enough if the monetary incentives were sufficient,and if cooperative 
domination of the rice collection market was not in any way jeopardised. 
These conditions were entrusted to Nokyo's Parliamentary allies to 
ensure.
The relationship between Zenohü and the agricultural cooperative 
membership bore many similarities to that between the LDP leadership 
and its farm politicians. Both leadership groups were much more willing 
to contemplate reforms - given certain provisos - than were their rank 
and file. Towards its membership, Zenohü's position was very much a
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policy persuasive one: it was the crucial intermediary in the search for
a compromise between the policy objectives of the MAF administration and 
the demands of its agricultural clientele. From beginning to end, however, 
ZenchTi was forced into a defensive and reactive position: it had to respond
continually to strong initiatives from governmental authorities who were 
urgently pressed by the imperatives of a financial situation created by 
massive rice surpluses. Nokyo had no constructive alternatives to offer 
in the face of these pressures for reform other than demands for the status 
quo to be maintained. Its initial reaction was consistently one of 
unequivocal opposition to government proposals combined with appeals for 
the retention of FC in its long-established form. At a certain point in 
the negotiation process when the government's determination to carry out 
substantial changes became clear (indicated primarily by MAF 
acceptance of the need for change and its taking the policy initiative), 
Zenchü typically retreated from its position of absolute rejection of the 
administration's proposals and moved to one of tacit acceptance of the 
need for change. Discussions then shifted to detailed bargaining between 
Nokyo and the MAF. This called for a strategy which, on Nokyo's part, 
maximised concessions to the cooperatives in the form of safeguards and 
guarantees of their privileged position in the rice market, combined with 
compensation for potential income losses to farmers in exchange for their 
acceptance of reform. Once this stage had been reached in the process of 
policy debate, the agricultural policy activities of the Nokyo leadership 
underwent a subtle reorientation. The successful introduction of reforms 
required acceptance of and cooperation with governmental initiatives by 
the farmers. Obtaining this cooperation meant redirecting pressure towards 
cooperative union members. During the period under review, the Nokyo 
leadership by and large accomplished this objective, but sometimes at the
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cost of tremendous dissatisfaction amongst those farmers hardest hit by 
the changes. This was vital, however, if Nokyo was to give full effect 
to its role as the primary assistance mechanism in the execution of 
government agricultural policies.
The way in which the 1967-1970 reforms were introduced illustrates 
the strategic limits of a pressure group ’operating within the system' 
(taiseinai no atsuryoku dantai-) . Nokyo was not able to contemplate con­
certed opposition and non-cooperation with government policies if it 
wished to maintain its privileged position and benefits as a semi- 
administrative body. This factor was recognised and exploited as a 
bargaining weapon by the government side including the Minister of 
Agriculture and Forestry. It proved to be an effective method of 
obtaining acceptance by the agricultural cooperative leadership to 
unprecedented reforms in the FC system.
When the rice surplus problem and the accompanying FCSA deficit 
reached crisis proportions in 1967, the MAF had clearly lost the agri­
cultural policy initiative. This was due to the failure of the 1961 
Agricultural Basic Law to restructure Japanese agriculture and expand 
the scale of farming. Initially both the Minister and the department 
performed a minor holding operation in reaction to the forces of inno­
vation. This response changed in the latter half of 1968, however, 
when under growing pressure from government financial authorities and 
from big business and fiscal experts who exercised their voice in 
advisory councils and in the press, the MAF produced its own solution 
in the form of a comprehensive agricultural policy. This long-term 
solution was accompanied by the more radical short-term objective of FC 
reform and restrictions on producer rice price increases. The latter 
were a response to proposals from government financial agencies and
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advisory councils including the RPAC. On the'other hand, the MAF terms 
for the introduction of a CAP in the form of incentive payments were 
carefully geared to obtaining the cooperation of farmers and Nokyo members 
with government priorities. The MAF demonstrated its skill in instituting 
changes in the system without undercutting Nokyo's position or the MAF 
budget. In fact it could be argued that new programs such as the CAP and 
voluntary production adjustment were justification for additional 
increases in the MAF's budget share.
How radical in fact were the reforms and new directions in agricultur­
al policy launched between 1967 and 1970? What was their long-term effect? 
The following section lists each of the reforms and traces the substance of 
its success or failure.
The Comprehensive Budget Principle collapsed from its first year of 
operation. It was promulgated for the 1968 budget year and instituted in 
the 1968 budget, but because the amount of rice the government bought in 
1968 exceeded original estimates by one million tonnes, a supplementary 
budget had to be passed in 1968 to provide the necessary finance. The 
additional amount allocated through the supplementary budget was 37 
billion yen. This added at the time to mounting pressures for reform of 
FC. Although the 'slide system' was successfully applied for the 1968 
producer and consumer rice prices, the eight per cent increase in the 
consumer rice price was not sufficient to cover the substantial increase 
in the cost of FC in that year. Rice in excess of consumption went into 
storage and was not sold at all, thus adding further costs to FC and so 
compounding the rice surplus problem.
The institution of a free trading system to supplement that operated 
by the government under FC proved more successful. First indications 
were, however, not very promising. These became evident in September 1969,
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a few months after the launching of the new system, when rough estimates 
for the 1970 budget were being drawn up. The Minister of Finance, Fukuda 
Takeo, in an explanation to Cabinet on the rough estimate of demands from 
each Ministry for the General Account budget, drew attention to the fact 
that 1969 had produced another expansion in the deficit of the FCSA 
because of the increase in the amount of rice bought by the government 
and ’dull' trading in free marketed rice. The government had stated that 
it would restrict its rice purchase to 7.5 million tonnes, permitting 1.7 
million tonnes to be sold freely. But the actual amount diverted to 
independent distribution fell far short of this target at only 0.86 
million tonnes. The government had been forced to purchase the difference 
because of previous guarantees that rice unsold on the free market would 
be purchased by the government. As a result, in November 1969 after a 
meeting with the MOF, the MAF and Food Control Agency announced that they 
would pay a subsidy of 60 yen per month for each 60 kilograms of free 
traded rice. This was designed to cover part of the trading costs and 
would be paid in the form of storage fees and interest to agricultural 
cooperatives and traders who stored and delivered rice for independent 
distribution. This amounted to a subsidy for the promotion of rice 
bought and sold on the free market. The government was aiming at pushing 
a further 400,000 tonnes into the system at a cost of 1.5 billion yen.
As a result, there was improvement in the ratio of targeted and actual 
amounts of rice under independent distribution. In 1970, the ratio was 
1.8 to 1.69 million tonnes, and in 1971, growers actually exceeded the 
target of 1.8 million tonnes by an extra 60,000 tonnes.
The figures for Nokyo's marketing commission on rice from 1970 on­
wards also showed the increasing share of free rice in the total amount 
handled by the cooperatives. Nokyo earned more than one billion yen from
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marketing commission on government sale and free traded rice in 1970.
The value of free traded rice in this total was 17.9 per cent. In 1971, 
it was 28.6 per cent, in 1972 28.2 per cent, in 1973 31.1 per cent 
and in 1974, 30.5 per cent.^ In spite of the existence of dual market­
ing systems for rice, however, the FCSA continued to climb at a stagger­
ing rate after 1969. The two other major changes instituted during the 
1967-70 period, the producer rice price freeze and the CAP or rice pro­
duction conversion, failed to alter its acceleration.
By diverting a certain proportion of the rice produced to the inde­
pendent distribution system, the government was able to lower the actual 
amount of rice it bought from 1970 onwards. In April 1969, one month 
before the system was launched by an amendment to the FC Law, the amount 
of the 1968 rice harvest bought by government was calculated at 10 million 
tonnes. By September 1970, however, the Food Control Agency was able to 
state that the total of advance-booked rice for the 1970 year was down to 
8.5 million tonnes.
The reduction in the government’s buying level was also a result of 
the lower overall production of rice. In 1970, it fell by 1.3 million 
tonnes to 12.7 million tonnes, and in 1971, it fell again (partially 
assisted by a poorer harvest) to 10.9 million tonnes. This was due 
largely to the production conversion and acreage reduction program which 
successfully accomplished its targets (shown in Table 5.4).
Nonetheless, the fundamental cause for the institution of changes in 
the rice system, the FCSA deficit, remained. There were several reasons 
for this. Firstly, the government was faced with enormous losses in dis­
posing of the rice surplus. In 1970, the government’s rice holdings
Calculated from figures given in Sdgd Nökyö Tökeihyo, 1974, op. cit. 
p .130.
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Table 5.4
TARGETS AND RESULTS IN 
Units:
THE PRODUCTION ADJUSTMENT 
million tonnes, %
PROGRAM
Year Target Result Rate
1970 1.00 1.39 139
1971 2.30 2.26 98
1972 2.15 2.33 108
Source: Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, ’The
Current Situation of Rice Economy in Japan',
Japan Agricultural Coop News, Vol.13, No.3,
October 1972, p.15.
reached 7.35 million tonnes which was the equivalent of 15 months supply. 
This created an enormous headache in terms of storage costs and disposal 
strategies. A great deal of effort and expense was poured into reducing 
the government’s rice stockpile with the loss estimated at 1,000 billion 
yen by 1971.
Secondly, the producer rice price freeze lasted substantially for 
only two years instead of three. Even in 1970 (its second year of oper­
ation), it rose by a very small 41 yen per koku, and this was supplemented 
by a 'political addition' in the form of a government subsidy amounting to 
23.8 billion yen as a 'quality incentive payment' (in the same vein as the 
22.5 billion yen subsidy issued in 1969 as 'Rice Planting Special Policy 
Works Expenses' to soften the blow of the price freeze). The additional 
payment added on to the producer rice price emerged from the negotiations 
between the government and the LDP. The latter had been demanding a rise 
in the producer rice price of 4.4 per cent. The quality incentive payment 
was the equivalent of a 2.7 per cent increase.
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In 1971, the producer rice price rose by 2.98 per cent, but 
additional benefits and subsidies (as in the previous three years) lifted 
this to the equivalent of a six per cent rise in the rice price. The year 
1971 was also marked by disruptions to RPAC proceedings led by Nokyo’s 
representatives. The result was the RPAC closed without submitting its 
recommendation to the government. The small percentage increase in 1971 
added another 46.5 billion yen to government rice expenditure, in 
addition to a grant of 7.4 billion yen as a subsidy for free traded rice 
and the 10 billion yen in additional subsidies to rice growers accompany­
ing the producer rice price decision.
1971 proved to be the last year of moderation in producer 
rice price increases. As inflation hit Japan, the MAF's 'Income Compen­
sation and Production Cost' formula forced increases of 5.06 per cent in 
1972, 16.1 per cent in 1973, and a staggering 37.4 per cent in 1974. The 
deficit in the FCSA for rice control continued to rise, more than 
doubling between 1970 and 1976 (it was 360.8 billion yen in 1970 and 
740.8 billion yen in 1976).^ Throughout this period, supplementary 
budgets were required to finance producer rice price increases. Increases 
in the producer rice price were clearly overtaking the cost-cutting re­
forms in FC and production adjustment to force substantial annual rises 
in FC expenses. The situation in the mid-1970s was presenting the govern­
ment and agricultural policy-makers with the same problems they faced 
in the late 1960s. The alternatives facing Japan's agricultural policy­
makers in relation to rice control had not substantially changed.
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Food Agency, 'Budget Relating 
to Indigenous Rice's {sic.) Control and Production Adjustment', n.d., p.33 
(supplied directly to the author).
371
CHAPTER 6
NOKYO AND THE ANTI-LIBERALISATION LOBBY IN FRUIT AND
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS
The centrality of rice to Nokyo's political operations is indisput­
able. Nevertheless, other issues recurrent in Japanese agricultural 
policy have motivated the political action of Japan's farmers. The 
agricultural trade liberalisation question is one of these. Beginning in 
1959, the liberalisation debate intensified in the late 1960s and early 
1970s as pressure from agricultural exporting countries for abolition of 
Japanese import restrictions grew, and domestic producers rallied under 
Nokyo's leadership to launch their own counter-offensive.
The history of the anti-liberalisation movement has been a partial 
victory for both sides. Although the Japanese government succeeded in 
reducing the total number of agricultural commodities under import con­
trol, those most subject to domestic political pressure from Japan's 
farmers remain in dispute. The key items are beef, dairy products, 
citrus fruits and fruit juice. This chapter details the structure of 
the anti-liberalisation lobby with particular reference to Nokyo's 
leadership of the livestock and fruit sectors.
The Course of Japanese Agricultural Trade Liberalisation
International pressure on Japan for increased trade and capital 
liberalisation came chiefly from the United States and was exercised 
primarily through the medium of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade). Japan became an official signatory in 1955, and at 
the October 1959 GATT general meeting in Tokyo, increased calls were
372
made for Japanese trade liberalisation. The first steps in this direc­
tion were made by the Cabinet Council for Promoting the Liberalisation 
of Trade and Exchange (Böeki Kawase Jiyuka Sokushin Kakuryö Kaigi), which 
was charged with formulating concrete liberalisation proposals. The 
Council came to a firm decision on a 'basic policy' for liberalisation in 
January 1960. In May, this was followed by a MAF policy draft which out­
lined trade liberalisation for a number of agricultural commodities. The 
most significant items on this list were soya beans (liberalised in July 
1961), and lemons (liberalised in May 1964). It was only in connection 
with the latter that significant opposition was aroused amongst the 
farmers. Lemon production was a viable farm industry virtually destroyed 
by import liberalisation;^ soya bean production was already in decline 
at the time of liberalisation. The experience of lemon growers in South­
ern Japan, although they constituted a small, select group of farmers, 
provided the agricultural lobby with the historical evidence they needed 
to spur their renewed campaign against the government's much more 
extensive liberalisation proposals formulated in the late 'sixties. The 
liberalisation dispute during this latter period centred chiefly around 
citrus fruits, particularly grapefruit.
In 1968, there were still 73 commodities under the jurisdiction of 
the MAF which could be classed in the quantitative import control cate­
gory. This number was the highest amongst the advanced nations, which
According to Kenzo Hemmi, 'the domestic (retail) price of lemons 
declined sharply from around 60 yen per fruit (before liberalization) to 
around 15 yen (from September to November, 1964) . . . .  In facing this 
price decline the producers gave up lemon production, and all lemon trees 
were cut out.' All lemons and limes consumed in Japan are now imported. 
See his 'Structural Adjustment of Japanese Agriculture', Australia-Japan 
Economic Relations Research Project, Research Paper, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1974, p.13.
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made the Japanese particularly vulnerable to foreign criticism and 
demands for liberalisation. In September 1969, Hasegawa Shiro, Minister 
of Agriculture and Forestry, nominated 23 articles for liberalisation in 
the Cabinet Council for Promoting the Liberalisation of Trade and Exchange. 
In the following month, the Cabinet Council decided to liberalise 28 
articles from amongst the 73. With only 45 restricted import articles 
remaining, the Japanese were then able to argue that their total was only 
slightly larger than that of France with 39.
Liberalisation of a majority of agricultural commodities on this list 
was accomplished in April 1970.^ For the rest (which included nine items 
to which producer objections were raised such a grapefruit, black tea and 
rapeseed), the government decided to delay abolition of import quotas 
until the end of 1971.
Nonetheless, the pace of liberalisation continued, and import •
restrictions were abolished on a range of agricultural products in
X 3 XSeptember 1970, January 1971, June 1971 (the round originally scheduled
These included dried dates, fruit flavours, instant coffee, fruit 
flour, gluten and gluten flour, and malt sugar. See US Department of 
Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Agricultural Trade Policy,
June 1972 , p . 17 .
2 Items liberalised in this round included lemon juice, margarine, 
shortening, potato (flour,meal, and flakes), tapioca, sago and other 
starches. Ibid.
3 This round involved fresh grapes, cake mixes, macaroni, spaghetti, 
noodles, puffed rice, corn flakes etc. Ibid.
4 This group included fresh grapefruit, soya bean oilcake and meal, 
rapeseed meal, rapeseed, vegetable oils, peanuts for oil extraction, 
sausages, live horses, bases for beverages (nonalcoholic), fresh apples, 
frozen pineapples, limes, grapes, apples (provisionally preserved), black 
tea, grain sorghum (other than for feed), lemon and spa water. Ibid.
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for December, which included grapefruit), October 1971’ and April 1972.
In addition to this rapid reduction in the number of agricultural 
commodities under import restriction, the Japanese government increased 
its import quotas for beef, oranges, and fruit juice in the early 1970s.
Although the producer lobby was successful in achieving a delay in 
the liberalisation of certain sensitive commodities such as grapefruit 
and rapeseed from October 1969 to June 1971, considerable progress was 
made during this period towards a substantial freeing of agricultural 
trade from import controls. By mid-1972, there were still some commodi­
ties in dispute, however, such as beef, oranges, and fruit juice, as 
well as certain dairy products such as butter, skim milk and other milk 
products, peanuts, and miscellaneous beans. All these items remained the 
focus of continuing pressure for liberalisation from Japan’s main foreign 
agricultural suppliers: the US, Australia and New Zealand.
It was at this point in 1972 that events in the international environ­
ment impinged on the Japanese domestic scene and gave an ideological boost 
to the protectionist cause. A global shortage of foodgrains beginning in 
mid-1972 and a US soya bean embargo in 1973 combined with the oil crisis 
of that year to generate a renewed sense of Japanese vulnerability to 
reduced supplies of strategic resource materials (into which such staple 
items as soya beans, food and feed grains were classed). They also 
affected the Japanese economy as a whole, giving rise to a recession and
This list included live cattle, live pigs, pork, instant potatoes, 
canned corn, confectionery products, biscuits, manioc, arrowroot, sweet 
potatoes (and their flour and meals), molasses, sugar and chocolate con­
fectionery, nectar. Ibid.
2 Items liberalised included ham and bacon, refined beet and cane 
sugar, tomato puree, certain mixed feeds, salted meat and edible offal. 
Ibid.
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reduced economic growth expectations. Henceforth, the agricultural pro­
tectionist lobby was able to identify its sectoral interests with those 
of the national interest and national security.
These developments sparked off a dramatic downturn in the domestic 
livestock industry which prompted the government to suspend the beef 
quota for the remainder of fiscal 1973 and for 1974, thereby ceasing 
beef imports into Japan. This act marked a turning point in the trend 
towards increasing agricultural trade liberalisation. It intensified 
the dispute between agricultural exporting countries (such as Australia, 
the US, and New Zealand) and Japan: not only over the iniquities, in
their view, of the import quota system for certain products, but over 
the pernicious effects of such ’stop-go’ import policies on their own 
domestic farm industries.
Far from responding to these pressures, the Japanese government went 
a step further in institutionalising its import restrictions on beef with 
the passage of an amendment to the Law Relating to the Price Stabilisation 
of Livestock Commodities (Chikusanbutsu no Kakaku Anteitd ni kansuru 
Hovistsu) in 1975. The measures contained in this legislation were 
specifically designed to prevent a recurrence of the drastic fall in the 
domestic wholesale beef prices which had occurred in late 1973 and 1974. 
Imports henceforth were to be made only in order to stabilise domestic 
wholesale prices for beef.
The status quo established in relation to beef in 1975 has continued 
to exist in spite of continued criticism from Japan's overseas suppliers. 
Similar provisions exist in legislation for dairy products, while oranges 
and fruit juice remain subject to import quota restrictions.
This chapter focusses on the two main periods of dispute over agri­
cultural trade liberalisation: between 1969 and 1971, when grapefruit
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was the key commodity at issue; and from 1972 onwards, when the debate 
intensified in relation to those products as yet unliberalised: beef,
dairy products, oranges and fruit juice.
Discussion centres around the structure of the Japanese citrus and 
livestock lobbies: the various groups, organisations and institutions
with a stake in the viability of these farm industries. Because the 
issue of liberalisation is bound up with larger questions of the structure 
of Japanese agricultural production and price stabilisation policies, the 
analysis extends to more general questions relating to fruit and livestock 
policies and the course of their evolution.
The Nokyo Rice and Specialist Farmers* Lobbies: Some Contrasts
Certain fundamental differences exist between the political repre­
sentation of rice growers and Japanese beef, dairy and fruit farmers.
The Nokyo rice lobby has several basic features which lend it great 
strength: its economic and financial predominance in mainstream sögö nokyo
operations; its geographical breadth in production area and primacy in 
terms of the number of rice-cultivating farmers; its production importance 
in the total pattern of Japanese agricultural output and its significance 
as a staple food; and its status as a prime agricultural income earner 
with high priority in government farm incomes policies.
These elements are either lacking or not evident to the same degree 
in the case of citrus and livestock products. These lobbies however, have 
other features which magnify their political significance.
Livestock and fruit farming have been the focus of MAF 'selective 
expansion' and 'production diversion' programs. As a result they have 
benefited from special government subsidies and assistance measures. 
Equally important has been the incorporation of livestock and fruit
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products (particularly livestock) into the vast ancillary processing and 
farm input supply industries into which Nokyo has undertaken considerable 
financial and business expansion. As items not only of production, but 
also as processed merchandise in the form of fruit juice, packaged milk, 
ham and sausage, livestock and citrus commodities have assumed added 
importance in the totality of Nokyo's economic operations. And as is 
often the case, political 'interest' is related to the size of Nokyo's 
economic stake in a particular farm industry.
Considerable agricultural cooperative energy, planning and finance 
have been channelled into livestock and fruit 'integration' strategies 
which rest at their base on 'agricultural production complexes' or 
'integrated farm management units (eznd danchi). The latter form part of 
a full-scale government-assisted program to rationalise and expand co­
operative production, distribution, processing and marketing facilities 
in these sectors.
Perhaps the most significant difference between rice production and 
livestock and fruit farming, is the more regionally concentrated and 
highly specialised character of the latter. These factors lend the 
advantage of geographic proximity and close identity of interest to the 
producers involved. They also provide a strong organisational focus for 
the specialist cooperatives which operate in these sectors. One political 
consequence of this is the involvement of Nokyo specialist groups in 
lobbying activities on behalf of their membership. The result has been 
a sharing of the spokesmanship function between Zenchü, the 'natural' 
leader of the agricultural cooperatives with other specialist Nokyo 
federations. This picture of overlap, or functional sharing, is one 
that extends to all aspects of the fruit and livestock industries in 
Japan: from marketing, purchasing, guidance and production services, to
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agricultural policy activities. The extent and nature of this organis­
ational overlap is a major theme in the following discussion of Nokyo's 
leadership of the anti-liberalisation lobby.
Another political consequence of regional concentration of special­
ist commodity production is high levels of policy activity amongst some 
regional Nokyo specialist federations. Close connections have been 
established between these organisations and Diet members representing 
regions of production specialisation. In the context of the political 
representation of livestock and fruit interests in the Diet, a number of 
key political figures with specific commodity links and specialist Nokyo 
connections have come to play an important role in influencing liberal­
isation policies in both formal and informal Diet and party positions.
The prominent members of this group and the nexus of regional, organis­
ational and agricultural interests which they embody is selected for 
detailed examination.
The anti-liberalisation campaign in the Diet has been advanced by 
one group in particular: the Fruit Farming Promotion Diet Members'
League (Kaju Nögyö Shinko Giin Renmei), (hereafter referred to as the 
Fruit Promotion League, or FPL). Membership of this group is dominated 
by Parliamentary representatives from fruit producing prefectures, who 
are also known as 'fruit MPs' (kudamono giin).
The FPL was launched at the beginning of the anti-liberalisation 
debate in 1959 in direct response to increased pressure from the US 
and other GATT members for abolition of Japanese import controls on 
agricultural products. Its title reflects the historical course of the 
liberalisation debate: the early scheduling of lemons for liberalisation
and the prominence of grapefruit as a significant item in dispute. The FPL 
operated in much the same way as the informal grouping of LDP rice Diet
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members known as the Rice Price Policy Conference (Beika Taisaku 
Kyogikai): it was the key grouping for the transmission of pressure
from the extra-Parliamentary, anti-liberalisation agricultural lobby 
into Diet and government party policy-making machinery.
As liberalisation schedules extended to other sensitive products 
like grapefruit, rapeseed, miscellaneous beans and pork, the FPL 
became the spearhead organisation of farm politicians in the Diet who 
opposed agricultural trade liberalisation. Membership numbers expanded 
to include not only fruit MPs but other Diet members whose farming 
constituents felt themselves under threat. At the height of the anti­
liberalisation campaign in 1971 it mobilised 153 members.'*"
Functional Overlap in the Specialist Fruit Industry
The following survey of agricultural cooperative involvement in the 
Japanese fruit industry produces a complex picture of functional overlap 
between the mainstream and specialist sides of the Nokyo organisation. 
This vertical division is further complicated by horizontal and geo­
graphic variations: that is, the proportional share of general-purpose
and specialist cooperative involvement differs according'to organis­
ational level and region.
The marketing of fruit amongst the tankyö is conducted by both 
general-purpose cooperatives as part of their wide-ranging marketing 
activities relating to the whole spectrum of agricultural commodities 
traded in Japan, and also by specialist fruit agricultural cooperatives.
Enoki Akira, Takagi Kinae and Hirata Masami, 'Han Jiyuka Giin'
(The Anti-liberalisation Dietmen), Keiei Mondai, No.36, September 1971, 
p.243 .
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At this level, the sogo nokyo handle the overwhelming proportion of fruit,
_ 2although their share is declining in comparison with the senmon nokyo .
The trend, in other words, is towards increasing specialist organisation 
formation and turnover in fruit. Local fruit co-ops are engaged mainly 
in marketing and operate in the more important fruit producing areas (where 
the scale of fruit production warrants the establishment of a specialist 
tarikyö). Their scale of operations (per cooperative) tends to be much 
larger than that of the sögö nokyo handling fruit. Purchasing activities 
involve the supply of items directly related to the production and 
marketing of fruit, such as corrugated cardboard containers.
The picture of overall general-purpose domination in fruit handling 
at the local level is reversed at the prefectural level where the share 
of specialist federations (senmon ren göka i, or senmonven) is high. This 
is particularly true in the case of citrus fruits and amongst these, mikan 
are by far the most important product.
The activities of the fruit Nokyo federations centre on production 
guidance and marketing. Guidance activities are specific to fruit, and 
are conducted by technicians who stay permanently in production areas and 
give advice directly to farmers. Purchasing functions are also fruit- 
related, and mainly entail the supply of materials needed for fruit pro­
duction and marketing, such as specialist packaging. More general farming
According to MAF surveys reported in Nökyö Nenkan, 1971, p.295, there 
were 6,622 sogo nokyo engaged in the fruit marketing business with a total 
turnover of 131.6 billion yen. On the other hand, there were only 52 
senmon nökyö handling a much smaller total business.volume of 17.6 billion 
yen (only one seventh the sogo nokyo total).
In Nökyö Nenkan, 1973, p.283, it was reported that 2,458 sögö nökyö 
and 123 seimon nökyö were engaged in fruit handling, and that measured in 
terms of the tonnage of fruit shipped, the general purpose cooperatives 
marketed four times the amount of the specialist cooperatives (cf. foot­
note 1) .
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needs like fertiliser and agricultural chemicals are handled by the 
senmonren only in limited amounts, and in most cases this is contracted 
business with the keizairen (the general-purpose prefectural economic 
federations). These are areas in which the general-purpose organisations 
predominate. Senmonren activities have more recently extended into the 
business of fruit processing (juice and canned goods).
An examination of the relative market shares of the keizairen and
senmonren in fruit substantiates the strength of the specialist Nokyo
fruit federations. In 1970, the prefectural economic federations handled
fruit to a value of 70.2 billion yen.^ The marketing volume of the
2specialist fruit federations was 105.4 billion yen.
The proportional weight of so go nokyo and senmonren fruit handling 
is reflected in the structure of the membership of the national Nokyo 
fruit specialist organisation: the Japan Horticultural Agricultural
Cooperative Federation (Nihon Engei Nokyo Rengökai, or Nichienren). Its 
direct membership is composed predominantly of specialist Nokyo fruit 
federations. In 1972, Nichienren had 20 member federations (of these 
19 were sentnonren) and six unit agricultural cooperative members (of
3these five were senmon nokyo). Within these 20 member federations, 
however, sögö nokyo constituted the overwhelming proportion with 1,102 
general-purpose nokyo members, and only 77 senmon nökyö members,^ 
reflecting the large number of general-purpose cooperative engaged in 
fruit marketing at the local level. The latter are members of the
Nokyo Nenkan, 1973, op. cit. , p.225.
2 Calculated from figures given in ibid., p.284.
3 Ibid., p.203. These figures vary only by one or two from year to
year.
 ^ Ibid.
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specialist fruit federations mainly for the purpose of shipping fruit 
directly to regional wholesale markets. They represent almost half the 
total number of general-purpose co-ops handling fruit.^ Those sögö 
nökyö not connected to Nichienven's member federations either market 
fruit locally, or operate through the keizaiven-Zenriö fruit marketing 
system.
Another aspect of the functional sharing between the two types of 
cooperatives handling fruit is the regional strength of certain Nokyo 
specialist fruit organisations. This is evident at both local and 
prefectural levels. The picture of sögö nökyö predominance in fruit 
marketing is balanced to some extent by the strength of certain local 
fruit cooperatives in selected areas. Senmon nökyö are prominent in 
citrus handling in Ehime and Saga for example, and in deciduous fruits 
in Yamanashi. Furthermore, although the total number of specialist fruit 
co-ops and their total marketing volume is smaller in the case of the 
senmon nökyö than the sögö nökyö, their average volume per cooperative
is much larger: 340.1 million yen per specialist co-op compared with
_ 219.8 million yen per sogo nokyo. The explanation for this is clear 
enough: as far as general-purpose cooperatives are concerned, fruit is
one commodity amongst many, and fruit marketing one function amongst a 
multitude. For the specialist fruit cooperatives on the other hand, 
fruit handling represents their total livelihood and organisational 
rationale.
In 1972, this was 1,102 co-ops out of 2,458. See ibid.
2 These figures are for 1970 (see Nokyo Nenkan, 1971, op. oit. , p.295), 
but the same pattern predominates in all years.
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The regional strength of specialist Nokyo fruit organisations is
also evident at prefectural level. Total keizairen turnover in fruit in
1970 was 70.2 billion yen.^ On the other hand, seven Nokyo specialist
fruit federations operating in Yamagata, Tottori, Kagawa, Ehime,
Fukuoka, Nagasaki and Hiroshima had a combined marketing turnover of 
234.5 billion yen, which represented almost half this figure. Prefectural
senmonren strength in the citrus industry especially mikan,is also very
3apparent in some fruit producing areas. Some of these federations have
set up their own factories for juice and canned fruit production, others
for the production of specialist fruit marketing requirements such as
4corrugated cardboard containers for fruit shipments.
Overlap between the mainstream Nokyo organisation and specialist 
fruit federations also exists at the national level. Fruit marketing 
for example, is conducted by both Nichienren and Zennd (Zenhanren prior 
to 1972), with the general-purpose side of the organisation handling 
slightly more than double the national horticultural federation.'
Nokyo Nenkan, 1973, op. cit. , p.225.
2 -  -Calculated from figures given in Nokyo Nenkan, 1972, p.288.
3 The Shizuoka Prefecture Citrus Nokyo Federation (Shizuoka-ken 
Kankitsuren) had a marketing turnover of 16.5 billion yen in 1971. Of 
this nrikan represented 14.9 billion yen. Similar figures for the 
Wakayama Prefecture Fruit Nokyo Federation (Wakayama-ken Kajitsuren) 
were 15.5 billion yen (nrikan 9.3 billion); and the Saga Prefecture 
Horticulture Nokyo Federation (Saga-ken Engeiren) 11.0 billion yen 
(nrikan 9.9 billion). These details were obtained from 'ibid.
4 Specialist prefectural fruit federations in Shizuoka, Tottori, 
Hiroshima, Ehime, Saga, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Yamagata and Kanagawa 
operate canning and juice factories (sometimes in the form of 
cooperative companies). Federations in Hiroshima, Ehime, Saga, Tottori 
and Tokushima manage corrugated cardboard factories.
In 1971 for example, Zenhanren turnover in fruit was 37.1 
billion yen; that for Nichienren was 17.4 billion. See Nökyö Nenkan, 
1973, op. cit., p.226, and 1972, p.289 respectively.
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Whereas fruit marketing represented only 2.1 per cent of Zenhccnren's 
total marketing turnover in 1971, however, almost all Nichienren 's 
functions were related to fruit.^ In other words, its marketing, pur­
chasing, production guidance, export, education and informational 
activities are all commodity-specific in the sense that they concern a 
small range of fruit products, nichienren, although strictly speaking a
'horticultural' federation (a descriptive category which also includes 
2vegetables ), is predominantly an organisation of fruit farmers, and
'specialisation' within fruit agricultural cooperative organisations at
all levels involves not only a restricted set of commodities, but a
limited range of functions in relation to these commodities.
Furthermore, Nichienren could be said to represent only those fruit
producers linked to it through organisational membership. Its direct
members are almost all specialist fruit or horticultural cooperatives
(20 federations and six tankyö). Its extended federation links it to a
further 1,227 organisations: 1,102 sögö nökyö, 77 senmon nökyö, 22 pre-
3fectural federations and 26 less than prefectural-size federations. 
These in turn have a total farmer membership of 1.3 million.
Its technical advisory functions for example are related to fruit 
production and farm management, and in this area it cooperates positively 
with MAF in the dissemination of new techniques, and in the Ministry's 
general research and experimental activities. Its marketing role centres 
around detailed regional analyses of demand/supply situations, and it 
undertakes planned deliveries of fruit to marketing centres. The aim of 
its delivery adjustment activities is to encourage stable prices for pro­
ducers. Marketing activities also extend to consumption publicity, mar­
keting mediation and provision of transport. Nichienren's purchasing 
functions, like that of its lower level organisations, revolve around the 
supply of specialist packaging products for fruit. It also engages in the 
export of fruit products: mainly mikan and mikan juice to overseas 
countries such as Canada, the US, USSR, Europe, the Philippines and the 
Middle East.
2 Vegetables are almost entirely concentrated in the hands of the 
general-purpose Nokyo organisation and utilise the sögö nökyö-keizairen- 
Zennö route.
3
Nokyo Nenkan, 1973, op. cit., p.283.
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The sogo nökyö membership figure, however, represents less than 
half the total number of sogö nökyö engaged in fruit marketing.
Nichienren is also limited in its representation of specialist fruit 
cooperatives: it covers only 82 (five direct members and 77 base-level
members) out of a total of 564 horticultural sermon nökyö . ^  However, in 
gauging Nichienren's leadership position in the fruit industry, one 
should look beyond mere numerical proportions to the quality of its 
membership. Its direct members include all those specialist fruit 
federations with the highest average turnovers in fruit marketing: those
in the main fruit (and especially citrus) producing regions of Ehime, 
Wakayama, Shizuoka, Saga, Yamanashi, Tottori, Fukuoka, Hiroshima,
Nagasaki etc. In other words, Nichienren is an organisation composed of 
the largest regional specialist fruit federations in Japan, most of 
which are particularly strong in the area of citrus fruit. This has 
vital implications for its agricultural policy functions and interests, 
and particularly for its stance in the liberalisation debate over grape­
fruit .
Fruit interests are also represented at the national level by 
another specialist federation: the Japan Fruit Juice Agricultural
Cooperative Federation (Nihon Kajü Nökyö Rengökai, or Kajüren). A 
comparatively small organisation compared to Nichienren, Kajuren is com­
posed of 10 federations and two agricultural cooperatives which undertake 
the processing and marketing of fruit juice. Its main business relates 
to guidance on marketing and processing, and technical inspection. With 
the expansion in demand for fruit juice in recent years, the growth in
1 Ibid. Being ’horticultural' cooperatives, however, a certain pro­
portion of these would handle only vegetables, or predominantly vegetables.
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the Japanese fruit juice industry has been spectacular, and Kayuren1s 
policy involvement has extended to issues which involve this particular 
commodity, such as the establishment of a 'Price Stabilisation Fund for 
Raw Fruit for Processing'. With fruit juice also high on the list of 
items in the anti-liberalisation campaign, Kajüren has actively partici­
pated in the movement to 'halt expanded imports and import liberalisation 
of fruit juice'
Nichienren's Political Role
Nichienren as the leadership organisation of cooperatives conducting 
economic, business, production and technical activities in relation to 
fruit and especially citrus products, has been at the forefront of the 
anti-liberalisation movement. More than any other issue, the grapefruit 
import question launched Nichienren on to the political stage. Historic­
ally, government moves to de-control citrus imports also coincided with 
expansion in consumer demand for fruit and fruit products and increasing 
levels of official assistance to the industry under the 'selective 
expansion' clause of the Agricultural Basic Law. These factors combined 
to multiply Nichienren's policy interests and connections at a crucial 
time.^
In its public and official pressure group activities, Nichienren 
deploys strategies similar to Zenchü: conferences of member chairmen,
Nokyo Nenkan, 1973, op. cit. , p.283.
2 In its outline of activities as reported in Nokyö Nenkan each year, 
there is a specific category reserved for ndsei katsudö, and Nichienren 
is the only one of the national specialist Nokyo federations which 
officially subscribes to such an interest representational role in this 
form.
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national conventions of representatives which pass resolutions and 
issue ’demands' and ’declarations', signature campaigns, newspaper 
advertisements, presentation of petitions to Diet members and to MAF 
officials, and in Nichienren's case, the sending of delegates on missions 
to the US to discuss problems of fruit imports.
The question of fruit juice liberalisation has enlisted Kajuren into 
the campaign alongside Nichienren, an alliance which is facilitated by 
the fact that both are national Nokyo specialist federations operating 
within the same product sector with an overlapping membership and 
executive structure.^
Although Nichienren was galvanised into political action by the 
liberalisation question, it has widened its spectrum of policy involvement
In December 1968 for example, prior to the announcement of the 
planned liberalisation of grapefruit, Nichienren held a conference of 
chairmen which resolved on a policy of opposition to the liberalisation 
of citrus fruits. This was followed in succeeding years by its sponsor­
ship of a series of national Nokyo representatives' conventions 'for the 
prevention of fruit liberalisation'. It was reported in Nokyo Nenkan,
1971, that at the height of the anti-liberalisation controversy involving 
grapefruit, Nichienren held a number of producers' conventions including 
a 'National Representatives' Convention for a Policy on Summer Oranges', 
a 'National Representatives' Convention for the Prevention of the Liberal­
isation of Fruit' and a 'National Mikan Producers' Convention'. (Op. cit., 
p.296.) In March 1971, just prior to positive government action on the 
grapefruit liberalisation issue, Nichienren sponsored a_'Grapefruit 
Liberalisation Prevention Convention'. See '(Nenpyo)_ Nokyo Nijugonen' 
(Twenty Five Years of Nokyo: A Chronology), in Kondo Yasuo (ed.),
Nokyo Nijugonen (Twenty Five Years of Nokyo), Tokyo, Ochanomizu Shobo,
1973, p.413.
2 .All Kajuren's members for example, are members of Nzchzenren, and
it is customary for them to share the same executive leaders. In 1975, 
the Vice-Chairman of Nichienren, Kirino Chubei, was Chairman of Kajuren. 
They also shared the same Managing Director. A Director of Nichienren 
was Vice-Chairman of Kajuren, and another Director of Nichienren was 
a Director of Kajuren. See Zenkoku Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Yakushokuin 
Renmei, Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Rengokai Yakushokuin Meiho (National Agricultur­
al Cooperative Union Executive and Staff Members' League, Agricultural 
Cooperative Union Federations' Executive and Staff Members' List), 1976, 
Tokyo, Kyodo Kumiai Tsushinsha, pp.111-112 and p.120.
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since the late 1960s, not only on liberalisation but on other issues
connected with the fruit industry, including participation in the Fruit
Farming Promotion Advisory Council (Kaju Nögyö Shinkö Shingikai), which
is an inquiry organ of the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, and
Parliamentary and LDP agricultural policy committees.^" Representations
to the MAF also became more frequent and extensive, particularly on
2matters relating to the budget.
Political Leadership of the Fruit Industry by Mainstream Nokyo 
Organisations: Zenchu and Zennö
The principal contrast between Nichienren's agricultural policy
activities and those of Zenchu and Zennö, is the singular focus of the
former and the multiplicity of interests of the latter. This difference
follows logically from the differing functional concerns of specialist
as opposed to general-purpose cooperatives: the former are commodity-
or activity-specific; the latter are commodity- and activity-
comprehensive. The result is that fruit ranks considerably lower on the
In 1972 for example, Nichienren participated in a range of govern­
ment, Diet and party committees, beginning with the Fruit Farming 
Promotion Advisory Council on matters relating to the institution of a 
fruit insurance system, the enactment of a Fruit Farming Promotion Basic 
Policy and a Wholesale Markets' Law. On the latter it made strong 
representations as a relevant fruit producers' group to Diet committees 
considering amendments to the Central Wholesale Markets Law.
2 Nichienren has now established its own plan of action in relation 
to those sections of the MAF Budget which affect the fruit industry.
In its own words: 'It undertakes forceful presentation in its budget
demands of the requests of producers and its member cooperatives'.
(.Nökyö Nenkan, 1978, p.230). In 1978, it achieved: 'the promotion of
deciduous fruit production through deciduous fruit producer groups' 
comprehensive consolidation works; the advancement of a plan for rrrlkan 
price revision for the following year as part of activities for promoting 
an emergency policy for achieving an early resolution of the mikan surplus 
crisis; and a revision upwards of the subsidy rate for raw fruit for 
processing in connection with the price stabilisation policy for these 
products'. Ibid.
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Zenchü and Zenriö scale of policy priorities than it does on Nichienren's. 
This provides Niohienren with a basis for defence of its own policy- 
related activities. It contends that fruit falls considerably behind the 
principal commodity interests of the mainstream organisation: rice,
followed by livestock products.
Zenchü in particular has a special role as policy leader of the 
entire Nokyo movement, and apart from support issues, it is concerned 
with problems that affect the agricultural cooperative movement or 
farmers as a whole, such as agricultural land taxes, farmers’ pension 
systems, agricultural insurance and disaster relief, comprehensive agri­
cultural policy proposals and the MAF budget. Similarly, Zennö is the 
marketing and purchasing agent for all agricultural products and farm 
inputs, not only those commodities under threat of liberalisation. Its 
attitude towards this question is coloured by the fact that it wishes to 
see continuing protection for Japanese agriculture as a whole. Conse­
quently, it conducts its anti-liberalisation activities on a number of 
fronts.
Another factor downgrading the importance of fruit in the priori­
ties of general Nokyo leadership organisations, is the absence of 
extensive price support arrangements in this sector. Free market forces 
have generally been allowed to determine the wholesale price of fruit 
and fruit products in Japan, except for more recent policy innovations 
such as the 'Price Stabilisation Fund for Raw Fruit for Processing'.
As a result, demands relating to fruit tend to appear in combination with 
other commodity requests in the agricultural policy activities of Zenchü 
and Zennö .
In Zenchu's anti-liberalisation demands, fruit is subsumed under the 
general heading of 'agricultural and livestock products', the standard
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phraseology used in Zenohu-sponsored conventions, councils of represent­
atives and conferences of chairmen on liberalisation."*" This broader 
coverage of product demands even in relation to the particular issue of 
liberalisation, is a logical by-product of Zenohu's all-encompassing 
leadership role. It does not preclude specific instances of action 
involving a single product, such as oranges and fruit juice, but it does 
encourage a more generalist approach.
Since 1971, Zenohu has had a 'Nokyo Vegetable and Fruit Policy
Central Headquarters’ {Nökyd Seiko. Taisaku Chüö Honbu) , but this policy
committee is one of six, and ranks lower in importance than the rice,
livestock and dairy policy central headquarters. In large part, the
policy priorities of Zenohu derive from the commodity priorities of the
general-purpose trading arm, Zenriö. Zennd has a policy-making division
for fruit, but it is subsumed within its Horticulture and Farm Produce
Headquarters (Seiko Noson Honbu), which is then divided into a Policy-
Making Department for Horticultural and Agricultural Produce, a
Department of Horticulture, and a Farm Produce Division. Furthermore,
2vegetable trading plays a large part within this Zenno department.
Apart from the issue of liberalisation, Zenohu's fruit interests are 
included within two main policy sets: those relating to its budget 
demands; and since 1968, those connected to its formulation of a ’basic 
agricultural policy' (kihon ndsei) , which is Zenohu's equivalent phrase­
ology to the government's 'comprehensive agricultural policy' (sögö
In August 1972 for example, a National and Prefectural Nokyo Central 
Union Chairmen's Conference was held. It presented 'Demands in Relation 
to the Opposition to the Expansion and Liberalisation of Imports of 
Agricultural and Livestock Products'.
2 In 1976 for example, vegetables constituted 63 per cent of the turn­
over in the category of vegetable and fruit products (seika butsu) of 
Zennö.
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nösei) . In both, however, measures relating to fruit production, 
marketing, distribution and processing etc. are catalogued as part of a 
bigger listing."*"
The relationship between Nichienren and the mainstream organisations, 
Zenohu and Zennd, however, should be seen as less one of rivalry and 
confrontation between groups competing for the loyalties of the same 
clientele, than one of mutual collaboration and reinforcement in the 
presentation of the same interests. In other words, the reality of 
'functional overlap' or 'sharing' exists in the field of interest repre­
sentation just as it does in almost all other areas of activity which 
the general-purpose and specialist organisations undertake. Nichienven, 
strictly speaking, is not a 'central union' and is not therefore endowed 
with the functions and duties of these bodies which formally incorporate 
policy representation activities. But as the national guiding and 
leadership body for specialist and other cooperatives involved in fruit 
handling, and as the organisation with the most vital stake in the 
viability of the fruit industry, it has undertaken a 'natural' extension 
of its activities into the policy field. This process was sub­
stantially advanced by the anti-liberalisation dispute. Nichienren1s 
policy role should, therefore, be seen as supplementary and complementary 
to that of Zenohu. It is divisive only insofar as it isolates fruit 
interests from all other agricultural interests which the cooperatives 
embody and represents fruit producers as a distinct and separate
In Zenohu1s 1978 budget demands, vegetable and fruit policy, when 
it was mentioned, was included as one item amongst many in a list of 
'Policies to Expand the Production, Distribution and Consumption of 
Agricultural and Livestock Products' (Nökyö Nenkan, 1978, op. cit., p.295). 
This was part of a very long list of 'Main Demands Relating to 1978 
Agricultural and Forestry Policies and Budget, and the Establishment of a 
Basic Agricultural Policy'. Ibid. , p.293.
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grouping. This can be an organisational asset in the presentation of 
demands, but it does tend to strengthen the centrifugal forces operating 
within the complex and unwieldy Nokyo organisation.
The relationship between Nichienren, Zenchü and Zennö in agricultural 
policy activities should not be viewed as a constant however. In 
historical terms it underwent very significant development during the 
course of the liberalisation dispute.
The Course of the Grapefruit Liberalisation Dispute, 1968-1971
The Japanese government’s intention to liberalise grapefruit became 
known as a result of the Japan-US negotiations on abolishing remaining 
import controls which opened in Tokyo in spring 1968. Nichienren's anti­
liberalisation activities began at this point. It launched a vocal 
campaign of opposition to the government's schedule for grapefruit 
liberalisation in a conference of Nichienren member chairmen in December
1968. Resolutions were taken at the conference to oppose grapefruit 
liberalisation because of the likely effects of imports from the US on 
summer orange and mikan producers in Japan.
In spite of the existence of domestic producer opposition, the 
government’s favourable attitude towards grapefruit liberalisation was 
confirmed at the 7th Japan-US Trade and Economic Joint Committee in July
1969. The Minister of Agriculture and Forestry at that time, Hasegawa, 
attended Committee sessions and presented his terms for grapefruit 
liberalisation. These were:
1. the US agree to extend the number of states which had 
lifted the ban on Japanese mikan; and
2. there would be a high tariff on grapefruit at the time 
they came on to the market.
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If these conditions were fulfilled, then grapefruit liberalisation, 
originally scheduled for December 1971, would be completed in April 1971. 
Hasegawa also included grapefruit in his list of 25 articles for 
liberalisation under the jurisdiction of the MAF presented to the Cabinet 
Council for the Promotion of the Liberalisation of Trade and Exchange in 
September 1969. This coincided with a 'National Nokyo Representatives 
Conference for the Prevention of the Liberalisation of Agricultural and 
Livestock Products' hosted by Zenchü. Zenchü's interests at the time 
extended beyond grapefruit to such items as rapeseed, pork, live cattle 
and pigs.
The government's plan was subsequently endorsed at the Conference 
on Japanese Import Restrictions held the following month, when the MAF 
publicly announced its grapefruit liberalisation proposal. Nichzenren 
responded with a National Representatives' Convention for the Prevention 
of Fruit Liberalisation.
The first half of 1971 saw the anti-liberalisation movement 
gradually gaining momentum as the date for the scheduled liberalisation 
of grapefruit in April 1971 drew nearer. A vigorous public campaign was 
launched by Nichtenren largely through the medium of conventions of fruit 
producers. Official visits were also made by Nichienren executives to 
the MAF, particularly to the Fruit and Flowers Division of the MAF 
Sericulture and Horticulture Bureau. Zenchü orchestrated a 'National 
Nokyo Chairmen's Conference for the Prevention of the Liberalisation of 
Pork and Other Items'. When, by April, it became clear that the 
Americans were making no effort to expand the number of States lifting 
the ban on imports of mikan, and were not going to fulfil the 
prior condition for liberalisation imposed by Hasegawa, the Japanese 
government staged a stalling operation and spent April trying to find a 
compromise between Japanese domestic citrus interests and US pressure.
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The scheduling of April for grapefruit liberalisation was badly 
timed from a party-political and electoral point of view. It fell not 
long before a House of Councillors' General Election timed for June. 
With this vital electoral consideration in mind, 80 fruit MPs belonging 
to the FPL held a meeting at LDP Headquarters and bitterly criticised 
the government. The content of their criticism was as follows:
The government failed to institute the liberalisation of 
grapefruit scheduled for the end of April because they did 
not fulfil their promise to procure an expansion of mikan 
exports to the US. The House of Councillors election is 
important, but trust of the LDP is an even more important 
issue. With things as they stand, this trust will be lost.
We have a lying Cabinet and a lying LDP. Only if the 
decision on grapefruit liberalisation is postponed until 
after the election can any negative effects of these events 
on the election be avoided.1
This pronouncement from the FPL was patently influenced by electoral
*
considerations. At a crucial juncture, the League felt it necessary to 
exercise its political muscle and advocate the use of the same delaying 
tactics that had proven so effective in producer rice price decisions.
The League was joined by a chorus of voices from within the Agri­
culture, Forestry and Fisheries Committees of both Houses of the Diet 
which passed resolutions to the effect that:
1. the target date for the liberalisation of grapefruit 
should be set only after the government on the basis 
of negotiations with the US had satisfied itself that 
there had been an actual lifting of the ban by the US 
on mikan; and
1 Enoki, Takagi and Hirata, op. oit. , p.244.
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2. because grapefruit liberalisation had an important 
influence on the domestic fruit industry, the 
government in the future should aim to expand its 
policies generally on the production, distribution 
and processing of fruit.^
The second resolution held out a promise of increased budgetary allo­
cations to fruit farmers in exchange for liberalisation.
The government responding to this pressure from agricultural repre­
sentatives and anxious to avoid an electoral backlash, postponed the 
April liberalisation date, giving as its reason the lack of a definite 
promise from the US government on mikan exports. In a Cabinet meeting 
two days after the election on June 30, however, it decided to put 
grapefruit liberalisation into effect. In normal circumstances the bait 
of increased budgetary allocations to fruit farmers held out by the 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee might have made policy 
defeat more acceptable, but on this occasion, Nokyo was not going to be 
so easily appeased.
Zenchu issued a very angry statement of protest to the government 
pointing out the contradictions in the official policy of rice production 
adjustment. On the one hand it advocated commodity diversification while 
on the other, it forced liberalisation of those products selected for 
expansion on the farmers.
The following month, the largest Nokyo convention to be held up to 
that point on the liberalisation issue was organised in Tokyo. Called 
the 'National Producers' Convention for a Policy to Overcome the Crisis 
in Fruit Farming' (Kaju Nögyö Kiki Toppa Taisaku Zenkoku Seisansha Taikai),
1 Ibid.
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it represented a break with precedent insofar as Zenchu, Zenhanven and 
Nichienren, as national organisations representing fruit farmers, came 
together for the first time in the management of a convention. These 
groups had not previously agreed on such combined action. Zenchu 
Chairman Miyawaki Asao, delivered a strongly worded anti-government 
speech to the 2,200-strong gathering of Nokyo representatives.
Politicians from all parties were invited to attend, but of the 37 who 
showed up, Upper and Lower House LDP members from the FPL were over­
whelmingly numerous. There was a very strong reaction at the convention 
against the LDP Diet members in attendance who were accused of promising 
much in the election but delivering little.
Several resolutions emerged from the convention and were presented 
as demands to government. Firstly, recognition that the government had 
instituted grapefruit liberalisation in spite of strong opposition from 
Nokyo was acknowledged. It was also noted that the resolutions of the 
Diet Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committees in not obtaining 
guarantees from the US on mikan exports prior to liberalisation had been 
ignored. The Government was asked to resolve this situation promptly 
and obtain increased exports of mikan to the US. In addition, it was 
asked not to liberalise oranges or fruit juice, to institute measures to 
indemnify those fruit producers directly and adversely affected by the 
liberalisation of grapefruit through price improvements and other
One Nokyo delegate said he had voted for Higaki Tokutaro in the 
national constituency and Ito Goro for Yamagata prefectural constituency, 
because he had believed that they would protect him. He added, however, 
that the government was now saying that oranges and fruit juice were going 
to be liberalised. With this new development in the offing, he stated 
that he did not know what he had voted for. This was reported in Enoki, 
Takagi and Hirata, op. cit., p.246.
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budgetary measures, and to launch emergency duties on imports and 
temporarily suspend imports if grapefruit prices fell to inappropriate 
levels. ^
The Convention produced a further joint Zenchu and Nichienren 
operation: 'A Combined Committee for a Policy to Overcome the Crisis in
Fruit Farming’ (Kaju Nogyo Kiki Toppa Taisaku Godo Iinkai).
Although farmers had lost the first political round, the battle over 
the liberalisation of oranges and fruit juice had still to be fought, and 
the immediacy of this issue maintained the impetus of the anti-liberalisation 
debate. Protests ’after the fact' against grapefruit liberalisation be­
came incorporated into a heightened anti-liberalisation campaign involving 
these other citrus products, both of which were the subject of continuing 
liberalisation pressure from the US.
The 'Combined Committee to Overcome the Crisis in Fruit Farming'
acknowledged in its public statements that fruit farmers had suffered a
great blow in the liberalisation of grapefruit and presented a number of
'Demands Relating to the Prevention of the Liberalisation of Oranges and
Fruit Juice'. It asked the government not to carry out its plan to
liberalise these products, and 'to institute emergency policies for the
fundamental constitutional improvement of Japan's fruit farming in order
2to enable it to cope with international competition'.
Increased opposition to agricultural trade liberalisation was aroused 
by the 8th Round of the Japan-US Trade and Economic Combined Committee in 
September, in which the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Akagi 
Munenori, announced that an additional number of agricultural items would
1 Nökyö Nenkan, 1972, op. cit., p.360 
Ibid. , p.361.
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be liberalised in 1972. Protests from citrus farmers became incorporated 
into a general anti-liberalisation campaign involving a range of products: 
beef, pork, flour, beans, live cattle, sugar products and edible cherries. 
It was at this point that the two sides of the Nokyo anti-liberalisation 
movement, mainstream and specialist, joined forces, and the precedent 
established with the first joint Nichienren-Zenchu convention was followed 
up with further activities organised along similar lines. In December 1971, 
Zenchü in partnership with a number of other agricultural groups including 
Zenhanren and Nichienren, sponsored a ’National Producers' Convention for 
the Prevention of the Liberalisation and Expansion of Imports of Oranges, 
Fruit Juice, Beef, Miscellaneous Beans etc.’ This was supplemented by 
additional pronouncements from Zenchü and its Chairman, Miyawaki. These 
activities represented a significant development in the fruit producers' 
campaign insofar as the national Nokyo lobbying body had taken up the 
specific cause of oranges and fruit juice, and this trend was to continue. 
Zenchü and its leaders began to play a much more active role in relation 
to fruit interests than they had done in the past.
Under direct pressure from Nokyo groups the anti-liberalisationist 
forces came together in the formation of a new informal grouping with 16 
members in the House of Councillors: the Agricultural Policy Promotion
Diet Members' League (Nosei Suishin Giindan) (hereafter referred to as 
Agricultural Policy Promotion League, or APPL). Its leading official 
spokesmen (daihyö sewanin) were both Nökyö giin: Horimoto Senjitsu who
was Nichienren's Chairman and Chairman of the FPL, a Diet member from 
Ehime; and Nukumi Saburö, Miyazaki Prefecture Central Union Chairman and 
Chairman of the National Nokyo Tourist Bureau, a Diet member from 
Miyazaki. Of its main members, all but one had electoral ties to the 
agricultural cooperatives (as members of the Nosei Kenkyukd), and a total
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of four were Nökyö giin. ^
Although the Ndsei Suishin Giindan was a general anti­
liberalisation group with strong livestock as well as fruit interests, 
there was a natural membership overlap between it and the FPL. The APPL 
expressed its unequivocal opposition to the liberalisation of oranges,
fruit juice, beef, beans etc. as striking at the very heart of Japanese 
2agriculture. It opposed liberalisation on the ground that the basis
of the country's agriculture had to be protected, and a number of
opinions were expressed within the group that 'as things were, the LDP
3would be defeated in the elections three years hence'. One Nokyo
leader took this statement a step further, and suggested that if the LDP
liberalised oranges, fruit juice and beef, there would be no need for
candidates to have LDP endorsement in the next election, since they would
4do better as Independents.
The anti-liberalisation battle over citrus fruits has not moved much
beyond this point. The campaign was lost over a number of items which
were not the object of such sustained producer opposition such as pork,
ham, bacon, live cattle and pigs, but the government responded to each of
the demands presented to it by the combined conventions and committees
Apart from Horimoto and Nukumi, these were: Takahashi Yünosuke, LDP
member from Hokkaido, Prefectural Nokyo Central Union Chairman, Zenchü 
Director and Chairman of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee; 
Kujime Kentaro, LDP member from Tokushima, Prefectural Nokyo Central Union 
Chairman and Combined Chairman of the Four Nokyo Prefectural Federations; 
Higaki Tokutaro, LDP, national constituency, former Vice-Minister of the 
MAF; Kobayashi Kuniji, LDP, national constituency, former MAF official and 
advisor to the National Land Improvement Federation; Sonoda Kiyomitsu, LDP 
member from Kumamoto, Chairman of the prefectural farmers' political 
league (ndseiren), former Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee 
Chairman; and Onimaru Katsuyuki, LDP member from Fukuoka, former 
Construction Ministry official.
2 Enoki, Takagi and Hirata, op. cit. , pp.246-247.
3 Ibid. , p.247.
4 Ibid.
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formed under the joint sponsorship of Zenchü, Zenno and Nichienven 
following grapefruit liberalisation, in the following form:
(i) oranges and fruit juice were not liberalised;
(ii) there was a negotiated increase in the number of 
American States permitting imports of Japanese 
mikan;
(iii) when the liberalisation of grapefruit took place on 
June 10, 1971, the 20 per cent tariff on grapefruit 
was raised on a seasonal basis to 40 per cent from 
December to May during the mikan season in order to 
protect domestic fruit growers;
(iv) additional subsidies were granted to citrus growers, 
with an immediate subsidy of 8.5 billion yen paid out 
after grapefruit liberalisation in order to improve 
the management support of citrus farmers; and
(v) further assistance was granted to summer orange 
growers in the 1972 MAF Budget.”*"
With the government committed to a policy of maintaining import 
barriers on oranges and fruit juice, the point at issue with regard to 
these products shifted to the size of the import quota granted by the 
Japanese government. The Nokyo campaigners redirected their pressure 
against 'expansions in imports of oranges and fruit juice'. The 
government, while not conceding on the issue of liberalisation, made 
concessions to US pressure in the form of successive enlargements in the
1 üokyo Nenkan, 1973, op. cit. , p.79.
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import framework of these products. The liberalisation battle over 
oranges and fruit juice has continued in this form throughout the 1970s.
The selection of this particular tight-rope strategy as a solution 
to competing domestic and foreign demands, has been an attempt by the 
government to satisfy domestic citrus producers and overseas exporters 
simultaneously. It began with grapefruit liberalisation itself. The 
MAF orchestrated a pose of ostensible liberalisation by abolishing the 
grapefruit quota in an attempt to satisfy foreign critics of Japan’s 
protectionist import policies and US fruit growers, but at the same time, 
it took tariff action on grapefruit imports which had the effect of 
partially negating quota liberalisation. This mechanism of’half­
liberalisation' , as it has been described, extended beyond the 40 per 
cent seasonal tariff rate imposed on grapefruit from December to May of 
each year, to a whole range of products liberalised during this period. 
Tariff rates on vegetable oils, live cattle and pigs, pork, ham, bacon,
refined beet and cane sugar and mixed feeds were all increased when
2quotas were removed. Moreover, agricultural and livestock products 
were the only items subjected to this kind of action.
In spite of the tariff imposed on grapefruit, however, imports 
increased at a phenomenal rate after liberalisation: from 2,265 tonnes
in 1970 to 11,350 tonnes in 1971, 109,695 tonnes in 1972, and 151,757 
tonnes in 1976. Import quotas on oranges and fruit juice have also 
been raised, but have not permitted import expansion at anything like the 
rate of grapefruit. In 1971, the orange quota was set at 7,800 tonnes: 
this was lifted to 16,418 tonnes in 1972 and 24,401 tonnes in 1976.
Enoki, Takagi and Hirata, op. cit. , p.247.
Agricultural Trade Policy, op. cit., pp.17-18.
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In January 1978 under direct pressure from the US, the Japanese agreed
to almost double the orange quota to 45,000 tonnes, and undertake an
even greater expansion in the quota for fruit juice to 4,000 tonnes.
(This was 300 tonnes in 1971, and 900 tonnes in 1972.^)
It is difficult to gauge the exact contribution of agricultural
cooperative pressure to the decisions on the liberalisation, partial
or otherwise, of each of these fruit products. Clearly, however, the
Nokyo national organisations involved did present the fruit farmers'
case in a public demonstration of farmer solidarity, and at a crucial
juncture, the FPL joined the chorus of anti-liberalisation voices to
berate its own party leadership in the hope that they would delay the
grapefruit liberalisation decision until after the 1971 House of
Councillors' election and come up with concessions in the form of
increased subsidies for fruit producers. The success of these moves is
surely evidence that residual electoral considerations can play a
decisive role in the timing and content of agricultural policy decisions.
Furthermore, the results of the 1971 elections were unfavourable for
the LDP. For the first time, it lost ground in some traditionally
conservative rural prefectural seats like Tochigi, Fukui, Yamanashi,
Oita and Kagoshima, some of which were also fruit producing prefectures.
These results may in turn have influenced subsequent government attitudes
towards liberalising oranges and fruit juice.
Nichienren and the FPL: The Political Connection
In reports of Nichienren’s agricultural policy activities, the FPL
seems to enjoy the reputation of being Nichienren’s specific Diet
2connection, manned by supporters of the Nokyo fruit lobby.
Nichienren openly acknowledges the backing of the FPL in its agricultural
These figures are taken from Nokyo Nenkan for relevant years.
These reports appear in Nokyo Nenkan each year.2
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policy campaigns. Although the League began as an informal, intra-
Diet group opposing the liberalisation of citrus imports, its activities
have broadened beyond the scope of the liberalisation issue to all
aspects of policy relating to the fruit industry. In 1977 for example,
the FPL played a supportive role in close collaboration with Nichienren
in the promotion of a Stabilisation Fund for the Shipment of Fruit
Products, an idea sponsored by Nichienren, Zenchu and Zenno. (The FPL
annually cooperates with Nichienren in the presentation of its budget-
related demands, and much of the success Nichienren claims to have had
2in this area, is attributed to the FPL's support.)
The membership of the FPL grew from about 80 at the time of its
3original organisation to 170 by the late 1970s. An examination of the 
organisational connections of some of its leading members illustrates the 
process of political 'osmosis' by which Nokyo has penetrated Diet and 
government party policy-making structures.
Regional concentrations of fruit and especially citrus production 
in Japan, produce a strong correlation between constituency representation, 
citrus production, and membership of the FPL. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 rank 
prefectures according to quantity and area of citrus production.
1
2
3
See for example, Nökyö Nenkan, 1971, op. cit., p.296. 
Nökyö Nenkan, 1977, op. cit., p.240.
Nökyö Nenkan, 1978, op. cit., p.229.
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Table 6.1
A RANKING OF MIKAN PRODUCTION BY PREFECTURE
Prefecture
Area Under 
Cultivation 
(ha)
Amount
Produced
(t)
Amount
Marketed
(t)
1 . Ehime 22,000 525,000 479,200
2. Shizuoka 16,900 408,200 359,000
3. Saga 13,900 318,300 280,900
4. Wakayama 12,300 317,700 298,200
5 . Nagasaki 11,900 211,000 183,700
6. Kumamoto 13,500 250,400 223,900
7. Öita 8,550 177,800 161,100
8. Fukuoka 9,070 193,500 173,300
9. Hiroshima 8,040 173,200 153,500
10. Kanagawa 3,780 98,400 90,500
Source: Nörinshö, Tokei Johobu, Poketto Nörin Suisan Tokei-
(Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Statistics and 
Information Department, Pocket Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries Statistics), 1976, Tokyo, Norin Tokei 
Kyökai, p.210.
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Table 6.2
A RANKING OF SUMMER ORANGE PRODUCTION BY PREFECTURE (lOY5 .:
Prefecture
Area Under 
Cultivation 
(ha)
Amount
Produced
(t)
Amount
Marketed
(t)
1. Ehime 2,950 102,800 98,300
2. Wakayama 2,210 60,600 59,100
3. Kumamo to 2,270 57,500 52,700
4. Oita 1,040 28,400 25,900
5. Shizuoka 1,120 22,900 21,700
6. Yamaguchi 979 18,800 16,700
7. Fukuoka 686 14,300 12,500
8. Nagasaki 593 9,440 7,600
9. Hiroshima 295 8,590 7,880
10. Mie 466 7,770 7,220
Source: Nörinshö, Tokei Johöbu, Poketto Nörin Suisan Tokei
(Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Statistics 
and Information Department, Pocket Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries Statistics), 1976, Norin 
Tokei Kyokai, p.210.
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Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show that Ehime is the most important citrus pro­
ducing prefecture for nrikan as well as summer oranges, both products 
significantly affected by prospective imports of grapefruit, fruit 
juice and oranges. Not surprisingly, this prefecture and its con­
stituencies have consistently provided the leadership of the FPL.“*" 
Supplementing this leadership strength within the FPL, is the numerical 
predominance of politicians representing Ehime electorates. At least 
five other members of the FPL have been Diet members from Ehime. The 
latter group demonstrates predominantly constituency-dictated fruit 
interest, rather than any special connection with producer organisations.
Horimoto Senjitsu for example who represented Ehime prefectural 
constituency in the House of Councillors from 1956 to 1974, was Chairman 
of the FPL and the APPL until the end of his final Diet term. He com­
bined Diet members' activities with the chairmanship of Nichienren, thus 
contributing more than any other political figure to the amalgamation of 
producer organisation and Diet roles. During the crucial year of grape­
fruit liberalisation in 1971, he held a high-ranking agricultural policy 
position within the LDP as Vice-Chairman of the party's Comprehensive 
Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee (Sögö Nösei Chdsdkai). He 
was succeeded as Chairman of the FPL by Higaki Tokutarö, who, during his 
career in the MAF occupied the posts of Director-General of the Food 
Agency and Vice Minister of the MAF. Between 1971 and 1977, Higaki held 
a seat for the LDP in the national constituency, and in 1977, was re­
elected as a member for Ehime prefectural constituency. On his entry 
into the Diet in 1971, Higaki became an 'honorary' member of the Nokyo 
House of Councillors' Diet members' grouping: the Nokyo Problem Confer­
ence (Nökyö Mondai Kondankai) , whose membership is normally restricted to 
current Nokyo executives. In 1978, Higaki succeeded to the position of 
LDP Sogö Nosei Chosakai- Chairman, and has been at the centre of negoti­
ations on liberalising import quotas of oranges and fruit juice ever 
since. Both Horimoto and Higaki as members of the Nösei Kenkyukai, 
received electoral support from the cooperatives in the elections, and ex­
emplify the Nokyo connections of so many farm politicians. The current 
Vice-Chairman of the FPL is Mori Matsuhei, an LDP member from Ehime (3) 
from 1958 onwards, who has held a wide range of party executive posts.
2 This group includes Sekiya Katsutoshi, LDP member in the Lower House 
for. Ehime (1) 1947-76; Shiozaki Jun, LDP member in the Lower House for 
Ehime (1) from 1969, who became Chairman of the LDP Foreign Affairs 
Division in 1978 and was therefore involved in Japan'-US citrus negoti­
ations; Murakami Shinjiro, LDP member in the Lower House for Ehime (2) 
1967-72; Imai Isamu, LDP member in the Lower House for Ehime (3) from 
1972, who in 1977 held the post of Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Agri­
culture and Forestry; and Yagi Tetsu, LDP member in the Lower House for 
Ehime (2) 1958-72, a county horticultural Nokyo federation chairman and 
advisor to Ehime Prefecture Vegetable and Fruit Nokyo Federation.
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Other members of the FPL have also represented fruit producing districts
2 3 A 3 6such as Fukuoka, Kumamoto, Wakayama, Yamanashi, Oita, Kanagawa
and Tokushima.^ Except for Tokushima, these are all amongst the top ten
prefectures for mikan and summer orange production.
Examples are: Moribe Takasuke, LDP member in the Upper House for 
Fukuoka prefectural constituency, 1962-68, who held the posts of 
Fukuoka Prefecture Nokyo Central Union Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Zenchu, 
and later became Chairman of Nokyo's Kyushu and Yamaguchi Mikan Policy 
Council; and Onimaru Katsuyuki, LDP member in the Upper House for Fukuoka 
prefectural constituency, 1967-1974.
2 Matsuno Raizo, LDP member in the Lower House for Kumamoto (1) from 
1947 onwards, who has held a wide range of party executive and minis­
terial positions, a member of the Nosei Kenkyukai', and Sonoda Kiyomitsu,
LDP member in the Upper House for Kumamoto prefectural constituency from 
1942, with strong local agricultural interests such as chairmanship of the 
prefectural farmers' political league, a member of the Nosei Kenkyukai, 
and experience as Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry and Chairman of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee.
3 Bo Hideo, LDP member in the Lower House for Wakayama (1) from 1952 
onwards, with high-ranking party executive and Cabinet posts in finance; 
and Shoji Keijiro, LDP member in the Lower House for Wakayama (2) from 
1960, formerly an official of the Finance Ministry, who became Vice- 
Chairman of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation 
on retirement, with strong interests and leadership roles in party 
foreign affairs posts.
4
Nakao Eiichi, LDP member in the Lower House for Yamanashi Prefecture 
from 1967, who has held Diet and party posts in agriculture and forestry 
such as Parliamentary Vice-Minister and Chairman of the LDP Agriculture 
and Forestry Division.
5
Aizawa Sakae, DSP member in the Lower House for Oita (1) from 1969 
to 1972, Prefectural Fruit Nokyo Federation Chairman, and a consultant to 
the Japan Fruit Juice Nokyo Federation, a Nosei Kenkyukai member.
6
Kamei Zensho, LDP member in the Upper House for the national con­
stituency from 1968 to 1974, who was Vice-Chairman of the National Food 
Industries' Federation and former member of the Rice Price Advisory 
Council.
7
Kujine Kentaro, LDP member in the Upper House for Tokushima 
prefectural constituency from 1968, Chairman of the Prefectural Vege­
table and Fruit Nokyo Federation, a Director of Zenno, Combined Chairman 
of the Nokyo Prefectural Federations and a Nosei Kenkyukai member.
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Strongly developed regional interests in fruit also show up in the 
political activities of certain Nokyo prefectural fruit federations. Not 
surprisingly, the Ehime Prefecture Vegetable and Fruit Nokyo Federation 
(E'hime-ken Seika Nökyö Rengdkai, or Seika'ren) is a leader in the field of 
citrus fruit promotion, and this interest extends to political activities. 
In 1967, the Seikaren ran its own candidate for prefectural governor in 
opposition to the sögö nökyö-keizairen candidate.'*" At the time this con­
frontation seemed to embody the rising strength of specialist cooperatives 
in the growth sectors of Japanese agriculture. The dominant hold of the
Seikaren on the marketing of citrus fruit in Ehime (it markets 70 per
2cent of the mikan crop ), links it to a large number of specialist farmers 
with a well-defined commodity interest. Such singularity of interest 
lends a good deal of organisational cohesion to the Seikaren's political 
activities.
The Ehime region also dominates leadership positions in the national
3specialist fruit federations, Nichienren and Kajüren, a connection which
At bottom, this electoral battle was a 'mikan war’: a confrontation
between the general-purpose and specialist fruit co-ops over the market­
ing of mikan within the prefecture. The specialist fruit cooperatives 
supported the LDP gubernatorial candidate, and the general-purpose 
cooperatives in concert with a prefectural assembly breakaway LDP group, 
backed the joint JSP-JCP candidate. The official LDP-endorsed candidate 
triumphed over his progressive rival, which produced a call amongst 
specialist agricultural cooperatives for the 'extermination of general- 
purpose agricultural cooperatives'. See Tanaka Toyotoshi, Nihon no Nokyo 
(Japan's Nokyo), Tokyo, Nokyo Kyokai, 1971, pp. 445-446.
2 _Koichi Nishimoto, 'Nokyo: Pressure from the Co-ops', The Japan
Interpreter, trans. by V. Dixon Morris, Vol.7, 3-4, Sum-Aut 1972, p.327.
3 In 1975 for example, Kirino Chubei, Chairman and Vice-Chairman (after 
Horimoto Senjitsu) of Nichienren. Other executives of Nichienren and 
Kajüren in that year also came from Ehime, and from other prefectures 
such as Yamaguchi, Kanagawa, Wakayama, Tottori, Kumamoto, Shizuoka, Saga, 
Tokushima and Oita.
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seems enduring regardless of personalities.' The tradition of Ehime- 
based leaders operating as political leaders of the Nokyo citrus lobby 
is a situation which is replicated within the Diet as we have indicated.
With such organisational and political strength as a basis for 
action, the Ehime Seikaren unilaterally involves itself in anti­
liberalisation campaign activities, such as the presentation of petitions 
to MAF officials and Diet members, the organisation of missions to the 
US, the financing of advertising campaigns in the press and the conduct of 
high-pressure overseas sales marketing.
Functional Overlap in the Specialist Livestock Industry
The arrangement of producer and political groupings in the fruit 
sector is, by and large, duplicated in the livestock industry but here, 
the picture is complicated by the existence of a greater range of Nokyo- 
connected organisations operating in a variety of fields such as 
extension services, price negotiation, State trading and electoral 
support activities.
Within the federated Nokyo organisation, the same structural 
division is evident: the general purpose national organisations (Zenchu
and Zennd), share leadership of the livestock sector with the national 
specialist livestock federations: the National Livestock Nokyo Federation 
(Zenkoku Chikusan Nokyo Rengokaij or Zenchikuren) and the National Dairy 
Nokyo Federation (Zenkoku Rakunö Nökyö Rengökai, or Zenrakuren).
The major difference between the Nokyo livestock and fruit lobbies 
is the greater size and strength of the former because of the proportional 
weight of the livestock sector in Japanese agriculture. In total farm
The current Ehime Seikaren Chairman, Takakado Kaoru, serves simul­
taneously as one of the Vice-Chairmen of Nich'ienren.
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output, livestock production is second only to rice. The value of 
Nokyo's economic stake in the livestock industry is consequently much 
greater. This is enhanced by expanding livestock-associated industries 
such as feed supply and meat processing, into which Nokyo has extended 
its financial and business involvement.
Secondly, the political content of livestock commodities is much 
greater than in the case of fruit products, because of the incorporation 
of livestock products into price stabilisation arrangements. For this 
reason, they are subject to the same regular, annual review procedures 
and political negotiations as the producer rice price.
Much of the functional sharing and overlap between the general- 
purpose and specialist sides of the Nokyo organisation involved in the 
livestock industry is similar to the fruit sector. The specialist Nokyo 
organisations are not only restricted to a range of commodities, but a 
range of specialist functions in relation to these commodities. At the 
same time, the regional strength of specialist livestock federations is 
evident in areas of greater livestock production.
7jenchikuren has 91 members (more than three times as many as 
Nichienren). This number is a reflection of the number of distinct sub­
sectors within the broad category of the ’livestock' industry. Of its 
61 unit cooperative members, 10 are livestock cooperatives (chikusan 
nokyo), seven are pig-raising cooperatives (yöton nökyö), 31 are dairy 
cooperatives (rakuno nokyo), three are poultry cooperatives (ydkei nökyö) 
and 10 are general-purpose cooperatives (sogö nökyö). The remaining 
third of its members are federations: 29 prefectural federations and
one sub-prefectural federation. Twelve of these are livestock specialist 
federations, four are dairy specialist federations and 14 are economic
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federations (keizairen). Categorised according to sector specialis­
ation rather than organisational level, Zenohikuren's total membership 
spans 35 dairy Nokyo organisations, 24 general-purpose organisations,
22 livestock Nokyo organisations, seven pig-raising Nokyo organisations,
2and three poultry Nokyo organisations. The large number of dairy 
cooperatives in Zenohikuren's membership is a reflection of the strength 
of the Japanese dairy beef industry.
Because of regional specialisation in the livestock industry, 
Zenohikuren's specialist livestock member federations operate in areas 
where livestock farming is well developed. Those in Hokkaido, Miyagi, 
Fukuohima, Aichi and Kumamoto are the largest and best known prefectural 
member federations.
In broad outline, the functional divisions within Zenohikuren 
conform to the normal breakdown of agricultural cooperative activity. 
They involve marketing, purchasing, technical and other production 
guidance activities. A particular feature of Zenohikuren's business, 
however (which also holds true of Nokyo's other federations operating 
in the livestock area such as Zennö and Zenrakuren), is the economic 
importance of its supply or purchasing business, which vastly outweighs 
the value of its marketing business. This is a consequence of the 
dependence of Japan's livestock producers on imported, factory-produced, 
compound feed rather than pasture grass to support livestock-raising.
As a result, Zenohikuren's purchasing activities are mainly concen­
trated in the supply of various feeds, supplemented by much smaller
These figures are all taken from Nokyo Nenkan, 1978, op. oit. , p.321.
2
Ibid. Japan's poultry industry is, of course, represented by its 
own national specialist federation (Nihon Yokei Nökyö Rengbkai, or 
Niyören).
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amounts of agricultural chemicals and other livestock production supply 
items. Its marketing functions involve meat marketing (beef and pork) 
on consignment from members. Meat is shipped by Zenchikuren mainly to 
the Sendai, Tokyo, Osaka-Kobe and Kita-Kyüshü wholesale markets. 
Zenchikuren has also sponsored experimental meat retail stores and 
conducted animal research programs. Its guidance activities centre on 
marketing leadership.
The balance between Zenchikuren's purchasing and marketing activities 
is heavily in favour of the former. In 1975, its total purchasing turn­
over was 6.8 billion yen 3  Its marketing turnover in meat was only one
2third this size at 2.2 billion yen. This amount was infinitesimal
however, when compared to the meat sales of the prefectural keizairen or
3
Zennö. These amounted to 462.6 billion yen and 416.4 billion yen
respectively. In other words, meat marketing in Japan is almost entirely
in the hands of the general-purpose Nokyo organisation, which brings the
influence of such organisations as Zennö and Zenchü to bear in its favour.
Zenrakuren is a much larger organisation than Zenchikuren with three
times as many members, the majority of which are local dairy cooperatives
(181). It also has 52 dairy member federations, 57 general-purpose
cooperatives, 12 economic federations, and a few livestock and settler
4cooperatives and federations (which market milk). The larger prefectural
Nokyo Nenkan, 1977, op. cit. , p.242.
Ibid.
Calculated from figures given in ibid., p.168, and Nokyo Nenkan, 
1978, p.162.
4 Nokyö Nenkan, 1978, p.232.
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dairy federations are to be found in Hyogo, Fukuoka, Kumamoto, Miyazaki 
and Fukushima.^"
Zenrakuren's marketing activities are principally concerned with the 
distribution of fresh milk from its member cooperatives all over the 
country, to the metropolitan areas (this is categorised as city milk 
marketing business); the distribution of other milk for drinking such as 
school milk; and the marketing of dairy products (such as butter and 
cheese), some of which are produced in factories directly managed by 
Zenrakuren.
Zenrakuren production activities (worth 2.8 billion yen in 1977)
involve management of dairy cattle fattening centres, dissemination of
fattening techniques to members and supply of different types of cattle
and calves to members. Zenrakuren, in cooperation with the Tomen
Company, financed the Japan Beef Production Company, which manages a
large dairy cattle-fattening enterprise. Zenrakuren's guidance services
provide technical, production and management advice to its members.
Ninety four per cent of its total purchasing business is taken up with
feed supply. The rest is dairy farming materials (seisan shizai) ,
some of which are produced in directly-managed factories.
In spite of the regional strength of certain specialist Nokyo dairy
federations, the general-purpose keizairen surpass the turnover of
2
Zenrakuren in total milk sales. In 1975, Zenrakuren sold 19.4 billion
yen worth of milk. The turnover of the keizairen was 11 times larger
3than this at 181.9 billion yen. The general-purpose Nokyo organisation
thus predominates in milk marketing, just as it does in meat sales.
Other large prefectural dairy specialist federations operate in Aomori, 
Ibaragi, Tochigi, Chiba, Niigata, Gifu, Aichi, Hie, Hiroshima, Tokushima 
and Saga.
Nokyo Nenkan, 1977, op. cit. , p.244.
Ibid. , p .168.3
The same picture is apparent in a comparison of market share in
feed sales. The combined Zenchikuven-Zenvakuven turnover in feed (as
the specialist suppliers), was 50.7 billion yen in 1976.^ The keizaiven
2total was 553.4 billion yen and that of Zenno was 898.8 billion yen.
Zennö therefore stands out as the most important single Nokyo organis­
ation handling feed.
Nokyo's Economic Stake in Livestock-Associated Industries
Clearly more so than in the case of fruit, the share of the main­
stream general-purpose organisations in the marketing and purchasing 
sides of the livestock industry is considerable.
In this context it is useful to think of Nokyo not only as an 
organisation of farmer-producers with an economic stake in the market­
ability of particular product (and in this case, a particular fear of 
competition from cheaper imported livestock products destroying the 
production base of Japan’s livestock industry), but as a business and 
commercial enterprise with considerable financial investment in livestock- 
related industries. Nokyo's entrepreneurial face is very apparent in 
the case of livestock products. It has made substantial organisational 
and financial investment in all business activities associated with the 
process of transforming a production input (feed in the case of live­
stock) into a saleable consumer item (a processed livestock product).
There are several reasons why Nokyo’s big business side has emerged 
more strongly in the Japanese livestock industry than in any other farm 
sector:
Ibid. , p.242.
2 _The general-purpose figures were obtained from Nokyo Nenkan, 1978,
op. cit. , p .164.
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(i) An increase in consumer demand for livestock products 
beginning in the late 1950s, provided an expanding 
market for livestock products, especially milk, meat 
and eggs. The government's response to this was its 
'selective expansion' clause in the Agricultural Basic 
Law in 1961, which served to reinforce and encourage 
this trend. This new reference point for agricultural 
policies furnished new targets for agricultural 
investment and subsidies.
(ii) Livestock products require more processing than many 
other agricultural products, such as reconstituting 
milk, slaughtering cattle, arranging and packing 
different meat cuts, producing butter and cheese, etc. 
all of which require processing facilities, which in 
turn require capital investment. The increasing 
demand for processed livestock products was an attrac­
tive proposition for capital, especially surplus Nokyo 
capital which was generated in large quantities as a 
by-product of the expansion in its financial 
activities, particularly insurance.
(iii) Japan's livestock industry is highly dependent on 
feed, which encouraged the development of a Nokyo 
feed-processing industry.
Livestock feed has become to Nokyo, and especially to Zenrid and the 
economic federations, one of the most vital farm inputs handled by the 
agricultural cooperatives. If we look at the various dependency rates
on purchased feed for the different sectors of the livestock industry,
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the following picture emerges: poultry 100 per cent; pigs 95 per cent;
beef cattle 85 per cent; and dairy beef 62 per cent.^ (These percentage
figures represent the ratio of bought feed over the total feed consumed.)
Furthermore, Japan is highly dependent on imported feed. Eighty-one per
cent of all the feed consumed by livestock and poultry in Japan is
imported (a total of 13.9 million tonnes out of a total of 17 million
tonnes). Sixty per cent of these imports came from the US. Japan's
livestock industry has been called a 'harbour livestock industry'
because of the extent to which it relies on imported raw materials for 
3feed-making.
Japan's expanding livestock industry thus provided a growing market 
for feed. As a major farm input supplier, Zenno (and before it Zenkören), 
substantially increased its investment in the feed-processing, or com­
pound feed production business.
Feed is the most important commodity handled by Nokyo next to rice,
and easily the largest in terms of value of turnover in the entire Nokyo
purchasing business. Zenno's feed business was worth 898.8 billion yen
in 1976. The turnover of the next major item on Zenno's purchasing list
4(fertiliser) had a value of 308.2 billion yen. Out of Zenno's total 
purchasing business in 1976, feed constituted 41.9 per cent. Only rice 
marketing, at 2,229.2 billion yen, exceeded the value of Zenno's feed 
business.^ The same picture emerges for each level of the general-
Ötani Tetsumaru, Nökyö no Ryutsu Senryaku (Nokyo's Distribution 
Strategies), Tokyo, Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1973, p. 82.
Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
These figures were obtained from Nökyö Nenkan, 1978, op. cit. , p.164. 
 ^ Ibid., p.162.
417
purpose organisation: the keizairen and the sögö nokyo.
What is distinctive about Nokyo's feed industry is that the agri­
cultural cooperative organisation controls every step of the process of 
feed supply. It imports the raw material from abroad {Zenno operates 
eight special bulk cargo ships for this purpose), and it processes and 
supplies it to the farmer. There are 221 feed factories in Japan
operated by 141 compound feed companies. Of the latter, 59 have
1 2connections with Nokyo. These farmers produced 41 per cent of the
total national feed production in 1974. Zenno' s nationwide network of
compound feed factories launched by means of ’related companies’ (kanren
3gainka) , operate in almost every prefecture in Japan.
As a result, a subtantial part of Nokyo’s economic stake in the 
livestock industry, and a major reason why it has been pressing for the 
expansion of domestic Japanese livestock production and opposing the 
entry of overseas beef and dairy product imports, has been attributable 
to its involvement in the feed processing business, and its desire to 
maintain and expand the market for its finished product: animal feed.
This connection becomes even clearer in the light of Nokyo’s share of 
the feed supply business for each of the different sectors of the live­
stock and poultry industries. It is far greater in the beef and dairy 
sectors than in the poultry and pig sectors. It supplies 70 per cent of 
the feed for beef cattle, 44 per cent for dairy beef cattle, 50 per
4cent for pigs, 32 per cent for poultry and 26 per cent for broilers.
Aono Bunsaku, Nökyö: Soshiki to Hi to to Senryaku (Nokyo: Organis­
ation, People, and Strategies), Tokyo, Daiyamondosha, 1976, p.154.
2 Ibid., p .143 .
3 For a comprehensive list of these Zenno-related feed production 
companies contained within a total listing of Zennd kanren gaisha, see 
Appendix II in Yoshihara Shizuo, Zennö o K i m  (I Attack Zenno), Tokyo, 
Nisshin Hodo, 1975, pp.252-261.
4 Aono, op. eit., p.154.
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Japan's farmers' overall utilisation rate of the agricultural cooperatives 
for purchasing feed is 72.4 per cent.'*'
Furthermore, livestock products rank second only to rice in import­
ance in the turnover of Zenriö, the keizaiven and the sögö nökyö. ln 1976 
for example, the sögö nökyö handled livestock products to the value of 
1,031.9 billion yen, the main items in this total being fresh milk (247 
billion), pork (236.1 billion) and beef (214.2 billion).^ Livestock
commodity marketing represented 45 per cent of the value of rice market-
3ing which amounted to 2,271.1 billion yen and 2.14 per cent of the
total sögö nökyö marketing turnover.
The growth in importance of livestock product marketing to Nokyo
has been remarkable in the last decade. In 1968, the sögö nökyö traded
in rice to a value of 1,296.1 billion yen, and in livestock products to
a value of 312.2 billion yen (or one quarter the value). Between 1968
and 1976, the relative value of livestock marketing rose from one
quarter of the turnover in rice to half. Furthermore, in 1968, the
312.2 billion turnover in livestock products represented only 15 per
cent of the total sögö nökyö marketing turnover.
This trend has also been evident in keizairen trading figures. In
1970, the keizairen marketed livestock products to a value of 309.6 
4billion yen. In the six years to 1976, this tripled in value to 955.4 
billion yen.^ An equivalent rise took place in Zenno's figures: in 1970
Ibid., p.66.
These figures were all obtained from Nokyo Nenkan, 1978, op. oit.,
p.161.
3
4
5
Ibid.
Nökyö Nenkan, 1973, op. oit. , p.225. 
Nökyö Nenkan, 1978, op. oit., p.162.
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Zerihanven marketed livestock products to a value of 126.6 billion yen.
2By 1976, this had risen to a Zenno total of 376.1 billion yen.
Amongst Zenno-related companies, those conducting livestock business 
are second only in importance to feed processing. Table 6.3 sets out 
company titles, capital and principal business functions.
The 21 companies listed in Table 6.3 represent 17 per cent of the 
total of 123 Zenno-linked companies. When added to the 44 engaged in 
feed production, the total involved in livestock-related business amounted 
to 65, or more than half of all Zenno's company ventures.
Compared to the specialist Nokyo national federations involved in 
the livestock and dairy sectors, Zenno has far greater financial and 
economic power to channel into livestock business. This is generated not 
only from its own activities relating to the whole spectrum of farm 
products and inputs, but from the business of the general-purpose finance 
organisations, such as Novln Chiikin and Zenkyören on which Zenno can draw 
as a source of investment capital. Zenno's recent expansion into company 
activities has mostly served to consolidate the dominant hold of the 
general-purpose side of Nokyo on the livestock sector.
Private Capital Integration of the-Livestock Industry
Zenno's heavy investment in livestock and feed companies was partially 
designed as a counter-strategy to the movement of private trading capital 
into the livestock sector. Beginning in the late 1950s, leading Japanese 
trading companies began to invest in all aspects of the livestock industry, 
a development which has been described in terms of a process of
1
2
Nokyo Nenkan, 1973, op. cit., p.226. 
Nökyö Nenkan, 1978, op. cit., p.162.
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Z£WM9-RELATED LIVESTOCK COMPANIES
Company Title Capital(yen) Livestock-Related Business
Zenno-Shokuhin (KK) 100 million Processing of agricultural and live­
stock products.
(KK) Kumiai Boeki 300 million Importing of live cattle and meat.
(KK) Co-op Meat 3 million Meat processing and marketing.
Zenkoku Nokyo 
Chokuhan
324 million Milk and meat sales.
Zenno Takasaki 
Shokuniku Kako (KK)
200 million Production and marketing adjustment 
amongst group production companies.
Ibaragi Kyodo 
Shokuniku (KK)
125 million Slaughtering and meat processing.
Kyushu Kyodo 
Shokuhin (KK)
92.5 million Slaughtering, meat processing 
and storage.
Takasaki Ham (KK) 150 million Meat processing and sales.
Hokkaido Nokyo 
Nyugyo (KK)
2.4 billion Milk and milk products processing 
sales.
(KK) Hokkaido 
Chikusan Shinko 
Kosha
400 million Cattle and pig slaughtering, meat 
processing, shipment and sales.
Iwate Chikusan 
Ryutsu Senta
586.4
million
Cattle and pig slaughtering, meat 
processing, shipment and sales.
(KK) Miyazaki-ken 
Chikusan Kosha
571 million do.
Kagoshima Kumiai 
Shokuniku
50 million . do.
(KK) Tokyo to Shoku­
niku Kyokyu Kosha
1 billion Meat storage, transport and pro­
cessing .
Chuo Shokuhin 151.5
million
Meat processing, packaging and 
marketing.
Omiya Shokuniku 
Niuke (KK)
100 million Carcass and fresh meat reception 
and marketing.
Tokyo Shokuniku 
Shi jo
600 million do.
Yokohama Shokuniku 
Niuke (KK)
60 million do.
Nagoya Shokuniku 
Shijö (KK)
30 million do.
Kobe Chuo Chikusan 
Niuke (KK)
50 million Cattle slaughtering, meat processing 
and sales.
Nihon Rakunö Kyodo 
(KK)
500 million Processing and sales of milk and 
milk products.
Source: Appendix II in Yoshihara Shizuo, Zenno o Kirn (I Attack Zenno),
Tokyo, Nisshin Hodö, 1975, pp.252-261.
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’integration'. This process involved the systematisation by private 
trading companies of the production, processing, distribution and sale 
of livestock products within their corporate networks (Keiretsu).
The integration process germinated in the decade 1955-1965. It 
was pioneered by Taiyo Fisheries in response to the depression in the 
inshore fishing industry. The first step involved breeding contracts 
for fowls between private companies and farmers, then feed company 
capital moved in with the idea of expanding the market for feed. Mitsui 
Company joined up with its corporate feed maker, Japan Compound Feed 
(Nihon Haigö Shiryo) to establish a company which advanced from broiler 
into hog raising. C. Itoh was next to establish a livestock company in 
Ibaragi Prefecture which consigned hog raising to 600 farm households 
in the region.
After beginning with production contracts with farmers, trading 
companies moved by the late 1960s, into the possession of company farms 
under their direct management. 'Japan Farm' was created in July 1969 
with one billion in capital contributed by Mitsubishi (40 per cent), and 
15 per cent each from Japan Agricultural Production Industries (Nihon 
Nösan Kogyd), Nisshin Flour Milling (a feed maker), Mitsuwa Feed 
(Mitsuwa shiryo), and Nippon Ham. The 'Japan Farm' Company invested two 
billion yen in a farm in Kagoshima Prefecture which concentrated mainly 
on broiler production (1.6 million birds). It established another 100 
hectare farm for hog raising with 65,000 head.
This enterprise was followed by a series of trading company farms;
C. Itoh established Cl Farm in Iwate Prefecture in January 1969, Mitsubishi
1 See Otani, op. cit., pp.77-84.
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set up Bösö Farm at the end of 1969, followed by Sumitomo’s Kidogawa 
Farm in Tochigi Prefecture. Nissho Iwai then established three beef 
cattle farms in Tochigi, Aichi and Kumamoto.
One Japanese writer summed up this process in the following terms: 
’large enterprises have accomplished almost total integration and control 
of the livestock industry from production to sale. They have taken over 
the production of raw materials (beef cattle, pigs, broilers and chickens), 
feed supply, processing, distributing, wholesaling and retailing of the 
final product in the supermarkets of their corporate networks’.^
It took some time for Nokyo to marshall its forces to respond to 
this challenge from the private sector. It was, however, concerned about 
the development of strong ties in the form of production contracts between 
farmers and private trading companies outside the Nokyo system. Because 
of the operations of specialist cooperatives in the livestock sector, and 
the weaker linkages amongst specialist cooperative federated organisations, 
livestock farmers were more ’open’ to the development of independent con­
tracts with private trading companies. The general-purpose side of Nokyo 
viewed this not only as an attack on Nokyo's market share, but as a 
threat to the Nokyo organisation itself, with the creation of potentially 
divisive loyalties within the agricultural cooperative system.
The general-purpose counter-offensive was led by Zenrid, which had 
the organisational and financial strength to lead the agricultural 
cooperative strategic response. This took the form of a concerted 
’integration' program which paralleled that inaugurated by private capital. 
Just as the handling of diverse aspects of the livestock industry by
1 Translated excerpts from ib id .
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different branches of the corporate enterprise networks (keivetsu) 
facilitated their integration 'backwards1 from production to sale, by 
consolidating the links between all the various cooperatives engaging 
in relevant functions such as feed supply, processing and commodity 
distribution. This was supplemented by Zennö investment in business 
areas which required strengthening, such as meat and milk processing, 
livestock product marketing, distribution, collection, transportation 
and retailing, as well as expansion of its feed-processing industry.
Some of the results of Zenno's investment program in livestock were 
listed earlier in the table of cooperative companies.
These parallel integration processes produced considerable compe­
tition between Nokyo and the trading companies, especially in the area 
of feed production. The outcome was an uneasy division of interests. 
Private capital continued to dominate the poultry and broiler 
industries and milk and processed meat production. Its share of 
butter production for example, remained at almost 90 per cent, and ham 
sausage at about 85 per cent. Nokyo on the other hand, has been stronger 
in the larger animal industries producing beef, pork and milk.
Nokyo Production Enterprises: The Eiriö Danchi
A major new development at the production level has been the con­
struction of 'regionally integrated production units', otherwise known 
as 'agricultural cooperative farm complexes' (eiriö danchi). These form 
the basis of the integrated 'production to sale' Nokyo system. They 
operate not only in the livestock industry, but also in the other two 
main Nokyo commodity areas: rice and fruit.
The concept of 'eind danchi' was introduced in the Agricultural 
Basic Law of 1961. The government embodied in several Articles its
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obligations to encourage ’cooperation in production processes . . . 
and measures to enable [those engaged in agriculture] to offer their 
rights [to land] and their labour for sale for the purpose of coopera­
tive farming’^" (Article 17), and 'to take whatever measures may be
necessary . . .  to enable agricultural cooperatives to underwrite
2trusts relating to the leasing and sale of farm land . . . .'
(Article 18).
Amendments to the Nokyöhö the following year facilitated the 
carrying out of these Articles. A Paragraph 2 was added to Article 10 
of Agricultural Cooperative Law (that which pertains to the ’business' 
of the cooperatives). It stated: ’An agricultural cooperative which
assigns its capital stock contributions to its members may . . .  on
3the trust of its members, undertake the business of farm management’.
And a new Paragraph 3 stated: ’An agricultural cooperative which con­
ducts credit business may accept the trust of its members for the pur­
pose of leasing or selling agricultural lands or grasslands, and other 
immovables which are left in trust together with the agricultural lands 
or grasslands etc'.^
The effect of these amendments was to allow agricultural cooperatives 
to lease land from their members and undertake the business of farm 
management in the form of cooperative farm complexes.
Nogyo Kihonho' (Agricultural Basic Law) in Norinsho Kanshü, Nogyo 
Roppo (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Editorial Supervision, A 
Compendium of Agricultural Laws), Tokyo, Gakuyo Shobö, 1976, p.4.
2 Ibid.
3 , - - __Nogyo Kyodo Kumiaiho' (Agricultural Cooperative Union Law), in 
ibid., p .113.
4
Ibid., pp.113-114.
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In practice, the eirio danchi are established by tankyö (which have 
to be sögö nökyö, that is, cooperatives undertaking credit activities 
according to Paragraph 3, Article 10 of Nökyöhö above). They rent land 
from their members (almost always part-time farmers who wish to leave 
agriculture but retain their lands), and consolidate it into larger 
blocks, organising full-time specialist farmers to produce a single 
commodity. This activity goes some way towards overcoming the perennial 
problem of farm size in Japan by constructing viable farm units, en­
larging the scale of production and rationalising the structure of 
production. It also helps to solve the endemic problem of part-time 
farming by overcoming the farmers’ reluctance to sell their lands. In 
addition, it contributes to a growth in farm production. All these 
goals were fundamental objectives of the Agricultural Basic Law: 
'promotion of increases in farm productivity'; 'improvements to the 
farm structure'; and 'rationalisation of land tenure and modernisation 
of farm enterprises by increasing the scale of management, by consoli­
dation and joint use of farm land'."^
Those farmers who cultivate the regionally integrated production 
units are part of producers or 'commodity' groups which specialise in 
the production of a single commodity, a type of producers' sub­
cooperative .
The eind danchi form the basis of the Nokyo integrated system which 
links these units to cooperative distribution and marketing systems.
The whole aim of these projects is to expand direct agricultural 
cooperative involvement in agriculture from the production to the 
marketing stage. According to the working procedure of cooperatively
1 Extracts from 'Nogyo Kihonho', op. cit. , p.3.
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reorganised farming, the first stage is production planning such as 
selection of participant farmers, choosing commodities suitable for 
the land and formulating long-run farm management plans. The second 
stage is unification of distribution channels, organising the farmers 
into commodity groups, consolidating farm guidance systems and pro­
duction facilities and establishing systems of production collection. 
The third stage includes nation-wide market co-ordination, supplying 
production requisites such as seeds and breeding stock, instruction of 
production techniques, installation of large facilities, and processing 
and marketing of products on a stable basis in order to attain an 
influential position in the market. The eino danchi form an economic 
unit of optimum size from the viewpoint of the economic management of 
production, distribution facilities and proper guidance services. The 
farmers do the producing under agricultural cooperative management, and 
the latter provide services such as technical advice, provision of 
credit, supply of production requisites and marketing of products in a 
systematic fashion.^ For the producer, the einö danchi take the risk 
out of farming.
Nokyo has thus pioneered large-scale farming ventures, employing 
innovative methods, utilising modern facilities and a high degree of 
mechanisation and technical expertise. These developments have been 
most significant in three areas of agricultural production: the growth
sectors of Japanese agriculture - fruit and livestock farming, and the 
area of traditional Nokyo interest - rice farming. Livestock farming 
is, however, predominant in the eino danchi, and there are more
This outline of the structure of the eino danchi was condensed from 
Appendix II, 'Establishment of Cooperative Farming Complexes^ in Central 
Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, Japan Agricultural Coop Uews3 Vo 1.9, No.4, 
February 1969, pp.64-65.
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cooperative farming complexes producing beef than any other product.
Beef is an area in which private sector integration does not dominate 
to the same extent as other livestock enterprises such as poultry farm­
ing.
Most of the rationale of the eind danchi, and much of their later
development has been designed by Zennö to link these production units
into its integrated processing, distribution, supply and marketing 
2systems. This aimed to meet the challenge of specialist co-op links 
with private trading companies, and to strengthen general-purpose 
marketing vis-a-vis the specialist cooperatives. According to its own 
propaganda, the 1(c)ooperative movement has to strengthen [its] bargain­
ing position in the market by having a voice and hands in the sphere of 
production through distribution' . . . and in order to prevent develop­
ments 'in an undesired direction' such as 'big capitalistic concerns
3concluding direct transaction contracts with producers'.
The eind danchi concept is attractive to the mainstream Nokyo 
organisation because it is exclusive to the general-purpose cooperatives. 
This strengthens the sögö ndkyo-keizaiven-Zenno network at the expense 
of the specialist side of the organisation particularly the livestock 
and fruit cooperatives. The establishment of cooperative production
As reported in Nokyö Nenkan, 1978, there were 32 danchi producing 
rice and wheat, 39 in vegetable and fruit farming (including one in Ehime 
producing mikan) , and 234 in livestock-raising (118 in beef cattle, 73 
in pigs, three in dairy, 21 in eggs and 19 in poultry). Op. oit., p.48.
2 'Establishment of Cooperative Farming Complex', op. oit., p.64. In 
1976, the eino danchi shipped 872,000 head of pigs, 400,000 head of beef 
cattle, 8,000 tonnes of fresh milk, 560,000 tonnes of eggs, and 701,000 
tonnes of poultry to Zenno, which represented 54 per cent of its total 
turnover in pork, 30 per cent of its beef, 4 per cent of its fresh milk, 
14 per cent of its eggs, and 47 per cent of its poultry. See Nokyo 
Nenkan, 1978, op. oit., p.47.
3
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complexes also requires considerable financial assistance from govern­
ment via the MAF budget. It has been used by both Nokyo and the MAF to 
justify substantial new investment in agriculture for such projects as 
land improvement and consolidation, and the installation of specialist 
facilities, all of which come under the major budget heading of 
’production improvement'.
Because the eino danchi are so well enveloped by the general- 
purpose cooperative system, their cause and ideology have been strongly 
taken up by Zenchu. The National Central Union devotes an entire section 
of its budget demands to the ei.no danchi, listed under the heading of 
’agricultural structural improvement’ and the ’promotion of regional 
agriculture'.
Zenchü-Zennö Domination of the Nokyo Livestock Lobby
Zenchü and Zenno dominate the producer livestock lobby in Japan.
This relates directly to the economic stake of the mainstream Nokyo 
organisation in this sector. Livestock ranks second only to rice as an 
agricultural commodity interest of Zenchü and Zenrio.
Demands relating to all aspects of livestock production constitute 
a vitally important section of Zenchü's budget request policy. Unlike 
fruit, livestock is not subsumed under a series of sub-headings, but 
constitutes a major section in itself. Feed policy also commands con­
siderable attention within the Zenchü ’demand’ budget.
The dominance of Zenchü in the presentation of livestock-related 
demands to government is also attributable to the incorporation of so 
many livestock products into administrative price decisions. A majority 
of livestock products are subject to price stabilisation laws. For this 
reason, Zenchü is legally required to present its ’suggestions’ on these 
matters to ’administrative authorities’. The processes involved in
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government price decisions are very similar to the procedures followed 
with regard to the producer rice price. Historically it would seem 
that producer strategies and institutional forms which evolved in one 
sector were transposed to another, as a greater range of farm products 
were incorporated into price legislation.
Livestock Products' Pricing Policies
There are several ’demand' prices for livestock and dairy products 
which require the organised action of Japan’s livestock producers.
Those of particular relevance to the issue of import liberalisation of 
livestock products are the administrative prices for:
(a) fresh milk;
(b) raw milk for processing (i.e. manufacturing milk);
(c) dairy products;
(d) beef.
In law, there is a direct relationship between the importation of 
dairy products and beef and domestic price movements for these commodities 
within Japan. The price-determination process therefore indirectly affects 
quantities of imports. This is reinforced by the fact that the institution 
charged with administering support prices and the supply control of pro­
ducts on the domestic market, is also responsible for the importation of 
these same products.
A special organisation has been created by Nokyo to handle the 
representation of Nokyo milk marketing interests: the Central Dairy 
Council (Chuo Rcckuno Ka.'ig'i, or ChwPCLku) . Churccku. comprises Nokyo groups, 
predominantly federations which engage in milk marketing. It has 46 
regional members (16 economic federations, 25 dairy federations, two milk
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marketing federations and three dairy agricultural cooperatives)1 .
These are all 'designated groups' (a condition of Churaku membership):
that is, they are officially 'designated' by prefectural governors to
market milk under the terms of the Provisional Measures Law For the
Deficiency Payment to Producers for Raw Milk for Processing {Kakö
Genryonyu Seisansha Hokyukinto Zentei Sochiho). This designation
enables producer groups to receive the subsidy paid out under the law.
In 1977, Chüraku's members held a 92.8 per cent share of all milk 
2marketed in Japan.
Churaku has six central (as opposed to regional) Nokyo organisations 
as members. the national federations of its regional members - Zenno 
and Zenrakuren;and other groups such as Zenohü, Chukin
and Kaitakuren (the National Nokyo Settlers’ Federation), which are either 
interested in milk policy determination, or can assist in financing 
Churaku's activities. The latter extend to a range of functions: market
adjustment - formulating policies to balance the supply and demand for 
milk; public relations and promotional activities particularly with the 
objective of expanding the consumer demand for milk; policy determination; 
and producer representation on milk prices. There are two categories of 
milk prices; the raw milk for drinking price (inyökö genryö nyuka), in 
other words, the fresh milk price; and the guaranteed price for raw milk 
for processing ( kakö genryonyu hoshd kakaku).
Nokyo Nenkan, 1978, op. ait., p.245.
2
Ibid.
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(a) Fresh Milk
Raw milk for drinking, or fresh milk (seinyü) is not subject to any 
government intervention in the form of price control, but it is subject 
to price negotiation between producer representative groups and major 
dairy companies which bottle, package and distribute milk. The govern­
ment does not involve itself in this process, except when negotiations 
reach an impasse and the MAF offers its mediation services. Like the 
producer rice price, dairy farmers push for rises in the producer price 
for drinking milk each year. Chüraku conducts the necessary negotiations 
with the big milk makers en bloo with the National Designated Groups'
Milk Price Policy Committee (Zenkoku Shitei Dantai Nyuka Taisaku Iinkai, 
or Zennyütai) which is an elected body of leaders from the designated 
groups which are Chüraku members. This is a price decision and negoti­
ation committee charged with determining the 'demand' price for drinking 
milk, and then presenting it as a demand to major dairy companies. It 
is responsible to its electing body which also channels input into the 
'demand' price formulation: the Prefectural Designated Milk Producer
Groups' Chairmen's Conference (Toctöfuken Shitei Seinyü Seisansha Dantai 
Kaicho Kaigi). Although this price is not subject to ministerial control, 
it is nevertheless an important issue to milk producers, because of the 
proportion of raw milk for drinking in total milk production: approxi­
mately 70 per cent of the raw milk marketed by designated producer groups 
is for drinking, and 30 per cent for processing as manufacturing milk.
(b) Raw Milk for Processing
Chüraku, as a milk producers' organisation, is also involved in 
pushing for higher prices for 'raw milk for processing', which has a 
'guaranteed price' under the government's deficiency payments scheme.
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Because this milk price is administered under government legislation, 
however, leadership in this area passes to Zenchü.
Like the Food Control Law, the ’Provisional Measures Law for the 
Deficiency Payment to Producers for Raw Milk for Processing' (short­
hand for which is 'Manufacturing Milk Deficiency Payment Law') requires 
the government 'to enable producers to obtain a return for their milk 
which covers, on average, their cash costs plus an agreed reward for 
their labour, capital and land'.^ " An equivalent role to the Food 
Control Agency in relation to rice is played in this case by a semi-
governmental organisation, the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation,
2or LIPC (Chikusan Shinko J'tgyddan) . The payment of a government sub­
sidy (deficiency payment) to farmers for manufacturing milk was one of 
the original reasons for the establishment of the LIPC.
An initial price stabilisation scheme for raw milk for processing 
was launched in 1958 with the Dairy Farming Promotion Fund Law. The 
Fund prevented falls in the price of raw milk by guaranteeing the 
liability of milk processors when they borrowed capital from financing 
institutions for their operations and construction of installations, 
thus guaranteeing their purchase of raw milk from the farmer.
The Law was replaced in 1961 by a Law Relating to the Price 
Stabilisation for Livestock Products, which set up the LIPC as a 
statutory body designated to perform various functions in relation to 
this law. The LIPC is a semi-governmental institution in the sense
E.A. Saxon, 'Some Aspects of the Growth in the Japanese Dairy 
Industry and Their Relevance to Dairy Policies and Pressure Groups', 
Paper Presented to Japan Advisory Committee Seminar, Wellington, NZ, 
December 12, 1978, p.19.
2 The producer rice price system as administered by the Food Control 
Agency is, of course, also a deficiency payments scheme.
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that over 90 per cent of its capital funds were provided by the govern­
ment with private investors supplying the remainder. Any milk process­
ing company which wishes to take advantage of the LIPC guarantee pro­
visions must invest in it.
The LIPC took over the function of guaranteeing the liability of 
milk processors and raw milk producers’ groups, but its range of func­
tions since then have been considerably expanded. These now include a
range of price stabilisation functions in relation to livestock products,
2and issuing a variety of subsidies.
The payment of the government subsidy (deficiency payment) to 
farmers for manufacturing milk, is therefore, only one of the LIPC’s 
functions. Since 1966 it has administered the Manufacturing Milk 
Deficiency Payment Law by purchasing milk up to a ’maximum quantity' 
(administratively determined) each year at a guaranteed price (hoshö 
kakaku) - the equivalent of the producer rice price - and selling it to 
manufacturers at a standard selling price (kljun torihlkl kakaku) .
Under the Law Relating to the Price Stabilisation of Livestock 
Commodities, the LIPC may purchase, sell, and store designated milk 
products (butter, skim milk powder, sweetened condensed whole milk and 
sweetened condensed skim milk). Under the same law, it may purchase, 
sell and store designated meat (pork). An amendment to the law in 
1966 enabled it to purchase, sell, and store imported beef, import 
designated milk products, and promote the demand for livestock products 
as a public relations function. Another amendment to the law in 1975 
enabled it to purchase, sell and store domestic beef (added to pork as 
a designated meat).
2 This function involves the payment of a government subsidy on milk 
for the school lunch program, issuing subsidies or investment finance 
to businesses designated to receive such subsidies, and from 1966 
onwards, paying subsidies to farmers producing raw milk for processing 
under the Manufacturing Milk Deficiency Payment Law. The list of LIPC 
functions is outlined in Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation,
LIPC, August 1975, pp.2-11.
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The LIPC subsidises the difference between the guaranteed price and 
the standard selling price (the deficiency payment). This is funded by 
government allocations from the MAF budget, and from any profits made 
by the LIPC on the purchase and sale of imported milk products.
There are three political decisions in relation to 'raw milk for 
processing' which it is incumbent upon the Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry to make prior to the start of each business year (i.e. April 
1):
(a) to set the ceiling quantity of the amount of milk on 
which the deficiency payment is to be paid;
(b) to determine the guaranteed price for raw milk for 
processing; and
(c) to determine the standard selling price of raw milk 
for processing.
In these decisions, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry is 
obliged to consult an 'inquiry organ' of the MAF: the Livestock Industry
Promotion Council (the LIP Council).
The LIP Council has a maximum of 25 members appointed by the 
Minister, and a number of 'special' members also appointed by the Minister 
(usually about 20). Its membership spans the same range of interests as 
the Rice Price Advisory Council: producers, consumers, trade unions,
'men of learning and experience', and in this case, also representatives 
from milk manufacturers and meat processors."^ " Its official functions
Its membership in March 1980 for example, comprised the Chairman of 
the Board of Directors of the Japan Meat Processing Association, a 
Professor from Hitotsubashi University Institute of Economics, Chairman 
of Zenvakuren, Chairman of the Agricultural Trust Insurance Association, 
President of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation,
(contd)
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relate generally to advising the Minister on the improvement and 
increased production of the livestock industries, the supply and 
demand situation for livestock products and animal feed, modernising 
livestock management and stabilisation of prices. As its business 
relates to the various branches of the livestock industry, it has 
five sub-councils which consider the particular problems in relation 
to each: dairy farming, meat, poultry, domestic animal improvement
and production, and livestock feed.
(from previous page)
an advisor to Chukin, Chairman of the Cooperative Union Japan Feed 
Industries Association, a Managing Director 6f Zenchü, Chairman of the 
National Towns and Villages' Association, Chairman of the Stabilisation 
Organisation for Combined Feed, Vice-Chairman of the Japan Livelihood 
Cooperative Union Federation, the Governor of Hokkaido, a commentator from 
NHK, Vice-Chairman of Chiba Prefecture Hog Raising Association, a Nihon 
Keizai Shinbun journalist, a Professor of the Agriculture Department of 
Tokyo University, Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Japan 
Central Horse Racing Association, a Professor of the Agriculture 
Department of Tohoku University, Vice-Chairman of the Central Livestock 
Association, Vice-Chairman of the National Beef Association, a Zennd 
Managing Director, Vice-Chairman of the Japan Poultry Association, an 
agricultural policy commentator, an Asahi Shinbun journalist and 
Chairman of the Japan Milk Products Association. The following were 
'special' members: two Tokyo University Agriculture Department
Professors, a Managing Director of the National Beef Association, a 
Managing Director of the Domestic Livestock Improvement Corporation, a 
Professor of the Japan University Agricultural and Veterinary Science 
Department, Chairman of the National Meat Industry Cooperative Union 
Federation, Chairman of the Feed Export and Import Conference, Chairman 
of the Japan Meat Market Wholesalers' Association, Chairman of the 
Japan Horse Meat Association, Chairman of the National Federation of 
Milk Industry Associations, a Managing Director of Zennb, Chief of 
the General Affairs Bureau of the National Chamber of Agriculture, a 
Kyoto University Agriculture Department Professor, Chairman of the 
Japan Egg Industry Association, Chairman of the Japan Manufacturing Milk 
Cooperative Union, Chairman of the Hokkaido Dairy Association, a 
Managing Director of the Japan Light and Heavy Horse Breeding Association, 
a Director of Kaitakuren, Chairman of the Japan Scientific Feed 
Association, a Managing Director of Zenchikuren and Chairman of the 
Hokkaido Agricultural Development Corporation.
The names and organisational affiliations of LIP Council members were 
listed in Chikusccn Shiiiko Shingikai Iin Meibo (Membership List of Live- 
Stock Promotion Advisory Council Members), 1980.
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(c) Dairy Products
Prices for these are subject to ministerial control under the 
Provisional Measures Law for a Deficiency Payment to Producers for Raw 
Milk for Processing. The Minister of Agriculture and Forestry has the
legal duty to determine annually the 'stabilisation indicative price'
sh.tici_
(antei shi-yo kakaku) for 'designated milk products' (nyuse'ihin) - 
butter, skim milk powder, sweetened condensed whole milk and sweetened 
condensed skim milk. The same procedure follows for these products as 
it does for manufacturing milk. The 'administrative prices' for these 
products are decided by the Minister after consultation with the LIP 
Council, and in particular its dairy sub-council. The price stabilis­
ation scheme is likewise administered by the LIPC, which regulates the 
market through supply control. If the price of designated milk pro­
ducts appears likely to fall below 90 per cent of the stabilised 
indicative price, the LIPC is empowered to purchase at 90 per cent of 
the stabilised indicative price from milk processors. If the prices 
appear likely to rise above 104 per cent of the stabilised indicative 
price, the LIPC is empowered to sell designated milk products in its 
stocks to keep prices below the 104 per cent of the stabilised 
indicative price. If these measures are insufficient, the LIPC, which 
has a monopoly over the import of designated milk products, is empowered 
to import and sell these too. These commodities are all under import 
quota restriction except for skim milk powder for school lunches and 
for feed.
According to Articles 13 and 14 of the Manufacturing Milk 
Deficiency Payment Law, the importation of these 'designated' dairy 
products is thus restricted to a State monopoly trader and is permitted 
only as a means of preventing 'undesirable' price rises in the Japanese 
domestic wholesale market.
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(d) Beef
In 1965, the powers of the LIPC were extended to permit it to 
engage in the importation and sale of beef. Beef was not liberalised, 
but remained under an import quota system. In 1965, Japan imported 
10,000 tonnes of beef. The LIPC share of this was only 6 per cent.
By 1970, total imports had grown to 24,200 tonnes and the LIPC share 
was exactly half, at 12,100 tonnes. This increased to 22,000 tonnes 
out of a total of 36,000 tonnes in 1971, and 57,500 tonnes out of a 
total of 71,500 tonnes in 1972. In other words, not only did beef 
imports grow rapidly, but the LIPC share of the imports took up almost 
the total increase. The aim of the LIPC importation function was 'to 
restrain the upward movement in domestic beef prices by having a 
government agency standing ready to sell imported beef'.^ If, however, 
beef prices fell on the domestic market, the LIPC was powerless to 
intervene other than to withhold the sale of imported beef.
This eventuality did in fact take place in late 1973 and 1974 as 
a sequel to the oil crisis and the downturn in consumer demand for beef 
which produced a catastrophic fall in beef domestic wholesale prices.
The situation for many Japanese livestock farmers was a critical 
one. The oil crisis and the world grain shortage which preceded it 
combined to force up feed prices, and numbers of beef farmers who had 
invested heavily in cattle fattening and feeder calf purchases went 
bankrupt. The fall in domestic wholesale beef prices was generally 
blamed on imports.
John W. Longworth, 'Institutions and Policies Influencing Japanese 
Beef Imports’, Department of Agriculture, University of Queensland, 
June 1976, p.15.
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The result was a concerted campaign led by Zenchü (together with 
Zennö, Zenchikuren, Zenrakuren and Chüraku) to press the government 
into an emergency policy for freezing imports, and to add beef to pork 
as a 'designated meat' under the Law Relating to the Price Stabilis­
ation of Livestock Commodities. Zenchu presented these demands 
in meetings with MAF officials, and also made representations to the 
Diet Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committees, and to the Sub- 
Committee of the LDP's Agriculture and Forestry Division (Nörin Bukai) 
on Agricultural and Livestock Commodity Prices.
The result was a temporary freeze on LIPC beef imports: the MAF
suspended 40,000 tonnes of a 90,000 tonne quota allocated for the 
period October 1973 to April 1974. This action amounted to a de facto 
cancellation of most of the remaining 40,000 tonnes for the fiscal year. 
Furthermore, the after-effects of this action continued for a consider­
able period. No beef quotas were announced at all in 1974, and quotas 
were considerably below the levels desired by Japan's overseas beef 
suppliers - Australia, New Zealand and the US - until the late 1970s.^
In addition to the quota suspension, the government introduced an 
amendment to the Livestock Products' Price Stabilisation Law in April 
1975, which designated beef in the same category as pork as a product 
subject to price stabilisation administered by the LIPC.
The 1975 amendment empowered the Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry on the advice of the LIP Council, to set annual floor and 
ceiling prices at the beginning of each Japanese fiscal year for second 
grade beef carcasses. As in the case of pork, the LIPC could intervene
The quota was 75,000 tonnes in 1975, 80,000 tonnes in 1976, 92,500 
in 1977, 112,000 tonnes in 1978, and 132,000 in 1979.
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in the market by either releasing imported beef to bring prices down 
(with import quotas allocated by the MAF to keep up the flow of 
imported beef on to the market), or to buy beef at domestic wholesale 
markets to keep prices within the floor to ceiling price band.
Since 1975, although prices of domestic beef have tended to hover 
in the upper half of the price band and even rise above the ceiling 
price from time to time, import quotas allotted by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry in consultation with the MAF have been conservative. 
Japan's traditional beef suppliers regard the present beef import regime 
as limiting their potential beef export sales to Japan. So far, the 
Japanese government has resisted the combined pressure of the US, 
Australia and New Zealand to grant 'stability of access' to the 
Japanese beef market, either in terms of optimum quota levels or longer 
term agreements on beef imports. Present export levels continue to be 
dictated by an import framework which is announced approximately every 
six months in March and October, the system which has operated since 
1965. Furthermore, the 132,000 tonne quota for fiscal 1979 was still 
below 160,000 tonnes allocated for fiscal 1973.
Aside from complaints about actual quota levels, criticisms have 
also been directed against the current import regime as operated by 
the LIPC which imports beef under the guidance of the MAF; against 
government decisions on quota levels; and the Livestock Products'
Price Stabilisation Law which established the whole system. In other 
words, there are objections both to how the beef import system 
actually operates under the management of the LIPC, and to the 
formal-legal framework within which imports are made, chiefly the 
allocation of LIPC beef quotas solely for the purpose of 'stabilis­
ing the domestic market'. As with dairy products, beef imports serve a
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price stabilisation function, and are legally permissible only within 
the restricted terms of reference of the LIPC: to achieve the policy
objective of preventing domestic wholesale prices of beef from rising 
above the ceiling price as set by the Minister of Agriculture and 
Fores try.
Criticisms of the beef import system have also come from within
Japan itself. These have been directed mainly against the structure
of the nation's beef industry and its dependence on imported feed
which keeps production costs at unreasonably high levels.’'- The high
cost domestic beef industry results in high retail prices for beef
which keeps consumption to a low level. Investigations by Japanese
who have delved deeper into the beef distribution network, have also
revealed that a number of private traders (wholesaler middlemen who
deal in beef) participate in a profiteering racket at the distribution
stage by taking paper profits on the nominal movement of beef from
2one wholesaler to another. They allege that the chief beneficiaries
of the high cost of beef in Japan are not farmers, but a few large
meat brokers, meat processors and trading firms.
Only one major criticism of the system is examined here: the
charge that 'beef quotas are a direct reflection of the power of the
3[Japanese] farm lobby’, and that, more specifically, floor and ceil­
ing prices for beef are set too high by the Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry because of political pressure from Japan's livestock lobby.
Yokota Tetsuji, Gywiku wa Naze Takai ka? (Why are Beef Prices 
So High?), Tokyo, Simul Press, 1977.
2
'Beef Maze Hides Profiteering', The Japan Times, March 19, 1978.
Australian National Cattlemen's Council, Press Release, May 2, 1977.3
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This assessment is of course also relevant to the problem of larger 
quotas for dairy products which has been the subject of particular 
pressure from New Zealand dairy exporters. The following discussion 
extends to all these 'designated products' handled by the LIPC, to 
the processes by which beef and milk stabilisation prices are decided 
and channels through which producer influence is exercised.
The Amalgamation of Politics and Administration: The LIPC
The LIPC has been singled out by critics of the Japanese livestock 
import system as the 'advance guard' of that country's 'protectionist 
forces' and the primary bureaucratic obstacle to the import liberal­
isation of beef and dairy products.
The LIPC's leadership - its President, Vice-President and its 
four full-time directors (managing its General Affairs and Accounting 
Departments, its Dairy Department, its Meat Department and its Subsidy 
Department)-are all retired,top-ranking bureaucrats, most of whom were 
formerly employed in the MAF.^  Its President and Auditor are nominated 
by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; its Vice-President and 
other full-time executive directors are nominated by the President on 
the permission of the Minister.
In 1975 for example, its President, Okada Kakuo, was a former MAF 
Director-General, its Vice-President was a former head of the MAF 
Livestock Bureau (Chikusan Kyoku), and its Auditor was President of 
Meiji Milk Company. In 1976, its President, Öta Yasuji, was former 
Head of the MAF Livestock Bureau and Director-General of the Fisheries 
Agency. Its President in 1970, Katayanagi Naoyoshi, was a former Vice- 
Minister for Agriculture and Forestry, former House of Councillors' 
member from 1950-1956 for the Ryokufukai, one-time Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of Covin Chukin and Zenchü Director (as its Covin 
Chukin representative). In 1975 he combined the Chukin Chairmanship 
with the Central Dairy Council Chairmanship.
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In its funding largely by government subsidy through the MAF 
budget, its nomination of top officials by the relevant Minister, and 
its functioning within relevant agricultural laws, the LIPC displays 
the regular features of an extra-departmental body (gadkaku dantad) of 
which there are a large number in Japan. In these and other respects, 
it is also structurally similar to Norin Chukin. The latter, although 
serving a banking function for Nokyo independently of government under 
its own executive leadership, operates under the guidance of the 
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry because of the large quantities of 
government funds channelled through the cooperative bank to Nokyo and 
to the farmers. The LIPC likewise, has seven part-time directors 
representing groups such as milk and livestock producers and the dairy 
and livestock industries, which have direct financial and other interests 
connected with the operations of the LIPC. The professional and 
organisational connections of the LIPC’s part-time directors in 1975^ 
are listed below:
1. I to Denzo, President of Ito Ham Company and Chairman of 
the Japan Sausage Industries’ Cooperative Union.
2. Otsubo Toichi, Chairman of Zenrakuren.
3. Honda Masakazu, Director of the Japan Milk Processors' 
Cooperative Union.
4. Yamaguchi Iwao, a Managing Director of Zenchü
5. Yamamoto Hyosaburo, Chairman of the All-Japan Chick 
Sexing Association and former Chairman of Zenrakuren.
The names and connections of these individuals were given to the 
writer in a personal interview with a MAF Livestock Bureau official, 
Tokyo, January 14, 1977.
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6. Yamamoto Yoichi, President of Snow Brand Dairy 
Processing Company.
7. Vacancy.
This list reveals that three out of the six LIPC part-time directors
in 1975 had current or former links with Nokyo organisations. This has
been described as 'the institutionalised participation of Japanese
domestic producer representation in the administration of the beef [and
dairy product] import trade'.^ In the assessment of another writer:
'The structure of the LIPC is such that livestock interests have a
further avenue which facilitates access to centres where policy measures 
2are formulated'. This line of reasoning assumes both that the advice of 
LIPC part-time directors is an input into LIPC decision-making, and that 
LIPC plays a definite role in determining import allocations. If 
these premises prove valid, then one can reasonably conclude that 
Japanese beef and dairy producers actually have a hand in deciding the 
quantity of overseas beef and dairy products which come into Japan.
The first assumption is logically justifiable given the guaranteed 
provision of representation from domestic producer and processing 
interests through the formal ranking of part-time directors; the second 
is more difficult to substantiate. One must first establish the role 
the LIPC plays in the actual decision-making process on import quotas.
The LIPC is formally charged with administering the import quota 
systems for beef and dairy products through the purchase, sale and 
stockpiling of beef and dairy products. It is also formally required
Aurelia D. George, 'The Japanese Beef Import Controversy', New 
Zealand International Review, Vol.III, No.2, March/April 1978, p.22.
2 Saxon, op. cit., p.14.
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to monitor movements in domestic wholesale prices for these products
'thus providing a critical economic input into the decision-making
process on import quotas. In this regard, it is consulted by the MAF
prior to the initial round of formal governmental negotiations on the
quota led by the Ministry in concert with the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry. It is at this stage that the LIPC has the
opportunity to influence the final decision . . . This it does by
making its own recommendations as to the size of the quotas required to
maintain domestic wholesale prices at the stabilised levels laid down
by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. The fact that LIPC
full-time executive leaders are recruited 'almost to a man from the
MAF not only facilitates the communication process but also signifies
2that LIPC influence over the Ministry will be great'. That the LIPC
has a direct and substantial influence over deciding import quotas was
a view expressed by an LIPC official formerly attached to the Sydney
3office of the Corporation.
Another unusual facet of the LIPC's construction is its dual role 
as administrator of the beef and dairy products' import trade, and as 
distributor of government subsidies and investments to 'businesses 
designated to receive subsidy' (sic.).^  This places it as an important 
source of government subsidies to domestic livestock producers. These 
subsidies are drawn from the LIPC budget which derives its income from 
government and private investment in the LIPC and funds derived from
George, op. cit., p.22.
Ibid. , p.23.
Personal interview with Morita Kuniharu in Tokyo, January 14, 1977. 
LIPC, op. cit. , p.8.
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p r o f i t s  on LIPC o p e r a t i o n s ,  i n  t h e  ' p u r c h a s i n g  an d  s e l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n s
o f  i m p o r t  m i l k  p r o d u c t s  and beef ' . "*"  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  ' s u r p l u s  f u n d s
g e n e r a t e d  by t h e  w i d e  m a r g i n  o f  d i f f e r e n c e  a t  w h ic h  t h e  LIPC b u y s
2
i m p o r t e d  b e e f  a n d  s e l l s  i t  t o  d o m e s t i c  w h o l e s a l e r s  ( e x t r a c t e d  a s  an  
i m p o r t  l e v y )  a r e  c h a n n e l l e d  i n t o  t h e  p r o m o t i o n  o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  b e e f  
i n d u s t r y .  I n  f i s c a l  197 6 ,  t h e  LIPC i s  known to  h a v e  c o l l e c t e d  25
3
b i l l i o n  y e n  . . . f r o m  t h i s  s o u r c e ' .
The LIPC l i s t s  t h e  p r o j e c t s  'w h i c h  a r e  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  s u b s i d y  o r  
4
i n v e s t m e n t ' :  t h e y  i n c l u d e  m a r k e t i n g  r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  m a j o r  l i v e s t o c k
p r o d u c t s ;  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  m i l k  p r o d u c t s ;  r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n
o f  b e e f  c a t t l e ;  p r o m o t i o n  o f  m i l k  p r o d u c t i o n ;  c o m p e n s a t i o n  o f  l o s s
a c c r u i n g  f rom t h e  f l u c t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  p r i c e  o f  compound f e e d  f r o m  th e
5
f e e d  p r i c e  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  f u n d .
O r g a n i s a t i o n s  q u a l i f i e d  t o  r e c e i v e  t h e s e  i m p o r t - g e n e r a t e d  s u b ­
s i d i e s  a r e  a l m o s t  a l l  Nokyo o r g a n i s a t i o n s .  The t o t a l  l i s t  i s  a s  
f o l l o w s :  ' a g r i c u l t u r a l  c o o p e r a t i v e ,  f e d e r a t i o n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l
c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  j u r i d i c a l  p e r s o n s  f o r  p u b l i c  b e n e f i t  (shadan ho j i n )  o r  
j o i n s t o c k  company (kabush ik i  ka ish a ) i n  w h i c h  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  
f e d e r a t i o n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t s  o r  t h e  LIPC 
h o l d  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  s t o c k s
1 Ib id .
2
T h i s  m a r g i n  h a s  c o n t r a c t e d  s i n c e  1978 owing to  r i s e s  i n  t h e  c o s t s  
o f  A u s t r a l i a n  b e e f  i m p o r t s  w h i c h  c o n s t i t u t e  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  80 p e r  c e n t  
o f  t h e  t o t a l .
3
G e o r g e ,  op. c z t . , p . 2 3 .
4
LIPC3 op., c z t .  , p . 8 .
T h e s e  a r e  l i s t e d  i n  ib id .
6 Ib id .
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In other words, almost all LIPC subsidies are channelled either 
directly to the cooperatives themselves, or to cooperative-related 
organisations: that is, those in which cooperatives have a financial
interest, including cooperative companies.
For Nokyo, and for domestic producers, the subsidy system is an
additional advantage of the current beef import regime as administered
by the LIPC. An alternative deficiency payments-cura-liberalised
imports scheme has been suggested in a number of quarters.''" It was
also considered but rejected by the MAF prior to the establishment of
2the present stabilisation arrangements. The deficiency payments 
system would subsidise domestic producer returns by imposing a levy on 
imports. The viability of this scheme, however, rests on a substantial 
margin remaining between Japanese market prices and the equivalent 
import prices for beef. The international beef market is, however, 
highly volatile, and since the late 1970s, import prices have increased 
sharply, thus narrowing the potential margin between ’low’ import 
prices and ’high* domestic prices. Any shortfall in the import levy 
would ultimately have to be taken up by allocations from the MAF budget, 
a commitment which the Japanese government, particularly the MOF, is 
not prepared to undertake on a continuing basis. Given the present 
budget load of the producer rice deficiency payment system, and the fact 
that 'deficit bonds which are being used to finance the deficit are 
equivalent to more than 30% of the budget . . . .  The government is
See for example Hayami Yujiro, Trade Benefits to Alt: A Design of
Beef Import Liberalisation in Japan, Tokyo Metropolitan University, 1978; 
and J.W. Longworth, 'The Japanese Beef Market: Recent Developments and
Future Policy Options', Agricultural Economics Discussion Paper, 
Department of Agriculture, University of Queensland, March 1978, pp.34-36. 
2 The MAF raised a number of objections to the scheme, some of which 
were highly technical, relating to uncertainties about the effects of 
such a scheme on the domestic pig and poultry industries, about the price 
elasticity of demand for beef, and about the variability of world market 
prices for beef.
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thus concerned to limit budget appropriations for agricultural support. 
Under such circumstances, the government is more inclined to measures 
providing support to farmers through the pricing mechanism'.^ Further­
more, if the present system were replaced by a deficiency payments 
system, LIPC surpluses on imports would be absorbed into such a scheme, 
and the subsidy system operating at present would have to be abolished.
Amongst the list of organisations entitled to receive LIPC sub­
sidies are those which specialise in the promotion of domestic livestock 
interests. These groups form part of the livestock lobby by maintaining 
close connections with farm politicians and playing a substantial 
intermediary role linking producers and producer organisations to 
policy-makers.
Livestock Promotional Groups
Two main organisations operate in this area: the National Beef
Cattle Association (Zenkoku Nikuyögyü Kydkai) and the Central Livestock
2Association {Chuo Chikusankai). The organisational charters of these 
groups reveal remarkably similar aims and functions. Both are national 
organisations with a sub-structure of prefectural associations. They 
are ’corporate juridical persons' (shadan höjin) - one category of 
recipient of LIPC subsidies.
The objective of the National Beef Association (NBA) is ’to strive 
for the promotion of our nation's beef production and the development 
of beef management, as well as to contribute to the continuing improve­
ment of the national welfare and the advancement of the livestock
Ivan Roberts, ’Japan’s Agricultural Production and Trade Policies - 
Implications for Australia's Rural Exports’, Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, Canberra, n.d., p.9.
2 In the pork and poultry industries, there are the Japan Hog Raising 
Association and the Japan Poultry Association.
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industry'. The phraseology of the Central Livestock Association (CLA)
is almost identical. It 'strives for the continuing improvement of
farmers' livestock management, as well as contributing to the promotion
2of livestock farming'.
Both groups specify their functions as investigation, research,
education and training, supply of information, publication of relevant
3materials, and most importantly, technical advisory services.
Zenkoku Nikuyogyu Kyokai, Zenkoku Nikuyogyu Kyokai Teikan3 
National Beef Association, 'Articles of Incorporation of the National 
Beef Association'), p.l.
2 Chuo Chikusankai, Chuo Chikusankai Teikan (Central Livestock 
Association,'Articles of Incorporation of the Central Livestock Associ­
ation' ), p.l.
3 The list of activities of the National Beef Association are:
1. Business relating to the promotion of beef;
2. Investigation, research, instruction and publicity aiming
at the advancement of beef management;
3. Publication of printed materials relating to beef;
4. Other necessary activities for the achievement of the
objectives of the association.
See the Zenkoku Nikuyogyu Kyokai Teikan, op. cit. , p.l.
The list of activities of the Central Livestock Association are:
1. Guidance in management and techniques relating to live­
stock production etc;
2. Education and training of extension personnel in the
livestock industry;
3. Investigation and research relating to the livestock
industry;
4. The supply of publicity and information relating to
the livestock industry;
5. Guidance on the management, official duties and organis­
ation of prefectural livestock associations which are 
members;
6. Registration of cattle;
7. Necessary business to achieve the aims of the association
as stated under its objectives.
See the Chuo Chikusankai Teikan, op. cit., p.l.
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Each list also includes a final catch-all category of 'any other 
activities necessary to achieve the objectives of the association'.'*' 
Although the lobbying function is not actually spelt out, it could be 
conveniently subsumed within this all-purpose category. The public 
relations work of both organisations could also indirectly serve an 
interest representational role.
Membership of both organisations is similar. The list is headed 
by their prefectural branches and Nokyo organisations. The latter 
category includes agricultural cooperatives and federations of agri­
cultural cooperatives which conduct business relating to livestock
2production, livestock guidance, mutual aid and marketing etc.
See ibid. , and Zenkoku Niyuyogyu Teikan op. cit. , p.l.
2 The membership of the National Beef Association is:
1. Prefectural beef associations;
2. Prefectural agricultural cooperative federations which
perform the business of guidance or production or 
distribution in relation to the livestock industry;
3. Prefectural groups which have the objectives of con­
tributing to the promotion of the livestock industry 
as well as striving for the continuing improvement 
of farmers' livestock management.
See ibid., pp.1-2.
The membership of the Central Livestock Association is made up of:
1. Prefectural livestock associations;
2. Agricultural cooperatives and federations of agri­
cultural cooperatives (prefectural and national) 
which perform marketing, purchasing, technical 
advisory, management, credit etc. functions in 
relation to livestock farming;
3. Agricultural mutual aid federations;
4. Other juridical persons for public benefit involved
in the livestock guidance business, whose members 
are whole or in part farmers, or whose members 
perform livestock guidance activities;
5. Non-profit juridical persons (other than shadan hdjin)
which strive to contribute to the promotion of the 
livestock industry through livestock guidance activities.
The Central Livestock Association has associate members: non-profit
organisations other than those in its regular membership categories which 
conduct livestock extension business. See Chub Chikusankai Teikan, op. 
cit., pp.2-3.
450
Both groups have a category of 'supporting members' (sanseisha) 
which are groups (the exclusion of private individuals is made explicit 
in the case of the CLA) which support the aims and objectives of each 
association. This is a very vague category of membership which could 
theoretically encompass any organisation whatsoever (including the 
LIPC for instance), which is willing to pay 'supporters' fees'. The 
latter are unspecified and are quite different from membership fees. 
Structural categories therefore exist for both the NBA and the CLA to 
have financial connections with a wide range of groups in a covert 
fashion.
The emphasis of the CLA which patently emerges from its list of
members and activities is guidance, or technical advisory and extension
services. According to one writer, agricultural cooperatives join the
prefectural livestock associations in order to provide their members
with the extension services which the associations offer."^  At the
prefectural level, most of the activities of the association are
2related to technical and management advice. This more practical 
emphasis is also true of the prefectural branches of the NBA.
It is at the national level in particular, however, that the lobby­
ing function of these groups is fully exercised through representation 
on the LIP Council for example, and in the election of politicians 
(invariably from the LDP) to head these groups. In this way, permanent 
contact is made with the government, Diet and government party on 
livestock-related issues. The politician-leaders of these groups serve
See Longworth, 'The Japanese Beef Market: Recent Development and
Future Policy Options', op. cit. , p.39.
2
Ibid.
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as political middlemen, maintaining a permanent liaison between the
Diet and livestock producer organisations.^ There is an interesting
financial connection here also. The finance for these organisations'
operations in livestock extension and in the other services which they
offer, is provided in the main by national and prefectural government
subsidies channelled through the MAF. Theoretically their legal
construction as shadan höjin with agricultural cooperative union
membership also qualifies them for subsidies from the LIPC. When one
combines this fact with the character of their organisational leadership,
that of prominent Diet members with livestock connections and interests,
it points to a possible channel for political finance. It was alleged
for instance, that a portion of the beef import 'adjustment fund' (that
is, LIPC profits on its beef import operations) finds its way into the
pockets of LDP politicians in exchange for services rendered in the form
of pressure on government to protect the interests of domestic beef
2producers. A number of politicians were named in this connection 
including the Chairmen of both the NBA and the CLA, in addition to 
several other LDP House of Representatives' members known to be keenly 
interested in agricultural and livestock issues and to have connections 
with Nokyo ._________
There are a number of organisations in the agriculture and forestry 
field which are structured along these lines: that is, they are led by
Diet politicians and have a group membership of Nokyo organisations. Those 
which fall into this category include: the National Association for the
Structural Reform of Agriculture (Zenkoku Nögyö Közö Kaizen Kyökai), the 
National Association of Trust Federations (Zenkoku Shinren Kyökai), the 
National and PrefecLural Chambers of Agriculture, the Japan Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries Industries' Promotion Council (Nihon Körin Gyogyö 
Shinkökai), the National Mountain Village Promotion Federation (Zenkoku 
Sanson Shinkö Renrnei), the Japan Tea Industry Central Association (Nihon 
Chagyö Chüökai), the Japan Forestry Association (Nihon Ringyö Kyökai), 
the National Nokyo Tourist Association (Zenkoku Nökyö Kankö Kyökai) and 
the Food Demand and Supply Research Center (Shokuhin Jikyü Kenkyü Senta) .
2 This allegation emerged from Yokota Tetsuji's book, op. cit., and 
was taken up by the Japanese press. It was subsequently reported in the 
Australian press. See the Australian Financial Review, June 1, 1977.
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The allegation of political funding by the LIPC is currently under
challenge by one writer who maintains that a considerable proportion of
the import taxes collected by the LIPC on beef has been channelled into
supporting feeder calf prices.^- It was denied by the Chairman
of the LIPC in 1978 with a statement that 'the organisation is subject
to the close scrutiny by the [Japanese government] Board of Audits',
and that 'the LIPC must obtain prior endorsement from the MAF and the
2Finance Ministry for any outlay of its gains'. Neither of these argu­
ments necessarily disproves the financial connection between the LIPC 
and Diet politicians, however. It may be true that a substantial pro­
portion of LIPC profits is channelled into the legitimate area of 
supporting feeder calf prices, but this still leaves room for political
3use of a certain proportion of its funds. Furthermore, although LIPC
accounts may be subject to official scrutiny, the methods of 'laundering'
funds for political purposes are multifarious. Organisations such as
the NBA and CLA undeniably perform an official and legitimate role in the
promotion of the livestock industry,and this function, combined with the
character of their membership structure, places them within the
eligibility caregory for LIPC subsidies. At the same time, however, these
4groups are led by Diet members who represent livestock producing
Longworth, 'The Japanese Beef Market: Recent Developments and Future
Policy Options', op. cit. , p.12.
The Japan Times, 18 March 1978.
3 The fact that some .LIPC funds are used for political purposes was 
affirmed by an LIP Council member, interviewed in Canberra, March 20, 1980.
4 Another such group operating in the beef sector is the National Beef 
Price Stabilisation Fund Association (Nikuyögyü Kakaku Antei Kikin Zenkoku 
Kydkai). This does not have political functions in the sense of perform­
ing a general promotional role on behalf of beef producers. Its main task 
is to pay out funds to prefectural beef price stabilisation fund associ­
ations to cover any shortfalls in their funding operations when beef prices 
fall below a certain level. It is, however, led by a prominent LDP poli­
tician who represents a beef producing constituency (Yamanaka Sadanori).
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constituencies and who have access to these funds. These groups also 
play a central role in addition to the relevant Nokyo organisations, 
in influencing the Japanese government on behalf of domestic livestock 
farmers in matters such as the allocation of beef quotas and stabilis­
ation prices. They utilise channels both official (such as membership 
on the LIP Council), and unofficial in their lobbying activities. 
According to one source"!’ the NBA made an important input into the 
government decision to grant a particularly low beef import allocation 
of 20,000 tonnes in November 1976 immediately prior to the December 
1976 Lower House elections (after a much larger import quota of 45,000 
tonnes had been announced for the first half of fiscal 1976) .
Livestock Diet Members (Chikusan Giin)
The general and informal label of chikusan giin is given to those
Diet members who organise themselves informally around constituency-
dictated livestock interests and those who are members of official
party committees which consider livestock issues (with a good deal of
overlap between both sets of groupings). It includes both ’beef’
politicians and 'dairy' politicians (vakunö giin) , given the close
relationship which exists between the different sectors of the livestock 
2industry, especially in relation to such matters as imported feed 
prices and the growth in dairy beef production.
As with rice Diet members (home giin) and fruit Diet members 
(kudamono giin), livestock Diet members almost always display one or a
Interview with a MAF Livestock Bureau official, Tokyo, January 14,
1977 .
2 The depressed state of the meat market as a whole for example, and 
the drop in pork prices in particular, was used by the Japanese 
government as justification for its reduced import quota for beef in 
November 1976.
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combination of key features relating to their personal, career, 
electoral or organisational attributes. These are:
(a) Their voting base (jiban) or native place (shusshinchi)
is an important livestock or dairy producing constituency.
(b) They are, or have been members, or have served as leading 
executives in Nokyo organisations, such as Zenrakuren, 
Zenehikuren, Zennd or ZenchTi, or Nokyo prefectural feder­
ations (particularly the livestock and dairy federations) 
or unit agricultural cooperatives (espdcially those hand­
ling livestock products).
(c) They have non-official but nevertheless important electoral 
connections with Nokyo, as evidenced by their membership of 
the KIdsei Kenkyukai, or ties with Nokyo-sponsored political 
groups such as the Japan Dairy Farmers' Political League 
{Nihon Räkunö Seiji Renmei) . The latter is the only Nokyo- 
related organisation of livestock producers which acknowledges 
a specifically 'political' function in its title. Its 
individual farm membership is drawn from the membership of 
the Nokyo specialist dairy cooperatives (rakuno nokyo) , which 
are in turn linked to the dairy Nokyo federations and the 
national dairy federation (Zenrakuren). The League could in 
fact be said to be the political arm of the Nokyo dairy 
specialist cooperatives.^ It recommends (suisen) and provides 
other forms of electoral support to those politicians who
1 The League's activities are also discussed in Chapter 4.
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form connections with it and pledge to support its 
objectives in the Diet."*"
2The Headquarters of the Japan Dairy Farmers' Political League 
is in Tokyo. It has a small office staff comprising a 
Managing Director and Office Chief. Its leaders are elected 
by its membership and consist of one Chairman (Iinchö) ,  
four Vice-Chairmen and one Auditor. Its activities are sub­
sidised by the cooperatives and its leaders are almost always
3Nokyo dairy organisation executives.
In the 1976 House of Representatives' elections for example, the 
League successfully backed Morita Kinji, an LDP candidate, to a seat in 
Fukuoka (1) constituency. Morita stood as Chairman of Fukuoka Prefecture 
Livestock Association, Prefectural Dairy Nokyo Federation Chairman, Vice- 
Chairman of the National Forestry Seedlings Nokyo Federation and 
Chairman of the Forestry Technical Association. He had previously been 
Chairman of Amagi City Nokyo, and a Director of the Fukuoka Prefecture 
Nokyo Central Union. Morita also received backing in these elections 
from the Federation of Prefectural Forestry Associations, the National 
Farmers' General Federation (Zennösören) and became a member of the Nösei 
Kenkyükai on entry to the Diet. Morita died in April, 1979.
2 There is another dairy organisation, the National Dairy Association 
(Zenkoku Raktcnd Kijokai) , but it is a non-political group which provides 
technical guidance to farmers in association with Zenrakuren.
3 Its 1975 Chairman for example, was also a Director of Zenrakuren, 
and Chairman of Ibaragi Prefecture Dairy Nokyo Federation. Its four 
Vice-Chairmen included a Vice-Chairman of Zenrakuren representing the 
Gumma dairy cooperatives; the Representative Auditor (Daihyö Kanji) of 
Kumamoto Prefecture Livestock Marketing Nokyo Federation; another 
Zenrakuren Vice-Chairman who was also Chairman of Chiba Prefecture Dairy 
Nokyo Federation; and a local dairy cooperative leader from Miyagi 
Prefecture. In the Japan Dairy Farmers' Political League, these indi­
viduals are Nokyo executives in their alternate roles as dairy political 
leaders. The preceding details were obtained from Nögyö Kyödö Kwmai 
Rengökai Yakushokuin Meibo, op. cit. , pp.121-137, and pp.915-916.
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(d) They hold or have held executive posts in Nokyo-connected, 
semi-administrative, government-financed livestock organis­
ations, such as the CLA and its prefectural branches, or 
the National Beef Association and its prefectural branches.
The election of politicians who function as leaders of these 
groups serves a dual purpose. Diet members accept leader­
ship of livestock associations for electoral purposes: to 
publicise themselves as active spokesmen for livestock and/ 
or beef producers.’*' On the other hand, the organisations 
themselves, nominate 'men of power and influence'
(kenryokusha, or jitsuryokusha) as their leaders because 
influential politicians can facilitate communication with 
the centres of power, particularly in such practical matters 
as the issuing of political statements on policy issues and 
the presentation of petitions to MAF bureaucrats and LDP 
members. It is the lower-level executives of these groups 
who are the experts in technical guidance, informational 
and public relations activities.
2In 1975 for example, the Chairman of the CLA, Akagi Munenori,
This was information gained from a personal interview with a MAF 
Livestock Bureau official, Tokyo, January 14, 1977.
2 Akagi was an LDP Nokyo Diet member in the Lower House for Ibaragi (3) 
between 1952 and 1976 , who served in a wide range of Cabinet posts includ­
ing the position of Minister of Agriculture and Forestry (which he held 
seven times), and in high-ranking party positions, including the posts of 
Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council, Chairman of the Execu­
tive Council, and Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. As Minister of 
Agriculture and Forestry, he played a vocal role in negotiations with the 
US over liberalisation in 1971. He was prominent in the Ibaragi Pre­
fecture Nokyo organisation, holding at one time the post of Chairman of 
the prefectural Nokyo Central Union. He was also a member of the Nösez 
Kenkyukai. He was named in the list of politicians who reputedly received 
kickbacks from the LIPC beef surplus account. In December 1976, he (contd)
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and two of its three Vice-Chairmen, Oishi Buichi^ and
2Yamanaka Sadanori were Diet members. Yamanaka was also
serving concurrently as Chairman of the National Beef
Association. One of its Vice-Chairmen, Suzuki Seigo,
3was also a Diet member. The remaining Vice-Chairmen
(from previous page)
numbered amongst the old, prominent, LDP farm politicians who lost their 
seats in the Lower House elections.
Öishi Buichi was an LDP Nokyo Diet member in the Lower House for 
Miyagi (2) between 1949 and 1976. In addition to his CLA position, he 
was concurrently acting as Chairman of Zenchikuren, Chairman of Miyagi 
Prefecture Livestock Nokyo Federation, and as Minister of Agriculture 
and Forestry. As Minister, he was responsible for what at the time 
was interpreted as a blatantly political manoeuvre in announcing a 
substantially reduced beef quota for the second half of fiscal 1976.
The timing of this announcement was crucial: it preceded the December
1976 Lower House elections by a month, and was lambasted in both the 
Japanese and foreign press as a ’vote-getting ploy geared to the . . .
general elections' (The Japan Times, December 13, 1976). Öishi joined 
the ranks of those long-serving LDP farm politicians who were defeated 
in the election, but was revived (fukkatsu) in the Upper House elections 
of the following year (1977) . His action over the November 1976 beef 
quota was in the same vein as the June 1971 grapefruit liberalisation 
deferral, and followed a similar ’reverse course' after the election was 
over. In January 1977, the Japanese government announced an additional 
17,000 tonne beef quota as a concession to its overseas trading partners. 
This brought the total quota for fiscal 1976 to 80,000 tonnes, which was 
more in line with what beef exporting nations such as Australia had been 
expecting the previous November.
2 Yamanaka was an LDP member in the Lower House for Kagoshima (3) from 
1953 onwards, a respected party spokesman on financial and taxation 
affairs, who visited both Australia and New Zealand in 1977 as a repre­
sentative of Japanese beef producers. He was concurrently serving as 
Chairman of the National Beef Price Stabilisation Fund Association, and 
was named in 1976 as one of the recipients of LIPC funds.
3 Suzuki was an LDP Nokyo Diet member in the Upper House for Fukushima 
from 1968 onwards, who was also Chairman of the Fukushima Prefecture 
Livestock Association, Fukushima Prefecture Livestock Nokyo Federation, 
a Director of Zenchikuveny a member of the Ndsei Kenkyükai, former 
Chairman of a town agricultural co-op, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for 
Agriculture and Forestry, and Vice-Chairman of the LDP's Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries Office. In 1977, Suzuki succeeded to the post of 
Chairman of the House of Councillors' Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
Committee.
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were Nokyo executives. Yamanaka's predecessor as Chairman
2of the NBA was a farm politician from Okayama, Koeda Kazuo.
Personnel overlap was also evident between the NBA and the 
National Beef Price Stabilisation Fund Association. In 
addition to Yamanaka who headed both, they had a common 
Vice-Chairman who was also Chairman of the Kumamoto Livestock 
Marketing Nokyo Federation.
Leading positions in Japan’s livestock organisations are thus 
reserved for incumbent Diet members who have specialist expertise and 
interest in livestock issues. An important criterion for the CLA Chair­
manship or Vice-Chairmanship also appears to be experience as Minister 
of Agriculture and Forestry.^-
An examination of the agricultural organisational affiliations of 
Japan's livestock Diet members over the past three decades shows that 
large numbers of them have held positions in prefectural livestock
These were the Chairman of the Kumamoto Livestock Marketing Nokyo 
Federation, and another Nokyo official from Okayama.
2 Koeda was an LDP member in the Upper House from Okayama from 1968 
to 1974, who preceded his career in the House of Councillors with 20 years 
in the Lower House (1947 to 1967) as an LDP member for Okayama (1).
Koeda had experience in multiple Diet and party agricultural policy roles: 
as Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Chairman of 
the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee, Chairman of the LDP 
Agriculture and Forestry Division, Chairman of the National Wagyü 
(Japanese beef cattle) Association, and member of the Uosei Kerikyukai.
3 Apart from Akagi and Oishi, former Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry, Kono Ichiro, 1946 to 1967,LDP member in the Lower House for 
Kanagawa (3) had also held the Chairmanship of the CLA. It is interest­
ing to note that Kono Ichiro's son, Köno Yöhei, has succeeded him in more 
than one political connection. From 1967 to 1976 he was LDP member in 
the Lower House for Kanagawa (3) and Chairman of Kanagawa Prefecture 
Livestock Promotion Association. In 1976 he was elected to a new seat in 
Kanagawa (5) as a member of the New Liberal Club.
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associations. The key members of this group of livestock organisation- 
connected Diet members constitute the political leaders of the live­
stock lobby in Japan. They usually combine strong constituency-
dictated livestock interests with one or more official connections to
2livestock organisations.
Prior to 1976 this group included: Matsuura Tosuke, Liberal, then 
LDP member in the Lower House for Yamagata (1) from 1946 to 1958 and 
1960 to 1963, a member of the Ndsei Kenkyukai, Yamagata Prefecture Live­
stock Association Chairman and Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Agri­
culture and Forestry; Ogasawara Yasomi, Liberal, then Democratic, then 
LDP member in the Lower House for Aomori (1) from 1946 to 1952 and 1955 
to 1958, who was Vice-Chairman of the Aomori Prefecture Livestock 
Association; Terashima Takataro, Liberal, then Democratic, then LDP 
member in the Lower House for Chiba (2) from 1946 to 1955 and 1958 to 
1967, who served as Chairman of Chiba Prefecture Livestock Association; 
Inatomi Takato, Right Wing Socialist, then JSP, then DSP member in the 
Lower House for Fukuoka (3) from 1953 to 1958 and from 1960, former 
Vice-Chairman of Zennichinö then Chairman of Zennö, Chairman of Fukuoka 
Prefecture Livestock Association and Director of the Central Livestock 
Association, previously Secretary-General of the Farmers' Party (Nomintö) , 
member of the Ndsei Kenkyukai, Chairman of the DSP Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries Policy Committee, with a political base in the Nokyo pre- 
fectural farmers' political league (yidseiren); Matsumoto Ichiro,
Democratic Liberal, then Liberal, then LDP member in the Lower House for 
Mie (1) from 1949 to 1955 and 1960 to 1963, Hie Prefecture Livestock 
Association Chairman and Chairman of the Prefectural Mutual Aid Associ­
ation; Kubö Kanichi, LDP member in the Upper House for Nagasaki from 1962 
to 1970, Director of the Prefectural Agricultural Mutual Aid Association 
and Chairman of Nagasaki Prefecture Livestock Association (the National 
Mutual Aid Association is,for instance, a member of the CLA, and the same 
probably applies at prefectural level); Nukumi Saburo, LDP member in the 
Upper House for Miyazaki from 1959 to 1976, Miyazaki Prefecture Nokyo 
Central Union Chairman, Chairman of the Miyazaki Prefecture Nokyo Economic 
Federation, Chairman of the National Nokyo Tourist Association, member of 
the Nosei Kenkyukai, chairman of the prefectural farmers' federation 
(ndmin venmei) , Chairman of Miyazaki Prefecture Livestock Association, who 
succeeded to senior Diet posts in agriculture and forestry such as 
Parliamentary Vice-Minister and Chairman of the Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries Committee; Mizuno Hiyoshi, LDP member in the Lower House from 
1967 to 1976, Chairman of the Chiba Prefecture Livestock Association and 
Director of the CLA; Nonaka Fiji, LDP member in the Lower House for 
Saitama (3) from 1969, Director of the Saitama Prefecture Livestock 
Association; and Kita Shuji, LDP member in the Upper House for Hokkaido 
from 1977, local agricultural cooperative chairman and Hokkaido Pre­
fecture Livestock Association Vice-Chairman.
2 Amongst the post-1976 group (apart from Yamanaka), are Aoi Masami,
LDP member in the Upper House for Ehime from 1974 onwards, Prefectural 
Nokyo Economic Federation Chairman, Zennd Representative Auditor, Chair­
man of Ehime Prefecture Livestock Association and member of the (contd)
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The Beef and Dairy Electorates
The size of the beef farming electorate is approximately half the 
size of the fruit farming electorate (about 500,000 against a little 
more than one million) and is contracting in numerical size. The trend 
amongst beef farming households in Japan has been for a drop in their
absolute number, with corresponding increase in average herd size per
1 2 farm household. The same trend may be observed in dairy households,
but there has recently been a steep upward trend in dairy cattle used for
3beef production. If both sets of figures are combined the total number 
of beef and dairy households declined, while total cattle numbers
(from previous page)
Nosei Kenkyukai, who in 1977, succeeded to the Vice-Chairmanship of the 
LDP Agriculture and Forestry Division; and Eto Takami, LDP member in the 
Lower House for Miyazaki (1) from 1969, a beef breeder himself, Director 
of Miyazaki Prefecture Livestock Nokyo Federation and member of the 
Nosei Keykyukai, who had served in a variety of posts in prefectural 
livestock organisations, such as the Miyazaki Prefecture Domestic Animal 
Breeding Association Chairman (Kachiku Toroku Kyokai), and Chairman of 
the Miyazaki Prefecture Domestic Animal Improvement Association 
(.Kachiku Kairyo Kyokai), and who had also held the positions of Parlia­
mentary Vice-Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Vice-Chairman and 
Chairman of the LDP Agriculture and Forestry Division, and in 1978, 
Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Agricultural and Livestock Commodity 
Prices of the Agriculture and Forestry Division.
 ^ There were two million beef farming households in 1960 holding an 
average of 1.2 head each. By 1965, this number had fallen to 1.4 million 
households holding an average of 1.3 head each; by 1970, 902,000 house­
holds holding an average of 2.0 head each; and by 1975, 474,000 house­
holds holding an average of 3.9 head each. These figures were obtained 
from Poketto Norin Suisan Tokei, op. cit. , pp.247-248.
2 In 1960 there were 410,000 dairy households holding an average 
of two head each. By 1970, there were 308,000 holding an average of 
5.9; and by 1975, there were 160,000 holding an average of 11.2 head 
each: that is, 820,000 head in 1960 compared with 1.7 million in 1975.
See ibid.
3 Most dairy farmers sell some animals for beef, while some beef 
households concentrate on fattening dairy breeds. However, published 
statistics do not show dairy beef producers separately, although they 
do separate meat production from dairy and beef breeds.
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have increased somewhat since 1973.
These figures suggest that there has been some contraction of the 
beef and dairy farming electorate in terms of the number of farmers in 
this sector. This has not, however, resulted in the reduced electoral 
importance of the livestock sector or a decline in the effectiveness 
of the beef and dairy lobbies. There are a number of reasons for this. 
Firstly, there is the offsetting factor of an increase in absolute herd 
numbers and average herd size, which signifies a growing level of 
specialisation in the livestock sector. Secondly, there is a 'homogenis­
ing' factor at work in Japanese agriculture: farmers, no matter what 
commodities they produce or what level of specialisation they engage in, 
tend to identify closely with one another as a defensive block. A threat 
to one particular sector is viewed as a threat to all, and on the 
liberalisation issue in particular, farmers appreciate the tactical value 
of presenting a united front to policy-makers: witness the closing of 
ranks amongst Nokyo organisations after grapefruit liberalisation was 
actually put into effect.
While examining the number of people engaged in production is, 
therefore, a useful exercise, it cannot be used as a basis for conclusions 
about the particular strength of one set of farmers compared to 
another, or a decline or increase in the political power of a par­
ticular sector over time. The latter is not solely a function of 
absolute numbers. The strength of a specific farm lobby is also a 
reflection of other factors, some of which were mentioned earlier: the 
organisational strength and economic stake of Nokyo in a particular 
field (and as we have shown, agricultural cooperative operations in the 
livestock industry are second only to rice, which has important
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repercussions for Nokyo's political pressure on behalf of livestock 
interests); the political content of agricultural commodities as a 
result of their incorporation or otherwise into statutory regulations 
such as price stabilisation laws (this factor contributes to the more 
highly mobilised operations of the rice and livestock lobbies particularly 
by the mainstream Nokyo organisation compared to fruit for example); 
regional specialisation in production which helps to counterbalance the 
geographical spread and numerical superiority of rice farmers for 
instance, with the organisational cohesion and clearly defined interests 
of many specialist farmers and their cooperatives in areas of production 
concentration; and finally, the policy 'weight' of certain products in 
the priorities of the MAF, which multiplies their political significance 
in budgetary terms and also has an influence on liberalisation policies 
(this has strengthened the influence of rice, fruit and livestock pro­
ducts in Japan since the 1960s).
Regional Concentration in the Livestock Industry
As was demonstrated in the case of the constituency backgrounds of 
livestock and more particularly, beef politicians, certain select 
regions are represented by Diet members who combine a strong commodity 
interest with specialist organisational connections. The best known beef 
politicians for example, come from constituencies in the beef producing 
regions of Kyushu and Tohoku, such as Kagoshima, Miyazaki, Iwate, Miyagi, 
Fukushima, Kumamoto etc.
The same sort of regional ties are evident amongst dairy politicians 
(rakuno giin), although the distinction between the categories of 
'beef' and 'dairy' politicians is somewhat spurious given the high regional 
coincidence of dairy and beef production and the fact that about two thirds 
of domestic beef now comes from dairy herds.
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The geographic breakdown of dairy household and cattle numbers 
according to region for 1975 is shown in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4
Regional Breakdown of Dairy Farm Household and Cattle Numbers
Region No. of Dairy Households No. of Dairy Cattle
Tohoku 42,180 208,300
Kan to 30,570 335,900
Hokkaido 27,380 614,800
Kyushu 14,060 159,300
Chukoku 9,750 94,100
Tosan 8,610 56,000
Kink« 8, LßO 95f 000
Shikoku 7,620 64,700
Tokai 7,490 117,400
Hokuriku 3,750 38,400
Okinawa 180 2,400
Total 160,070 1,787,200
Source: Norinsho, Tokei Johobu, Poketto Norin Suisan Tokei
(Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Statistics 
and Information Department, Pocket Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries Statistics), 1976, Tokyo,
Norin Tokei Kyokai; and from the same source, Norinsho 
Tokeihyo, (Statistical Yearbook of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry) 1974-75, Tokyo, Norin Tokei 
Kyokai, p.144.
Dairy producing constituencies are therefore to be found in 
Hokkaido, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Chiba, Gumma, Miyazaki, Kumamoto, 
Kagoshima etc. Prefectures significant for dairy beef production are 
Hokkaido, Miyagi, Tochigi, Fukushima, Kumamoto and Fukuoka, and those 
significant for both dairy and dairy beef are Hokkaido, Nagano, Miyagi 
and Fukushima. Nokyo specialist livestock and dairy federations
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also tend to be stronger in these areas, and can mobilise considerable
support for politicians with whom they have close ties. The Fukushima
Prefecture Livestock Nokyo Federation for example, has had two Diet
members directly representing it at different times.
Leaders of the dairy lobby in the post-1976 election Diet included
2politicians such as Morita Kinji from Fukuoka, Sakamoto Chikao from 
3 - 4Miyazaki, Kujime Kentaro from Tokushima, and Nakagawa Ichiro from 
Hokkaido.“* Nakagawa was one of the livestock politicians mentioned in
These were Suzuki Shujiro, Liberal Party member in the Diet for 
Fukushima from 1946 to 1947, then LDP member in the Lower House for 
Fukushima (1) from 1955 to 1958, who was Fukushima Prefecture Livestock 
Nokyo Federation Chairman and President of Morinaga Milk Industries' 
Tohoku Branch; and I to Takashi, LDP member in the Lower House for 
Fukushima (1) between 1960 and 1963, who was also Chairman of the 
Fukushima Prefecture Livestock Nokyo Federation.
2 Morita was referred to earlier in connection with the Japan Dairy 
Farmers' Political League.
3 Sakamoto was an LDP member in the Lower House for Miyazaki (2) 
between 1969 and 1972, and was successfully elected to the Upper House 
in 1976. At the same time he held the post of Chairman of Miyazaki Pre­
fecture Four Nokyo Federations, Chairman of Miyazaki Prefecture Dairy 
Nokyo Federation, Director of Zenchii, member of the Ndsei Kenkyukai 
and Chairman of the prefectural agricultural council (nbgyö kaigi) . He 
inherited the giban of Nukumi Saburö (referred to earlier).
4 Kujime has been an LDP member in the Upper House for Tokushima since 
1968, in addition to his Nokyo executive positions which included the 
posts of Chairman of the Tokushima Prefecture Four Nokyo Federations, 
Chairman of Tokushima Prefecture Fruit and Vegetable Nokyo Federation 
(he is also a kudamono giin) , Director of Zenno, Director of le no Hikavi 
Kyökai, former Chairman of Tokushima Prefecture Dairy Nokyo Federation, 
Chairman of Tokushima Prefecture Nokyo Feed Company, a member of the 
Nosei Kenkyukai, and Chairman of the prefectural agricultural council 
(ndgyd kaigi) .
Nakagawa has been an LDP member in the Lower House for Hokkaido 
(5) since 1963. His electorate covers a specialist dairy farming area.
He is a member of the Nösei Kenkyukai and a reputed member of the rice 
'Vietcong', who gained the post of Chairman of the LDP Agriculture and 
Forestry Division in 1974, Chairman of the Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries Committee in 1976-77, and Minister of Agriculture and Forestry 
in 1977-78. As Minister he handled the crucial negotiations with the 
New Zealanders over the trade-off offered by Prime Minister Muldoon which 
proposed to exchange access to the Japanese market for New Zealand beef, 
dairy products and wood pulp,for Japanese access to the New Zealand 200 
mile fishing zone.
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connection with the receipt of funds from the LIPC surplus account.'*' 
Rakuno giin prior to 1976 represented constituencies in Ibaragi, 
Shizuoka, Chiba, ^ Nagasaki,^ Niigata,^ and Hokkaido.^
In addition to those already named in this regard were Watanabe 
Michio, LDP member in the Lower House for Tochigi (1) from 1963, who 
held the posts of Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Agriculture and 
Forestry (1970) , Chairman of the LDP Agriculture and Forestry Division 
(1972), Vice-Chairman of the LDP’s Comprehensive Agricultural Policy 
Investigation Committee (1976), reputedly a member of the ’rice Viet- 
cong'; and Matsuno Raizo, referred to earlier in relation to the fruit 
lobby. The common attributes of those with alleged secret financial 
connections to the LIPC appear to be high-ranking positions in party 
agricultural policy-making organs.
2 -  -Sato Yonosuke, LDP member in the Lower House for Ibaragi (3) from 
1946 to 1969, author of a book Japan's Dairy Farming, and Chairman of 
an LDP committee on dairy policy.
3 Endo Saburo, LDP member in the Lower House for Shizuoka (2) from 
1949 to 1972, former Chief of the MAF Livestock Bureau, LIP Council 
member, member of the Advisory Council on Feed Supply and Demand 
Stabilisation, Chairman of Shizuoka Prefecture Dairy Nokyo Federation, 
and Nösei Kenkyukai member.
4 Jitsukawa Kiyoshi, JSP member in the Lower House for Chiba (3) from 
1958 to 1969, Chairman of Chiba Prefecture Nokyo Central Union, Chair­
man of Chiba Prefectural Dairy Nokyo Federation, a Nösei Kenkyukai 
member, and member of the Zennichino Central Executive.
Kuranari Tadashi, LDP member in the Lower House for Nagasaki (1) 
from 1958, former MAF Agricultural Land Bureau Chief, Chairman of the 
LDP Agricultural, Forestry and Fisheries Office, member of the LIP 
Council, member of the Nösei Kenkyukai, and Chairman of a Special LDP 
Committee on Dairy Farming Promotion.
0
Hatano Shinichi, LDP member in the Lower House for Niigata (2) from 
1972 to 1976, and chairman of a local dairy agricultural cooperative.
Shimada Takuro, JSP member in the Lower House for Hokkaido (5) from 
1972, chairman of a town dairy cooperative, member of the Nösei Kenkyu­
kai, Chairman of the JSP’s Farmers’ Division and the informal JSP intra- 
Diet group - the Agricultural Policy Diet Members’ Group (Nösei Giindan), 
member of the Hokkaido Prefecture Agricultural Council (Nögyö Kaigi), 
and Secretary-General of a regional farmers’ federation (nönrin renmei); 
Okamura Fumijiro, mentioned extensively in Chapters 3 and 4, who was a 
Director of Snow Brand Milk Company; and Takahashi Yunosuke, LDP member 
in the Upper House for Hokkaido from 1965 to 1977, Chairman of the 
Hokkaido Prefecture Nokyo Central Union, a Director of Zenchü, a 
Director of Snow Brand Milk Company, member of the Nösei Kenkyukai, who 
became Chairman of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee in 
1971, and Vice-Chairman of the LDP’s Comprehensive Agricultural Policy 
Investigation Committee in 1974.
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Clearly there is a complex web of party-political, organisational 
and constituency connections which promote livestock interests in the 
national Diet. Farm politicians representing livestock constituencies 
usually demonstrate their support for the interests of their farming 
constituents by engaging in extensive Diet members’ activities (gzzn 
katsudo) on livestock-related issues. In this area there is no equiva­
lent of the 'standing committee' which represents specialist fruit 
interests - the Fruit Farming Promotion Diet Members' League (FPL). In 
fact as the former emerged as the informal Parliamentary anti­
liberalisation leadership group, many chikusan gizn joined it, anxious 
to prevent the liberalisation of beef and dairy products, and many House 
of Councillors' livestock politicians also joined the Nosei Suishin 
Giindan.
A majority of Diet members' leagues are temporary, non-regularised, 
issue- or commodity-oriented bodies. Some may last considerably 
longer than others, such as the FPL. There are many such informal groups 
in the Diet (about 100 altogether), covering a much broader policy field 
than agriculture alone. No special group operates in the area of live­
stock commodity prices like the Beika Taisaku Kyogikai or the FPL, 
although the informal title of livestock Diet member (chikusan giin) or 
livestock-related Diet member (chikusan kankei gizn) is attached to those 
active in this policy area. The leagues may formalise their proceedings 
to the extent of holding monthly meetings to discuss the problem of a 
particular commodity. They may also be petitioned by representatives 
from relevant Nokyo groupings (aside from the direct communications 
facilitated by politicians who hold joint Diet and executive positions 
in livestock organisations). They have no powers of decision, but where 
they can be effective is by acting as a unified voice in LDP agricultural
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policy committees and sub-committees. The LDP's Alov'in Bukai, for 
example, concerns itself with price problems other than rice, and has 
a Sub-Committee on Agricultural and Livestock Commodity Prices 
(Nöchikusanbutsu Kakaku Shöiinkai) . In this sort of forum,a league can 
act in concert as an informal pressure group, and their numerical pre­
dominance in the membership of LDP formal policy committees on agri­
culture and forestry facilitates their penetration of the policy­
making process. They serve as a key channel for pressure from interested 
groups outside the Diet into the inner decision-making circles of the 
government party.
Politicians who head LDP policy committees on agriculture become 
the leaders of the various commodity lobbies. Their original selection 
of party committee is almost always linked to the interests they repre­
sent. In agricultural circles, 'interest' is dictated by the nature of 
farm production in a particular electorate, specialist expertise in 
agricultural affairs and links with farm organisations. This results in 
a strong measure of coincidence between political 'connection' and policy 
role within party structures. Prominent livestock politicians for example, 
head the Nörin Bukai Sub-Committee on Agricultural and Livestock Commodity 
Prices which formulates party policy on the price stabilisation bands for 
beef and the guaranteed prices for milk and milk products. These are the 
equivalent in the livestock sector of the Comprehensive Agricultural 
Policy Committee in matters concerning the producer rice price. It is 
not surprising therefore, that these different sets of official party 
agricultural policy committees tend to act in a similar fashion in the 
political process leading up to key commodity price decisions.
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Decision-Making on Livestock Commodity Policy Prices
Parallels between rice price decision-making procedures and those 
followed in relation to livestock products such as beef and milk are 
striking. There are obvious differences in timing, with livestock 
product policy prices (chikusanbutsu seisaku kakaku) earlier on the 
annual agenda for the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry than the 
producer rice price (March as against June/July). Because the pro­
ducer prices for beef, pork and milk have to be decided at the same time 
prior to the start of the financial year, however, Zenchu tends to 
launch a unified campaign of demands.
The various rounds of demand-presentation and negotiations on these 
prices follow the same stages as for rice. Round I consists of the 
presentation of the MAF 'preliminary calculated prices' (sh'Lsan kakaku) 
to the LIP Council by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. MAF 
calculations are based on the same formula used to establish its 
recommended producer rice price: the 'production cost and income com­
pensation' formula. The relevant sub-council of the LIP Council 
deliberates in detail on each MAF recommendation. The opening sessions 
of the Council mark the beginning of Nokyo's producer livestock prices 
campaign.
The agricultural cooperative organisation reaches its 'demand' 
prices on livestock commodities by undertaking formulation procedures 
which parallel those of the MAF. Zenchu Agricultural Policy Department 
and Section Chiefs hold an investigatory meeting, and there is an 
extended examination of relevant statistical materials which have been 
collected by the agricultural cooperative organisation. This also 
includes an analysis of the general situation in each industry. The 
final draft which emerges from this meeting is passed on to the Conference
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of National and Prefectural Central Union and Economic Federation 
Department and Section Chiefs' Conference (another staff-level meeting), 
and on the same day, it is also examined in the Nokyo Livestock and 
Dairy Policy Central Headquarters' Committee (a smaller body of members 
of these two Central Headquarters). The Committee has already canvassed 
the views of the prefectural Livestock and Dairy Policy Head­
quarters and collects the reports and demands emanating from these 
bodies. The next stage is the formal round of decision-making within 
the Zenchü Board of Directors, and the Committee formally and finally 
decides on a set of demands within this body. (In other words, the 
Committee is itself staffed by Zenohü Directors.) The Nokyo demands 
are decided by the same formula used by the government: the'production
cost and income compensation'formula, but the agricultural cooperative 
application of this yardstick invariably produces much higher prices. 
Furthermore, the list of policy requests usually extends to more than 
just the demand prices themselves. They consistently involve price- 
related policies such as: the halting of imports and the establishment
of production targets to achieve improvement in self-sufficiency levels 
(import restriction is a consistent theme linked to livestock stabilis­
ation prices); matters relating to feed price stabilisation through the 
Feed Price Stabilisation Fund (feed is a critical input into farm costs 
in the livestock sector); additional government subsidies and assistance 
for livestock producers in management, transport, distribution and 
marketing; and measures for establishing direct Nokyo marketing, pro­
cessing and distribution facilities in order to expand consumption of 
livestock products and rationalise livestock production distribution. 
These subjects are examined in the LIP Council together with the live­
stock policy prices which constitute the second major section of Nokyo
demands.
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Round II comprises the submission of Nokyo demands to the LIP 
Council by its representatives in attendance. The three sets of prices 
are: the guaranteed price for manufacturing milk, the pork stabilis­
ation prices and the beef stabilisation prices.
With regard to the Manufacturing Milk Deficiency Payment, four 
Nokyo demands consistently reappear:
(a) a rise in the guaranteed price for manufacturing 
milk (hoshö kakaku);
(b) a rise in the standard selling price (kijun 
torihiki kakaku);
(c) a request that the whole quantity of manufacturing 
milk be subject to a deficiency payment (the 
quantity for subsidy is determined each year during 
price negotiations), and
(d) a call for the establishment of deficiency payment for 
raw milk for drinking, and meanwhile, the use of 
'administrative guidance' to raise the standard trans­
acting price (torihiki kakaku) for this product.
Nokyo also annually demands rises in the stabilisation prices for 
designated meats (pork and beef).
The Nokyo demands are made first to the Council in general session 
which comprises its regular members (up to 25) and its special members 
(usually around 20), and then to the opening sessions of the sub­
councils on meat (shokuniku bukai) and dairy farming (rakund bukai) .
Zenchü, Zenriö, Zenrakuren and Zenchikuren all have direct representation 
on the Council, and this is supplemented by spokesmen from other Nokyo- 
related groups such as the National Nokyo Livestock Agricultural
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Cooperative Farm Complex Conference (Zenkoku Ndkyd Chikusan Danohi 
Renraku Kyögikai), the National Beef Association, the Central Livestock 
Association and other agricultural organisations .’*'
Timed with the opening sessions of the LIP Council, are the Nokyo 
mass conventions sponsored by Zenchu such as the National Nokyo 
Representatives' Convention on Livestock Policy Prices'. Compared to 
the average rice price convention, the numbers in attendance are small - 
around 2,000. The purpose of the convention is to publicise the Nokyo 
'demand' prices, and to obtain ratification from rank and file on these 
executive-formulated policy requests.
A second series of meetings concurrent with those of the LIP 
Council is held within the LDP's Agriculture and Forestry Division 
(AJörin Bukai) particularly its Sub-Committee on Agricultural and Live- 
Stock Commodity Prices. To this gathering of farm politicians, Zenchli, 
as represented by its Nokyo Livestock and Dairy Policy Central Head­
quarters' Chairmen, conducts a forceful presentation of its 'Livestock 
Policy Prices List of Demands', accompanied by similar representations 
to the headquarters of all the other political parties, to individual 
Diet members of both Houses, to each relevant bureau and division of 
the government (MAF), and to government Ministers and LDP leaders.
Other meetings may include combined sessions of the Borin Bukai 
and Sögö Bösei Chösakai, but the key party organ is the Agricultural and 
Forestry Division Sub-Committee, which may call on MAF officials to 
testify on the government recommended prices. Informal meetings of 
livestock and dairy Diet members are also usually taking place.
1 See the list of LIP Council members on pp.434-435, footnote 1.
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Within the Diet, the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
Committees may request submissions from the Minister on the MAF 
recommended prices and pass resolutions on these prices.
Round III begins when the LIP Council submits its report on the 
MAF recommendations to the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. As 
with the producer rice price, the final and most crucial negotiations 
take place between the government, represented principally by the 
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and the Minister of Finance, the 
government party, as represented by the leaders of the Agriculture and 
Forestry Division, its Sub-Committee on Agricultural and Livestock 
Commodity Prices, and top-level party executives (the 'Big Three' - 
Secretary General, Chairman of the Executive Council and Chairman of 
the PARC). During these negotiations, Agriculture and Forestry 
Division and Sub-Committee meetings continue to take place as part of 
the on-going process of internal party adjustment, and Nokyo represen­
tatives made their final appeals to these. After the closing session 
of the Sub-Committee, a final party viewpoint is firmed up between the 
Bovin Bukai Chairman, Vice-Chairman and the Chairman of the Sub- 
Committee on the one hand, and party leaders on the other. Before the 
final decision is made, the Zenchil Chairman, flanked by his Livestock 
and Dairy Policy Central Headquarters' Chairmen, usually visits the 
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. (In the case of the producer rice 
price decision, it is often the Prime Minister.)
The outcome of the government-party negotiations is the announce­
ment by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry of the producer live­
stock prices, following a final Cabinet decision.^- Here, as in the case
What has been described is the 'observable' process of party decision. 
This must, however, be interpreted in the light of the information offered 
by an LDP official (and recounted in Chapter 5, p.306) as to the 'real' 
timing and procedures involved in producer price decision-making.
of the producer rice price, the party is almost always successful in 
achieving a 'political addition' (seiji kasan) to the MAF recommended 
prices. Table 6.5 shows these for the 1976 livestock policy stabilis­
ation prices.
Nokyo does not present any 'demand' on the 'stabilisation indica­
tive price' for designated milk products, as it is not a 'producer' 
price paid to farmers. It is a secondary price designed to enable milk 
manufacturers to pay the LIPC its standard selling price for manufactur­
ing milk. (To this the LIPC adds the deficiency payment to bring it up 
to the guaranteed producer price, which the LIPC pays the farmers.)
In 1974 , Nokyo attempted to attach a more objective label to the
political addition on manufacturing milk by calling it an incentive
payment 'for collection and despatch'.^ This was, however, discontinued
in later years. Nokyo's 1976 campaign was particularly vociferous,
because the 1975 beef price stabilisation prices contained no political
addition whatsoever: the MAF recommended price equalled the final
decision. This response from government was described as a 'one shot
2reply' (ippatsu kaitö) by Nokyo and condemned. Zenchu successfully 
campaigned for its non-continuation in the 1977 beef stabilisation prices. 
The farmers received an overall 8.5 per cent increase as well as a small 
political addition. In 1976, Nokyo also extracted an additional payment 
on top of the deficiency payment for raw milk for manufacturing.
Immediately after the various livestock stabilisation prices were announced 
on March 31, 1976, the Zenchü Chairman, Fujita Saburo, flanked by his
2
Saxon, op. cit.-, p.22.
Nökyö Nenkan, 1977, op. cit. , p.67.
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Nokyo Livestock and Nokyo Dairy Policy Central Headquarters Chairmen, 
presented a list of 'urgent' demands to government. These included 
making a quality improvement incentive payment on raw milk for manu­
facturing, restricting beef import quotas to amounts that would not 
overwhelm domestic production, and linking the distribution of imported 
beef by the LIPC to the beef ceiling price."*"
The outcome of these 'urgent' demands was remarkably successful.
They were followed by a continuation of the conservative administration 
of the beef import quota by the LIPC, the institution of a quality 
improvement incentive payment on the deficiency payment for manufactur­
ing milk from 1976, and an unexpectedly low beef import quota announce­
ment for the second half of fiscal 1976.
The quality improvement incentive payment of one yen per kilo was 
attached to the manufacturing milk deficiency payment in 1976. In 1977, it 
was 1.75 yen. The attractiveness of these additional payments, which in 
practice substitute for even higher deficiency payments on raw milk for 
processing, is their different budgetary classification. They do not 
become part of the official milk price support system and do not, there­
fore, appear within the budget category of 'Price, Marketing and Income 
Measures'. Such incentives to increase quality, output etc. come under 
the more acceptable and less obviously 'political' category of 
'Production Measures'. Spread across two budgetary categories in this
fashion, the MAF is able 'for a given standard selling price and a given
2actual price to the producer, to record a lower deficiency payment'.
1
2
Ibid., p. 70.
Saxon, op. cit. , p.25.
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This sort of budget strategy adopted by the LDP is reminiscent of 
the period of producer rice price restrictions from 1968 onwards, when 
the government party sought to appease its financial critics by shifting 
part of the budget load of the producer rice price away from the Food 
Control Special Account and on to the MAF 'Production Measures’ budget 
category. This was done by granting a variety of incentive and 
’special works' payments to farmers.
Anti-Liberalisation MAF Policies
A number of other more general policies influence the Minister of 
Agriculture and Forestry's decisions on the beef and dairy product 
import quotas quite apart from the livestock commodity stabilisation 
prices themselves. They also indirectly influence MAF views on 
agricultural trade liberalisation as a whole, and are, by and large, 
incompatible with 'liberalised' attitudes towards agricultural trade.
In other words, the issue of the trade liberalisation in fruit and 
livestock products cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be evaluated 
in the context of overall Japanese agricultural policies and agri­
cultural policy priorities. At the present time, substantial 
liberalisation of agricultural trade is fundamentally incompatible with 
some of the basic goals of Japanese agricultural policy.
In considering this question, one is faced with a problem of deter­
mining cause and effect: are these other basic goals the by-product of
agricultural protectionism (in the sense of having been formulated as 
ex post facto justification for it); or is agricultural protectionism an 
inevitable consequence of these other policy goals? The fundamental 
agricultural policy objectives referred to here are: the Agricultural
Basic Law, particularly its clauses on import restrictions; agricultural
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production adjustment, which represented the second major redirection 
in Japanese agricultural policy (launched in 1968, but made definitive 
from 1970 onwards); and agricultural self-sufficiency, particularly the 
much-quoted self-sufficiency targets postulated for 1985. Each of these 
policies will be examined in turn.
(a) Agricultural Basic Law clauses on import restrictions create
the possibility not merely of goal incompatibility, but of direct 
contravention of the law. Article 13 of the Law states that 'if import 
of any agricultural product causes or is likely to cause a substantial 
decline in prices of any competitive product and the effect would be a 
serious setback, then in such a case, . . . the State is to adjust tariff
duties, restrict imports or take any other necessary measures 1.^  The 
directives to MAP resulting from this Article are clear enough and 
require no elucidation.
(b) Production Adjustment
Livestock and fruit products, as the object of 'selective expansion' 
measures became the logical alternative to rice growing in the pro­
duction adjustment program launched by the MAF in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. This policy, however, in concert with the essential failure 
of the Japanese 'charter of agriculture' (the Agricultural Basic Law) to 
solve the fundamental problems of Japanese agriculture - expansion of the 
scale of production and a lowering of production costs through increased 
productivity meant that the production alternatives to rice growing 
were also high-cost goals, and this made the products involved uncom­
petitive compared to their cheaper overseas counterparts. Furthermore, 
it was illogical for the MAF to espouse mutually contradictory policies:
1 'Nogyo Kihonho' , op. <yit. , p.4.
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to advocate diversion from rice into fruit and livestock products while 
proposing to swamp these products with more competitively priced imports. 
As we have seen, substantial liberalisation took place only in relation 
to a limited range of products, and not those of high production priority 
or those which were the object of sustained anti-liberalisation pressure. 
Liberalised commodities included lemons (which involved a small pro­
duction area and even fewer farmers), soya beans and feed grains (which 
the Japanese needed cheaply and in very large quantities). As far as the 
latter two products were concerned, even an approximation of self- 
sufficiency was an impossible goal, and production began declining even 
before liberalisation took place.
Grapefruit was the exception, but even here, the mechanism of 'half 
liberalisation' was applied, with tariff barriers to some extent replacing 
quantitative import restrictions. Those commodities subject to both 
production priority and anti-liberalisation movements from the farmers are 
still under quota restriction. The response of the Japanese government 
under external pressure from the US, Australia and New Zealand, has been 
to grant quota increases, but not to abolish the quotas themselves. For 
Japan's overseas agricultural suppliers, these are only limited and 
temporary victories.
(c) Self-sufficiency
Another provision of the 1961 Agricultural Basic Law (Article 8) 
states that 'The Government shall prepare and publish long-term pro­
jections of demand and production of major agricultural products'.^
1 Ibid. , p.3.
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These long-term supply projections in agricultural products have 
assumed the nature of production or self-sufficiency targets. It is 
widely acknowledged that the targets are often set at optimistically 
high levels given the objective constraints on agricultural production 
in Japan.^ They constitute a MAF rationale for measures under Article 
9 of the Law which states that: ’the State is to take measures necessary
to develop and equip the agricultural production base, to increase 
capital equipment, to readjust agricultural production and so forth,
taking into consideration the long-term projections mentioned in . . .
2the preceding Article’.
In other words, these long-term projections are justification for 
the sort of assistance mentioned in Article 9 which requires substantial 
government financial outlays to agriculture. Self-sufficiency therefore 
contributes to the general policy justification for budgetary subsidies 
to the farm sector. There is in consequence, a considerable MAF 
bureaucratic stake in these long-term projections, and substantial 
liberalisation would place them under serious challenge. Nothing short 
of a reversal of traditional MAF policy and budgetary rationale would be 
required.
Logically enough, the desire to maximise self-sufficiency in food is 
quoted as the official policy justification for the maintenance of import 
barriers, particularly since the early 1970s when supply crises brought 
the question of the nation's food supplies to national attention.
The self-sufficiency target set by MAF in 1975 for beef by 1985 
was 81 per cent. This has since been revised downwards to 71 per cent 
by 1990.
2 —  —  —’Nogyo Kihonho’, op. cit., p.3.
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The worldwide grain shortage beginning in mid-1972 and continuing 
through into 1973 as a result of reduced harvests in both the USSR and 
the US, gave rise to huge increases in the prices of cereals and feed- 
stuffs. It also brought forth ominous projections about future world 
shortages in the supply of staple foods and sparked off a renewed sense 
of unease about Japan’s capabilities for feeding its own large popu­
lation. This was reinforced by the fact that Japan's self-sufficiency 
ratio in rice had fallen to 92 per cent in 1972 as a result of the 
government's rice production reduction and conversion policies, and by 
1973, government rice stocks had fallen to their lowest levels for four 
years or more. Curtailment of rice production had succeeded to the 
point where the country's rice surplus had almost been completely 
eliminated, and domestic production and consumption were once again in 
rough balance. In the event of an exceptionally bad harvest, it was 
conceivable that Japan might even have to import rice. The principal 
effect of the global shortage of cereals on government rice policy was 
the subsequent abandonment of production adjustment targets and a policy 
emphasis away from restricting rice production.
These events were followed in 1973 by a temporary US embargo on 
soya bean exports which demonstrated the measure of Japanese dependence 
on a single supply source for this staple item in their diet. Although 
the embargo was shortlived, its psychological effects endured. It 
served to strengthen a growing sense of national vulnerability to 
fluctuations in the supply of foodstuffs. It combined with the oil 
crisis which followed the October 1973 Middle East War to create a 
certain 'seige mentality' which easily carried over from one policy 
sphere (that of energy supply) into another - food supply. The situation 
prompted further re-examination of Japan's reliance on overseas imports
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for a significant part of her food needs, particularly as Japan’s 
production of non-rice grains had reached an all-time low in 1973.
These constituted a substantial proportion of its food imports. The 
overall self-sufficiency ratio for total Japanese food production had 
also dropped sharply from 80 per cent in 1969 to the lowest-ever figure 
of 71 per cent in that same year.
The Japanese attachment to food autarky or self-sufficiency did 
not, however, originate in these historical events of the early 1970s.
It had long been in existence as one of the critical tenets of postwar 
Japanese agricultural policy, and was embodied in the Agricultural Basic 
Law itself. It was also part of the rationale for the government's farm 
incomes policy. Massive support from government was necessary to insu­
late the Japanese farmer from the effects of the decline in agriculture 
relative to other sectors of the national economy and to preserve agri­
culture as a viable industry. The latter was necessary to ensure the 
nation's food security. Apart from purely political considerations, the 
official reasoning behind the MAF farm incomes policy was, therefore, 
based on more than social policy considerations. It also took into 
account the objective on which there was a national consensus: that
the destruction of Japanese agriculture should be averted, and the 
role and status of those engaged in it assured. This notion 
was contained in the preamble to the Agricultural Basic Law itself.
Furthermore, there were several key policy developments which took 
place prior to the events of mid-1972 onwards, which related directly 
to the question of Japanese domestic farm production versus agricultural 
imports. The theme of self-sufficiency as a fundamental goal of 
Japanese agricultural policy was postulated in a high-level report issued 
by the Round Table Conference on Agricultural Problems Arising from
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Internationalisation (of the Japanese economy) (Kokusaika ni taiö 
shita Nögyö Mondai Kondankai) . This conference, first launched in 
1970 by the Chairman of Keidanren and the Chairman of the National 
Chamber of Agriculture, represented the meeting of minds of represent­
atives from the economic world and the agricultural world. They were 
anxious to mesh the seeming contradictions between the interests of 
big business, which were more inclined to respond favourably to inter­
national pressures for a relaxation of Japanese trade restrictions 
(and in 1970 it appeared as if liberalisation was proceeding in high 
gear), and agriculturalists, who were demanding the modernisation and 
structural reform of Japanese agriculture in order to be able to com­
pete with overseas products. The Conference, which was acting as a 
semi-official advisor to government, endeavoured to establish a mutual 
understanding between these two conservative sections of Japanese 
society, and to find mutually acceptable solutions to the problems they 
faced.
The founding members of the Round Table Conference at the time of 
its first meeting in September 1970 numbered 18,"^  and included
These were: the Chairman of Keidanren, the President of the 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation, Chairman of the 
Asia Economic Research Institute, Chairman of the Board of Directors of 
Körin Chukin, a representative manager (daihyö kanji) of the Japan 
Committee for Economic Development, the Chairman of Zenhanren, a member 
of the Policy Committee of the Bank of Japan, a Tokyo University 
Professor, Chairman of the Keidanren Agricultural Problems Round Table 
Conference Committee, Chairman of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 
Chairman of the Overseas Technical Cooperation Corporation, Chairman of 
the Japanese Chamber of Agriculture, Assistant Representative Manager 
of the Japan Committee for Economic Development, Chairman of Mitsubishi 
Industries, Vice-Chairman of Keidanren, Chairman of Mitsui Industries, 
Chairman of Zenkören and the Chairman of Zenehu. This list is given in 
Anon., 'Kokusaika ni Taiö Shita Nögyö Mondai Kondankai' no Keii 
(Particulars of the Round Table Conference on Agricultural Problems 
Arising From Internationalisation), n.d. p.5.
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representatives from Keidanren, Nokyo, the Japanese Chamber of 
Agriculture, the Japan Committee for Economic Development, the Bank of 
Japan, Mitsui and Mitsubishi Companies and the academic world.
The Round Table Conference presented its second report in December
1971. In it was expressed a growing concern for the need to encourage
farmers to maintain agricultural output in order that Japan’s food
supply be met as much as possible by domestic producers. The report
stressed a number of themes: the issue of self-sufficiency in staple
foodstuffs particularly food grains; the importance of the stable supply
of these grains at stable prices by domestic producers; and the belief
that feeding the nation was a matter of 'national security'. It also
posed a new imperative for policy-makers: 'Japan must aim at complete
self-sufficiency in staple food supply',^ and in due recognition of
the valuable contribution of the farm population to the nation and of
2their role as a 'stabilising factor' in society, the maintenance of 
rural standards of living on a par with those in urban areas was 
acknowledged as a prime goal of agricultural policy. Much of this was 
repetition of the ideology of the Agricultural Basic Law, but it also 
demonstrated that the acquiesence of the big business world to these 
fundamental objectives, including the notion of self-sufficiency, had 
been ob tained.
The Conference was in part both a political and public relations 
exercise. Its participants represented the leadership strata of two 
major LDP supporting groups, and it was inevitable that they should
See Haruhiro Fukui, 'The Japanese Farmer and Politics', in Isaiah 
Frank (ed.), The Japanese Economy in International Perspective, The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, London and Baltimore, 1974, p.144.
2 Ibid.
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place importance on the role of the farmers as a conservative and 
'politically stabilising' force in the community. Big business 
recognised the strategic necessity for preserving the rural population 
as a reliable source of LDP voting support, because successive con­
servative governments had provided the stability vital for rapid 
economic growth.
The content of this December 1971 report and its timing was also 
significant. The LDP had suffered setbacks in the Lower House elections 
of 1967 and 1969, and in the most recent June 1971 elections, when a 
number of long-held conservative seats had been lost to JSP candidates. 
The grapefruit liberalisation issue was in part blamed for this, 
particularly as it followed hard on the heels of rice production cut­
backs and deferrals in producer rice price increases. All these policies 
had provoked unprecedented opposition from the farmers and this had 
worried the LDP. Adverse political repercussions in the form of 
significant anti-government feeling amongst the farmers appeared to be 
emerging at the polls. The government's new attitude towards self- 
sufficiency in foodstuffs, particularly rice, which was further 
developed as part of official policy in 1972^ had its roots in these 
political and electoral considerations.
The pattern of organisational collaboration and mutual consultation 
between big business and agricultural group representatives which began 
in 1970, continued with annual Round Table Conferences and reports.
These groups found common cause in the issue of self-sufficiency and in 
the importance of shoring up the LDP's electoral fortunes, both of which
See the White Paper on Agriculture for Fiscal 1972 and the Nihon 
Keizai Shinbun, April 11, June 4, 1972, reported in ibid., p.165.
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contributed to a subtle reorientation in the attitude of big business 
towards the farm sector during this period. It is indicative that 
these earlier voices in support of higher levels of self-sufficiency 
were directed towards staple grain commodities, in particular rice, 
which carried more political and electoral significance than any other 
agricultural commodity. This further substantiates the underlying 
political origins of the resurgent self-sufficiency doctrine.
It was at this juncture that Japan's supply crises of the early 
1970s intervened and gave new impetus to the notion of maximising 
domestic food production. These external factors substantially reversed 
the swing towards further agricultural trade liberalisation by providing 
powerful ammunition to the growing self-sufficiency lobby. The task of 
ensuring a stable food supply to the nation, whether from external or 
domestic sources, was elevated to a critical tenet of national security 
policy. The self-sufficiency doctrine conveniently rationalised an 
ideology of agricultural protectionism against those foreign imports 
which Japanese producers wished to exclude from domestic markets, while 
at the same time, providing support for the notion of developing 
diversified sources of supply. The latter policy applied to those 
commodities which Japanese farmers had by and large stopped producing, 
like soya beans, feed grains and wheat.
What was only nascent in the period from 1970 to 1972- the 'national 
obsession with food self-sufficiency '^ '-became full-blown from 1973 
onwards. The timing of these policy developments, however, is fairly 
crucial to an understanding of the 'political' source of the self- 
sufficiency doctrine. The doctrine itself, far from being merely
 ^ Longworth, 'Institutions and Policies Influencing Japanese Beef 
Imports', op. oit., p.4.
supported by farm lobbyist groups, was originally propagated by agri­
cultural organisations (in concert with big business groups) who 
wished to find policy justification for a rice surplus and the restor­
ation of rice production as a prime imperative of agricultural policy.
This is supported by the emphasis given to particular farm products 
under the policy in the name of improving self-sufficiency ratios. The 
selection of certain commodities for expansion and protection is 
explainable more in political than in economic terms. Given that 100 
per cent self-sufficiency in foodstuffs is an impossible goal for Japan, 
and in view of the policy orientation towards ’selective expansion' 
embodied in the 1961 Agricultural Basic Law, it is logical that some 
agricultural commodities should be given priority over others, especially 
those in increasing demand. The self-sufficiency policy is, however, 
actively directed towards two very contentious, but at the same time, 
politically significant, areas of production: rice and livestock
products.
Japan is, on current harvests, more than 100 per cent self- 
sufficient in rice. Production consistently exceeds demand each year.
The emphasis given to maintaining this ratio and even expanding pro­
duction under the self-sufficiency policy at tremendously high cost in 
price support and storage subsidies, has been justified in terms of the 
need to establish a rice 'stockpile' situation. The terminology has 
thus been adapted to the post-energy crisis situation: the policy is 
now one of 'building-up buffer stocks' as 'emergency stores', a policy 
directive similar to that used in the case of oil. Official reasoning 
points to the fact that since rice is one of the few agricultural 
products in which Japan is completely self-sufficient, it should be 
promoted under the self-sufficiency policy as a means of increasing
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Japan’s reserve stock of grain food. The chief financial beneficiaries 
of this policy, however, are the Nokyo warehouses which stockpile the 
rice as government agents under the Food Control system, and which 
receive sizable commissions for their services, and the farmers who 
have also benefited from the substantial increases in producer rice 
prices since 1973. Rice growing has once again, and in spite of all 
the policy upheavals of the late 1960s and early 1970s,become one of the 
most profitable ventures in farming. The result has been an upswing in 
rice production since 1974, with a costly surplus build-up once more an 
expensive reality.
There is a second contradiction in the self-sufficiency policy 
which points to the political basis of targets selected for Japanese 
protectionism. The emphasis on maintaining and increasing the supply 
ratios for livestock products actually undermines Japan's overall self- 
sufficiency capability by increasing its need for imported feed grains.
The Japanese government is not, however, exhorting its farmers to pro­
duce these in much larger quantities, because of their availability on 
the international market at prices considerably below Japanese domestic 
prices. Moreover, production and price support measures for these 
products are not a political priority amongst the farmers and Nokyo.
Conclusion
In the liberalisation issue, perhaps as much as in the case of the 
rice surplus and FCSA deficit problem, the Japanese government was under 
domestic economic and fiscal pressure, but policies concerning the 
abolition of agricultural import quotas also involved questions of 
international trade, particularly Japan's trading relationship with the 
US. The fundamental issue at stake, however, related to the confrontation
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between the forces of economic rationalism and the forces of agri­
culturally vested interest. For the time being the latter hold sway, 
although there was a period in the late 1960s and early 1970s when this 
superior position was placed under serious challenge. The supply crises 
of the early 1970s ensured their renewed predominance at least until 
1980. They also made a significant contribution to the ideology of 
protectionism. By arguing for the maintenance and increase of self- 
support ratios on the grounds that this contributed to national security, 
the advocates of protectionism were able to tap a valuable source of 
policy legitimisation. If the promotion of sectional interests by 
pressure groups in Japan is not regarded as strictly legitimate, then 
the opposite is also true: the phraseology of ’national interest'
automatically raises policy requests above the level of selfish group 
interests. In spite of the elevated terminology, however, the self- 
sufficiency doctrine remains a policy veneer for government commitment 
to the policy goals of the farm lobby, and one of the most officially 
acceptable rationales for maintaining and increasing MAF budgetary 
allocations in the name of raising production levels in the farm sector.
To those who would argue that consumer pressure, possible changes 
of government, financial common sense, foreign trade demands and the 
changing structure of farm population must in the end prevail, it should 
be pointed out that the political barriers that need to be overcome 
are enormous. Supporters of agricultural trade liberalisation 'are up 
against a complex of legal, policy and institutional barriers which 
provide the necessary backing to the protectionist argument'.^
1 George., op. cit. , p.24.
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Opening up the Japanese market to overseas fruit and livestock 
commodities would require overturning the whole bureaucratic system 
governing the importation of these farm products, a revision of long­
term MAF production goals and a reversal of current agricultural 
trade policies.
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CONCLUSION
Nokyo has been portrayed in this thesis as a monolithic farmers' 
group which dominates the representation of agricultural interests in 
Japan. It does so for reasons which are largely electorally-based, 
and by means which hinge primarily on party-political connections.
While Nokyo is not a political group (seiji dccntai) in terms of 
organisational type, patently, it conducts political, electoral and 
policy-related activities in addition to carrying out its more fund­
amental cooperative objectives.
Nokyo's economic, business and financial functions have expanded 
at a spectacular rate in the last two decades in a way which has to a 
degree parallelled the rapid growth of the Japanese economy. It can no 
longer be dismissed (as it was by Ishida) as one of the weaker interest 
groups which benefited from minor concessions on subsidies and agricultural 
prices, while major national policies continued to be attuned to the 
interests of big business. Developments in the 1960s and 1970s seriously 
challenge this thesis. Nokyo demands attention as an economic power 
in its own right, as the equivalent in the agricultural sector of the 
giants of Japanese industry. As Nokyo has assumed more of the features 
of a keivetsu, it has begun to encroach on big business areas of 
political support, such as electoral funding.
Ishida's writings on Nokyo were influenced by conditions in the 
early postwar reconstruction period, when the agricultural cooperatives 
were undergoing a shared experience of rehabilitation and economic 
consolidation, along with the nation's secondary and tertiary industries.
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As productivity in industry rapidly outstripped that in agriculture 
from the 1950s onwards, however, the government was faced with the 
urgent problem of ensuring that farm incomes could rise in step 
with incomes in other sectors. The problem was specifically 
recognised in the Agricultural Basic Law and was met by successive 
LDP governments’ agricultural pricing policies falling into two 
major categories. Prices for some products (especially rice) were 
subsidised so that farmers received a price higher than the on-farm 
equivalent of the consumer price. In the case of some other products 
(e.g. meat, fruits), imports were controlled and tariffs and/or levies 
imposed to ensure that the domestic market prices would rise sufficiently 
to return farmers a payable price through the market mechanism.
Originating largely in social welfare and electoral considerations, 
the LDP’s farm incomes policy has been remarkably successful in 
supporting a relatively prosperous agricultural sector and a standard 
of living amongst farmers comparable with that of urban workers. It 
has been so successful in fact that it has inhibited more fundamental 
structural changes in farm production (also an aim of the Agricultural 
Basic Law) which sought to reduce disparities in income and productivity 
between agriculture and other sectors of the economy by encouraging the 
out-migration of farmers, the consolidation of farm plots and expansion 
in the scale of production. Japan’s farmers have remained closely 
attached to the land,and since policies of price support have combined 
with opportunities for off-farm work to enable farm families generally 
to achieve income parity with non-farm families, such policies have 
helped maintain structural inefficiencies in Japanese agriculture, 
inhibiting for example the sale of farm land to enable the scale of 
operation to be enlarged. Of course, this 'dear food policy' has been
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possible only because the general level of economic prosperity has 
resulted in average incomes high enough to afford the high food 
prices which are frequently several times import parity.
Although spokesmen groups for Japan's industrialists (Keidanren 
and Keizai Doyukai) have on occasions been in the forefront of public 
protests about agricultural support prices (particularly rice and 
beef), the system remains entrenched, and the number of commodities 
subject to price stabilisation laws continues to increase. As more 
and more agricultural products have become subject to ministerial 
intervention and processes of political negotiation between government 
and the farmers, the involvement of Nokyo in the policy process has 
deepened and pricing decisions have become even more politicised.
In yet another field - that of trade liberalisation - the interests 
of the farm sector also appear to have prevailed. Here there has been 
a clash of interest between the Japanese corporate world, attached to 
the notion of the international division of labour and the securing 
of cheap, reliable sources of supply, and domestic farm producers 
anxious to protect their high-cost industry from cheaper foreign imports. 
Quota restrictions have been maintained on politically sensitive 
products such as beef, dairy products, fruit juice and oranges, and 
tariffs and levies imposed or retained on these and other farm products 
which have been ostensibly liberalised, even where these measures have 
jeopardised Japan's wider trading relationships with nations such as 
the US and Australia. To some extent the halt in progressive Japanese 
agricultural trade liberalisation which took place in 1973 was also due 
to the supply crises of the 1970s, which prompted a re-evaluation of 
policies relating to the provision of strategic resource materials and 
the security of food supplies. Staple items such as food grains, feed
grains and soya beans were in this category. There was thus a timely 
coincidence between the dictates of agricultural protectionism and 
those of national security. Neither Japan's industrialists nor the 
public at large are immune to appeals for the need to preserve domestic 
food production and to secure reliable overseas sources of essential 
supplies.
The late 1960s and 1970s have also witnessed a decline in the 
electoral popularity of the LDP, a process which has registered much 
more strongly in urban areas, but which has also been apparent in the 
LDP’s traditional support base in the countryside. The result has 
been an even greater rural/agricultural bias amongst the conservatives. 
Although there is no specific agrarian party in Japan, the LDP’s 
identification with the rural sector has strengthened rather than 
weakened over the past two decades. Continuing support of the farmers 
has been the key factor enabling the LDP to hold on to power. In spite 
of the gradual contraction of the agricultural sector, farmers continue 
to represent a sufficiently important group within rural, semi-rural and 
even some urban electorates not to be ignored. The calculations in 
Chapter 4 with respect to the size of the national Nokyo electorate 
demonstrate that the number of votes theoretically within the scope of 
the agricultural cooperative system still represents a significant 
proportion of the national vote. It has been suggested elsewhere"*" that 
changes in the rural environment such as the increasing diversification 
of the occupations and interests of farmers could be expected to reduce 
the effectiveness of Nokyo vote control. Absence of marked changes in
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Representative', in Peter Drysdale and Hironobu Kitaoji (eds.), Australia 
and Japan: Two Societies and Their Interaction, Canberra, ANU Press,
forthcoming.
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the numbers of Nokyo Diet members or farm politicians with electoral 
connections to the cooperatives, however, provides little support for 
this hypothesis. Having displaced prewar buraku-centred power 
structures as the primary mechanism of political recruitment and vote 
mobilisation in the countryside, the agricultural cooperative 
leadership forms one of the core groupings in local political elites, 
a role which is considerably enhanced by the semi-administrative status 
of Nokyo as a distributor of Treasury subsidies. There have been no 
significant changes in the structure of Japan's party system, forms of 
local party organisation or personal political support groups which could 
challenge this system. Agricultural cooperative leaders, either in 
their capacity as Nokyo officials or holders of public office, continue 
to engage in and sponsor both formal and informal electoral support 
activities. Nokyo not only relies on the residual importance of the 
farm vote going to the government party to extract special policy 
considerations for agriculture and the cooperatives, but it actively 
intervenes in the electoral process in order to place political supporters 
in positions where they can most effectively influence policy formation.
Nokyo's political connections are not exclusively tied to the 
conservatives as was shown in Chapters 3 and 4; nor are constituencies 
which farm politicians represent the exclusive preserve of the LDP.
The predominant pat terns of political alignment amongst Nokyo's political 
allies in the Diet (whatever their criteria of identification), is 
majority-conservative/minority-socialist. The same proportion of 
political support is evident amongst voting patterns in rural and semi- 
rural districts. The diverse political beliefs and relationships 
encompassed within the agricultural cooperative system preclude a uniform 
attachment to any political groupings; it also prevents Nokyo from
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operating as a centralised electoral machine and has on occasion been 
a source of internal political disunity. Cross-cutting cleavages 
within the agricultural cooperative organisation (identified in 
Chapter 2) have become more evident in the last decade or so as Nokyo's 
financial and business involvements have multiplied and the proportion 
of rice to non-rice products in total agricultural production has 
declined. Moves to liberalise agricultural commodities selected for 
production expansion also encouraged specialist cooperatives to 
supplement the central spokesmen groups of Nokyo with an organised 
strategy of response in defence of their own interests. This was 
particularly true of Nichienren and the prefectural fruit cooperative 
organisation in Ehime as was pointed out in Chapter 6.
An examination of agricultural policy content was not central to 
the study: it was interpreted largely in relation to Nokyo's own 
interests and demands. If one were to sum up trends in agricultural 
policy in the last three decades, the most striking feature would be 
lack of change, suggesting that there is a great deal of immobilism in 
Japanese agricultural policy. The one major turning point was the 
passage of the Agricultural Basic Law in 1961 which inaugurated the 
government's farm incomes policy. Later developments which appeared at 
the time as fundamental redirections in agricultural policy proved to 
be largely ineffectual in coping with the long-term problem of 
structural adjustment in agriculture. These included the initiation of 
a Comprehensive Agricultural Policy, the reforms in FC which partially 
liberalised the sale of rice and the‘institution of 'voluntary' 
production adjustment (backed by substantial financial incentives) aimed 
at curtailing rice production. Measures taken during the period 
reviewed in Chapter 5 did remarkably little to reduce the dimensions of the
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problem of excess rice production and massive deficits in budgetary 
allocations to rice control. Japan's agricultural policy-makers are 
still faced with the task of discouraging rice production and 
increasing land mobility. The substantial barriers to change are 
endemic to the system and have their roots in political and electoral 
factors. The rice price campaign, for example, although it contains 
a large element of ritual, continues to carry political weight.
It is a display of mass farmer solidarity which farm politicians, 
particularly those within the government party, cannot afford to ignore. 
This group is not a diminishing voice within the LDP; as a proportion 
of total government party membership it is becoming larger. It operates 
to greatest effect within internal party policy-making organs concerned 
with agriculture. Its role here is to amend political policies which 
originate from the MAF. This can be measured in finite terms in the 
form of the 'political addition' made by the party to agricultural 
support prices annually reviewed by the Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry. In this process, even the MAF itself cannot be thought of as 
an entirely independent and 'rational' arbiter between the LDP and the 
farmers. It frequently acts as policy advocate in order to promote 
its own vested interests. The desire to maximise the- share of the 
national budget allocated to agriculture and forestry is an objective 
it shares with Nokyo and the farmers, although there may be major 
differences over funding for particular projects. Vis-a-vis the MOF 
on budgetary matters therefore, the MAF and Nokyo have broadly speaking 
identical goals, although in the one-to-one relationship between the 
MAF and Nokyo, agricultural cooperative leaders are in a subordinate 
position as petitioners who come in request of subsidies and special 
concessions. The degree of financial dependence of Nokyo on government,
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however, has declined notably in recent years as the cooperatives have 
consolidated their own economic power base and the contribution of FC 
to Nokyo finances has declined as a proportion of its total operations.
The role of MAF as policy advocate has been increasingly 
apparent not only in the terminology of MAF spokesmen and official 
publications, but also in the public pronouncements of whatever politician 
dons the hat of the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, particularly 
in the area of agricultural trade liberalisation. References to self- 
sufficiency and the notion of food security are constant. The MAF has 
emerged as arch-protectionist, and the ideology of protectionism has 
been built into production policies in the form of self-sufficiency 
targets. The vested interests not only of Japan’s farmers but also 
of its agricultural and forestry bureaucracy are an additional obstacle 
to change quite independently of party-political and electoral considerations.
The factor of immobilism in Japanese agricultural policy is thus 
due to a complex of interrelated causes. An adequate explanation of the 
barriers to change cannot be found in the analysis of production constraints, 
demand estimates for farm products or market conditions. An exclusive 
concentration on economic factors might lead one to suppose that the 
’irrationalism’ inherent in Japanese agricultural policy is easily 
susceptible to change as a result of the application of ’rational’ 
economic solutions. Changing agricultural policy in Japan, however, is 
not a matter of manipulating a few administrative variables, nor is it 
an area where a free market situation is likely to be possible if 
Japanese agriculture is to survive. This may be difficult to understand 
for analysts of the Australian scene where agricultural policies are 
basically ones of non-interference, but the Australian is the absolute 
antithesis of the Japanese situation. Economic pressures in Japan are
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certainly important, but whenever there has been a direct clash between 
economic and political imperatives in agricultural policy formation 
(as in the debate over FC reform and agricultural trade liberalisation), 
political arguments have predominated. This has been true even when 
domestic economic pressures and strong representations from Japanese 
financial and business interests have been reinforced by external trade 
and diplomatic pressures from Japan's major trading partners. The 
Japanese government is well aware of the factors which contribute to its 
high cost farm industry, but this is not a policy area where normal 
economic arguments apply. Its response in the face of exogenous pressure 
has been to institute a series of palliatives (in the form of enlarged 
import quotas), but there has been, so far, a steadfast refusal to 
implement systemic change. The latter is prevented by political barriers 
created by the strength and complexity of established agricultural 
interests with effective political clout. The restructuring of Japanese 
agriculture can only be attempted within the restrictive boundaries of 
what is politically acceptable to Japanese farmers. For a number of 
reasons, Japan's farmers are in a strategic position to influence farm 
policy to a striking degree. It has been the aim of this thesis to spell 
out the institutions and structures through which this power is exercised.
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